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ABSTRACT 
 
Should the securities regulation of Ontario venture issuers be based primarily on rules or 
principles? Advocates for rules argue that detailed rules, with predictable meaning and scope, 
allow participants to focus on matters other than compliance.   Advocates for principles argue 
that when an activity is complex, such as securities trading, detailed rules can become a 
confusing web, obscuring core values and discouraging creative solutions.  
The rules and principles literature is reviewed, along with the topics of risk-based, responsive, 
outcomes oriented and proportionate regulation. Governance theory is addressed and various 
compliance theories are discussed.  From this, eight factors are gleaned to assess where along the 
rules/principles continuum a particular area of regulation should lie: (i) Is there a shared 
understanding of regulatory principles within the community being regulated? (ii) Are the 
regulated committed to the public interest?  (iii) Are the regulated able to find analogous 
solutions? (iv) Are there institutions or actors which promote regulatory collaboration? (v) Do 
the regulated see enforcement as fair and effective? (vi) Are regulatory issues predictable? (vii) 
Should historical transactions be disclosed? and (viii) Should future projections be disclosed?  
These factors are then explored with a survey of 175 managers of venture issuers, followed by 
in-depth consultations with six experts in the industry and by a consideration of other matters.  
The assessment of the eight factors suggests that in some respects, principles could be effective 
for Ontario venture issuers since they are more flexible and can adapt to the changing 
complexities of securities regulation.  However, principles-based regulation requires a shared 
understanding of, and commitment to, regulatory principles, and the answers given by many of 
the respondents to the survey and the discussions with the six experts consulted suggest that 
more work needs to be done before principles-based regulation could be effective. 
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Introduction to the Research Question 
 
Should the securities regulation of Ontario “venture issuers” be based primarily on rules or 
principles? Venture issuers are small– and medium– sized enterprises—“SMEs”—which sell 
securities to the public on the Toronto Venture Exchange or the Canadian National Stock 
Exchange.
1
 There is a debate among Canadian securities regulators as to whether detailed, 
prescriptive rules should be published with known, after–the–fact penalties (a “rules approach”), 
or whether securities regulators should publish salutary objectives and engage participants in a 
before–the–fact, best practices dialogue (a “principles approach”). The Ontario Securities 
Commission (OSC) shifted towards rules in 1995 in response to the Ainsley case, and further in 
2004 by adopting detailed rules based on the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“US SOx”), with some 
exemptions for venture issuers. In contrast, the BC Commission (BCSC) proposed a principles–
based Securities Act in 2004, with a simplified, plain language rulebook with an overarching 
                                                 
1
 “Venture issuer” is defined in the Canadian Securities Administrators’ National Instrument 52–
100 as a company or trust which publicly trades its securities but is not quoted on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange, a U.S. marketplace, or a marketplace outside of Canada and the United States 
of America.  
Venture issuers are a subset of small and medium enterprises, “SME”, which have been 
variously studied in the corporate and tax context according to their total annual sales, total value 
of capital assets and/or number of employees. Industry Canada defines SMEs as companies with 
up to 500 employees and annual sales of less than $50 million. (Nicol and Heidrick 2002) 
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“Code of Conduct” of twenty–eight general principles. The proposed national securities regulator 
(declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada in December 2011) was intended to 
be principles–based. 
This paper begins by examining the context of the research question—it reviews the 
rules/principles debate among Canadian securities regulators, some background facts about 
Ontario venture issuers, the opinions of various expert reports, and the academic literature 
regarding rules and principles generally. Eight factors are developed in chapter three to assess 
whether rules or principles are better for a particular field of regulation. These factors are then 
applied to Ontario venture issuers with a web-based survey of 175 managers of venture issuers 
discussed in chapters four and five, followed with in-depth consultations with six experts in the 
industry discussed in chapter six, and by a consideration of other matters.  By assessing the 
regulation of venture issuers according to the eight factors developed in chapter three, the debate 
shifts from a philosophical discussion about how laws should be written in general (rules or 
principles?) to an empirical question about which language strategy is best in the particular 
context of Ontario venture issuers.  
The Context of the Research Question – chapter one 
Chapter one notes that the OSC has had detailed policy statements for many years, then shifted 
towards rules in 1995 in response to the Ainsley case, and towards more detailed rules in 2004 in 
response to US Sarbanes Oxley regulations.  To illustrate how complex Ontario securities 
regulations have become, a table is presented comparing Ontario securities regulation with the 
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Canadian Income Tax Act, the Ontario Employment Standards Act, the Ontario Business 
Corporations Act, the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and part of the U.K. Financial Services 
Authority Handbook.  Although the Ontario Securities Act, as a statute, is of average complexity, 
various rules published by the Ontario Commission are as detailed as the notoriously complex 
Income Tax Act.  
Chapter one reviews the British Columbia and federal proposals for principles–based regulation 
and summarizes the recommendations of various Canadian expert studies, including the 1979 
Federal Proposals, the 1993 Ontario Task Force Report, the 1994 Ontario Securities Commission 
proposals, the 2002 Wise Person’s Committee, the 2006 Crawford Report, and the 2009 Expert 
Panel.  Chapter one situates the rules/principles debate within the context of other regulatory 
concerns. It identifies the importance and regulatory challenges of venture issuers generally and 
then narrows the discussion to the regulatory risks of junior mining exploration in particular, 
which comprise the majority of ventures listed on the TSX Venture exchange.  Chapter one 
summarizes some of the more important securities rules which affect venture issuers and the cost 
of securities regulation. It describes the competition among Canadian and foreign regulators to 
attract venture issuers to their markets, and it assesses the argument that securities disclosure can 
be a “public good”.  
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Literature Review – chapter two 
Chapter two is a literature review regarding the rules and principles debate, generally. The debate 
illustrates two competing philosophies of law. One philosophy is that rules which 
comprehensively regulate behaviour makes law predictable, less discretionary, and easier to 
enforce. Advocates for rules say that they enhance certainty because outcomes are proscribed ex 
ante—that clearly expressed rules, with predictable meaning and scope, reduces administrative 
discretion and allow participants to focus on matters other than compliance. Critics argue that 
despite their apparent simplicity, rules often require knowledge of their underlying purpose. For 
example: a traffic sign might say “no standing”—the obvious (unstated) purpose is that it applies 
to vehicles and not to pedestrians.  There are risks with detailed rules, especially if the field of 
activity faces unpredictable change. With rules, the regulated can develop a check–list mentality. 
Rather than taking responsibility for assessing risks, they mechanically follow bright-line 
standards. 
Principles–based regulation is grounded on the philosophy that when an activity is complex, such 
as securities trading, detailed rules can evolve into a confusing web, obscuring core values and 
discouraging creative solutions. The ingredients for effective principles–based regulation are 
reviewed in chapter two. For example, principles must be clearly communicated and the 
regulator and regulated should collaborate, so that the development of principles is coherent. A 
critique of principles–based regulation is presented, including the view that broad principles 
gives the regulator too much power to interpret compliance after-the-fact, risking arbitrary 
enforcement. 
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Chapter two situates the debate about rules and principles within the discussion of “risk–based”, 
“outcomes–oriented”, “responsive” and “proportionate” regulations. Although these topics don’t 
easily map onto the principles/rules debate, the best language strategy for securities regulation is 
one which addresses these regulatory goals. 
Chapter two discusses various theories of why the regulated do (or do not) comply with the 
law—the incentive motive, the reason-driven motive, the social identity motive, the justice 
motive and the citizenship motive. One aspect of the incentive motive, which rules-based 
regulation is often based on, is deterrence theory—the argument that individuals and 
corporations are self–interested and will “rationally” bend or break rules, unless the amount and 
probability of the penalty is clearly prescribed. A related theory is reviewed—that regulators can 
engineer social compliance by enforcing clearly stated rules with predictable penalties greater 
than the expected gain from the wrongful activity. A critique of deterrence theory is then 
presented—that individuals and companies can have other motives, often with greater influence 
than reward and punishment; motives such as status, influence and fame. The discussion of the 
reason-driven motive, the social identity motive, the justice motive and the citizenship motive 
leads into a discussion of governance theories, including management-based regulation and an 
assessment of new governance.  
Chapter two discusses special considerations when regulating conflicts of interest. Conflicts can 
arise in many ways, both financial and social. Venture issuer managers often make transactions 
between the issuer and themselves or with related parties. Is self–dealing better controlled by 
rules or principles? Also, a discussion of two accounting methods—the “historical cost model” 
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and the “mark to market model”—is presented; the former is more rules–based and effective in 
some situations; the latter is more principles–based and effective in other situations.  
A comparison of the use of rules-based and principles-based regulation in other fields are 
reviewed—income tax compliance, accounting standards, the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Act, and some other regulated fields.  The review illustrates the theories of 
compliance and governance discussed and identifies some of the factors for effective regulation. 
Chapter two describes how some academics have rejected the bipolar, either/or, debate between 
rules or principles, and have argued that different areas of regulation should lie on different 
points along a continuum from rules on one end to principles on the other. For example, in 
securities law, Cristie Ford
2
 argues that periodic and prospectus disclosure should be rules–
based, with uniform document presentation, so that investors can efficiently compare similar 
circumstances. Principles should be used where a flexible approach is needed to ensure good 
corporate conduct; for example, material fact and material change disclosure, which can arise in 
unanticipated ways, should be principles–based.3  
Factors to consider on continuum of rules to principles – chapter three 
Chapter three draws from the literature review in chapter two and advances what has been 
missing in the literature—a series of factors for assessing where along the rules/principles 
                                                 
2
 (Expert Panel on Securites Regulation 2009) 
3
 (Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation, A Research Study 2009). 
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continuum a particular area of regulation should lie. Regulation is a form of communication. 
Different communities will have different experiences and cultures requiring different language 
strategies, including different combinations of rules and principles. By analogy, consider the 
detail required in a cookbook. One for the beginner can assume knowledge of such terms as 
“boil”, “poach” or “garnish”, but ignorance of “braise”, “blanch” or “flambé”. Recipes for the 
beginner are more “rules–based” since tasks should be described in detail; those for the chef can 
be shorter and more “principles–based”.  
Knowledge of technical language is an important factor (for the chef, knowledge of food 
principles), but other factors are important too. The eight factors, gleaned from the literature 
review in chapter two, are these: (i) Is there a shared understanding of regulatory principles 
within the community being regulated? (ii) Are the regulated committed to the public interest?  
(iii) Are the regulated able to find analogous solutions? (iv) Are there institutions or actors which 
promote regulatory collaboration? (v) Do the regulated see enforcement as fair and effective? 
(vi) Are regulatory issues predictable? (vii) Should historical transactions be disclosed? and (viii) 
Should future projections be disclosed? 
The first factor is—is there a shared understanding of regulatory principles within the 
community being regulated?  As discussed in the literature review, regulatory communities can 
exist at a surface level or at a deep level. At a surface level, an interpretive or regulatory 
community might consist of only a shared “sociolinguistic register or understanding of 
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practices”. At a deep level, it might consist of “shared validity claims and normative 
commitments.”4   
The second factor is—are the regulated committed to the public interest, within the meaning of 
Ontario securities regulation?  Principles are more effective if the regulated wish to enhance their 
reputation among peers. Conversely, rules may be required where reputation is not valued and 
deterrence and the threat of punishment are necessary. The public interests protected by Ontario 
securities regulation are animated in part by the stated purposes of the Securities Act: “to provide 
protection to investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices” and “to foster fair and 
efficient capital markets and confidence in capital markets”.5   
The third factor reviewed is—are the regulated able to find analogous solutions? Problems in one 
field of regulation are often analogous to problems in another field, and those who can draw 
from related experiences are probably better at recognizing patterns and solving problems. In the 
literature review in chapter two, Shearing and Ericson describe how a community can apply rules 
consistently by evolving a shared storyline from varied experiences to explain how to act or 
decide in a particular situation. It can be a process of “mythological thinking”, “myth–making” 
or “poetic logic”. “People simply do not walk around with rules in their heads that they apply to 
situations in the midst of action”, suggest Shearing and Ericson.  Rather, knowledge is 
communicated through a culture by “analogous reasoning” from layered meanings in stories 
                                                 
4
 (Black, Regulatory Conversations 2002) p.179 
5
 Section 1.1 of the Ontario Securities Act, RSO R.S.O. 1990, Chapter S.5.   
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based on analogous experiences.  I argue that boards of directors that can draw from related 
fields are more likely to effectively manage the company when faced with complex issues. 
The fourth factor reviewed is—are there institutions which can promote regulatory 
collaboration? Principles–based regulation requires collaboration in order to flesh out the 
meaning of broad principles.   
The fifth factor reviewed is—do the regulated see enforcement as fair and effective?  In chapter 
two, Feld and Frey describe tax compliance as a psychological contract—the more that the 
taxpayers believe that the government is using their money to benefit their community, the 
greater is their compliance. Kahan argues that individuals who believe that others are paying 
their taxes will likely treat honest payment as a moral duty. The same “psychological contract” is 
probably true for securities law compliance.  
The sixth factor reviewed is—are regulatory issues predictable?  If a field of activity is complex, 
with unpredictable outcomes, detailed rules can obscure risk. In simple systems, with known 
risks, rules can have a predictable scope, allowing participants to focus on matters other than 
compliance.   
The seventh factor—should historical transactions be disclosed? As described under the topic 
“Accounting for Conflicts of Interest”, detailed rules can measure the conflict when a promoter 
solicits public funds for a company which is buying property indirectly from the promoter.  
Financial statements disclose historical transactions and, perhaps, can be rules-based.   
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The eighth factor—should future projections be disclosed?  Arguably, forecasts should lie at the 
principles–based end of the continuum, because they are subject to changing considerations.  
Survey of managers of venture issuers – chapters four and five 
The eight factors developed in chapter three are tested in chapters four and five with a voluntary, 
web-based survey of 175 managers of issuers listed on the TSX Venture exchange.  One email 
invitation was delivered to 1,581 TSX-V issuers.  A total of 133 respondents answered all of the 
questions and an additional 42 respondents answered some of the questions. In order to assess 
how representative the respondents’ were to the population of managers of venture issuers as a 
whole, a comparison with known qualities of the population are considered. 
Chapter five summarizes the results of the survey and other facts about venture issuers in order 
to address the eight factors identified in chapter three.  The most disturbing result of the survey 
was the commonly held view among respondents that promoters are primarily motivated by the 
short-term share price of the issuer’s shares, rather than the long-term value of their business or 
their reputation for ethics.  Also disturbing were deep level misunderstandings of many 
respondents regarding the principles which underlie securities regulation.   
Consultations with Six Experts 
Six industry experts were consulted by personal interview.  Each interview was in the nature of a 
conversation of approximately one hour each, initiated with open-ended questions, as opposed to 
a formal interview or survey.   
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The experts consulted, in alphabetical order, were: Ian Bandeen, Elaine Ellingham, Brian Prill, 
Edward Thompson, Michael White and Al Workman.  Thompson and Workman were chosen 
because of their extensive experience in the junior resource industry, which comprise the 
majority of venture issuers listed in Ontario.  Ellingham was chosen because of her knowledge of 
the TSX and TSX-V exchange.  Bandeen and Prill were chosen to gather insight about market 
intermediaries including the Exempt Market Dealers Association, and White was chosen to 
reflect the practical interests of one Exempt Market Dealer / Broker which has consistently raised 
capital for venture issuers over many years.  
The experts gave their opinions about the eight factors developed in chapter three, as well as 
opinions of a more general nature, such as whether or not Ontario securities regulations currently 
are, or should be, principles- or rules-based, what is the practical effect of the application of 
principles or rules in this industry, what mandatory paper disclosure should the regulator require 
for investors, how should market intermediaries be regulated, and should there be mandatory 
continuing education for those working in the industry?  These opinions were relied upon when 
formulating the summary and recommendation chapter of this paper. 
Summary and Recommendations – chapter seven 
The answer to the research question—should the securities regulation of Ontario venture issuers 
be based primarily on rules or principles?—is summarized in chapter seven.  It is not a simple 
choice of all principles or all rules in all cases.  Rather, the assessment of the eight factors 
suggests that in some respects, principles can be effective since they are more flexible and can 
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adapt to changing complexities of securities regulation.  However, principles-based regulation 
requires a shared understanding of, and commitment to, regulatory principles, and the answers 
given by many of the respondents to the survey and the discussions with the six experts suggest 
that more work needs to be done before principles-based regulation could be effective for 
venture issuers. 
Chapter six makes the following recommendations to improve securities regulation for Ontario 
venture issuers: (a) better education of market participants, (b) enforcement based on compliance 
motives, (c) regulators should encourage diversity on boards of directors and should accept 
analogous solutions from similar situations in other regulatory fields, (d) use rules for historical 
transactions and principles for ongoing disclosure and forecasting, and (e) simplify the private 
placement rules. 
Regardless of the assessment of the eight factors and how representative the survey respondents 
were, the value of this paper is that it develops eight factors to assess rules or principles.  It shifts 
the debate from a philosophical discussion about rules and principles generally to an empirical 
question about which language strategy is best in the particular context of Ontario venture 
issuers.  It could contribute to a new line of evidence-based inquiry.  
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Chapter 1: The Context of the Research Question 
 
This chapter begins with a review of the regulation of Ontario venture issuers and the OSC’s 
shift to more rules when rule-making authority was granted to the OSC in 1995. It assesses the 
relative complexity of Ontario securities rules by comparing them with the Canadian federal 
Income Tax Act, the Ontario Employment Standards Act, the Ontario Business Corporations Act, 
the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and part of the United Kingdom FSA Handbook. British 
Columbia’s proposed principles–based approach is reviewed, as well as the proposed Canadian 
national regulator’s principles–based securities regulation. The regulatory risks of venture issuers 
are discussed. The costs of securities regulation and the use of regulation to create a “public 
good” are addressed. The competition among regulators to attract issuers and various expert 
reports on securities regulation are reviewed.  
Regulation of Ontario venture issuers 
 
There are two major securities regulators for Ontario venture issuers: the OSC and the TSX-V 
Exchange.
6
  In my experience, as a solicitor with twenty years of practice, the most important 
OSC and TSX-V rules for venture issuers are the following: 
                                                 
6
 The Canadian National Stock Exchange is a relatively minor influence—only 1.3% of the TSX-
V capitalization. See note 408 at p. 207 
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National Instrument 45-106 provides exemptions from the requirement to file a prospectus with 
the OSC when an issuer sells or distributes securities.  The most common exemption used by 
venture issuers to avoid the cost of a prospectus (which can cost hundreds of thousands of 
dollars
7
) is the accredited investor exemption,
8
 which permits an issuer to sell shares without a 
prospectus to investors who meet defined wealth or income thresholds.
9
  If the accredited 
investor is given any document that purports to describe the business and affairs of the issuer, 
whether or not the document is called an “offering memorandum”, it must contain full disclosure 
and the investor has various rights of rescission, and damages against the issuer and any seller 
for a misrepresentation (which includes an omission of a material fact).
10
   
National Instrument 31-103 requires that only an “Exempt Market Dealer” can engage in, or be 
in the business of, advising or soliciting exempt investors.  The Exempt Market Dealer must be 
                                                 
7See “The Cost of Securities Regulation” at p.50 below 
8
 As to its use, see Table 6 at p.212 below 
9
 For individuals, the investor must certify that he or she, either alone or with a spouse, 
beneficially owns financial assets having an aggregate realizable value before taxes, but net of 
any related liabilities, exceeding $1 million, or whose net income before taxes exceeded 
$200,000 in each of the two most recent calendar years or whose net income before taxes 
combined with that of a spouse exceeded $300,000 in each of the two most recent calendar years 
and who, in either case, reasonably expects to exceed that net income level in the current 
calendar year. By National Instrument 45-102, the accredited investor will not be able to re-sell 
the shares for a period of four months.   
10
 Section 1 of the Ontario Securities Act defines an “offering memorandum” It must include a 
statement of the rights in section 130.1 of the Act.  A copy of the document must be filed the 
Commission. 
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registered with the OSC, pass the Canadian Securities Course, pass the Exempt Market Products 
Exam, have 12 months experience in the last 3 years, and meet various capital and compliance 
requirements.   
National Instrument 51-102 regulates continuous disclosure of venture (and other) issuers, to 
give investors continuous access to all material facts about the issuer via the public website 
www.sedar.com and National Instrument 55-102 requires insiders to publicly report their trades 
on the website www.sedi.ca.
11
 For mining issuers, National Instrument 43-101 requires that an 
independent Qualified Person supervise all technical statements on becoming a reporting issuer, 
on filing a non-POP prospectus, information circular, takeover bid, or “any other document that 
discloses for the first time resources or reserves on a property material to the issuer [with] a 100 
percent or greater change, from the most recently filed report...” National Instrument 51–101 
imposes similar disclosure requirements for oil and gas issuers.  
                                                 
11
 On July 29, 2011, the Canadian Securities Administrators published for comment Proposed 
National Instrument 51-103, which would tailor regulations for venture issuers. It would improve 
access to key information, eliminate less valuable disclosure obligations, and provide 
supplemental disclosure where relevant.  It would consolidate disclosure of the venture issuer's 
business, management, governance practices, audited annual financial statements, associated 
management's discussion and analysis (MD&A) and CEO/CFO certifications in a single 
document, the annual report. It would introduce substantive corporate governance requirements 
relating to conflicts of interest, related party transactions and insider trading.  It would require 
the delivery of disclosure documents only on request, in lieu of mandatory mailing requirements, 
and it would allow for the incorporation of public disclosure documents in certain kinds of 
exempt offerings. 
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Multilateral Instrument 61-101 regulates insider bids, issuer bids, business combinations, and 
related party transactions, and imposes minority shareholder approval and in some cases formal 
valuations in order to assess the fairness of these transactions.  As discussed below (“Controlling 
shareholders of venture issuers” at page 38), a significant percentage of Canada’s largest non–
financial public companies have controlling shareholders, or major shareholders, and so good 
policy in Canada regulates self-interested transactions of the controlling shareholders. 
The TSX Venture Exchange Corporate Finance Manual regulates venture issuers listed on its 
exchange, with policies regarding sponsorship by a broker, listing procedures, corporate 
governance, private placements, loans and bonuses, finder’s fees, shares for debt, and other 
matters.  The TSX-V manual is currently 791 pages in length, of which 341 pages are for the 
rules and 450 pages are for the associated forms and appendices.
12
  For example, Policy 4.1 
regulates private placements, and requires a news release, disclosure of the details of a 
transaction, and TSX-V approval before closing a transaction.  The price per share cannot be less 
than the “Discounted Market Price” as defined in Policy 1.1 and there are also limits on the 
amount of any finder’s fee.    
  
                                                 
12
 (TSX Venture Exchange 2013) 
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Ontario shifts to rules  
The OSC has been rules-based for many years through detailed policy statements, shifting 
further to rules in 1995 with the grant of rule-making authority in response to the Ainsley case 
described below, and then further again to rules in 2002 in response to US Sarbanes Oxley 
legislation. 
 
1993 Ontario Task Force 
The October 7, 1993 Ontario Ministry of Finance and Ontario Securities Commission Task Force 
on Securities Regulation (the “Ontario Task Force”)13 was appointed by the Ontario Finance 
Minister to recommend a legislative response to court decisions which had questioned the 
enforceability of OSC policy statements (which were often very detailed
14
).  On August 13, 
1993, in the Ainsley case,
15
 Justice Blair held that Ontario’s Draft Policy Statement 1.10 (which 
was intended to control penny stock brokers) was mandatory and thus regulatory in nature. 
Because the OSC had no statutory authority to make regulations, it was ultra vires. This was 
despite the OSC’s declaration that the policy was “a mere guideline”. In a notice announcing the 
policy, and in other statements and evidence, the OSC indicated that it would “strictly” enforce 
                                                 
13
 (Daniels 1994) 
14
 Former Ontario Policy 5.2 was in force from 1988 to 2001. This was a very detailed document 
regulating resource issuers which were reporting issuers in Ontario, but which were not listed 
trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange—for example, resource issuers that were listed on the 
then Vancouver Stock Exchange or Alberta Stock Exchange 
15
 Ainsley Financial Corp. v. Ontario (Securities Commission), 1993 CanLII 5552 (ON S.C.) 
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the policy’s detailed rules. Also, the policy’s stated purpose included a warning to penny stock 
brokers that failure to comply would be considered grounds by the OSC to take enforcement 
action under its public interest powers in section 27(1) of the Securities Act, including the power 
to suspend, cancel, restrict or reprimand a broker. By issuing policies of general application, and 
then warning those who might fail to comply with its terms, Blair held that the OSC was 
effectively making law, not a guideline. At the time, the Securities Act did not delegate to the 
OSC power to make rules of general application. Instead, the OSC was required to assess the 
public interest in each particular case, including penny stock broker compliance, based on the 
evidence presented in each case.  
On appeal, Justice Doherty agreed with Blair’s characterization of Policy 1.10. As Doherty 
noted, administrative guidelines connote general statements of principles, standards, criteria or 
factors intended to elucidate and give direction. Policy Statement 1.10, on the other hand, set out 
a “minutely detailed regime complete with prescribed forms, exemptions from the regime, and 
exceptions to the exemptions.” The threat of sanction for non–compliance was essentially a 
mandatory requirement, in the nature of regulation, not a guideline.
16
  
The Ainsley case illustrates the tension between rules and principles. The rules approach requires 
the legislature to delegate rule–making authority to the regulator, i.e. the power to promulgate 
rules, with known, after–the–fact penalties. Administrative guidelines, on the other hand, are a 
more flexible approach—the regulator is directed to achieve broad principles, but the application 
                                                 
16
 Ainsley Financial Corp. v. Ontario (Securities Commission), 1994 CanLII 2621 (ON C.A.) 
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of those principles is to be determined in each case on the evidence presented, typically with a 
hearing or an opportunity to be heard in writing. The problem with the Ainsley case was that the 
OSC had used a rules–approach with enforceable regulation, but the Securities Act at the time 
gave it no such authority.  
The Ontario Task Force responded to the Ainsley case with a report based on several 
“foundational principles”. The first was the “need for flexibility and responsiveness in securities 
policy–making and regulation”. To achieve this, the report said that the OSC should continue to 
issue policy statements and blanket orders which are valuable because of their flexibility, but 
they should be treated as guidelines only.
17
 Regarding guidelines, the Ontario Task Force quoted 
from the administrative law scholar Kenneth Culp Davis: 
“…through case–to–case consideration, where the human mind is often at its best, [it] 
nibbles at the problem and finds little solutions for each little bite of the problem. 
Creativeness in the nibbling sometimes opens the way for perspective thinking about the 
whole big problem, and large solutions sometimes emerge.” 
 
The Ontario Task Force recommended that the OSC be granted rule-making authority. 
“[A]ppropriate political responsibility for the system of securities regulation, building on existing 
political traditions and institutions” was noted.  This was to be addressed by notice and public 
                                                 
17
 This parallels the literature review later in this paper, under the topics of “Rules and 
Complexity” (page 70), “Rules and Precision” (page 76) and “Rules and Risk” (page 83).  
Essentially, detailed rules can evolve into a patchwork of narrow solutions to past problems, 
missing the mark when new situations arise. Principles, on the other hand, are more flexible and 
can be applied differently in different circumstances. 
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comment on proposed rules, with at least one round of public consultation based on a published 
request for comments in the OSC Bulletin, and often two or more rounds of such consultation. 
This principle was discussed by Professor MacIntosh, who prepared extensive briefs for the 
Ontario Task Force, and who was quoted in the report as follows: 
“[T]he classic expression of the Rule of Law amounts at bottom to a statement about how 
law in a representative democracy differs from the arbitrary law of potentates. In a 
representative democracy, law derives legitimacy only to the extent that it emanates from 
the democratic institutions of the polity, and only insofar as those who exercise authority 
are acting within the sphere of authority properly delegated to them by the legislature.” 
The Commission was given rule-making authority pursuant to the Securities Amendment Act, 
1995. Subsection 143(1) of the current Securities Act specifies the matters in respect of which the 
Commission may make rules of a binding nature.  Unless an exception to the notice requirement 
applies, the Commission is required to publish proposed rules for public comment (s. 143.2). 
This publication must include, among other things, the proposed rule, a summary of the rule, the 
anticipated costs and benefits of the rule, and a reference to the authority under which the rule 
can be made. The public is provided at least 90 days to consider a proposed rule and submit 
comments to the Commission.  
2002 OSC response to US Sarbanes Oxley 
In August 2002, David Brown, the former Chair of the OSC, issued an open letter to all Ontario 
market participants asking for comments on the new US Sarbanes–Oxley Act (US SOx). 
Although Mr. Brown called for a “made–in–Canada solution,” he noted that more than half of 
the total market capitalization of companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (the “TSX”, 
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which is senior to the Toronto Venture Exchange TSX–V) were inter-listed in the United States. 
He stated that “our approach to reviewing these initiatives is based on the assumption that it 
makes regulatory sense to harmonize with the U.S. initiatives unless there are cogent reasons for 
not doing so.”18 In another open letter of October 31, 2002, he referred to the importance of 
maintaining domestic and international confidence in Ontario markets, the “spillover effect in 
Canada from the damage to investor confidence in the U.S.”, and the ongoing dialogue with the 
U.S. Securities Exchange Commission regarding cross–border issues.19 
US SOx was not in response to venture issuers, but in response to major corporate and 
accounting scandals, including those of Enron, Tyco, Adelphia, Peregrine and WorldCom. 
Contributing factors included: (1) directors failed to supervise complex business issues, or did 
not have the expertise to do so; (2) audit committees were not independent of management; (3) 
auditing firms were not independent “financial watchdogs” for the shareholders—many were 
being paid lucrative non–audit or consulting fees by management; (4) securities analysts issued 
buy or sell recommendations while being paid for lucrative investment banking services by the 
companies being analyzed; and (5) executive stock option and bonus practices, combined with 
volatile stock prices, encouraged management to manipulate earnings.  
                                                 
18
 (D. Brown, Open Letter to Market Participants 2002-Oct) 
19
 (D. Brown, OSC Open Letter to Market Participants 2002-Nov)
 
Pierre Lortie argues that the 
push to harmonize with US rules stems from the erosion of competitiveness of the TSX. Between 
1990 and 2008, the aggregate value traded on Canadian stock exchanges relative to that on US 
exchanges declined from 4.05 per cent to 2.4 per cent. Lortie argues that this is because of deeper 
liquidity on US exchanges rather than better regulation (Lortie 2010) p. 18 
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Under US SOx rules, listed companies, except for “controlled companies”, are required to have a 
majority of independent directors, and a nominating/corporate governance committee and 
compensation committee composed entirely of independent directors. A member of the audit 
committee may not be an affiliate of the company or a subsidiary. Each listed company is 
required to adopt and disclose a code of business conduct and ethics for directors, officers and 
employees, and promptly disclose any waivers of the code. The chief executive officer is 
required to certify that he or she is not aware of any violation by the company of exchange listing 
standards, to maintain internal controls, and to certify each annual and quarterly report. Auditors 
cannot perform non–audit services for the issuer. There are a number of other detailed 
amendments, including enhanced disclosure in periodic reports, enhanced conflict of interest 
provisions, and stiffer penalties for securities offences and fraud.
20
   
Although the Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”) argued that changes to audit committees should 
be voluntary with only a requirement that companies disclose whether they complied, Mr. Brown 
said that strict enforcement was necessary in Ontario because the 1999 Dey Committee found 
                                                 
20
 Although the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act is quite detailed, a U.S. “small business issuer” can file 
a registration statement (equivalent to a prospectus in Ontario) in a simplified question and 
answer format, in non-legalistic terminology, provided its publicly-held stock is worth no more 
than $25 million.  US small business issuers can raise up to $10 million in any twelve-month 
period with a simplified Form SB1U.S. Securities Exchange Commission website, accessed 
November 21, 2010 <http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm#eod4> 
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that “the response of Canadian corporations to the governance initiatives was more formal than 
substantive and the corporate sector in Canada had not yet achieved a ‘culture of compliance.”21 
Ontario adopted rules similar to US SOx in 2004 with new requirements regarding financial 
statements, annual information forms, management discussion and analysis (MD&A), material 
change reporting, information circulars, proxy solicitation, restricted share disclosure, and other 
matters.
22
 National Instrument 52–107 sets out the accounting principles and auditing standards 
for various transactions. National Instrument 52–110 requires all issuers to have an audit 
committee to which the external auditors must report, and which must pre–approve all non–audit 
services to be provided by the auditor
 23
 National Instrument 52–108 requires the auditor to 
participate in the oversight program of the Canadian Public Accountability Board. National 
Instruments 58–101 and 58–201 require issuers to disclose their best practice standards, 
including: maintaining a majority of independent directors on the board, adopting a written board 
mandate, adopting a written code of business conduct and ethics, and a compensation committee 
composed entirely of independent directors. National Instrument 52–109 was perhaps the most 
                                                 
21
 Mr. Brown also noted that in the year ended March 31, 2002, the OSC Continuous Disclosure 
team reviewed nearly 30 per cent of Ontario–based reporting issuers, of which 23 per cent agreed 
to enhance their future disclosure practices, and 9 per cent were required to refile certain 
materials due to deficiencies in their original filings. To Mr. Brown, voluntary compliance with 
principles was not enough—strict enforcement of clear rules was required. Open letter dated 
October 31, 2002 to All Ontario Capital Market Participants, from David Brown, QC. 
22
 National Instrument 51–102 Continuous Disclosure Obligations. 
23
 Except for “venture issuers”, every audit committee would require at least three members, 
each of whom must be “financially literate” (though not necessarily a “financial expert”). 
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controversial. The Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer must personally certify 
that the issuers' annual and interim filings do not contain any misrepresentations and that the 
financial statements and other financial information in the annual and interim filings fairly 
present the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows.  
The disclosure rules are somewhat relaxed for “venture issuers.”24 Interim financial statements 
do not need to be audited; venture issuers have 120 days (rather than 90 days) to file year–end 
statements; they need not file Annual Information Forms; they are exempt from the audit 
committee requirements provided they disclose that they are relying on the exemption to their 
shareholders.
 25
  
 
Assessing the complexity of Ontario’s rules 
 
When an issuer sells securities to the public in Ontario, the OSC mandates a “plain language” 
prospectus, disclosing all material facts with simple, accessible sentences, with “an easy–to–read 
format”, with everyday words and the active voice.26 Ironically, the Ontario regulations which 
                                                 
24
 See footnote 1 for definition of “venture issuer”. 
25
 As noted in footnote 11 above, on July 29, 2011, the Canadian Securities Administrators 
published for comment Proposed National Instrument 51-103, which would tailor regulations for 
venture issuers. 
26
 See Ontario Prospectus form 41–101F1 and Companion Policy 41–101CP: “Issuers should 
apply plain language principles when they prepare a long form prospectus including: using short 
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prescribe what must be included in a prospectus are anything but plain—they are a patchwork of 
complex, detailed rules. For example, National Instrument 41-101 General Prospectus 
Requirements is 34 pages in length; its appendices are an additional 17 pages, its Form 41-101F1 
Information Required in a Prospectus is 46 pages, or 38 pages for an investment fund, and its 
Companion Policy 41-101 is an additional 29 pages.  The text is often dense and difficult to read.  
For example, section 11.2 of NI 41-101 regulates when securities can be distributed to the 
underwriter, and it states in part: 
“No person or company may distribute securities under a prospectus to any person or 
company acting as an underwriter in connection with the distribution of securities under 
the prospectus, other than …(b) securities issued or paid as compensation to one or more 
persons or companies for acting as an underwriter in respect of other securities that are 
distributed under the prospectus, where the number or principal amount of the securities 
issued as compensation, on an as-if-converted basis, does not in the aggregate exceed 
10% of the total of the base offering plus any securities that would be acquired upon the 
exercise of an overallotment option.” 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
sentences; using definite everyday language; using the active voice; avoiding superfluous words; 
organizing the document into clear, concise sections, paragraphs and sentences; avoiding jargon; 
using personal pronouns to speak directly to the reader; avoiding reliance on glossaries and 
defined terms unless it facilitates understanding of the disclosure; avoiding vague boilerplate 
wording; avoiding abstract terms by using more concrete terms or examples; avoiding multiple 
negatives; using technical terms only when necessary and explaining those terms; using charts, 
tables and examples where it makes disclosure easier to understand.” 
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How do Ontario securities regulations compare with similar regulations, regarding language 
complexity? The following table compares the Ontario Securities Act, some of the more 
important rules of the OSC, with the Canadian federal Income Tax Act, the Ontario Employment 
Standards Act, the Ontario Business Corporations Act, the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and 
an excerpt from the U.K. Financial Services Authority Handbook.  
Of course, measuring language complexity is more than simply counting the number of words, 
sentences or pages.  Readability tests, readability formulas, or readability metrics are formulae 
for evaluating the readability of text, usually by assessing syllables, words, and sentences. Some 
word processing computer applications have readability tests built-in. The difficulty I found in 
comparing these statutes and rules is that it can become somewhat arbitrary to distinguish 
between sentences separated by periods and subordinate clauses separated by commas or semi-
colons.  To generate this table, for the most part, I have treated clauses separated by semi-colons 
as sentences.  Furthermore, the complexity of language involves many other factors, such as the 
plainness of words, the active voice, the use of an index, and the logical sequence of topics. This 
table, therefore, presents only a very basic comparison.  
 Sentences # of words Words / sentence 
Ontario Securities Act 
 
2,172 77,737 36 
Canada Income Tax Act 
 
3,867 707,805 183 
Ontario Employment Standards Act 1,688 44,804 27 
Ontario Business Corporations Act 2,040 71,183 35 
NI 41–101 – prospectus requirements 187 15,350 82 
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NI  45-106  468 47,280 101 
NI 51-102 425 76.878 180 
Rule 61–101 special transactions 226 23,420 104 
US Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002
27
 507 28,719 56 
UK FSA Handbook – Disclosure and Control of 
Inside Information
28
 
21 833 40 
Law Society of Upper Canada bylaws 1 to 3 342 16,933 50 
Law Society Rules of Professional Conduct 226 10,394 46 
Table 1 Complexity of Regulations - Methodology—see footnote 29  
 
The federal Income Tax Act has the largest average number of words per sentence, at 183. The 
Ontario Securities Act has only slightly more than the Business Corporations Act and 
Employment Standards Act. It appears, therefore, that the enabling legislation—the Securities 
Act—is of average complexity. However, the rules of the OSC have a large number of words per 
sentence, approaching the complexity of the notoriously complex Income Tax Act.  The Ontario 
Securities Act, and the Rules and Policies of the OSC, comprise a book of over 3,000 pages of 
small print, of which 156 pages are for the Securities Act passed by the legislature and 25 pages 
                                                 
27
 (SOX Online 2011) 
28
 (UK Financial Services Advisory 2011) 
29
 This table was calculated by copying and pasting the relevant acts, rules and policy into 
Microsoft Word, and then using Word statistics to compute the table. The values are approximate 
only, as the distinction between sentences and subordinate clauses is somewhat arbitrary.   
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are for the General Regulation; thus, there are over 2,500 pages of OSC rules in small print.
30
 It 
would seem, therefore, that Ontario regulations are a combination of principles-based legislation 
and detailed OSC rules.   
 
British Columbia proposes a principles approach 
 
In contrast to Ontario’s rules–based approach, in October 2002, B.C. Securities Commission 
Chair Doug Hyndman warned against rushing to adopt U.S.–style securities regulatory reforms: 
“Canadian regulators would do a serious disservice to Canadian markets and investors if 
we adopt more rules just to keep pace with our neighbours...Our duty is to regulate the 
markets under our jurisdiction as efficiently and effectively as we can. We should pay 
attention to what is happening in the U.S. and elsewhere but we shouldn't adopt new rules 
just for the sake of harmonization.”31 
 
Hyndman said that rather than adopting more prescriptive and detailed rules, Canadian investors 
would be better protected from the accounting fraud, governance lapses, and other market abuses 
that have been revealed in the U.S. by having regulators do a better job of enforcing the rules 
already in place.  
                                                 
30
 Consolidated Ontario Securities Act, Regulations and Rules. Paul Findlay, Carswell, 2013. 
Approximately 3,350 pages 
31
 In an October 2002 breakfast speech at the Economic Club of Toronto. 
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“This is probably the worst time for us to adopt prescriptive requirements for 
governance," he said [in 2002]. "As a result of the train wrecks of the past year, investors 
are now taking governance more seriously and asking companies hard questions about 
what their directors are doing. We should let the market work, as only it can, rather than 
stepping in as if we had all the answers.”32 
 
 
Stephen Sibold Q.C., the Chair of the Alberta Commission, agreed with Hyndman’s cautious 
view, and described the US SOx as a confusing and reactive array of new regulations. “When 
faced with a bunch of detailed prescriptive rules and processes people can lose sight of the 
purpose of the rule. They perform all the formalized rituals but fail to question whether they are 
meeting the golden rule”.33 
The BC Commission did not participate in the Canadian Securities Administrator’s “Investor 
Confidence” rules, because in its view the auditor oversight rule contained more detail than 
necessary, the certificate rule added nothing to the existing legal duty of the officers to insure 
that disclosure is not false or misleading, and there was no evidence that the certification would 
add any benefit. As John Hinze, Director of Human Resources and Administration and Chief 
Financial Officer and Chair of the BC Commission, later argued, too many rules are complex 
                                                 
32
 Ibid 
33
Address to the Calgary Chamber of Congress, Nov 15, 2002. 
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and confusing. Few business people or investors can decipher them without professional advice, 
making them accessible only to a narrow “priesthood” of securities lawyers.34 
In 2004, the BC Commission proposed a principles–based Securities Act with a simplified, plain 
language, rulebook. An overarching “Code of Conduct,” consisting of 28 general principles 
arranged under eight broad “standards” would regulate advisers and dealers, and a simplified 
“Continuing Market Access” structure would regulate prospectus requirements.35 Although BC 
later deferred its proposal in favour of the “passport” system (which harmonizes BC regulations 
with the other detailed disclosure provinces
36
), as of writing, BC still intends to simplify its 
regulations in keeping with the spirit of the principles–based approach. 
                                                 
34
 (Hinze 2007) Measuring plain language at the British Columbia Securities Commission. 
35
 This would replace the prospectus–based system and allow certain issuers to access the market 
at any time based on their continuous disclosure record. There would be no mandated offering 
document, except for an issuer's IPO. For issuers in the system, the prospectus exemptions 
regime, hold periods, and resale restrictions would disappear. An enhanced continuous disclosure 
regime would be introduced, requiring issuers in the system to maintain "evergreen" disclosure 
of all material facts. 
36
 The “Principal Regulator System”, Multilateral Instrument 11–101, or “passport system”, 
allows market participants access to the capital markets in multiple jurisdictions by dealing with 
its principal regulator. A market participant’s principal regulator will usually be the regulator in 
the jurisdiction where its head office is located. Ontario, however, does not support the system 
because the passport system endorses the idea of different regulatory standards for market 
participants depending on where their head office is located.  
 31 
 
The BC Securities Act would “engage firms in their own endogenous learning about 
compliance” by focusing on objectives and results, rather than on detailed rules. As stated by the 
BC Commission: 
“We prefer non–rule solutions, because rules are generally the most intrusive and 
expensive form of regulatory intervention, and this expense filters down to investors. 
Rules can also have adverse effects, such as limiting competition, slowing innovation, 
increasing costs, encouraging a loophole mentality, or creating other unanticipated or 
undesired responses.”37 
 
The BC Securities Commission (BCSC) later suggested that “principles–based regulation” had 
become a trendy term
38
 and now uses the phrase “outcomes–based regulation” to describe an 
approach which includes rules, but which emphasizes principles. If the regulator finds it 
necessary to intervene, the BCSC will consider “all regulatory tools in searching for outcomes–
based solutions”, such as compliance monitoring, enforcement, guidance, education, and rule–
making.
39
  
 
                                                 
37
 (Aitken 2005), p. 9 
38
 (Expert Panel on Securites Regulation 2009) Submission of the British Columbia Securities 
Commission, July 15, 2008 
39
 For further discussion about outcomes–based regulation, see the topic Risk–based, 
Responsive, Outcomes–Oriented and Proportionate Regulation” at p. 100 
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The BCSC outcomes–based regulation would require market participants to think about what is 
best for investors and markets, rather than looking to the regulator for instructions on what to 
do.
40
 The regulator’s assessment of compliance is based on whether the market participant 
exercised reasonable judgment in fulfilling its compliance responsibilities.
41
 
Even if the BCSC were to adopt a simplified, principles-based framework, venture issuers listed 
on the TSX-V exchange would still need to comply with the detailed TSX-V rulebook, which as 
mentioned above,
42
 is currently 791 pages in length, of which 341 pages are for the rules and 450 
pages are for the associated forms and appendices.  In other words, the BC proposal would be a 
shift towards principles for venture issuers, but not an elimination of all securities rules.  
Arguably, the TSX-V rulebook would fill in any gaps of the principles-based BC proposal.   
Furthermore, the rulebook for the TSX-V may become more detailed and rigid over time, as did 
the application of TSX rules (for senior issuers) following demutualization of the TSX in 2000.  
As one of the experts consulted in this paper (Elaine Ellingham, from page 349 below) describes, 
prior to demutualization in 2000, the TSX accepted listings in a discretionary, principles-based 
                                                 
40
 This is also called “management based regulation” by Cristie Ford: “Under a management–
based regulatory approach, the regulator provides incentives to the regulated to achieve socially 
desired goals. The regulated must do their own planning and decision making about how to 
achieve goals. Outcome–oriented regulation focuses on the final stage. Management–based 
regulation focuses on the planning stage.” (Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-
Based Securities Regulation 2008) at pp. 10–11 
41
 Ibid, at p. 6. 
42
 Supra, note 12 
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manner. When the TSX became a for-profit business, the OSC no longer saw the TSX as a 
regulatory partner focused on protecting investors and there was a major paradigm change within 
the TSX listings department.  The TSX became more rigid in its application of rules and 
standards, because rules-based decisions could more easily be verified on an OSC audit.  The 
same may hold for the application of TSX-V rules—they may become more rules-based over 
time. 
 
Proposed National Securities Regulator—a principles approach 
There have been proposals to centralize Canadian securities regulation in a national commission 
for many years.
43
 In 2007, Finance Minister Jim Flaherty re–introduced the idea in a document 
entitled “Creating a Canadian Advantage in Global Capital Markets.”44 Provincial regulation of 
Canada’s capital markets is too complex, he argued, raising financing costs and lowering 
Canada’s competitiveness. He noted that Canada is the only jurisdiction among the Organization 
of Securities Commissions without a national regulator.
45
 Flaherty referred to “numerous studies, 
analyses and commentary” showing that the fragmented structure of Canadian securities 
                                                 
43
 See the 1979 federal Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, “Proposals for a 
Securities Market Law for Canada”, a three volume set of recommendations written by Anisman, 
Grover, Howard and Williamson (Anisman, et al. 1979) See also the Wise Persons’ Committee 
report of 2003 (Wise Persons' Committee to Review the Structure of Securities Regulation in 
Canada 2003) and the Crawford Panel (Crawford Panel 2006).  
44
 (Department of Finance 2007) 
45
 (Department of Finance 2007) at p. 21 
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regulation impairs the ability to finance businesses in Canada. He referred to a 2007 study by the 
Canadian Bankers Association which found that smaller issuers spend proportionately more on 
regulatory expenses than larger issuers, and that costs for smaller issuers increase on average by 
7.5 per cent for each additional province or territory in which funds are sought.
46
   
The proposed national Act would have permitted provinces and territories to opt in, with the 
hope of creating an effective unified national securities regulation system. It included registration 
requirements for securities dealers, prospectus filing requirements, disclosure requirements, 
specific duties for market participants, a framework for the regulation of derivatives, civil 
remedies and regulatory and criminal offences pertaining to securities.  It was based on the report 
of the “Expert Panel on Securities Regulation” (the “Expert Panel”)47 which advanced a 
proportionate, principles–based, national regulator.48 The national regulator would derive its 
                                                 
46
 (Canadian Bankers Association 2007) The conclusions of this study are disputed by Pierre 
Lortie, who argues that costs for multi–provincial offerings by Alberta and BC venture issuers 
increase because Ontario has not adopted the “passport system”, and because offerings in 
Quebec require expensive translation. Under a national regulator, translation costs would 
increase for all offerings, even if there were no Quebec investors, because the federal 
government is committed to bilingualism. See (Lortie 2010) at p. 12 
47
 (Expert Panel on Securites Regulation 2009) 
48
 (Expert Panel on Securites Regulation 2009) “Mandate”.  Lortie (Lortie 2010) is critical of the 
national regulator proposal; he notes that under the existing provincial passport system: (i) 
Canada was ranked second in terms of the quality of overall securities regulation in the OECD 
2006 report “Going for Growth”, ahead of the USA (4th), the UK (5th) and Australia (7th). (ii) 
Compared to 178 economies, Canada was ranked 5th in terms of investor protection in the World 
Bank Doing Business 2008 Report, ahead of USA (7th), the UK (9th) and Australia (51st). (iii) 
The aggregate value of equity raised in Canada through initial public offerings (“IPOs”) relative 
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initial rules from the existing, harmonized, provincial “passport system”.49  In June 2009, 
Flaherty appointed Doug Hyndman to head a “Transition Office”50 for the national regulator—as 
noted above, Hyndman was Chair of the BC Securities Commission and is committed to 
principles–based regulation. 
On December 22, 2011 the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision on the 
constitutionality of the proposed federal Act.
51
 It ruled that the proposed Act was “in pith and 
substance” concerned with the day-to-day regulation of all aspects of contracts for securities 
within the provinces, including all aspects of public protection and professional competences.  
These are essentially “property and civil rights” powers within the jurisdiction of the provinces, 
not related to the federal power to regulate trade and commerce as a whole. Some aspects of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
to GDP compares favourably to the United States: the total value of IPOs over the 1996––2000 
period was 8.57 per cent in Canada compared to 5.47 per cent in the United States. (iv) Canadian 
junior issuers have a higher survival rate and longer life expectancy than equivalent–size 
companies in the United States. 
49
 In 2004, all provinces and territories, except Ontario, agreed to a single window of access to 
Canada’s capital markets for domestic and foreign issuers. Under this “passport” system, 
participants can clear a prospectus, obtain an exemption, and register as a dealer or adviser, by 
obtaining a decision from the securities regulator in their home province and have that decision 
apply in all other jurisdictions. See Multilateral Instrument 11–101. Critics of the national 
securities regulator argue that it is unnecessary since the current passport system works well.  
50
 (Minister of Finance Canada 2009) 
51
 Reference by the Governor in Council concerning the proposed Canadian Securities Act (2011 
SCC, Docket 33718). 
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Act did relate to trade as a whole, including management of systemic risk and national data 
collection, but the thrust of the Act was not aimed at these national concerns. The Supreme Court 
said that a cooperative approach, recognizing provincial securities regulation, but allowing 
Parliament to deal with national concerns, would be constitutional.  Following the decision, 
Flaherty seemed to have followed up on the suggestion of federal regulation of national 
standards and systemic risk.
52
 It is likely that any new federal proposal will be principles-based.  
National standards and the management of systematic risk would be designed to combat 
recurring financial crisis, which can arise from different and unpredictable sources.  High level 
principles can more easily be adapted to the circumstances. 
 
Background Facts about Ontario Venture Issuers 
 
The importance of venture issuers 
 
Venture issuers are a subset of “small and medium enterprises” or “SMEs”. Industry Canada 
defines SMEs as companies with up to 500 employees and annual sales of less than $50 
million.
53
 All but the largest 245 companies listed on the TSX, and all companies listed on the 
TSX Venture Exchange (“TSX–V”), would be considered “small cap” (or even smaller) 
                                                 
52
 (Larocque 2012) 
53
 (Nicol and Heidrick 2002) 
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companies in the United States. The SME sector, both privately and publicly held, is an 
important contributor to the economy. According to a report by the Canadian Federation of 
Independent Business (Debus 2005), a total of 32 per cent of employed Canadians have a job in a 
small firm with fewer than 50 employees, while 24 per cent work for mid–sized businesses 
employing between 50 and 500 workers.
54
 Canadian SMEs, including venture issuers, invest in 
research and development (R&D) proportionally more than big corporations.
55
 Companies with 
up to 100 employed workers represent a total of 85 per cent of Canadian exporters. Small 
establishments with fewer than 50 employees represent 72 per cent of all Canadian exporting 
businesses and are responsible for close to a quarter of the total value of exports.
56
  
On the other hand, 95% of Canadian small businesses do not achieve high-growth.  High-growth 
firms are defined by Statistics Canada as those with average annualized growth rates greater than 
20 percent per year, over a three-year period, and with 10 or more employees at the beginning of 
the period. Only 4.7 percent of Canadian small businesses achieved high growth in terms of 
employment—however, they created 45 percent of net new jobs from 2003 to 2006.57   
 
                                                 
54
 Statistics Canada, Survey of Employment, Payrolls and Hours (SEPH), 2004. 
55
 Statistics Canada, Industrial Research and Development – 2004 intentions, Catalogue. No. 88–
202–XIB, January 2005. 
56
 Statistics Canada 2004 
57
 (Industry Canada 2011) 
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Industry concentration of Canadian venture issuers 
 
A significant percentage of Canada’s public companies operate in a handful of key sectors: 
mining, oil and gas, and financial services—these three sectors collectively account for just over 
65 percent of the market capitalization of the TSX (which is senior to the TSX–Venture). Almost 
65% of issuers listed on the TSX Venture Exchange are mining issuers and almost 15% are oil 
and gas issuers.
58
 Ontario is heavily concentrated in the financial services sector, with large 
institutions inter–listed in the United States. British Columbia is concentrated in junior mining. 
Alberta is concentrated in junior oil and gas. Quebec has a more diversified but localized 
concentration in forestry and transportation.  
 
Controlling shareholders of venture issuers 
 
Nicholls notes that a significant percentage of Canada’s largest non–financial public companies 
have controlling shareholders, or major shareholders (shareholders with voting interests of at 
least 20 per cent are considered “controlling” and those with at least 10 per cent are considered 
“major”).59 Also, dual–class shares and pyramidal holding structures are common. Controlling 
                                                 
58
 Table 3 Industry Type on TSX-V at page 209 below 
59
 (Nicholls 2006) at 134–5. See also (MacIntosh and Daniels 1992) which says, at page 884, one 
of the most distinctive features of Canadian capital markets is the high degree of concentration of 
share ownership. Only 14 per cent of the companies that make up the TSE 300 Composite Index 
are widely held. Of the remainder, 60.3 per cent are owned by a single shareholder with legal 
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shareholders can accumulate sufficient proxies to control management.
60
 In contrast, widely held 
corporations (which are more common in the United States), leave dispersed shareholders with 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
control (in excess of 50 per cent of the voting shares). 25.4 per cent are owned either by one 
shareholder with effective control (between 20 per cent and 49.9 per cent of the voting shares) or 
by two or three shareholders (each owning between 10 per cent and 20 per cent of the 
outstanding voting shares of the corporation) having the ability to combine and establish joint 
legal or effective control. In contrast, American markets are characterized by a much greater 
preponderance of widely held companies. Approximately 63 per cent of the companies that make 
up the Fortune 500 companies are widely held, and 18 per cent are controlled by a shareholder or 
group of shareholders with effective control. Only about 12 per cent are controlled by a 
shareholder or group of shareholders with legal control. 
See also (Davis 2003-2004) at 982: “The Canadian capital market is constructed differently [than 
the US market]. It consists of a majority of thinly–traded companies, with little or no institutional 
investment. Of those companies on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) index, a majority have a 
single shareholder with legal control and more than three–quarters of them have either a single 
shareholder or a group of three or less shareholders with either legal control or effective control 
of the corporation. There is a much higher proportion of corporations with restricted voting or 
nonvoting stock such that the owner of a minority of the equity owns the voting shares. There is 
also a high degree of corporate interconnection, with many of the one hundred most profitable 
corporations holding up to ten percent of the stock of the other companies on the list. 
Directorships are interconnected as well, with a higher proportion of directors having multiple 
directorships. For most publicly traded Canadian corporations, the problem is not the inability of 
widely dispersed shareholders to monitor managerial conduct, but rather that an alliance between 
the management and majority or controlling group of shareholders will conduct corporate affairs 
so as to disadvantage the minority shareholders or other corporate stakeholders.” 
60
 (Davis 2003-2004) at 984: “the capital structure of most of Canada's publicly–traded 
corporations does not raise these concerns [as in the US]. Large blockholders can capture most of 
the gain from monitoring, and thus the disproportion between costs and benefits of monitoring is 
eliminated. In addition, since he or she will possess legal or de facto control over the directors' 
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little control over management; usually, they can only “vote with their feet”—i.e. sell their 
shares on the market if they are dissatisfied.
61
  
Therefore, in the United States, good policy controls management on behalf of dispersed 
shareholders. In Canada, good policy controls the controlling shareholders.
62
 As Nicholls argues, 
the prevalence of controlling or dominant shareholders in the Canadian market indicates that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
election, the controlling shareholder can impose discipline on errant managers. Thus, the conflict 
in the Canadian capital markets is not between managers and shareholders, but rather between 
controlling shareholders and noncontrolling shareholders over intrashareholder transfers of 
wealth or use of the corporation for the nonpecuniary ends of the majority shareholder.”  
(MacIntosh and Daniels 1992) at 885: “The predominance of shareholder controlled corporations 
in Canada changes the nature of conflicts that are likely to be important. Large block holders 
have better incentives than small investors to monitor management, since poor management 
affects the interests of a large stakeholder much more substantially than a small investor with a 
transient interest. Furthermore, the free rider problem that commonly makes coordinated 
shareholder action difficult is ameliorated, since a much more substantial portion of the benefits 
of monitoring is captured by the large block holder. The result will be more effective monitoring 
of hired managers. Moreover, since the controlling shareholder will effectively control the board 
of directors, which is legally empowered to hire and fire” 
61
 Most large publicly traded corporations in the US are incorporated under corporate 
administration friendly Delaware law, and because the US's wealth has been increasingly 
securitized into various corporate entities and institutions, the rights of individual owners and 
shareholders have become increasingly derivative and dissipated. 
62
 Investors in corporations owe few if any duties to fellow investors, because the financing 
device for these firms achieves substantial separation of management and risk bearing. We then 
take it as common (if not desirable) for a person investing in one public corporation to invest in 
its rival too (perhaps even to manage its rival). See (Easterbrook and Fischel, Contract and 
Fiduciary Duty 1993) 447 
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Canadian regulation should protect minority investors in the context of (a) related–party 
transactions; (b) going private transactions; and (c) unlawful trading on the basis of undisclosed 
material information (i.e., insider trading).
63
  
 
Regulation risks of venture issuers 
 
Venture issues have fewer shareholders, smaller trading volumes, and less share liquidity. 
Revenues are often unpredictable, but compliance costs are fixed. Illiquidity is a concern because 
of the uncertainty regarding the price of new shares and access to capital. Illiquidity is also a 
concern for the regulator, since share prices can be manipulated to the detriment of innocent 
outside investors. As Nicholls notes, this highlights a regulatory paradox: The very companies 
least able to afford enhanced regulation are also those which pose the greatest investment risk for 
retail investors. Shares of venture issuers are subject to greater price volatility, greater illiquidity 
risk, and are less likely to be monitored by sophisticated institutional investors.
64
 Securities 
analysts tend to focus on larger capitalized issuers because that is where they can make 
brokerage commissions sufficient to fund their research budgets.
65
 Canada’s venture issuers can 
                                                 
63
 (Nicholls 2006) at pp. 137–38 
64
 (Nicholls 2006) at p.135 
65
 Ironically, the “efficient market” hypothesis holds that a broker’s costs for researching larger 
issues is wasteful. Disclosure about larger issuers are rapidly distributed in the market, faster 
than investors can adjust on the basis of the new information. As a consequence, no trader can 
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be orphaned by the market, left to wither on the vine or to become targets of stock manipulation, 
despite real business opportunities.
66
 
Seligman reviewed US securities statistics and concluded that “the evils of high–pressure 
salesmanship and of selling on the basis of inadequate information are particularly prevalent in 
small issuers”.67 Managers of venture issuers are often paid with stock options (which appreciate 
with a rising stock price) and have an incentive to publish only “good news”.68 Carpentier and 
Suret argue that strong listing requirements for venture issuers should be maintained, because of 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
earn (financial) arbitrage profits in an efficient market because no one can identify (except by 
chance) securities which are under– or over–valued. See: (Gordon and Kornhauser 1985) at 770: 
Corroboration of this theory appeared in several studies which documented that the professional 
investors who managed mutual funds did not outperform randomly selected investment 
portfolios. See: Seligman, J. The Transformation of Wall St. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 
1982. Pgs ix–xii; 561–568 in Historical & Comparative Approaches to Securities Regulation, by 
Mary Condon, at p.316. 
66
 (The Task Force 2006) at p.141. Also, see p. 32: “being a cost centre, analysts will logically 
specialize in stocks for which there is large trading and substantial investor interest in an effort to 
demonstrate that this cost centre has value. However these are not always the stocks that most 
require information and analysis, since they are already heavily followed. It is the small stocks 
that do not generate the same trading activity that are under represented in analyst coverage. .” 
67
 (J. Seligman 1983) at p. 57. 
68
 See “The Role of Compliance in Securities Regulatory Enforcement”, in Volume 6, (The Task 
Force 2006).  
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information asymmetry and because of the very poor returns that are typical among venture 
issuers; otherwise, the venture market will become a “lemon market”.69  
There is a greater risk that management of a venture issuer will abscond with the firm’s assets, 
since they are generally less tangible, easier to transfer, and harder to trace than those of larger 
firms. Thus, investors must rely on, and promoters must acquire, reputation capital.
70
  
 
Junior mining risks  
Junior mining exploration ventures (which comprise 65% of listings on the TSX Venture 
exchange) usually fail, are expensive to finance, and are susceptible to market manipulation.   
Success is unlikely 
In his study for the 1964 Porter Royal Commission on Banking and Finance,
71
 E.K. Cork found 
that of the 6,679 public mining companies chartered in Ontario between 1907 and 1953, only 
348 found a producing mine (a 95% failure rate) and only 54 ever paid dividends (less than 1%).  
However, as Kalymon notes, a small number of producing mines can yield enormous results, 
                                                 
69
 (Carpentier and Suret, Entrepreneurial Equity Financing and Securities Regulation: An 
Empirical Analysis 2009). 
70
 (Fuller and Yumiao 2006) p.290 
71
 (Cork 1962) p. 37.  “The chance of an average prospect becoming a profitable mine is one in a 
few thousand; one estimate is one in three thousand.”  Similar results were found in Quebec. 
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more than compensating for failures.  From 1945 to 1975, the total gross value of minerals 
discovered by junior exploration companies in Canada was about $70 billion and the funds raised 
by juniors was about $2 billion.  After deducting development and extraction costs, taxes and 
opportunity costs, the total residual profit for juniors exceeded the total funds raised by a factor 
of 2.4.  Like a gambling casino, however, the profits were concentrated in the hands of a small 
number of winners and the vast majority of investors lost.
72
 
The odds of a mining exploration success are similar to the odds of an industrial product idea 
becoming commercially successful.  According to Stevens and Burley
73
, it takes 3,000 raw ideas 
to produce 300 patent disclosures to the patent office. Fifty percent of these disclosures are filed, 
of which seventy-five percent are issued patents.   Of this, 8 percent have some commercial 
value and less than 1 percent represents major commercial significance. In other words, the odds 
of a product idea becoming a significant commercial success are less than one-third of one 
percent.  Similar results were found when assessing how many products reviewed by venture 
capitalists are successful.  
Financings are expensive 
Historically, most of the funds invested for junior mining exploration have gone to the brokers 
and promoters.  Cork estimated that of the $850 million invested in Canada in mining between 
                                                 
72
 (Kalymon, Halpern and Waters 1978) chapter 2 
73
 (Stevens and Burley 1997) 
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1953 and 1960, 60% went to sales costs and promotional profits and only 40% went into 
corporate treasuries.  Of the 40% that went into corporate treasuries, 20% was spent on corporate 
maintenance (“working capital”) and only 20% was spent on exploration. 74 These percentages 
were confirmed in a 1977 study by OSC staff.
75
 
Prior to 1966, most Ontario mining exploration was financed on the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSE) by broker-dealers who used direct telephone sales to solicit investors across North 
America.  As a result of complaints in the U.S. and other Canadian provinces, the 1967 Ontario 
Securities Act prohibited junior mining companies from issuing new shares through the TSE and 
companies could be de-listed if they failed to maintain working capital requirements.  Juniors 
were now required to file a prospectus with the OSC and trade on the over-the-counter market.  
In addition, in 1976, the Commission prohibited underwriter options, replacing them with bonus 
shares, up to a maximum of 15 to 20% of the issue.  In 1986, Ontario’s Policy 5.2 limited dealer 
commission to a maximum of 35%, and the minimum net proceeds to the issuer became 
$100,000.  No other commissions, direct or indirect, were available, with two limited 
exceptions.
76
 
                                                 
74
 (Cork 1962) 
75
 (C. Armstrong 2001), p. 277 
76
 The first exception was the “green shoe” option of up to 15% of the primary offering. The 
second exception was available in a firm underwriting - a compensation option of up to 10% of 
the issued shares exercisable up to 60 days following the offering.  Both these exceptions are 
relatively minor, and the net result became a maximum dealer commission of 35%. 
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What was the effect of removing junior mining companies from the stock exchange and limiting 
broker compensation?  Although other factors may have been in play, including tax changes and 
high interest rates, from 1951 to 1955, on average $120 million was raised per year in 1977 
dollars by junior mining companies in Ontario.  From 1971 to 1977, it was reduced to one-tenth 
of that amount—only $12 million per year.i   Broker-dealers left the Ontario junior mining 
market. (Many moved west to the Vancouver stock exchange. In 1999, Vancouver stock 
exchange and the Alberta stock exchange merged with the Toronto over-the-counter market, to 
form the Canadian Venture Exchange, which later became the TSX Venture exchange in 2001.)  
There were 75 broker dealers in Toronto in 1965 and only 13 in 1978.
77
 Kalymon et. al. note that 
private communication with researchers in the Department of Energy Mines and Resources 
revealed that the junior mining sector accounted for approximately 41.8% of reported 
exploration expenditures in 1969, then dropped to 17.7% in 1975.
78
 
An argument can be made that brokers and promoters of junior mining exploration ventures 
should enjoy high levels of compensation, as a percentage of the funds raised.  Given that most 
of the deals are small, the amounts earned are not comparatively large, when considering the 
fixed costs of due diligence and running an office.   
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 (Kalymon, Halpern and Waters 1978) pp. 7-8 
78
 (Kalymon, Halpern and Waters 1978) p. 25 
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Fraud and manipulation 
Junior issuers are susceptible to market manipulation, generally in three ways: (i) publishing 
false information in an offering document, circular or news release; (ii) withholding material 
information from investors, and (iii) creating a false impression of the value of a security by 
spreading false rumours and manipulating the market.   
Spreading false information 
The Bre-X fiasco is a classic example of the damage that can be caused by false statements.  The 
Busang drill cores were salted with gold particles taken from a different location.  Press releases 
proclaimed the Indonesian gold mine to be the richest ever found. The price of Bre-X stock rose 
steadily from about 50 cents a share in May, 1993 to $228 when the stock split ten for one in 
May, 1996. The euphoria ended on March 19, 1997 with a report that the company's chief 
geologist Michael de Guzman had committed suicide by jumping from a helicopter over the 
jungles of Borneo.  When independent sources were unable to verify the gold resources, the 
share prices plummeted. On May 7, 1997, following a public announcement that there was no 
gold in the Busang, the TSE delisted Bre-X.  
The fraud was exposed because of independent due diligence reviews.  In late 1996, Barrick 
Gold began discussions to joint venture with Bre-X and conducted a limited review. Barrick 
found insignificant mineralization in the retained “in-fill” samples and the small uncrushed 10 
cm cores.  On February 18, 1997, Bre-X made a joint venture deal with Freeport-McMoRan 
Copper and Gold, Inc. (“Freeport”), subject to Freeport’s independent review.  Freeport's due 
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diligence, conducted between March 1 and March 19, 1997, discovered that the Bre-X in-fill 
samples contained “alluvial gold”, the kind found on the surface and not by drilling hard rock.  
Soon after the scandal broke, the TSE and OSC formed a joint “Mining Standards Task Force”, 
which proposed the strictest mining disclosure rules in the world.  The Task Force recommended 
that “Qualified Persons” (an engineer, geologist, geophysicist or other geoscientist with at least 
five years’ experience) be responsible for all exploration programs, the estimation and 
classification of resources and reserves, and the approval of all scientific and technical disclosure 
for public and regulatory purposes.   The recommendations were later incorporated in National 
Instrument 43-101, which require that an independent Qualified Person supervise all technical 
statements on becoming a reporting issuer, on filing a non-POP prospectus, information circular, 
takeover bid, or “any other document that discloses for the first time resources or reserves on a 
property material to the issuer [with] a 100 percent or greater change, from the most recently 
filed report...” 
 
Withholding material information 
In 1964, Viola MacMillan (a former president of the Prospectors and Developers Association) 
and her husband George MacMillan’s company Windfall Oils and Mines Ltd. staked claims 
adjacent to Texas Gulf Sulphur Company’s massive Kidd Creek discovery.  Rumours spread that 
drilling on their claims encountered significant mineralization. Windfall’s stock price rose from 
56¢ on July 3
rd
 1964 to $5.60 on Jul 21
st
.  It fell to 80¢ by the end of the month, after over 13 
million shares had traded and after an announcement was made that no commercial ore had been 
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discovered.  Justice Kelly’s report of 1965 revealed that the MacMillans had withheld negative 
assay reports in July and, through a network of five brokers and twenty-one trading accounts, 
sold almost one million shares for a trading profit of almost $1.5 million (a considerable sum in 
the early 1960s).  It was essentially a case of the MacMillans selling shares on the market with 
knowledge of undisclosed material information.   
A new Securities Act came into force in Ontario in 1967 which relied on the 1964 Porter Royal 
Commission on Banking and Finance and the Kimber report in 1965 (Kimber was former chair 
of the OSC).  The new act broadened the discretionary powers of the OSC and required the 
continuous disclosure of material facts.  It required more information in prospectuses filed with 
the OSC, uniform accounting principles, better takeover disclosure rules, proxy solicitation 
disclosure, and insider trading prohibitions.   
 
Market manipulation 
In a typical small issuer manipulation scheme, unscrupulous promoters and dealers hype a thinly 
traded stock through the use of “boiler room” direct marketing and telephone calls, company 
websites, bulletin boards, mass e-mails, chat rooms or on-line investment newsletters. They place 
“wash trades” to give an impression of price and volume increases.  After the price jumps, the 
manipulators aggressively sell their shares to unsuspecting investors and pocket the profits.  
Share prices eventually collapse, leaving investors with worthless securities. This is known as 
the “pump and dump”.  
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Justice Blair heard expert testimony concerning market manipulation in R. v. Campbell [1993] 
O.J. No. 3094 [Ont Ct Gen Div] at paragraph 11: 
“Mr. Cleland [an expert in the regulation of penny stock trading] described it as a three-
phase process, involving an "accumulation" phase, a "mark-up" phase, and a "liquidation" 
or "blow off" phase. He said: ... Manipulation of stock is normally done to make money 
and it seems to fall into a three-phase pattern. 
There is an accumulation of stock where stock becomes under the control of a person 
who has a plan to manipulate the market.  
There is a period during which the price is raised, referred to as a mark-up phase 
generally in the trade, and  
if the stock has been raised to a sufficient price or during the mark-up phase, and stock is 
sold, and it is the liquidation of the stock that creates the profitability of the manipulative 
activity, and the so-called blow off of the stock is the third phase.” 
 
 
The Cost of Securities Regulation 
 
The detailed rules in US SOx  has contributed significantly to the expense of doing an IPO 
(“initial public offering”) in the United States. By 2006, the cost of the legal and accounting 
work for an IPO was approximately $2 million, up from $500,000 a few years before. According 
to some, these U.S. regulatory costs are driving venture capital companies to other markets.
79
 
                                                 
79
 Statement of Keith Crandell, Committee on Small Business: House of Representatives, 
“Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404: What Is The Proper Balance Between Investor Protection And 
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In Canada, the Regulatory Burden Task Force found an overwhelming number of complaints 
regarding the unnecessary complexity of securities regulation. Issuers and registrants have 
difficulty in understanding their obligations and must often resort to costly and time–consuming 
legal advice. Even experienced securities lawyers expressed concerns regarding the increasingly 
prescriptive nature of securities regulation.
80
 Ontario securities regulations are frequently 
amended and only partially harmonized with other provinces. This further increases complexity. 
Puri and Condon note that “an unintended consequence of a rigorous compliance programme 
might be that these requirements become a way for larger issuers to preserve a monopoly, in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Capital Formation For Smaller Public Companies?” Washington, DC, May 3, 2006 Serial No. 
109–51 p.10.  
As cited in the April, 2006 final report of the Advisory Committee on Smaller Public 
Companies, the discrepancy between the initial Section 404 cost estimate of $91,000 versus the 
actual cost of $900,000 raises the question of cost benefit for the shareholders of smaller public 
companies. (Statement Of Bill Broderick, Analytical Graphics, Inc., p. 7)  
See also: Remarks to the Association of Professional Compliance Consultants 5 March 2008), 
online: FSA 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2008/0305_lt.shtml> The FSA 
approach to risk–based regulation is also proportionate. The FSA does not subject small firms to 
the same scrutiny as larger ones, or require the same kinds of structured and detailed responses 
from them, because of their sheer number and because on an individual level each one poses a 
relatively small risk to consumers. See also (Titcomb 2008) 
80
 (Regulatory Burden Task Force 2003) at p.13. See also #11 on page 8: “regulation be scaled 
according to the size of an issuer’s market capitalization and other issuer specific considerations 
in order to ensure that regulation is appropriate.” 
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sense that they are better able to meet the costs of compliance initiatives and so can drive out 
smaller operations.”81 
However, advocates for adopting US SOx requirements refer to the so–called “made in Canada 
discount” for securities traded only in Canada—securities which are inter–listed with US 
exchanges tend to trade 25 basis points higher. Tom Allen, Chairman of the Task Force, 
suggested that the reason for this discount is that enforcement in Canada is considered less 
rigorous than in the United States. With less enforcement, inappropriate managerial behaviour is 
considered more possible, so investors discount the prices if trading only in Canada.
82
 Others 
dispute the reasons for, or the existence of, this discount in Canada
83
, but logically, investors 
who trust that the regulations compel full and true disclosure would pay a premium over 
securities trading only in less reliable jurisdictions. 
Competition for Regulation 
 
With globalization and the growing use of the internet, foreign stock exchanges compete for 
                                                 
81
 (Puri and Condon, The Role of Compliance in Securities Regulatory Enforcement 2006) 
82
 (The Task Force 2006) at p.33 
83
 See, for example, (Lortie 2010) at pp. 15–16 and (Carpentier, L'Her and Suret, On the 
Competitiveness of the Canadian Stock Market 2009) who notes that the premium for listing on 
US exchanges applies to all countries and not just Canada; it doesn’t last for long but is 
temporary. As Carpentier et. al. suggest, “There is no strong empirical support for the so called 
“Canadian discount.” pp.15–17 
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Canadian and American listings.
84
 How can Ontario’s premier exchanges, the TSX and TSX–V 
(together, the “TMX”) compete for listings internationally? Is it simply a question of better 
regulation? 
The UK Alternative Investment Market (“AIM”), which regulates with principles rather than 
rules, has been growing steadily since 1995.
85
 As of July 2011, there were 1,151 companies 
listed on the AIM market, of which 929 were UK companies and 222 were international 
companies.  According to Mallin and Ow-Yong, while AIM saw phenomenal growth from 2004 
to 2006, there has been a declining trend in admissions since 2007
86
.  Mallin and Ow-Yong 
ascribe this downward trend to the global financial crisis of 2008. US exchanges, which must 
comply with detailed US SOx rules, have lost the listings of many small– and medium– sized 
                                                 
84
 As stated by (The Task Force 2006), p.50: “we have all witnessed the reaction of issuers to 
avoid, where possible, the costs associated with compliance with the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in the 
United States. We have observed that stock exchanges in the United States have a high level of 
concern regarding the impact of this extensive regulatory framework on the attractiveness of 
U.S. capital markets. At the same time other markets where capital is in adequate supply are 
distinguished by “toned down” regulation, by outsourcing to gatekeepers who have reputational 
capital at risk if they perform their task inadequately. 
85
 See, e.g., (Parkinson 2006) Whether this shift actually represents a reduction in the perceived 
value of an American listing is less obvious. For example, see (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz 2007) 
who argue that the decline in cross–listings on the New York and London stock exchanges 
between 1990 and 2005 is explained by changes in firm characteristics rather than by changes in 
the benefits of cross–listings. 
86
 (Mallin and Ow-Yong 2013) at p.114 
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issuers, which have either gone private or gone to the illiquid “pink sheet” quotation system.87 
Moran describes the contrasting regulatory philosophies in London and New York: London has 
emphasized trust, flexibility and voluntary compliance; but for over 50 years U.S. regulation has 
been adversarial, detailed and dominated by an administrative agency with statutory power. The 
City of London has been able to keep its own regulation off the conventional political agenda. 
By contrast, American financial institutions have worked in an environment of restraint because 
of populist suspicion of the “money trusts”, and because of the suffering caused by the financial 
collapses of 1929–3388 and the financial upheaval caused by the credit crisis of 2008. 
In 2009, Cetorelli and Peristiani, staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, undertook a 
detailed review of the attractiveness of various capital markets and the “patterns of relationships” 
among them. They found that, although the London Stock Exchange, the Deutsche Borse, and 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, were becoming more competitive, the U.S. exchanges remained 
the destination of choice for foreign issuers which wish to cross–list on multiple exchanges.89 
                                                 
87
 (Knowledge@Wharton 2003). Detractors such as Congressman Ron Paul contend that US 
SOX was an unnecessary and costly government intrusion into corporate management that places 
U.S. corporations at a competitive disadvantage with foreign firms, driving businesses out of the 
United States. In an April 14, 2005 speech before the U.S. House of Representatives, Paul stated, 
"…According to a survey by Korn/Ferry International, Sarbanes–Oxley cost Fortune 500 
companies an average of $5.1 million in compliance expenses in 2004, while a study by the law 
firm of Foley and Lardner found the Act increased costs associated with being a publicly held 
company by 130 percent." (Paul 2005) 
88
 (Moran 1980) 
89
 (Cetorelli and Peristiani 2009) 
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This is because of the “prestige effect” of listing on a U.S. exchange. Since the Second World 
War, U.S. exchanges have become the financial node for multinational companies, a stepping–
off point for additional financings in other markets.  
As to the competitiveness of Canadian exchanges, they have never achieved the same 
international prestige as U.S. exchanges. The TSX is not a common destination for foreign IPOs. 
As Lortie says, “[w]hy would a leading Chinese bank list its newly issued stock on the TSX 
when it can list on the NYSE?”90 Canadian issuers going global will list in New York, but U.S. 
and foreign issuers going global will not usually list in Toronto. Between 1900 and 2006, a total 
of 98 foreign companies listed in Canada compared to 651 Canadian companies that listed 
abroad. Furthermore, once Canadian companies do cross–list on U.S. exchanges, brokers tend to 
trade more on New York exchanges, because of increased liquidity and price competition in New 
York. Lortie refers to various estimates which suggest that, for an institutional trader, trading 
costs on the TSX are significantly higher than in New York.
91
 
However, the competitiveness of the Toronto market does not lie in its overall size, but in its 
international reputation for choice industries, especially mining. The TMX lists more public 
mining companies than any other exchange in the world—1,434 in 2009, compared to Australia, 
the next highest at 610, then the London AIM at 134. $79.1 billion mining shares traded on the 
                                                 
90
 (Lortie 2010) p.16 
91
 (Lortie 2010) p.17 However, Canadian brokers will typically reduce their prices once the 
issuer cross–lists on the U.S. to maintain market share. See (Foerster and Karolyi 1998)  
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TMX in 2009. The number of financings on the TMX was 1,962 in 2009, compared to the next 
highest, Australia, at 186. The mining companies listed on the TMX are international in 
operations: 50 per cent of the 9,700 mineral exploration projects financed on the TMX are 
outside of Canada.
92
 
Toronto brokers, advisers and analysts have developed an international reputation for mining 
expertise. Over 200 analysts cover TMX–listed mining companies. The Prospectors and 
Developers Association of Canada, which is located in Toronto, is a national organization of 
6,000 individual members (including prospectors, developers, geoscientists, consultants, mining 
executives, and students, as well as those involved in the drilling, financial, investment, legal and 
other support fields) and 950 corporate members (including senior, mid–size and junior mining 
companies and organizations providing services to the mineral industry)
93
. Ontario has excellent 
mining engineering and geophysics schools. Canadian securities commissions insist upon 
compliance with National Instrument 43–101, which requires that only a qualified engineer or 
geoscientist can make public statements about mining prospects. Although Toronto may not be a 
destination for foreign issuers generally, Toronto is the destination of choice for financing 
mineral projects anywhere in the world. Also, as described above (under the topic “Background 
Facts about Ontario venture issuers”) all but the largest 245 companies listed on the TSX, and all 
                                                 
92
 (Toronto Stock Exchange and TSX Venture Exchange 2009) 
93
 See “About the PDAC” at < http://www.pdac.ca/pdac/about/index.html > 
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companies listed on the TSX Venture Exchange (“TSX–V”), would be considered “small cap” 
(or even smaller) companies in the United States.  
It would seem, therefore, that a good way for Toronto and Ontario to compete internationally is 
to recognize the source of one of its main strengths—junior mining exploration.  
 
Regulation to Create a Public Good 
 
There are some areas where it is generally accepted that venture issuers should be compelled to 
gather rules–based, detailed information, whether or not it is justified on a cost–benefit basis for 
the particular transaction. For example, National Instrument 43–101 requires that mining issuers 
cannot disclose any information about a mineral resource to the public, or its quantity or grade, 
unless the disclosure uses only the detailed categories set out in the Instrument. Also, any public 
mineral resource statement must be approved by a “qualified person”, being an engineer or 
geoscientist with the appropriate training and experience. A “technical report” about the mineral 
resource must be filed when an issuer becomes a reporting issuer (i.e. a public issuer) or when 
any document is circulated to the public for a mining issuer (other than an offering memorandum 
delivered solely to accredited investors), so that investors have professionally approved 
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information before making any investment decision.
94
  These detailed disclosure rules are 
considered effective because the issuer is in the best position to accumulate mineral resource 
estimates, and it is material information to investors generally,
95
 even if the cost to acquire such 
information exceeds the value of any particular transaction.  
Another example is noted by Georgakopoulos
96
: shareholders typically do not vote at 
shareholder meetings or control management.  Without securities regulations requiring ongoing 
(and often expensive to produce) disclosure, most corporations would prefer spending retained 
earnings on long-term, more strategic, projects.  Disclosure and market liquidity enhances the 
market generally, which corporations may otherwise choose to ignore.  As Coffee argues, some 
                                                 
94
 National Instrument 51–101 has similar prescriptive requirements for oil and gas activities. 
These rules followed the Bre-X salting scandal, described on page 47 above. 
95
 The “efficient market” model referred to in note 276 , supra, would seem to discourage 
investors from acquiring information about a firm, because the information is so rapidly 
disseminated in the market that no gain can be made from its analysis. (Gilson and Kraakman 
1984) at 572 describes how, even though corporate insiders and exchange specialists can enjoy 
easy access to information that would be too costly for others to obtain, the advantage is quickly 
diminished by information leak and “derivatively informed trading”, i.e. traders can glean 
information by observing the public reports of insider trades. As (Gordon and Kornhauser 1985) 
note, the efficient market theory leads to a paradox: if participants fail to acquire costly 
information, the production of information may diminish generally and the market itself might 
fail to remain efficient.  
96
 (Georgakopoulos 1995), p.95 
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information about issuers is a “public good” that can spread throughout the market for the benefit 
of investors generally.
97
  
Some areas of mandated disclosure may not be so necessary, however.  For a small mining 
exploration company, for example, details about its audit committee, best practice standards, 
written code of business conduct and ethics, and CEO and CFO certifications may not be worth 
the cost.  Disclosure which is tailored to the needs of venture issuers and their investors is 
consistent with proposed National Instrument 51-103, which is designed to “improve access to 
key information and facilitate informed decision-making by venture issuer investors by tailoring 
disclosure requirements to the circumstances of venture issuers, eliminating certain disclosure 
obligations that may be of less value to venture issuer investors, and providing supplemental 
disclosure that…is relevant to venture issuer investors.”  By tailoring disclosure for venture 
issuers, the intent of NI 51-103 is to “allow venture issuer management more time to focus on the 
growth of their company's business by reducing the time venture issuer management must spend 
                                                 
97
 (Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System 1984) at 
725. Coffee describes how research is likely to be undercompensated because market news is 
leaked so easily. Thus, the gatherers of such information, including analysts, do not retain the 
benefits of accumulating market information (the “free rider” problem) and so it should be 
treated as a public good. So long as free riders do not pay, market information will be 
underprovided, especially as investors use discount brokers. 
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reading and trying to understand disclosure requirements through reducing the overall length and 
complexity of the instruments…and streamlining and reducing disclosure redundancies.”98 
As Sarra notes, proportionate disclosure should be based on what is relevant to investors. 
Investors in a junior venture may attach considerable importance to the track record of 
management in finding the resource or mineral sought, in building equity, and in securing 
mineral rights or licences, probable reserves, or intellectual property rights in the case of some 
sectors such as biotechnology. In contrast, detailed financial statements with extensive notes may 
not be as important to the investors of venture issuers.
99
   
 
Some Recent Securities Law Reports 
 
Various studies have advocated principles–based regulation, often in the context of promoting a 
federal securities commission. 
 
                                                 
98
 On July 25, 2013, the Canadian Securities Regulators published CSA Notice 51-340, which 
said that “After reviewing the comments received and further consideration, we have determined 
not to pursue the implementation of proposed NI 51-103. However, we are currently considering 
implementing some of the proposals within proposed NI 51-103 as amendments within the 
existing regulatory regime for venture issuers.” 
99
 (Sarra 2008) at p.14 
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1979 Federal Proposals 
 
In 1979, the federal government published a three–volume treatise entitled “Proposals for a 
Securities Market Law for Canada” (the “1979 Proposals”). The 1979 Proposals contained draft 
legislation, commentary and fourteen comprehensive studies supporting a national securities 
regulator. One of its authors, Williamson, argued that investor protection and market efficiency 
would best be achieved through a national marketplace. In the 1970s, computerized systems for 
trading were centralizing markets in Canada and the US, and so, according to Williams, 
regulators needed to centralize to manage the new technology. For example, the Toronto Stock 
Exchange’s work on CATS (“computerized assisted trading system”) started in 1969 and testing 
started in 1977. The Montreal Stock Exchange was faced with a dilemma: Over 90 per cent of its 
firms also belonged to the Toronto exchange. The Montreal exchange, with resources 
considerably smaller than Toronto, could not economically compete, so Montreal proposed the 
development of a Canada–wide trading system, to discourage its brokerage business from 
emigrating to Toronto. The Toronto, Vancouver and Alberta exchanges, and the Investment 
Dealers Association, adopted Montreal’s proposal by 1975. Williamson argued that competition 
with US electronic trading systems and reduced commissions south of the border, required 
systems for better operational efficiency and the centralization of electronic trading in Canada.
100
 
                                                 
100
 (Anisman, et al. 1979) Chapter 1, “Capital Markets” pp.104–131 
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To regulate this centralization, the argument was that Canada should adopt a national securities 
commission. 
Although computerized trading seemed to require centralization and harmonization of rules, 
other authors of the 1979 Proposals noted the complex politics of securities regulation. Howard 
described how legislatures, for political reasons, delegate to commissions outside of government 
departments, the resolution of problems too complex for ordinary bureaucrats, who normally 
apply static rules and standards. As Howards notes, “…[A] commission can take on a novel and 
complex task, explore and analyze an industry, apply its expertise to refine very broad statutory 
policy through adjudication and regulation–making, and maintain continuous oversight of the 
regulated market or industry to determine the effectiveness of that policy.”101 Howard’s analysis 
parallels the comments later in this paper (see Rules and Complexity, Rules and Precision and 
Rules and Risk). When faced with a complex field such as securities trading, detailed rules can 
become a tangled web as the regulator tries to anticipate and correct all risks. Principles–based 
regulation, on the other hand, gives the regulator flexibility to adapt principles to new 
circumstances. The draft Securities Act in the 1979 Proposals avoided precise, technical 
language. One its authors Philip Anisman said that the draft was written “in a clear manner  that 
would be understandable to a knowledgeable layman without losing the precision required in 
technical legislation.”102  
                                                 
101
 (Anisman, et al. 1979) at .1614–1615 
102
 (P. Anisman 1981) at343 
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Nothing came of the 1979 Proposals, however, because of the resistance to federal control over 
securities regulation at the time. There were also political concerns: Quebec was disputing the 
federal repatriation of the constitution with its new Charter of Rights—federal expansion into 
provincial regulation of securities could have exacerbated the constitutional and political 
debate.
103
 
1994 Ontario Securities Commission proposals 
 
The topic of a federal securities regulator lay relatively dormant until 1994, when the OSC 
published a proposal by the Atlantic provinces which contemplated a Canadian Securities 
Commission, headquartered in Toronto, reporting to the Minister of Finance of Canada.   
Flexibility and responsiveness to local concerns would be achieved through regional offices in 
British Columbia, Alberta and one of the Atlantic Provinces—Quebec was not expected to 
participate. After some initial interest and comment, the proposal lay dormant until the federal 
government revived it in a 1996 Throne Speech.
104
 At a first ministers’ conference in June 1996, 
the federal and provincial governments (excluding British Columbia and Québec) endorsed the 
concept of giving securities regulation to a federally–run commission. The parties expected a 
formal agreement within a few months, with draft legislation to follow. However, the 1996 
                                                 
103
 See the review in (Harris 2002) pp. 20–24.  As of April 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada is 
hearing a reference case, to determine if the federal government has the constitutional power to 
regulate securities under the “trade and commerce” head of power, or whether jurisdiction is 
purely provincial under the “property and civil rights” power.  See (Campbell and McLeod 2011) 
104
 (Harris 2002), p.27 
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revival proved short–lived, and the topic of Canadian securities regulatory reform once again 
dropped from the political agenda.
105
 
 
2002 Wise Person’s Committee 
 
In the fall of 2002, Harold MacKay delivered a report on securities regulatory reform to the 
federal Minister of Finance and recommended the establishment of the Wise Persons’ Committee 
(the “WPC”) to review the existing securities regulatory system and propose an appropriate 
model for the future. After an exhaustive research and public consultation process, the WPC 
published “It’s Time” in December 2003. The report recommended a cooperative model of 
securities regulation involving the federal and provincial governments. The WPC concluded that, 
if the cooperative approach was not successful, the federal government had the authority to 
regulate in the field of securities matters and should use that authority to create a national 
securities regulator. 
 
2006 Crawford Panel 
 
In May 2005, Ontario’s Minister of Government Services asked Purdy Crawford to chair the 
                                                 
105
 (Harris 2002), p.35 
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“Crawford Panel on a Single Canadian Securities Regulator”. Its terms of reference were to 
recommend a framework for a common securities regulator. Its “Blueprint for a Canadian 
Securities Commission” in June 2006 argued that inconsistencies between jurisdictions would be 
reduced and regulations would be easier to follow under a central regulator. The panel consulted 
widely with capital market participants as well as federal and provincial ministers and officials, 
securities regulators and other informed parties. The panel’s third “message”, from those with 
whom they consulted, was that “small and medium–sized enterprises require special regulatory 
attention to reduce compliance costs and help them access capital as efficiently as possible” and 
their fifth message was “to have as much principles–based regulation as is feasible, to replace 
bureaucratic legalese with plain language and to make the system more user friendly.”  
 
2009 Expert Panel 
 
The Expert Panel on Securities Regulation in Canada published its final report and 
recommendations on January 12, 2009, entitled “Creating an Advantage in Global Capital 
Markets”. The Expert Panel was appointed by Canada’s Minister of Finance (see above at page 
33). It made a number of recommendations, including a national regulator and principles–based 
regulation. It commissioned seven research studies to support its deliberations, some of which 
are discussed later in this paper, including Cristie Ford’s “Principles–Based Securities 
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Regulation”106 and Janis Sarra’s report “Proportionate Securities Regulation: The Potential for 
Scaled Treatment of Junior Issuers”107.  
The Expert Panel noted that capital markets are becoming increasingly sophisticated and 
dynamic. Principles–based regulation would better achieve regulatory outcomes since it would 
give businesses greater flexibility to adapt compliance practices to the latest innovations in the 
capital markets. This topic is discussed elsewhere in this paper—see, for example, reference to 
the empirical study in which the BC Securities Commission compared the current, rules–based, 
account supervision system of the Investment Dealers Association (“IDA”) with the principles–
based, B.C. proposal (“Effectiveness of Principles” at page 94). 
The Expert Panel argued that businesses, under principles–based regulation, when confronted 
with an ambiguous situation, would be responsible for actively developing and managing 
compliance practices to achieve the desired regulatory outcomes. This topic is discussed in the 
section of this paper titled “Principles and Regulatory Collaboration.” Principles–based 
regulation might facilitate better enforcement actions by being able to hold businesses 
accountable for rule infractions as well as actions that, although technically compliant, violate 
the public interest. This topic is discussed under the general topic of the “Rules Approach” in 
this paper.   
                                                 
106
 (Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation, A Research Study 2009) 
107
 (Sarra 2008) 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review – Rules, Principles and Compliance 
 
This chapter reviews the academic literature regarding rules and principles. It begins with a 
description of the rules approach; then discusses the complexity, precision and language of rules. 
The principles approach is discussed, and how, in order to flesh out principles, the regulator and 
community must learn to collaborate.   
To assess rules or principles requires a consideration of what makes regulations effective, and to 
do that, the regulatory goals of “risk–based”, “responsive”, “outcomes–oriented” and 
“proportionate” regulation are discussed in this chapter.  
Governance theory is addressed.  The choice of rules or principles must take into account how 
regulations are translated and implemented through organizations. Large issuers may have more 
resources for legal experts to interpret rules, but smaller issuers may have more direct contact 
with its employees and may find compliance easier to monitor.  “Meta-regulation” is discussed, 
in which principles are set by the regulator, with discretion to participants to implement 
procedures to achieve these principles.   
Also discussed are theories of regulatory compliance—why do the regulated comply? What 
motives are in play? It is not enough for regulations to make sense or to be laudable; they must 
be followed, and so, the mix of rules and principles should take into account compliance 
motives. 
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Conflicts of interest are discussed.  As noted in chapter one, a significant percentage of Canada’s 
public companies have controlling or major shareholders
108
 and Canadian securities regulation 
seeks to protect minority investors in the context of related–party and going private transactions. 
How should conflicts of interest be regulated—with detailed rules or broad principles? 
Also reviewed in this chapter are the rules/principles language strategies in other fields of 
regulation, in order to draw comparisons.  Income tax compliance, accounting standards, 
competition laws and other fields are reviewed to see what mix of rules and principles they use, 
how effective they are, and whether analogies can be made to securities regulation. 
 
Rules Approach 
 
In a rules–based approach, detailed rules prescribe all of the “do’s and don’ts”. Most traffic laws, 
for example, are rules–based. Speed limits say “Maximum—100 km/hr” rather than “Don’t drive 
too fast”. Signs say “Stop”, “No Left Turn”, “Yield”, or “Watch for Children”. There is little 
room for interpretation in traffic rules, with the exception of a few offences such as “careless” 
driving. As Sunstein argues, in a rules–based regime,  
                                                 
108
 See “Controlling shareholders of venture issuers”, above at p.38 
 69 
 
“…an assessment of facts, combined with an ordinary understanding of grammar, 
semantics, and diction and of conventions – and more substantive ideas on which there is 
no dispute—is usually sufficient to decide the case.” 109 
 
Rules can be simple or complex. “A law could say, for example, that no one under eighteen may 
drive. Or it could be somewhat more complex, by saying that people under eighteen may not 
drive unless they pass certain special tests. [And] it could be quite complex, creating a formula 
for deciding who may drive.”110 
Rules can be general or specific. A general rule may prohibit driving more than 50 km/hr. on any 
city road. A specific rule may prohibit driving more than 40 km/hr. near a particular school.  
Advocates for rules say they enhance certainty because outcomes are forbidden ex ante. As 
Wallison
111
 argues, clearly stated rules, with predictable meaning and scope, reduces 
administrative discretion and allows participants to focus on matters other than compliance. 
Braithwaite argues that vague principles are “a common affliction of regulatory standards, 
especially those that rely on such open–ended terms as ‘in the public interest’, ‘feasible’, or 
                                                 
109
 (Sunstein 1995), at 962 
110
 (Sunstein 1995), at 962  
111
 (Wallison 2007). Also, as Sunstein notes, supra note 109, at 977: “A special advantage of 
rules is that because of their fixity, ex ante quality, and generality, they make it unnecessary for 
citizens to ask an official for permission to engage in certain conduct. Rules turn citizens into 
right–holders, able to expect certain treatment as a matter of right. Standards, guidelines, or 
factors are more likely to make citizens into supplicants, requesting official help.”  
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‘reasonable.’112 As David Brown, former Chair of the Ontario Securities Commission, wrote in 
an open letter regarding securities regulation: 
“To force market participants to determine what is expected of them is to shift the 
regulatory burden down to those participants. To force investors to interpret a set of 
principles and to make a judgement as to whether their application by an issuer or 
registrant is adequate is neither efficient nor would it inspire confidence. We believe that 
rules are necessary to amplify and clarify clearly articulated principles.”113 
 
 
Rules and Complexity 
 
Although a rule can be clearly worded and have a predictable meaning on its own, it can become 
uncertain if juxtaposed with other rules.
114
 For example, consider parking in downtown Toronto, 
with signs: “No Parking between 12:00 and 6:00”, “No Stopping between 7:00 and 9:00 a.m.”, 
                                                 
112
 (Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty 2002), at p. 4–  
(The Task Force 2006) (p.14, #57) “the ‘contrary to the public interest’ regulatory tool be used 
sparingly and only with the greatest care if the behaviour which is criticized has not been 
publicly identified in advance as unacceptable. Where the behaviour that is criticized has not 
been publicly identified, the contrary to the public interest provision should only be used if the 
conduct is egregious and a reasonable person in the circumstances would view it to be contrary 
to the public interest. If the conduct is not egregious, the public should be duly warned before 
any enforcement action is taken. The risk that so–called “gotcha” enforcement brings the entire 
securities enforcement apparatus into disrepute must not be overlooked”  
113
 (D. Brown, Open letter to BC Securities Commission: Comment on the proposed BCSC 
model 2003). 
114
 (Expert Panel on Securites Regulation 2009) at p.55 
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“Tow Away Zone”, “No Standing”. Each rule on its own is clear enough, but their applicability 
becomes complicated as their numbers increase.  
Despite its clear language, a rule sometimes requires an understanding of its purpose.
115
 As 
Braithwaite says, certainty does not flow so much from the precision of the words used as it does 
from a tacit understanding within a community as to objectives.
116
 Braithwaite describes how 
rules are more certain when the field is “simple, stable and does not involve huge economic 
risks” (e.g. traffic laws). But where the field is “complex, changing and involves large economic 
interests” (e.g. securities law), principles are more certain.117 Braithwaite found that, with 
nursing home regulation, experienced practitioners reason by analogy when faced with a thicket 
of complex rules. They look through the surface features of a problem and identify the key 
relationships and principles involved (which is why Braithwaite advocates principles for nursing 
home regulation.  Nelson argues that task complexity generally harms judgment by encouraging 
coping strategies. For accounting standards, practitioners often complain that voluminous rules 
create such a “standards over–load” that very few are able to absorb. Coping strategies include 
disregarding potentially important information and combining information in simplistic ways.
118
 
                                                 
115
 (L. Fuller 1958) at 663 The example he gives is, a rule may say “no vehicles in the park”, but 
is the mounting of a World War II truck on a pedestal in the park for memorial purposes also 
prohibited? 
116
 (Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty 2002) at p.71 
117
 (Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty 2002) at p.75 
118
 (M. Nelson 2003) at p.94 
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Some complex accounting transactions can be regulated by rules if they have predictable 
characteristics – for example, leases with a contractually defined cash flow, because numerical 
thresholds can specify lease life and remaining value. Other accounting topics are less 
predictable and require judgment—for example, estimates of the probability of something 
occurring are better regulated with principles.
119
 
The Enron debacle (where debt–ridden, “special purpose entities” were structured in tortured 
ways to avoid consolidation on Enron’s balance sheet) is an example of detailed rules gone bad; 
arguably, had the substance of these technical transactions been reported, the Enron bubble 
would have burst earlier.
120
 But as Paul Williams says, things may have been just as bad under a 
principles–based approach:  
“All the principles in the world are not going to lead to better reporting so long as the 
culture of Big 4 professional accounting remains as it is. If Andersen manipulated the 
rules to allow Enron to misrepresent itself imagine how much more creative one can be 
when one only has a principle defining the boundaries!”121 
                                                 
119
 (M. Nelson 2003) at pp.94–95 
120
 According to Robert Kershaw, the common – though mistaken – view in the United Kingdom 
is that it avoided Enron style scandal in the early years of this millennium because its approach 
to accounting regulation is principles-based rather than rules based. (Kershaw 2005) The dispute 
has receded somewhat, given recent transnational convergence of accounting principles around 
International Financial Reporting Standards. See, e.g., News Release, FASB and IASB Reaffirm 
Commitment to Enhance Consistency, Comparability and Efficiency in Global Capital Markets 
(Feb. 27, 2006), <http://www.fasb.org/news/nr022706.shtml>  
121
 (Williams 2003)  What exactly the “culture of Big 4 professional accounting” is, is not 
defined by Williams. 
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As Wood notes,
122
 additional rules may increase or decrease task complexity, depending on the 
circumstances. Component complexity increases with more rules, coordinative complexity 
increases when a new rule must be considered in light of existing rules, and dynamic complexity 
increases by changing the pattern of rules over time. Adding an exception or precedent heightens 
total task complexity. On the other hand, adding an implementation guideline that sequences the 
decisions necessary to implement a standard, or adding an index that better relates existing rules 
and precedents, can lower total task complexity by reducing coordinative complexity to more 
than offset any increase in component and dynamic complexity. 
Frequent amendments to rules can substantially increase compliance costs. An interesting 
analogy is the cost of corruption. Ogus
123
 assessed the costs of corruption in Zaire, the 
Philippines, and South Korea. Where corruption is unpredictable (as in Zaire), it undermines the 
certainty of property rights and the enforceability of contracts and its impact on the economy is 
worse than where it operates as a predictable charge, like taxation, on productive activities (as in 
South Korea). Similarly, if regulations are frequently amended or reinterpreted, the 
unpredictability can become unmanageable. However, if the cost of securities compliance 
becomes a predictable charge on economic activity, it can be absorbed like taxes.
124
 Ontario 
                                                 
122
 (Wood 1986) and discussed by Nelson (M. Nelson 2003) at pp.94–95 
123
 (Ogus 2004) at p.334 
124
 As to the importance of predictability of regulation, see also Canadian Federation of 
Independent Business Tax Research Series, Report 1, The Hidden Tax Burden, A business 
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securities rules are subject to frequent amendment, comment and re-publication, making them 
difficult to navigate.  This is illustrated by the following page from the OSC website dealing with 
the private placement rule: 
History of 45-106 - Prospectus and Registration Exemptions
125
 
Table 2 Frequency of amending private placement rule 
April 25, 2013 
Proposed Amendments to NI 45-106 Prospectus and Registration Exemptions  
Comments Received 
March 27, 2013 
Proposed Amendments (Related to Modernization of Investment Fund Product 
Regulation (Phase 2)) 
March 14, 2013 
CSA Notice of Consequential Amendments to Registration, Prospectus and 
Continuous Disclosure Rules Related to NI 25-101 Designated Rating Organizations 
September 13, 
2012 
Republication and Request for Comment: Proposed NI 51-103 - Ongoing Governance 
and Disclosure Requirements for Venture Issuers and Related Amendments  
Comments Received 
April 26, 2012 
CSA Staff Notice: 45-308 - Guidance for Preparing and Filing Reports of Exempt 
Distribution under NI 45-106 Prospectus and Registration Exemptions 
April 13, 2012 
Unofficial Consolidation of National Instrument 45-106 and Companion Policy as of 
April 13, 2012 
November 10, 
2011 
Public Consultation: CSA Staff Consultation Note: 45-401 - Review of Minimum 
Amount and Accredited Investor Exemptions 
June 15, 2011 CSA Staff Notice 11-315 - Extension of Consultation Period 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
perspective on the cost of complying with taxes, August 2008: “property taxes ranked higher 
when business owners were asked which forms of taxation affect the growth of their business the 
most. This suggests that with respect to property taxes it may not be complying with the tax that 
is such an issue, but rather the unpredictable changes or increases in property taxes that we 
typically see from year to year.” 
125
 At <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/15126.htm> accessed May 2012 
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April 1, 2011 
Request for Comments: Proposed Amendments to NI 45-106  
Comments Received 
December 10, 
2010 Final: IFRS-Related Amendments to Securities Rules and Policies 
December 10, 
2010 
Notice of Ministerial Approval of IFRS-Related Amendments to Securiities Rules and 
Regulation 1015 under the Securities Act 
October 1, 2010 
Notice of IFRS-Related Amendments to NI 45-106 Prospectus And Registration 
Exemptions and Companion Policy 45-106CP Prospectus And Registration 
Exemptions 
April 23, 2010 
Proposed Consequential Amendments to NI 51-102: Request for Comment: NI 43-
101 Standards of Disclosure for Mineral Projects  
Comments Received 
November 27, 
2009 
CSA Staff Notice: 45-304 - Notice of Local Exemptions Related to NI 45-106 
Prospectus and Registration Exemptions and NI 31-103 Registration Requirements 
and Exemptions 
October 16, 2009 
CSA Notice and Request for Comment – Proposed Amendments to National 
Instrument 45-106 Prospectus and Registration Exemptions 
September 18, 
2009 Amendments 
September 18, 
2009 Notice of Ministerial Approval of Repeal and Replacement 
July 17, 2009 National Instrument: NI - 45-102 - Resale of Securities 
July 17, 2009 
Notice of Commission Approval of Repeal and Replacement: NI - 45-102 - Resale of 
Securities 
May 22, 2009 Notice and Request for Comment: NI - 45-102 - Resale of Securities 
February 29, 2008 
Notice and Request for Comment: NI - 45-102 - Resale of Securities  
Comments Received 
January 6, 2006 Notice of Ministerial Approval: NI - 45-106 - Prospectus and Registration Exemptions 
January 6, 2006 
Ontario Amending Instrument: NI - 45-106 - Prospectus and Registration 
Exemptions 
December 9, 2005 Notice: NI - 45-106 - Prospectus and Registration Exemptions 
December 9, 2005 Amendment: NI - 45-106 - Prospectus and Registration Exemptions 
December 2, 2005 CSA Staff Notice: NI - 45-106 - Prospectus and Registration Exemptions 
October 21, 2005 Request for Comment 
October 21, 2005 CSA Request for Comment 
October 7, 2005 Notice of Correction: NI - 45-106 - Prospectus and Registration Exemptions 
September 9, 
2005 
CSA Staff Notice: 45-304 - Notice of Local Exemptions Related to NI 45-106 - 
Prospectus and Registration Exemptions 
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September 9, 
2005 Notice of Ministerial Approval 
September 9, 
2005 National Instrument and Consequential Amendments 
July 8, 2005 CSA Table of Concordance: NI - 45-106 - Prospectus and Registration Exemptions 
July 8, 2005 National Instrument and Consequential Amendments 
July 8, 2005 
Notice of Commission Approval: NI - 45-106 - Prospectus and Registration 
Exemptions 
December 17, 
2004 
Notice: NI - 45-106 - Prospectus and Registration Exemptions  
Comments Received 
 
Rules and Precision 
 
“Bright–line” rules may appear to be precise because they limit discretion. But limiting 
discretion is not necessarily fair. Bright–line rules are arbitrary at the border. They force the 
regulator to distinguish cases even though they could be factually very similar. “A decision 
favoring rules thus reflects the judgment that the danger of unfairness from official arbitrariness 
or bias is greater than the danger of unfairness from the arbitrariness that flows from the 
grossness of rules.”126 
Braithwaite describes how a rule will have a core meaning and a “penumbra”, i.e., a grey area 
where the rule may or may not apply. If the field is complex and subject to change, lawyers may 
“aim for the penumbra” and exploit language uncertainties. “This problem multiplies as the state 
enacts more and more rules to plug loopholes opened by legal entrepreneurs. The thicket of rules 
                                                 
126
 (Sullivan and Amar 1992) at p.62 
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we end up with becomes a set of sign–posts that show the legal entrepreneur precisely what they 
have to steer around to defeat the purposes of the law.”127   
It is not just lawyers, acting as legal entrepreneurs, who “aim for the penumbra”. Nelson 
describes how auditors will usually not require their clients to adjust aggressive reporting 
structured to meet precise standards. Precise standards can create targets that managers use to 
achieve particular accounting objectives.
128
 
As staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission described in a report to the United 
States House of Representatives, in a rule-based system, accountants tend to develop a "check–
list" mentality. Rather than take responsibility for determining whether financial reporting fully 
reflects the objectives in an accounting standard, they mechanically check that the treatment is 
not prohibited by the "bright–line" standards within GAAP. One unintended consequence is that 
the rules themselves come to serve as a roadmap in structuring transactions that appear 
sanctioned by the rules, but which are, in fact, misleading. “To the financial engineer seeking to 
                                                 
127
 (Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty 2002), at 56. See also (Black, 
Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation 2008), where she describes an “interpretive 
paradox” of principles: “although principles may facilitate interpretation of the regulatory 
objectives and responsibilities of firms more clearly for some, they can also impede 
interpretation for others, particularly lawyers.” 
128
 (M. Nelson 2003) at p. 10. On the other hand, as Nelson notes, “there are situations in which 
auditors know more about precise accounting rules than do their clients, and therefore are better 
able to identify the specific rules and precedents that prohibit a client–preferred accounting 
treatment. However, another explanation is that auditors’ negotiating positions are particularly 
strong when they can point to precise rules that preclude the client’s preferred accounting 
treatment.” At p. 10. 
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structure transactions that transform debt into equity, shift revenue recognition, create an 
operating rather than a capital lease, or otherwise obscure the financial condition of a reporting 
company, the rules do not constrain so much as merely constitute challenging puzzles.”129 
The reverse is also true—the application of complex rules can be unpredictable, giving the 
regulator too much power. The thicket of rules can obscure activity and strangle innovation. As 
Braithwaite notes, “The larger the smorgasbord of standards, the greater the discretion of 
regulators to pick and choose an enforcement cocktail tailored to meet their own objective. A 
proliferation of more specific laws is a resource to expand discretion, not a limitation upon it.”130 
Colin Diver distinguishes three elements of regulatory precision: “transparency”, “accessibility” 
and “congruence”.131 Transparent rules are those which are easily applied within a relevant 
community; for example, driving over the speed limit or failing to pay at a toll bridge. Some 
terms are transparent only to a subset of the population; for example, the legal terms “obscenity”, 
“reasonable care” and “insanity” are too vague for the general population, but the legal 
community of lawyers and judges can apply them from case law. Accessible rules are those 
                                                 
129
 Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the 
United States Financial Reporting System of a Principles–Based Accounting System” U.S. 
Securities Exchange Commission, 07/25/2003 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.htm 
130
 (Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty 2002) at 64 
131
 (Diver 1984) p.67 
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which can be easily understood, though not necessarily easily applied. Congruent rules are those 
which produce a socially desired behaviour. 
132
 
Diver argues that rules usually require a tradeoff between their transparency, accessibility and 
congruence. For example, consider the following formulations of a rule to retire pilots when the 
risk of accident becomes unacceptable: 
Model I: No person may pilot a commercial airplane after his sixtieth birthday.  
Model II: No person may pilot a commercial airplane if he poses an unreasonable risk of an 
accident. 
Model III: No person may pilot a commercial airplane if he falls within one of the following 
categories. (There follow tables displaying all combinations of values for numerous variables, 
including years and level of experience, hours of air time logged, age, height, weight, blood 
pressure, heart rate, eyesight, and other vital signs, that would disqualify a pilot from further 
eligibility to pilot aircraft.)” 
Model I is transparent because age is easily understood and measured, but it can ground pilots 
who should fly and it can overlook pilots who should be grounded. Model II may be congruent 
                                                 
132
 (Diver 1984) p.67 
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with underlying safety goals, but is so vague as to be inaccessible. Model III may seem objective 
but difficult to apply.
133
 
Diver argues that, when drafting a particular rule, its transparency, accessibility and congruence 
should be prioritized. For example, definitions of criminal liability should be precise (for 
predictability), whereas sentencing should be principles–based (to achieve congruence and 
rehabilitation).
134
 Licensing should be principles–based to achieve congruence (since there are so 
many factors to consider), whereas prohibitions should be precise and transparent.
135
 Internal 
rules (which regulate the various branches of the regulator) should be principles–based and 
external rules (which regulate the public) should be more transparent, since “agency personnel 
are typically more homogeneous than the regulated public” and will develop a shared 
understanding of principles.
136
 
Applying Diver’s analysis to securities regulation, licensing market participants, such as brokers 
and public accountants, should be principles-based, with a discretion to consider the many 
                                                 
133
 (Diver 1984)73–74. Diver summarizes the effect of increased precision in a rule: (i) it will 
increase the rate of compliance since it is easily understood, (ii) it will increase the arbitrary 
distinction between intended and unintended application, (iii) it will increase the social cost of 
formulating the rule since “regulatory line–drawing increases the risk of misspecification and 
sharpens the focus of value conflicts”, and (iv) it will decrease the cost of enforcement since it is 
more easily applied. 
134
 (Diver 1984) pp.77–78 
135
 (Diver 1984) p.79 
136
 (Diver 1984) p.76 
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factors comprising “good character” before granting a licence. Enforcement regulations should 
be rules–based, precise and transparent, to enhance predictability. Also, the more homogeneity 
there is among a regulated group, the more that principles should be used. Diver’s reference to 
the homogeneity of a group and the use of principles is similar to the analysis of “interpretative 
communities”, described later in this paper (page 164). 
Ellinghaus and Wright
137
 conducted three experiments involving the participation of 1800 
subjects (law students and non–law students) in the resolution of contract disputes and the 
evaluation of judgments, using three different law models: (1) the common law of contracts, 
which mediates broad principles with detailed rules; (2) UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts, a model code with 194 articles; and (3) The Australian Contract Code, a 
model code, which has only 27 Articles with commentary of 47 short paragraphs (Article 3 of 
which states: “Neither past nor future decisions govern the application of the Code.”—thus 
reliance on broad principles under the Australian Contract Code was overt.)  
Students were given the facts of ten disputes and a statement of relevant law, either as broad 
principles or detailed rules. The disputes had all produced split decisions by the Australian 
appellate court. Five of the disputes were classified as “easy” and five were classified as 
“harder”. Participants were asked to decide the outcome and consensus was measured by the 
proportion of participants agreeing with the majority decision in each case. For the “easy” cases, 
they found a large consensus when students used broad principles and a moderate consensus 
                                                 
137
 (Ellinghaus and Wright 2005)  
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when students used detailed rules. For harder cases, consensus was moderate under both the 
principles and rules–based models. Ellinghaus and Wright concluded that broad principles 
promote greater consensus, especially in easier cases.
138
 “Detailed rules seem to have a tendency 
to increase the scope for plausible disagreement over the outcome of simple disputes, thus 
possibly promoting litigation. On the other hand, broad principles appear to make it clear when a 
decision is difficult, thus possibly leading to outcomes that are more just.”139 Judgments based on 
principles were more likely to be based on fairness.
140
 “The direct application of broad 
                                                 
138
 Braithwaite seems to propose a similar test in (Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of 
Legal Certainty 2002) at p.60: “One research strategy would be to persuade a media company, 
say Court TV, to try a large number of cases twice with a panel of retired judges in a randomised 
controlled trial. Or retired judges could be hired to make real awards to real volunteer litigants in 
a laboratory setting. The objective would be to assess whether different judges deciding the same 
case using the rules of existing law would be statistically more likely to deliver consistent 
judgements than judges and/or juries instructed to rely only on a set of prescribed legal 
principles. A prediction of research questions 1 and 2 would be that rule–based decisions would 
prove more consistent with simple matters, principle–based decisions more consistent for 
complex matters. To add thrther research and viewer interest to a Court TV program, litigants 
and observers could be polled on whether they found the rule of principles or the rule of rules 
procedurally and substantively fairer, more respecting of their rights, win–win, win–lose, lose–
lose, more dignified, less damaging to human relationships and so on. As our research group has 
found in Canberra, randomised controlled trials to courtroom adjudication of legal cases are very 
difficult to do, technically and politically. But it can be done and must be done if we want 
empirical answers to what are empirical questions.”  
139
 (Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty 2002) p. 22 
140
 (Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty 2002) p. 28 
 83 
 
principles, which implies the relegation of mediating rules to the status of illustrations, is, if 
anything, more likely to produce more just and predictable results.”141 
Rules and Risk  
 
Precise rules can obscure risk. Driving under the speed limit is not a “safe harbour”—it won’t 
protect us if we drive 100 km/hr in dangerous conditions, such as fog.
142
 Many disasters follow a 
common pattern—managers focus on technical compliance but fail to notice anomalies. The 
assessment of risk is often, and perhaps always, subjective.
143
 When all participants comply with 
                                                 
141
 (Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty 2002) pp. 28–29 
142
 (Braithwaite, Making Tax Law More Certain: A Theory 2002) at p.6. In Ontario, principles of 
safety are enforced by the somewhat vague offences of “careless driving” and “dangerous 
driving”. 
143
 The notion that a risk assessment could be entirely objective is suspect, since facts and truth 
do not present to one’s mind unfiltered by one’s perception.  Objective and subjective is a matter 
of degree.  (Trebilcock and Fraiberg 1998) argue that the regulatory process often overreacts to 
small and speculative risks while leaving larger and more certain risks unattended (at 838) 
because of difficulties in understanding probabilistic processes, biased media coverage, 
misleading personal experiences. Instead of judiciously assessing the magnitude of the risks that 
are subject to citizen demands and weighing the costs and benefits of regulation, governments 
frequently respond with highly visible, direct forms of regulation, such as ex ante or ex post bans 
on hazardous products, and ex ante or ex post minimum standard setting. Often this results in 
over–regulation of some risks and the under–regulation of others (at p.842) 
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the regulator’s rules and risk model, they can all react in the same way, exacerbating a crisis.144  
Some outcomes are not easily measured. Peter May describes how some systems are too 
complex or the outcomes may be unobservable. For example, the safety of a nuclear power plant 
cannot be directly observed, nor can the safety of a building with respect to earthquakes, fire, or 
other potential harms.
145
  
As Power notes, when rules are complex, middle–managers focus on process rather than 
substance, and where this ‘risk game’ is closely bound up with a ‘blame game’ the effect can be 
highly defensive reactions from organizational participants. For example, in the face of new 
reporting responsibilities for professionals relating to money laundering, a wave of ‘defensive 
reporting’ is being anticipated as a risk management strategy, reducing the usefulness of the 
regulations, because authorities may be overwhelmed with information.
146
 
                                                 
144
 For example, managerial and auditor certifications, which do not challenge the “notional 
normality” of the details of what is to be certified, can constrain diversity and adaptability. 
(Power 2004)  
145
 (May 2003) at p.386 
146
 (Power 2004) p. 46. See also (US Securities Exchange Commission 2003): “Internal 
inconsistencies, exceptions and bright–line tests reward those willing to engineer their way 
around the intent of standards.2 This can result in financial reporting that is not 
representationally faithful to the underlying economic substance of transactions and events. In a 
rules–based system, financial reporting may well come to be seen as an act of compliance rather 
than an act of communication. Additionally, because the multiple exceptions lead to internal 
inconsistencies, significant judgment is needed in determining where within the myriad of 
possible exceptions an accounting transaction falls.” 
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Haines and Sutton describe the dilemma facing the chief engineer (the manager) of a public 
hospital when faced with a “plethora of rules and regulatory standards”. A “juridification” 
develops, in which detailed rules overwhelm and effectively strangle the manager’s judgment, 
undermining the likelihood of effective compliance.
147
 As the Regulatory Burden Task Force 
Report to the Ontario Securities Commission noted  
“Prescriptive rules can ossify the relationship between regulator and regulated. Where 
behaviour is exhaustively prescribed, the regulator becomes enforcer, not problem solver. 
In recent years the Ontario Securities Commission has adopted a more prescriptive rules–
based regime. It should come as no surprise, then, that legal practitioners have said that 
Staff “is typically reluctant to sit down and discuss issues of concern, preferring to gather 
information through a prolonged exchange of correspondence.”148 
 
 
 
                                                 
147
 (Haines and Sutton 2003) They also argue that juridification is the product of deep–seated 
crisis tendencies in late modern capitalist democracies. Fiscal and legitimacy problems are 
causing governments and regulatory authorities to pressure the engineer to try to satisfy 
contradictory demands. Simultaneously the engineer must be a cost–conscious entrepreneurial 
risk–manager while not losing sight of the twin role as risk–averse maintainer of professional 
standards. “Ultimately, the resolution of juridification must be a political not a technical exercise. 
Politicians need to be more open about the trade–offs made between risk and economic factors. 
They must acknowledge that satisfying popular and media expectations that risks to people in 
dependent situations (eg hospital patients, airline passengers) be kept to an absolute minimum 
may well require either substantially increasing taxes and/or interefering with markets in other 
ways (eg supporting cartels and protecting professional privilege).” (at p.18) 
148
 (Regulatory Burden Task Force 2003) 
 86 
 
Principles Approach 
 
A principles–based approach uses high–level directives rather than detailed rules. As described 
by Cristie Ford, principles–based regulation uses plain language, fewer details, and is more 
outcome–oriented.149 Of course, most systems use a combination of principles and rules, so it is a 
matter of degree. As Korobkin describes, choosing rules or principles is a choice “among points 
on a spectrum” with rules at one end and principles at the other.150 No regulatory system is 
entirely based on rules or principles, which is why the U.K.’s FSA uses the term “a more 
principles-based approach” in describing its framework.151   
 
Principles and Regulatory Collaboration 
 
Principles–based regulation requires collaboration, in order to flesh out the meaning of broad 
                                                 
149
 (Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation, A Research Study 2009) p.5 
150
 (Korobkin 2000) p. 24–25. Korobkin refers to standards instead of principles, but the same 
considerations apply. 
151
 (Financial Services Advisory 2001) 
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principles. For example, industry should develop best practices to achieve stated principles, 
which the regulator can then monitor and analyze.
152
  
Black advocates a “decentred” approach, since knowledge within an industry is often 
fragmented: “[R]egulation should be a process of coordinating, steering, influencing and 
balancing interactions between actors/systems to organize themselves, using such techniques as 
procedularisation [sp.], collaboration, feedback loops, redundancy, and above all, countering 
variety with variety.”153 Cristie Ford notes that principles–based regulation must be accompanied 
by transparent and accessible guidance from the regulator and the incorporation of industry 
experience and best practices.
154
 In its narrowest sense, guidance means the official comments 
from the regulator, such as policies. In its broader sense, guidance includes the regulator’s 
speeches and “no action” letters. As Ford warns, guidance can be a flexible method of 
communication, but it has to be well–managed—if it resides in too many places, it becomes 
difficult to monitor.
155
 
                                                 
152
 (Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation 2008) 
“content to the principles is to be filled in through cooperative but realistic (and enforcement–
backed) collaboration between industry and regulator, taking advantage of industry’s greater 
contextual knowledge while maintaining a credible regulatory capacity to ensure law-abiding 
behaviour and punish law violators.” 
153
 (Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation 2002) at p.9 
154
 (Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation, A Research Study 2009) at p.9 
155
 (Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation, A Research Study 2009) at p. 12 
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In the U.K., to facilitate communication in the securities market, the FSA appoints a 
“relationship manager” for medium–sized firms, and a “supervisory team” for larger firms. 
According to a FSA letter issued to market participants in April 2006
156
, firms assigned a 
relationship manager should expect them to “be the focal point for your relationship with us”, 
“carry out an open, two–way dialogue with you”, “know your industry”, “know the regulatory 
framework related to your activities”, “assess the major risks posed by you and communicate this 
in detail to you”; and “set out and actively monitor an appropriate and proportionate risk 
mitigation programme for you.”  
For smaller firms, which do not have a relationship manager, the FSA will “engage 
constructively with the firms’ management, talking about regulatory outcomes and what they 
mean for the firm.”157 However, to do this economically,  
“[t]he main contact these firms have with us is through the firm contact centre (which 
handles queries from firms without a dedicated relationship manager), information on our 
website, regulatory returns and occasional ‘themed’ visits (i.e. when we conduct a review 
on a particular topic)… Firm contact centre staff will be able to answer firms’ reasonable 
questions on a timely basis and provide clarity and assurance around our expectations.”158 
 
                                                 
156
 (Advisory Financial Services 2006)  
157
 (Financial Services Authority 2007) 
158
 (Financial Services Authority 2007) p.12 
 89 
 
Prior to the global financial crisis of 2008, the FSA enforcement regime did not take formal 
enforcement action nearly as often as the rules–based U.S. SEC. and UK penalties were not as 
severe. For example, in 2005/06, the financial penalties imposed by the SEC exceeded those 
imposed by the FSA by a ratio of thirty to one, which, even after adjustment for differences in 
market capitalization, still translated into a ten–to–one ratio.159 Rather than focusing on ex–post 
enforcement actions, the FSA tries to maintain an open and cooperative relationship with firms 
based on dialogue, proactive supervision, and a focus on compliance.  However, following the 
2008 global financial crisis, according to Julia Black, the FSA’s deferential approach was 
replaced with a more activist approach by regulators to ensure that the systems and processes 
deliver the right outcomes.
160
 
Fairman and Yapp argue that the ongoing “regulatory encounter” is often more important than 
any particular outcome or sanction. For example, environmental health law in the UK is enforced 
on the ground with discretion and flexibility. It is a negotiated process, where the scope and 
degree of negotiation is contested. The enforcer and business have a continuing relationship 
which tends to be flexible and conciliatory.  
                                                 
159
 (Coffee, Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement 2007) p.2. In addition, as Coffee 
notes, the greater use of public enforcement is paralleled by the corresponding increase in private 
sanctions and class action lawsuits. At pp. 2–3 
160
  (Black, LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 17/2010 2010)At pp.22-23 
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As Braithwaite and Makkai
161
 found, small– and medium– sized businesses comply with the law 
where local authorities use educative enforcement approaches. In the long term, non–coercive 
and informal alternatives are more effective than coercive enforcement.  
As Ford argues, for principles–based regulation to work, the relationship between regulator and 
regulated should be trusting and collaborative, not adversarial or cat–and–mouse. The regulator 
must provide clarity around principles. The regulated must communicate industry experience and 
share information with regulators. This may require a “shift in orientation, and robust 
educational resources and other support—especially for smaller market actors.”162 Puri and 
Condon suggest “a reorientation of the [securities] regulatory approach to more proactive, 
ongoing, organizationally embedded monitoring”, such as requiring written policies and 
documentation of actions taken, new monitoring by sub–committees of the board or compliance 
officers, external auditing of processes, gatekeeper involvement (such as auditors, brokers and 
legal counsel), and enhanced self–reporting of policies.163 However, as Puri notes, the regulatory 
collaboration in the Ontario venture issuers market is generally with issuers and not investors. 
 “…[I]ssuers are more likely than investors to apply pressure on local regulators to 
develop locally and regionally–specific rules and policies. Issuers and their professional 
advisors have frequent and sustained contact with securities regulators and many 
                                                 
161
 (Braithwaite & Makkai 1991) 
162
 (Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation, A Research Study 2009) at p. 22 
163
 (Puri and Condon, The Role of Compliance in Securities Regulatory Enforcement 2006) See 
also (The Task Force 2006) p. 62: “Regulators should focus their attention in areas where 
external gatekeepers are less common and less central to the regulatory system” 
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opportunities to have their views heard… This statement cannot be made with the same 
force about investors.” 164  
 
To encourage regulatory collaboration, the BC Securities Commission has criticized the Expert 
Panel’s proposal which would separate the enforcement and adjudicative functions of the 
national securities commission from its policy functions. According to the BC Commission, 
those who adjudicate securities cases are involved closely with the development and 
implementation of securities law and policy, and so have an extensive background in securities 
regulation and its public interest implications. If the adjudicative arm were separate, a gap would 
develop between the policy objectives and the enforcement outcomes. If that happened, the 
regulator’s ability to regulate markets effectively in the public interest would be seriously 
impaired.
165
 
 
Communicating Principles 
 
To communicate shared principles in a complex area of law, Braithwaite proposes a combination 
of rules and principles (Braithwaite was referring to tax law): “...[L]aws can be written by setting 
                                                 
164
 (Puri, Local and Regional Interests in the Debate on Optimal Securities Regulatory Structure 
2003) at 227 
165
 Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, Submission of the British Columbia Securities 
Commission, July 15, 2008 , p. 9 
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down binding principles, then detailed rules to illustrate how the principles should be applied to 
perhaps a dozen common concrete commercial arrangements. If there are 1000 rare ways of 
setting up the kinds of arrangements covered by the law, but only a dozen are used with any 
frequency then these are the 12 concrete arrangements that should be fleshed out in rules.”166 
Principles should link to clear objectives. As Fairman and Yapp found in the U.K. food service 
industry, rules linked to known risks were most followed because their importance was 
understood. Temperature controls were most complied with, because compliance is relatively 
easy to assess and because inadequately cooking or freezing food is an obvious health risk.
167
 
Standards should be organized to illustrate any relationships between principles. Research in 
psychology and tax law shows that, in a complex field, decision makers will look through the 
                                                 
166
 (Braithwaite, Making Tax Law More Certain: A Theory 2002) at p. 79–80. According to 
Braithwaite,the best way to integrate rules and principles in complex areas of tax law is: (a) 
Define the overarching principles and make them binding on taxpayers; (b) Make one of those 
overarching principles a general anti–avoidance principle; (c) Define a set of rules to cover the 
complex area of tax law; (d) The legislature lays down, perhaps through an Acts Interpretation 
Act, that in a contest between a rule and an overarching principle, it will not be the rule that is 
binding; (e) In a complex field of tax, write specific sets of rules for the most commonly used 
types of transactions or business arrangements; (f) Follow each of the dozen sets of illustrative 
rules with the explanation that the reason for the rules being this way in this concrete situation is 
to honour the overarching principles; (g) When judges fail to do this, reverting to old habits of 
privileging rules, enact a simple statute that says the 11A shelter violates named principles in the 
tax law and should be disallowed in future; (h) Foster educative dialogue with judges, company 
directors and the community about the principles in the tax law (at page 3) 
167
 (Fairman and Yapp 2005) p.491 
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surface features of a problem to identify key relationships.
168
 They reason by analogy, mapping 
relations between standards. As Nelson notes, “Even standards with relatively few rules could 
benefit from increased structure and carefully chosen examples that facilitate analogy 
development.”169 See, for example, the following quote from the US Financial Accounting 
Standards Board regarding audits: 
“Because of developments such as new legislation or the evolution of a new type of 
business transaction, there sometimes are no established accounting principles for 
reporting a specific transaction or event. In those instances, it might be possible to report 
the event or transaction on the basis of its substance by selecting an accounting principle 
that appears appropriate when applied in a manner similar to the application of an 
established principle to an analogous transaction or event.”170 
 
For a principles–based accounting standard, Shortridge and Myring suggest that key objectives 
of good reporting be articulated, with examples. While some rules are necessary, guidance for 
every possible situation should be avoided. Where there is a gap, the reader should be directed 
back to the principles.
171
 As Nelson argues, “Adding an implementation guideline that sequences 
                                                 
168
 (Marchant, et al. 1993) pp. 95–119 
169
 (M. Nelson 2003) p.95 
170
 “The Meaning of Present Fairly in Conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles”, Auditing Standards Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA), paragraph 9, at <http://www.aicpa.org/download/members/div/auditstd/au-00411.pdf 
171
 (Shortridge and Myring 2004) Note: they also say “Many accountants seem to prefer rules–
based standards, possibly because of their concerns about the potential of litigation over their 
exercise of judgment in the absence of bright–line rules. The number of requests for 
implementation guidance received by FASB has always been high, and their significance 
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the decisions necessary to implement a standard, or adding an index that better relates existing 
rules and precedents, could lower total task complexity.”172  
 
Effectiveness of Principles 
 
The BC Securities Commission (“BCSC”) cites the following empirical studies to support 
principles–based securities regulation: 
In November 2003 the BCSC published a regulatory impact analysis comparing the then current, 
rules–based, account supervision system of the Investment Dealers Association (“IDA”) with the 
principles–based, B.C. proposal.173 The IDA requires daily and monthly account reviews for 
trading violations, suitability, and business risk factors. These were detailed reviews, requiring 
daily assessments of each trade against nineteen criteria (and more if a trade is in futures or 
options). There were many thresholds. For example, every account with over $1,500 of 
commissions in a given month had to be reviewed. In contrast, the BC model included general 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
resulted in the formation of the Emerging Issues Task Force. If financial statements conform 
with accepted rules, the bases for a lawsuit are diminished.” 
172
 (M. Nelson 2003) pp. 95–96 
173
 (Wolf 2003)  
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conduct rules (rules against misrepresentation, manipulation, fraud, etc.
174
) and eight broad 
principles (integrity and fairness, etc.)
175
 
The report analyzed four firms: two were national dealers (one, a Toronto bank–owned firm; the 
other, a large but independent local firm) as well as two regional dealers (one, a medium sized 
firm; the other, a small firm). None of the firms found the IDA daily and monthly transaction 
reviews useful in detecting abuses characterized by patterns of behavior, which is where they 
believed the biggest risks were. For example, concentration of securities is a potential problem, 
but the daily and monthly reviews did not aggregate concentration anomalies. Similarly, front 
running and stock manipulation is characterized by patterns of trading behaviour, which were 
difficult to detect through the transactional IDA focus. Each of the firms developed a parallel 
system, to better manage risk. One of the large firms said that it detected 90 per cent of potential 
compliance problems through its proprietary system, which it ran first, and that daily IDA 
reviews caught the remaining 10 per cent of potential problems. Thus, firms developed their own 
                                                 
174
 The BC Model includes general conduct rules for all market participants in Part 10 of the 
Draft Legislation. These include prohibitions against: misrepresentations, manipulation and 
fraud, unfair practices, insider trading or tipping, front running, false or misleading statements to 
the Commission, obstruction of justice. Most of these exist in some form under the current 
legislation. A dealer or adviser who contravenes any of the provisions of the legislation or rules, 
including the Code of Conduct, would be exposed to administrative sanctions, civil liability, and, 
in some cases, criminal prosecution.  
175
 The resulting 28 rules in the Code are arranged under eight broad principles, each addressing 
a key area of investor protection: 1 Integrity and fairness, 2. Dealings with clients, 3. 
Confidentiality, 4. Proficiency, 5. Know your client and suitability, 6. Conflict of interest, 7. 
Compliance systems, 8. Client complaints 
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systems to ensure their accounts were adequately supervised regardless of IDA requirements, for 
civil liability reasons, for reputational reasons, and for good business practice. 
In 2004, the BC Securities Commission completed a survey and found that most enforcement 
cases were prosecuted with principles rather than rules.
176
 The survey was limited and may not 
be very representative, as it analyzed only two decisions and 15 settlements relating to registrant 
misconduct between January 1, 2002 and November 14, 2003. However, of the 66 
contraventions, 68 per cent were in the areas of “know your client” and suitability, fair dealing, 
prudent business practices, misrepresentation and fraud, which are broadly worded, principles–
based, contraventions.  
 
Critique of the Principles–Based Approach 
 
Cunningham argues that broad principles (such as that public companies must "disclose all 
material facts") give the regulator too much power to interpret, after-the-fact, whether principles 
are being achieved, risking arbitrary enforcement.
177
 Better if regulators publish detailed (before-
the-fact) rules, with safe harbours, so that certainty and power is transferred to the regulated. 
                                                 
176
 (British Columbia Securities Commission 2004)  
177
 (Cunningham 2007) . See also (K. Sullivan 1992): “[t]hose who favor rules are skeptical of 
the possibility of normative argument; they believe that supposedly "reasoned elaboration" 
grounded in normative argument is really personal value preferences in thin disguise.” 
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As Wallison notes about the U.S. income tax system, which is heavily rule–based,  
“[Su]ppose that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) were to use a principles–based 
system in which the rule was simply that everyone should pay a fair percentage of his 
income. This general principle would leave the IRS in control of how the rule is 
interpreted and in possession of most of the power associated with the rule.” 178 
 
As the staff of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission note, “Under a principles–only 
standard setting regime, the increased reliance on the capabilities and judgment of preparers and 
auditors could increase the likelihood of retrospective disagreements on accounting treatments. 
In turn, this could result in an increase for both companies and auditors in litigation with both 
regulators and the plaintiffs' bar.”179 
To Black, there is a danger of “over compliance” by the regulated, unless principles are enforced 
in a predictable, rational and consistent manner. Firms may become too conservative, fearing 
after–the–fact penalties. “Over–zealous enforcement action” (whether or not in good faith) will 
lead to a deterioration of the relationship between regulator and regulated.
180
 Law consists in 
                                                 
178
 (Wallison 2007)  
179
 “Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the 
United States Financial Reporting System of a Principles–Based Accounting System” U.S. 
Securities Exchange Commission, 07/25/2003 
<http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.htm> 
180
 (Black, Principles Based Regulation: Risks, Challenges and Opportunities 2007) p.18. See 
also (Black, Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation 2008) at p.4 where she 
describes the communicate paradox of principles: “although [principles based regulation] can 
provide flexibility to firms, allowing them to innovate in the ways that they comply, in practice a 
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drawing lines. If principles are vague and participants believe they were almost prosecuted, they 
may view the “near miss” as a fortunate, but unpredictable, outcome.181 As Gill says, “If you 
draw a bright line in the middle of a room and tell people not to cross it or else something bad 
will happen to them, people will walk confidently right up to that line. But if you tell people 
there is an invisible line somewhere in the middle of the room and if they cross it something bad 
will happen to them, people will tend to stand back from the middle of the room for fear of 
stepping on a line they don’t see.”182 Experimentation and diversity may be constrained when 
firms become too conservative and fearful of litigation. 
To Peter May, there is an opposite danger of “under–compliance” in a principles–based 
approach, unless enforcement is a credible threat. May reviewed New Zealand’s move to a 
performance–based building code in 1986. Detailed rules were replaced with vague objectives, 
such as “protecting people, their health and safety, and the environment”. Unfortunately, market 
competition forced builders to choose the cheapest building solutions. The vague principles were 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
lack of certainty as to what enforcers will accept as compliance can lead firms to adopt quite 
conservative behaviour.” She also describes how regulators too can adopt a too–conservative 
application of principles, where there is little political support for enforcement.  
181
 The concern about over–compliance and “near misses” is described by (Hirsch and Mitchell 
2008) who suggest that the “near miss” psychology is strongest when there is a blizzard of fine 
lines, so that the borders of law are squeezed out of existence. Arguably, principles, which have 
unpredictable or no borders, are even less predictable. 
182
 (Gill 2003) at pp.978–79 
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not enforced by the poorly funded local building authorities, resulting in the “Leaky Building 
Crisis” of the 1990s.183 
Black describes a “proliferation of guidance” in a principles–based system, including: informal 
guidance from speeches, industry guidance, public enforcement actions, decisions, and risk 
assessments.
184
 As regulatory guidance increases, a principles–based regime can become as 
complex as a rules–based regime. “One reason why relatively younger standard setting regimes 
                                                 
183
 (May 2003) pp.391–392 
184
 (Black, Principles Based Regulation: Risks, Challenges and Opportunities 2007) p.15. See 
also (US Securities Exchange Commission 2003) regarding the “objectives oriented” proposal, 
which seems quite similar to a principles approach: “Implementation Guidance – there is a 
demand among accounting professionals for implementation guidance. This can be seen in the 
number of issues that are addressed each year by the EITF, the number of inquiries that the staffs 
of the FASB and SEC receive, and the volume of non–authoritative guidance that is published 
each year. The question is not whether such guidance will be provided, but when and by whom. 
Ultimately, under an objectives–oriented regime, there will still need to be guidance provided 
both at the time a standard is issued and subsequently… the standard setters should provide some 
implementation guidance as a part of a newly issued standard. We believe, however, that the 
amount of detail provided by the standard setter under an objectives–oriented regime would 
likely be less than that provided under a rules–based regime. [comment – sufficient reasons are 
not given why the “objectives oriented” proposal would require less guidance.] Otherwise, the 
guidance would quickly transform what could be an objectives–oriented regime back into a 
rules–based regime, with all the consequent disadvantages discussed herein.”Study Pursuant to 
Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the United States 
Financial Reporting System of a Principles–Based Accounting System” 
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like the IAS appear more principles–based is that they haven’t had as much time to accrete 
rules.”185  
Ford describes how “regulatory creep” can extend a regulator’s scrutiny into new areas of 
jurisdiction.
186
 This can lead to questions of accountability. The FSA can effect significant shifts 
in regulatory policy by promulgating a new interpretation of a principle through discussion 
papers and the like.
187
 
 
Risk–based, Responsive, Outcomes–Oriented and Proportionate Regulation 
 
What makes regulations effective?  To assess this requires a consideration of the topics “risk–
                                                 
185
 (M. Nelson 2003) p. 2 
186
 (Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation, A Research Study 2009) at p.16. See also 
(Black, Making a success of Principles-based regulation 2007) p.198 The example Black gives is 
the FSA extended its review into areas such as “product design” which it had not previously 
regulated.  
187
 (Black, Principles Based Regulation: Risks, Challenges and Opportunities 2007) p.17 The 
requirement on firms to undertake a “TCF programme” [i.e. “Treat Customers Fairly” 
programme] has been imposed without any specific rule being made. TCF has been developed 
quite independently from the handbook. TCF is based on the Principles for Businesses, but it 
reaches much further into the deeper recesses of firms' activities, and indeed those of the retail 
product supply and distribution chain, than the handbook ever did. However, its elaboration has 
not been subject to the consultation processes that the FSA is obliged to go through when making 
rules...there is concern that Principles–based regulation could effectively be used to bypass the 
key statutory requirements to which the FSA is subject when it issues formal rules and guidance. 
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based”, “outcomes–oriented”, “responsive” and “proportionate” regulations. These topics don’t 
easily map onto the principles/rules debate, since they are not so much about language strategy 
as they are about what regulations should achieve and how they should work.  However, the 
choice of rules or principles is not an isolated question.  The best language strategy is one which 
makes securities regulation for venture issuers risk-based, outcomes oriented, responsive and 
proportionate. 
 
Risk-based regulation 
 
“Risk–based” regulation is where the compliance burden is greater or less, depending on the risk 
of non–compliance. It targets the regulator’s resources to problems which are the most likely to 
arise and which could cause the greatest impact, so that resources are effectively employed. It is 
an evidence–based, calculated approach.188 It generally consists of six stages: (i) defining the 
problem and putting it in context (ii) analyzing the risks associated with the problem in context 
(iii) examining options for addressing the risks (iv) making decisions about which options to 
implement (v) taking actions to implement the decisions (vi) conducting an evaluation of the 
                                                 
188
 (Baldwin and Black, Really Responsive Regulation 2008) pp. 59–94 
 102 
 
action’s results.189 It is not just a matter of mathematically calculating the probability and 
magnitude of various harms, but also the “acceptability of risk”.190  
Although risk–based regulation could be applied in either a rules–based or principles–based 
regime, with principles–based regulation, the regulator can more effectively adjust its response. 
In a rules–based regime, there is a danger that all participants will follow one risk model, 
reacting in the same way, potentially exacerbating a crisis.  With diversity comes strength. An 
analogy can be made to monocropping in agriculture.  Monocropping is the high-yield 
agricultural practice of growing a single crop every year on the same land, without crop rotation. 
Corn, soybeans, and wheat are three common crops often grown using monocropping 
techniques.  While an economically efficient system in the short-term, allowing for specialization 
in equipment and production, monocropping can damage the soil ecology and provide an 
unbuffered niche for parasitic species, increasing crop vulnerability to opportunistic insects, 
                                                 
189
 Douglas Powell, “Risk-Based Regulatory Responses in Global Food Trade: A Case Study of 
Guatemalan Raspberry Imports into the United States and Canada, 1996-1998” in G.Bruce 
Doern and Ted Reed, eds., Risky Business. Canada’s Changing Science-Based Policy and 
Regulatory Regime (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 137-138 states that this 
integrative framework for risk managers was developed in 1997 by the U.S. 
Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management. 
190
 Jeremy D. Fraiberg and Michael J. Trebilcock, “Risk Regulation: Technocratic and 
Democratic Tools for Regulatory Reform” (1998), 43 McGill L.J. 835 at 857. 
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plants, and microorganisms. The result is a more fragile ecosystem with an increased 
dependency on pesticides and artificial fertilizers.
191
 
The dangers of uniform response in complex systems are not always caused by regulation, 
however.  Greed and panic can cause uniform response.  For example, the credit crisis of 2008 
was triggered by a complex interplay of government policies that encouraged home ownership, 
providing easier access to loans for sub-prime borrowers, overvaluation of bundled sub-prime 
mortgages based on the theory that housing prices would continue to escalate, compensation 
structures that prioritized short-term deal flow over long-term value creation, and a lack of 
adequate capital holdings from banks and insurance companies to back the financial 
commitments they were making.
 192
 There was a rush to trade in bundled sub-prime mortgages in 
2006 and 2007 caused by the high short-terms commissions—an example of greed taking over 
what should have been careful financial analysis.  Then, in the fall of 2008, there was panic in 
the market when the banks and institutions which held sub-prime mortgage products did not 
know their true value.  Essentially, greed caused the market to swing in a uniform way in 2005 
and 2006, and then panic followed in 2008 as institutions tried to unload their investments. It is a 
familiar “herd instinct” theme in markets, where lack of disclosure, or insufficient time to assess 
disclosure, can cause excessive market reactions. 
                                                 
191
 This is a well-known principle of agriculture (similar to the “don’t put all your eggs in one 
basket” observation).  I am familiar with the science as I have a Bachelor of Science degree in 
Agriculture from the University of Guelph. For further explanation, see “Agriculture Society” at 
<http://agriculturesociety.com/tag/monocropping/> 
192
 (Arner 2009) 
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Arguably, what is needed from the regulator is careful analysis of market risk by applying basic 
principles, rather than applying the rules that may have worked in previous situations.  The UK 
Financial Services Agency (“FSA”) uses a risk–based approach. It identifies the main risks to its 
regulatory objectives, prioritizes them, and then assesses the costs and benefits of alternative 
regulatory tools. The FSA takes a “differentiated approach” to supervision under which fewer 
regulatory resources are devoted to firms designated as “low impact.”193  
In 2002, the OSC issued “Staff Notice 11–719: A Risk–based Approach for More Effective 
Regulation”.194 As then Chair of the OSC, David Brown, stated: 
“With finite resources, we can't attempt to do everything and do it well. A selective 
approach allows us to apply greater scrutiny to the situations most likely to have an 
adverse impact on the capital markets, while reducing the regulatory burden on those 
market participants who pose a lower risk.”195 
 
However, the OSC withdrew Staff Notice 11–719 on December 12, 2008 for the rather cryptic 
reason that its risk–based approach “does not reflect current practice”.  
 
                                                 
193
 (Financial Services Authority 2006) 
194
 This policy was first described in Notice 20 – Selective Review of Prospectuses and Other 
Documents, issued in 1994 (17 O.S.C.B. 4386). 
195
 Ontario Securities Commission News Release, December 19, 2002, at 
<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Media/NewsReleases/2002/nr_20021219_osc-risk-based.jsp> 
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Outcomes-oriented regulation 
 
“Outcomes–oriented” regulation is where the regulatory outcomes achieved are measured against 
the goals or benchmarks pursued. It can be contrasted with “process–based” regulation, which 
measures success according to whether or not processes are followed. Outcomes-oriented 
regulation accepts that there may be more than one process to achieve a regulatory goal.   
Outcomes–oriented regulation is usually principles–based, since the outcomes to be measured 
are usually principles–based goals, but one could conceivably have a system that is both rules–
based and outcomes–oriented.196 
 
Responsive regulation 
 
“Responsive” regulation is where the regulations are enforced through a series of escalating tools 
depending on the seriousness of the violation. At the base of the “regulatory pyramid” is an 
educational, dialogue approach, with informal rewards such as praise, rather than sanctions (“soft 
words before hard”). Then, ascending and more demanding strategies (such as penalties) are 
invoked for serious or repeat non–compliance.197 This approach is “bottom heavy” since most 
action takes place at the base of the enforcement pyramid.  In Ayres and Braithwaite’s view, 
                                                 
196
 (Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation, A Research Study 2009) p. 10 
197
 (Healy and Braithwaite 2006)  
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regulatory agencies are most effective when they are “benign big guns.” That is, regulators can 
“speak softly” and carry “big sticks”, including a hierarchy of increasing sanctions. Punishment 
is “expensive” whereas persuasion is “cheap”. 198   
Although the regulatory pyramid could be used in either a rules–based or principles–based 
regime, with principles–based regulation, the regulator must respond proportionally to any 
unacceptable behavior as part of the “regulatory collaboration” model discussed later in this 
paper from page 86. 
 
Proportionate regulation 
 
“Proportionate” regulation is where regulations are adjusted according to the ability of the 
regulated to comply. For example, the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) uses a 
proportionate approach in its disclosure rule—venture issuers have 120 days to file their annual 
financial statements instead of 90. This recognizes that small issuers lack in–house expertise and 
public auditing firms tend to give their larger clients priority. Giving venture issuers more time is 
a proportionate response which does not significantly compromise investor protection. 
                                                 
198
 (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992) p.35 
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Risk–based and proportionate regulations both seek to minimize compliance costs without 
sacrificing investor benefits. However, they are slightly different—some regulation may be 
proportionately very expensive for small issuers, but necessary because of the unacceptable risk 
to the whole market as a whole if left unregulated. For example, in response to the Bre–X salting 
scandal,
199
 Canadian securities commissions now require “qualified person reports” as specified 
in National Instrument 43–101 for any public mining disclosure. The costs to obtain such mining 
reports are proportionally expensive for small issuers, but the reputation damage to the Canadian 
market as a whole from the possibility of another Bre–X scandal is considered to outweigh the 
costs.  
The FSA uses proportionate regulation. It does not subject small firms to the same scrutiny as 
larger ones, nor does it require the same kinds of structured and detailed responses from small 
firms, because of their sheer number and because, on an individual level, each one poses a 
relatively small risk to consumers:
200
  
                                                 
199
 Bre–X was a major Canadian gold mining scandal in 1996-97.  Bre-X Minerals Ltd., based in 
Calgary, bought the Busang mineral site in Indonesia in March 1993. In October 1995, Bre-X 
announced significant amounts of gold had been discovered, sending its stock price soaring. 
Originally a penny stock, its stock price reached a peak at CAD $286.50 (split adjusted) in May 
1996 on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE), with a total capitalization of over CAD $6 billion. 
Bre-X Minerals collapsed in 1997 after the gold samples were found to be salted with gold from 
another site—an elaborate fraud. 
200
 See e.g. Lesley Titcomb, See e.g. (Titcomb 2008)  
See also the (The Task Force 2006) at p.53, which proposes that “at one end of the scale will be 
issuers with the lowest market capitalizations that should be required to comply with regulations 
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In her research study for the Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, Janis Sarra describes eight 
tools that can be used to implement proportionate regulation for venture issuers:
201
 
(i) Specific exemptions should apply for junior issuers, if the time and resources required 
outweigh the benefits. [The observation is correct, in my view.  In fact, on September 13, 2012, 
the Canadian Securities Administrators published for comment Proposed National Instrument 
51-103
202
, which would tailor disclosure requirements for venture issuers and eliminate certain 
disclosure obligations that may be of less value to venture issuers. See the discussion under the 
topic “Regulation to Create a Public Good” at page 57.]  
(ii) Periodic disclosure timelines should be relaxed for juniors, since external consultants are 
frequently involved. [In fact, Canadian securities regulators have accommodated venture issuers.  
National Instrument 51-102 gives venture issuers 120 days to file their annual, audited, financial 
statements (rather than 90 days for larger issuers), and 90 days to file their interim financials 
(rather than 60 days for larger issuers).  This is because auditors will usually prioritize 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
that are appropriate and consistent with their size, the complexity of their business and their 
resources. Of course, investors should be duly warned of the risks associated with issuers at this 
end of the scale. At the other end of the scale will be issuers with the highest market 
capitalizations.” 
201
 Janis Sarra, (Sarra 2008) A Research Study Prepared for the Expert Panel on Securities 
Regulation  
202
 Proposed 51-103 was withdrawn by the CSA on July 15, 2013. Supra, note 98. 
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completion of their larger clients’ statements, leaving it more difficult for venture issuers to meet 
deadlines.] 
(iii) Transition timelines should be scaled, to give more time for new governance, financial 
controls, or other new standards. [This is consistent with the observation of Puri and Condo, 
supra note 81 at page 52 that “an unintended consequence of a rigorous compliance programme 
might be that these requirements become a way for larger issuers to preserve a monopoly, in the 
sense that they are better able to meet the costs of compliance initiatives and so can drive out 
smaller operations.” Allowing venture issuers more time for new governance and financial 
controls is reasonable.] 
(iv) Different frequency of reporting should be permitted, such as semi–annually instead of 
quarterly, where it is determined that investors and other market participants may not be 
interested in quarterly financial reporting if they receive timely, full and accurate material 
change disclosure. [Canadian securities regulators appear to agree.  Proposed National 
Instrument 51-103 would still require interim financial reports, but rather than being 
accompanied by a full Management Discussion and Analysis form, interim statements would 
only require a short discussion of the venture issuer’s operations and liquidity. The first proposal 
of 51-103 would have eliminated the 3 and 9 month interim periods for financial statements, but 
after receiving comments from the industry, the revised proposal eliminated only the 
Management Discussion and Analysis requirement.] 
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(v) Formal governance or internal control requirements, and the level of detail of disclosure, 
should be modified.  [Canadian securities regulators appear to agree.  Proposed National 
Instrument 51-103 would require venture issuers to develop and implement policies and 
procedures relating to conflicts of interest, related party transactions and insider trading.  
Disclosure relating to these matters, as well as other corporate governance matters, would be 
included in the annual report.] 
(vi) Set disclosure requirements based on technical information particular to a sector, should 
be tailored to the issuer’s history in the market, or to its revenue–generating capacity. [Canadian 
securities regulators agree.  For example, proposed National Instrument 51-103 would require a 
technical mining report if the venture issuer files a prospectus, or if it is a first time disclosure of 
mineral resources or reserves, or a preliminary economic assessment, or if it is a material change 
in these.] 
(vii) Guidance should be given as to best practice, in terms of offering junior issuers 
information and guidance on a range of compliance options that may be responsive to their 
capital and operational structure, such as the design of control systems. [I would agree, since 
principles–based regulation requires collaboration, in order to flesh out the meaning of broad 
principles (see the discussion above at page 86).] 
(viii) High–level principles should be used that should govern the conduct of issuers, to allow 
issuers to develop best practices appropriate to their size or resources. [This is a rather general 
comment by Sarra. In my view, the choice between rules and principles depends on the particular 
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issues being regulated.  This is discussed more fully below, under “(vi) Are regulatory issues 
predictable?” at page 194, “(vii) Should historical transactions be disclosed?” at page 197 and 
“(viii) Should future projections be disclosed?” at page198] 
 
Governance theory 
 
Governance theory examines how regulations are translated and implemented through an 
organization. To go beyond “nice policy statements”, the directors and agents of the venture 
issuer should incorporate compliance into internal procedures.  What follows is a discussion of 
governance theory and how it intersects with the rules/principles debate.   
Parker describes three nodes of governance: (1) the adoption of formal compliance systems; (2) 
the perceptions, motivations and strategies of individuals within the corporation; and (3) the local 
norms and habituated practices that mediate between the structures and the agents.
203
 The first 
node can be easily confirmed by checking an issuer’s policy statements.  As to the second node, 
later in this paper, I develop a series of factors to assess the proper balance of rules and 
principles for an industry, and the first and second of those factors are: (i) Is there a shared 
understanding of regulatory principles, and (ii) Are the regulated committed to the public 
                                                 
203
 (Parker and Gilad, Internal Corporate Compliance Management Systems: Structure, Culture 
and Agency 2011) 
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interest?  As Parker argues, the success of regulation is not whether the regulator wins a 
particular judgment in court, but the extent to which a shared understanding is developed and 
how that understanding is translated and implemented.  As to the third node described by Parker 
regarding local norms and habituated practices, the fourth factor developed in chapter three of 
this paper is: “Are there institutions or actors which promote regulatory collaboration?”  This is 
similar to the node identified by Parker, in that both address what catalysts exist for compliance. 
Parker further describes compliance in the context of “meta-regulation”, similar to principles-
based regulation, which recognizes that the regulator may not know what the right processes are, 
or even the right results, but must insure that those involved will responsibly work out the details 
in their own circumstances.
204
 “Management-based regulation”, as described by Coglianese and 
Lazer,
205
 is also similar to principles-based regulation—it does not specify technologies to be 
used, nor does it require specific outputs. Rather, it requires firms to do their own planning, to 
identify hazards, risk mitigation procedures, employee training, and measures for evaluating and 
refining management. According to Coglianese and Lazer, the problem with “technology-based 
regulation”, which is similar to rules-based regulation, is that it imposes specific requirements 
which can eliminate incentives to seek out new solutions that would achieve public goals at a 
lower cost.   
                                                 
204
 (C. Parker, Meta Regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social Responsibility 2006) 
205
 (Coglianese and Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to 
Achieve Public Goals 2003) 
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Hopkins
206
 notes that most accidents are not caused by a failure to follow rules, but by a failure 
to notice warning signs and adopt a “safety culture”.  Compliance must be treated as important 
and not just a cost of doing business.  This relates to the second factor identified in chapter three: 
“Are the regulated committed to the public interest?”  If they are committed, then principles-
based regulation may work.  As Hopkins describes, strategies to improve risk judgment include: 
auditing the auditors, proactive investigation, supporting company safety staff, advising on 
organizational design, and exposing performance.   
Parker, Ainsworth and Stepanenko argue that enforcement actions should hold as many parties 
legally responsible, to spread the threat to individuals who may be more sensitive to smaller 
penalties, or the shame of having a finding of liability against them.
207
  These observations are 
incorporated into the recommendations of this paper, under the topic “Enforcement strategies 
based on compliance motives” at page 281. 
Another consideration from governance theory is that the proper mix of rules and principles may 
depend on the size of the organization and what resources are available to it.  Hutter reviewed 
data from two research projects in the United Kingdom to assess the application of new 
governance.
208
 Large businesses such as British Railways can afford better advice and risk 
compliance systems, but this does not necessarily lead to compliance within the organization.  A 
                                                 
206
 (Hopkins 2007) 
207
 (Parker, Ainsworth and Stepanenko, The Impact of ACCC Enforcement Activity in Cartel 
Cases 2004) at pp.105-6 
208
 (Hutter 2011) 
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large organization can be structurally complex and suffer from information asymmetries, 
increasing the risk of deviance by its agents.
209
 Smaller organizations, with a less formal 
structure, may not be able to afford expert advice or compliance systems, but they may be better 
able to communicate with their agents, and understand the culture of its employees through 
ongoing, face-to-face, dialogue.  Ontario venture issuers are relatively small organizations, with 
limited budgets for compliance.  One of the factors identified in chapter three is: “Are there 
institutions or actors which promote regulatory collaboration?”—the more that Ontario venture 
issuers can access external resources to interpret principles, the more effective they will be. 
Ford describes how the BC principles–based model is consistent with “New Governance” theory, 
in which the regulator is not the “central articulator of non–negotiable, specific requirements” but 
“defines broad themes, to articulate them on a flexible and dynamic basis, to accept input from 
the ground level of regulated entities, and to effectively manage varied incoming information 
from industry actors.”210  Following the global financial crisis of 2008 and the apparent 
regulatory failures, Ford identified four lessons for effective principles-based regulation: (i) 
regulators must have the necessary capacity in terms of numbers and expertise; (ii) regulators 
must have transparent and reliable information about industry; (iii) regulators must 
                                                 
209
 (Parker and Gilad, Internal Corporate Compliance Management Systems: Structure, Culture 
and Agency 2011) at p.25 
210
 (Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation 2008) p.27 
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independently scrutinize information; and (iv) regulators must have healthy skepticism about 
industry.
211
 
 
Compliance theories 
 
Why do people comply with the law? Is it because they are self–interested and will comply if the 
amount and probability of the penalty is greater than the illegal gain? Are other motives in play?  
It is an important question, since the choice between principles and rules is not a philosophical 
question, but a question of compliance.  As discussed next, a rules approach with known, after–
the–fact penalties is premised on the incentive motive, whereas the principles approach is based 
on other theories of compliance. 
Feldman
212
 reviewed the literature and identified five motives to comply with the law, which will 
be explored in this section: (i) the “incentive” motive, i.e. the cost-benefit calculation of rewards 
and punishment; (ii) the “reason-driven” motive, where the regulated look to the law for 
convincing policy reasons for doing (or not doing) certain things; (iii) the need for “social 
identity” and to join the right community and to adopt its norms; (iv) the desire for justice and 
morality; and (v) the “citizenship-oriented” motive, i.e., those who choose to comply simply 
                                                 
211
 (Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis 
2010) 
212
 (Feldman 2010) 
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because it is the law. Feldman argues that policy makers should assess the motives of the 
particular group being regulated in order to design a behaviorally-responsive regime. 
 
Incentive Motive 
 
The incentive or “carrot and stick” theory is that individuals and corporations are self–interested 
and will “rationally” follow or break rules in order to maximize their personal gain.  It leads to 
the view that the regulator can engineer social compliance by enforcing clearly stated rules with 
predictable rewards and penalties.
213
  
The “stick” (rather than carrot) approach can be subdivided into two deterrence goals: (i) 
“specific deterrence”, where the goal is to deter a particular person from committing or 
recommitting an offence, and (ii) “general deterrence”, where the goal is to deter the general 
population by “making an example” of the offender. 
Specific deterrence 
Scholz describes four assumptions of the “simple deterrence model”, in order to deter a specific 
corporation:
 214
 
                                                 
213
 (Puri, Sentencing the Criminal Corporation 2001) at p.617 
214
 (Scholz 1997) at p.254. Note – I have changed the order of Scholz’s assumptions.  
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(1) Corporations are fully informed utility maximizers;  
(2) Legal punishment provides the primary incentive for corporate compliance;  
(3) Legal statutes unambiguously define misbehaviour; and  
(4) Enforcement agencies optimally detect and punish misbehaviour, given available 
resources.  
If (1) and (2) were true (i.e. if corporations are fully informed and effectively amoral), then the 
unambiguous rules in (3) and the strict enforcement in (4), would seem logical. 
Are corporations “rational” (i.e., amoral) as described by deterrence theorists? Do they comply 
simply because of the amount and probability of reward and punishment? Puri has argued that 
the rational economic actor model is a realistic model of corporate criminal behaviour.
215
 
Business corporations are formed to make profits. In the securities market, for example, 
decisions are usually based on the trading price of shares. Pearce and Tombs argue that, “[e]ven 
if a corporation wished to act with a primary commitment to social responsibility, this would 
entail ignoring the very rationale of the corporation and the nature of the existing economic 
system”.216 Bakan suggests that corporations are pathologically amoral, as their only constituent 
motive by law is profit.
217
 While some corporations comply with rules to foster good relations 
                                                 
215
 (Puri, Sentencing the Criminal Corporation 2001) at p.617 
216
 (Pearce and Tombs, Ideology, Hegemony, and Empiricism 1990) at p.425 
217
 (Bakan 2004) argues that the corporation is created by law to function much like a 
psychopathic personality whose destructive behavior, if left unchecked, will lead to scandal and 
ruin.  
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for long–term value, Pearce and Tombs argued [in 1990] that in the current era of hostile 
takeover bids, leveraged buy–outs and asset–stripping, long–term strategies are rare.218 “After 
all, an enterprise subscribing to standards higher than those of its competitors would, in the long 
run, render itself unviable or, minimally, unprofitable”, they say.219 
However, Braithwaite and Makkai
220
 note that the specific deterrence model for a corporation 
only applies if its managers have a profitability interest in the corporation and lack any personal, 
outside, commitment to compliance. Management will not always act in the financial interests of 
the shareholders of the corporation; they may be self–interested and seek to enhance their own 
personal, long term, reputation within the industry, rather than the short-term interests of their 
current employer. Management may have outside group loyalties—for example, loyalty to their 
profession, loyalty to their co–workers, or loyalty to their government.”221 Managers may be 
                                                 
218
 (Pearce and Tombs, Policing Corporate 'Skid Rows': A Reply to Keith Hawkins 1990) at 
p.424 
219
 (Pearce and Tombs, Policing Corporate 'Skid Rows': A Reply to Keith Hawkins 1990) at 
p.425 
220
 (Braithwaite and Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence 1991) 
p.9 
221
 (Braithwaite and Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence 1991) 
p.10 
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unwilling to risk their personal reputation by participating in the illegal conduct of the 
corporation.
222
 
General deterrence 
General deterrence conveys to the public at large the consequences of committing a particular 
offence by making “an example” of the offender.  Punishment serves an educational role by 
warning the public that they will suffer a similar fate if they commit the offence.   
Thornton, Gunningham and Kagan
223
 reject “fear–based”, general deterrence theory, at least for 
environmental regulations. After examining 233 firms in several industries in the United States, 
they found that the threat of punishment for environmental offences was not the primary motive 
for compliance, since consciousness of the penalties imposed was “remarkably inaccurate.” 
Respondents “overwhelmingly underestimated” the actual penalties imposed in the “signal 
cases” when they were presented as hypotheticals. At the same time, Thornton, Gunningham and 
Kagan referred to studies which indicated that compliance is far more common than deterrence 
theory would expect—relatively high levels of compliance exist for environmental offences even 
when the threat of enforcement appears to be remote.  
                                                 
222
 See also (Hawkins 1990) at 455: “How much do people in business behave as individuals or 
as organizational actors? And if people act self–interestedly, in whose interest do they act, their 
organization's or (sometimes?) their own? …For instance, are we to assume that the captain of 
the Exxon Valdez was prepared to risk his job, and possibly other sanctions, by allegedly 
drinking heavily while in charge of a vessel laden with oil?” 
223
 (Thornton, Gunningham and Kagan 2005) p. 272 
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Making “an example” of an offender can serve a denunciation role which relates to general 
deterrence, but which also relates to the expression of justice and morality, as described below in 
Feldman’s fourth motive to comply. Denunciation is public repudiation of wrongful conduct. It 
reinforces the sense within the community that the law should be obeyed.
 224
 Although regulatory 
offences are not typically based on morality, as is criminal law, denunciation can legitimize the 
regulatory authority and its rules, especially if the denunciation involves reasons and explains 
why the behavior is wrongful. 
 
Reason-Driven Motive 
 
The second regulatory motive posits a reason-driven person, who looks to the regulator as an ally 
with superior knowledge who can demonstrate the wisdom of complying with certain laws. For 
example, if the authorities prohibit public smoking and give good reasons for doing so, people 
may update their beliefs.  Vickers et.al. note that “proactive” and “positive” small businesses 
                                                 
224
 As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada [in the context of criminal law], “[t]he objective of 
denunciation mandates that a sentence should also communicate society’s condemnation of that 
particular offender’s conduct... In short, a sentence with a denunciatory element represents a 
symbolic, collective statement that the offender’s conduct should be punished for encroaching on 
our society’s basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law.” R. v. 
M.(C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, 105 C.C.C. (3d) 327 at 369 (C.C.C.). 
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(those which are motivated to learn) responded to pollution control and workplace regulatory 
requirements and improved their management processes and technology.
225
 
Sutinen
226
 argues that, although there is a core of chronic offenders, the usual reason why 
corporations comply is that those who operate them perceive the law to be consistent with their 
internalized norms.
227
 As Parker suggests, regulators must convince people that the law 
represents shared values.
228
 Regulators must avoid what Parker calls the “compliance trap”— 
i.e., where compliance becomes difficult to improve because the values underlying compliance 
are contested. 
 
Social Identity Motive 
 
The third compliance motive identified by Feldman relates to group identity and the individual's 
need to belong.  There are two aspects: (i) the desire to join the right community; and (ii) the fear 
of unnecessarily joining and following rules, while others do not and enjoy more freedom. 
                                                 
225
 (Vickers, et al. 2006) 
226
 (Sutinen 1999), p. 179 
227
 For example, most fishermen comply with regulatory catch limits even though the probability 
of detection and the severity of punishment are both low. Why? It is because the sense of moraal 
obligation is common throughout society, according to (Sutinen 1999) pp.177–78 
228
 (C. Parker, The Compliance Trap - The Moral Message in Responsive Regulatory 
Enforcement 2006) at p.34 
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Desire to join the “right” community and peer pressure 
As Sutinen argues, joining the right community and peer pressure affects compliance. “Social 
influence plays a significant role in everyday social exchange, often taking the subtle forms of 
ostracism or withholding of favors.”229 Peer groups can reward and punish, by withholding or 
conferring status, or by channeling material resources toward or away from a member of the 
group. 
A report of environmental enforcement in BC found that “[i]f the public knows that violators 
have broken an environmental law, this embarrasses the violator. They may lose business or be 
shunned by former friends. Peer pressure, and the financial implications of bad press, can be a 
powerful tool.”230 Petts and Horne note (for SMEs): “Adverse publicity and damage to company 
image, and hence competitiveness, were viewed by both managers and non–management 
employees as pressures at least equal to that of prosecution if not greater.”231 Similarly, as Puri 
and Condon suggest, “Issuers that became known as ‘compliance leaders’ …might be expected 
to reap reputational rewards”232  
                                                 
229
 (Sutinen 1999) p.181 
230
 (Oakes 2007)  
231
 (Petts, et al. 1999) pp. 14–30.  
232
 (Condon and Puri 2006) 
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Grasmick and Bursik argue that embarrassment and loss of respect affect compliance as much as 
state imposed penalties.
233
 They reject the homo economicus notion at the core of deterrence 
theory—the fictional man who cares only about the net present value and probability of the 
potential penalty, utterly indifferent to the attitude of his friends, neighbors, co–workers, and 
fellow corporate managers.
234
 Kahan argues that individuals in society are not homo economicus 
but rather, the more emotionally nuanced homo reciprocans. When they perceive that others are 
behaving cooperatively, they are moved by honour, altruism, and like dispositions to contribute 
to public goods even without the inducement of material incentives. But when they perceive that 
others are shirking, they can be moved by resentment and pride to retaliate and withhold 
beneficial forms of cooperation even if doing so exposes them to significant material 
disadvantage.
235
  
Ford and Hess
236
 discuss the use of settlement agreements and the appointment of independent 
monitors. Sometime around 2003, following the Enron, Worldcom and similar debacles, the 
Department of Justice and the U.S. SEC moved from a deterrence strategy of imposing large 
fines on corporate wrongdoers  (which are indirectly paid by the shareholders) with requirements 
that wrongdoers implement compliance systems and hire independent monitors. Ford and Hess 
                                                 
233
 (Grasmick and Bursick 1990) who don’t so much as reject the theory of deterrence, but argue 
that shame and embarassment are additional non–state costs for deterrence theory. 
234
 (Logue 2007) at p. 3 
235
 (Kahan 2001) at pp.333–4 
236
 (Ford and Hess, Corporate Monitorships and New Governance Regulation: In Theory, in 
Practice, and in Context 2011) 
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cite a survey of over 5,000 employees across several industries which found that the “root cause” 
of misconduct within an organization was most often the organization’s ethical culture—such as 
“pressure to do whatever it takes to meet business targets” and a belief that “their code of 
conduct is not taken seriously.”  Only one-third of those surveyed attributed wrongdoing to 
someone within the organization bending rules for personal gain.  Thus, independent monitors 
must determine what aspects of the corporate culture contributed to the wrongdoing, and then 
motivate management and employees to participate in compliance measures that go beyond 
formalism. Monitors should develop information-forcing techniques such as reason giving, 
dialogue, benchmarking, and outcome analysis, to emphasize root causes rather than superficial 
compliance.  However, Ford and Hess found frequent breakdown of the monitor program, 
especially where the monitors were former prosecutors. They tended to see the root cause of 
wrongdoing to be ignorance of laws and corporate policy, rather than management pressure to 
meet performance goals. 
 
Reputation capital 
 
Modern game–theorists suggest that repeated contact within a community can enforce the need 
for reputation capital. Small, entrepreneurial organizations require participative managers and 
coalition building in order to access investors, suppliers and opportunities.  Acquiring reputation 
capital can be just as “rational” as acquiring economic capital, since reputation capital can be 
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converted from one form to another, to gain advantage in the form of additional funds, power or 
allies.
237
 Moore and Spence found that small firms are not less ethical than large firms, because 
they depend on good relations with their community for financing, support and customers.
238
 As 
Edwards and Sen Gupta describe, small firms in highly competitive markets might be expected 
to be driven to short–term sales techniques, but in fact are embedded in networks that supply 
information and help to generate trust.
239
 
Lepoutre and Heene argue that, while small business operators do not have the time to recognize 
responsibility issues, those which engage in networks are more likely to find ways to resolve 
issues, and that “the case for a culture of shared responsibility and the creation of institutions for 
joint responsibility is compelling” because of networked opportunities for learning, risk sharing, 
                                                 
237
 (Fuller and Yumiao 2006) p.288 
238
 (Moore and Spence 2006) See also: (Edwards, et al. 2006) at 702: “...small firms in highly 
competitive markets... might be expected to be driven only by market logics, but in fact they are 
embedded in networks that supply information and help to generate trust; moreover, the extent of 
network embeddedness has important implications for productive success.” 
239
 (Edwards, et al. 2006) at 702 See also (Petts, et al. 1999) at 25, which found that “Adverse 
publicity and damage to company image, and hence competitiveness, were viewed by both 
managers and non-management employees as pressures at least equal to that of prosecution if not 
greater. These were the two motivators that were mentioned most frequently when individuals 
were asked ‘what would encourage your company to comply with regulation?’. This provides an 
indicator of the potentially greater influence of the market and social domains upon compliance.”  
See also: (Bucar and Hisrich 2003): “The belief in the goodness of people is far stronger among 
Americans and is probably one of the psychological barriers in former Eastern European 
countries. Without trust it is difficult to build entrepreneurial teams and obtain outside private 
equity capital; these difficulties are hindering the growth of the economy.” 
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and access to resources.
240
 This is echoed by Vickers et. al., who are pessimistic about the 
compliance of small firms in general, but who identify some which are “proactive learners” and 
“positive responders”—who have developed compliance awareness from external agencies, 
inspectors and customers, and are more tolerant of and more responsive to regulation.
241
 
A study by Petts et al. (1999)
242
 demonstrated that managers of SMEs believe that environmental 
compliance is important, but that regulation on its own is inadequate. Adverse publicity and 
damage to company image were viewed by managers and non–managers as pressures ‘‘at least 
equal to’’ that of prosecution.  Brown and King handed out questionnaires to 122 small business 
respondents (those who worked for businesses with fewer than 100 employees) and 95 
“others”—i.e. professionals and those employed by large corporations or government. Small 
business respondents placed more emphasis on “situational” or “relative” business ethics than on 
general ethics.
243
 Small businesses which are embedded in local communities are more likely to 
                                                 
240
 (Lepoutre and Heene 2006) at p.267 
241
 (Vickers, et al. 2006) at p.161 
242
 (Petts, et al. 1999) at p. 25: “Adverse publicity and damage to company image, and hence 
competitiveness, were viewed by both managers and non–management employees as pressures at 
least equal to that of prosecution if not greater. These were the two motivators that were 
mentioned most frequently when individuals were asked ‘what would encourage your company 
to comply with regulation?’. This provides an indicator of the potentially greater influence of the 
market and social domains upon compliance.” 
243
 (Brown and King 1982) at p.13: Rankings were done of various internalized factors – both 
respondent groups agreed that “norms and pressures from community and peers” come first in 
importance, that “fear of punishment” comes last, and that “upholding the law regardless” comes 
next to last. Small business owners placed “anticipation of rewards” in second place, followed by 
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act socially.
244
 Small businesses which draw their customers from a close geographical group 
(e.g., local auto repair shops) are more likely to feel “morally proximate” to their clients than, for 
example, web designers.  
Chau and Siu
245
 reviewed various studies and concluded that small, entrepreneurial 
organizations, require participative managers and coalition building. Whereas executives in 
traditional organizations follow routines, gather information within their own unit, and rarely 
prepare themselves to encounter opposition, executives of small organizations directly face 
conflicting ideas and regulators and must examine their own organizations from a broad 
perspective, combining ideas from unconnected sources.  
Concern about unnecessarily joining 
Feldman suggests that some people are “conditional cooperators” and will usually comply only 
when they have a reason to believe that others will do the same.
246
 Kahan has suggested that the 
individual needs to believe that other members of society share his or her commitment to the law 
in order to maintain his or her own commitment to society and to its rules, i.e., the fear of being 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
“higher moral or religious principles.” The other respondents reversed the order of “rewards” and 
“higher principles” 
244
 (Moore and Spence 2006) at p.222 
245
 (Chau and Siu 2000) 
246
 (Feldman 2010) 
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the only “sucker” who obeys the law. According to Kahan247, statistical analyses of tax evasion 
suggest the dominant role of reciprocity. Tax compliance rates vary across nations. This cannot 
be explained by differences in the expected penalty for evasion, but by different public attitudes 
toward tax laws. “In some nations (including the United States), individuals tend to view paying 
their taxes as an important civic obligation, and are highly motivated to pay for that reason. In 
other nations (including many in Western Europe), individuals regard tax obligations much more 
casually (akin, say, to traffic regulations in the United States), and display no particular moral 
aversion to evading them if they feel they can safely do so.” These “tax climates” are constructed 
by individuals' beliefs about the willingness of others to comply with tax laws: those who believe 
that others will comply believe that paying taxes is a moral duty; those who believe cheating is 
widespread believe that evading tax is not a serious wrong. Individuals will only act like homo 
economicus if they believe that others are acting like homo economicus.  Compliance is 
reciprocal.
248
 
Smaller issuers have fewer resources for compliance, and so, are concerned about spending 
funds to comply unnecessarily. As Puri and Condon note, SMEs could be a greater source of risk 
of insider trading practices because of their greater difficulty in educating their employees about 
the prohibition, and the prevalence of stock option compensation.
249
 Wayne and Scholz
250
 argue 
                                                 
247
 (Kahan 2001) 
248
 (Kahan 2001) at pp.341–42 
249
 (Puri and Condon, The Role of Compliance in Securities Regulatory Enforcement 2006) 
250
 (Gray and Scholz 2008)  
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that large firms are more aware of enforcement activities, and that the managerial effort available 
for monitoring regulations increases exponentially with the size of the firm.
251
 Vickers et. al. 
note that small enterprises are known to have “a preference for informality and an antipathy 
towards external regulation” and that the health and safety performance of small firms 
significantly lags those of larger firms, which can afford the finance, time, competency, training, 
plant and equipment for compliance.
252
 
 
Justice Motive 
 
The fourth compliance motive identified by Feldman is that some people are motivated by a 
sense of justice.  As Tyler
253
 explains, some people obey the law because they believe that the 
                                                 
251
 (Easterbrook and Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors 1984) at 709: 
“The securities laws possess many of the characteristics of classic interest group legislation. 
Existing rules give larger issuers an edge, because many of the costs of disclosure are the same 
regardless of the size of the firm or the offering. Thus larger or older firms face lower flotation 
costs per dollar than do smaller issuers. The rules also help existing investment banks and 
auditing firms obtain an advantage because they acquire expertise and because rivals cannot 
compete by offering differentiated products.” 
252
 (Vickers, et al. 2006) 
253
 (Tyler 2006) at p.4 
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law is founded on justice
254
. Tyler separates the notion of justice into two categories: concern 
about the justice of outcomes (distributive justice) and concern about the procedures by which 
decisions are arrived at (procedural justice).  
 
Distributive justice 
Distributive justice focuses on the outcomes of legal process, i.e. the distribution of rewards and 
punishments.  It is the desire that all members of the community receive the rewards and 
punishments that they deserve.  It can generate a commitment to comply because “it is the right 
thing to do”, rather than because of a cost/benefit calculation of the incentive motive. It is 
different than the citizenship-oriented motive, since compliance is based on morality rather than 
on the legitimacy of the authorities.  If this is an important motive for the regulated, then 
regulations should be justified on the basis of their morality. 
People may believe that they themselves are motivated by justice and morality and that they will 
“do the right thing”, but do they believe that others will?  Sanderson and Darley255 conducted 
                                                 
254
 The justice of the law and the legitimacy of the One can have laws that perceived as just but 
enforced by a corrupt police force, and one can have a respected police force enforcing unjust 
laws. 
255
 (Sanderson and Darley 2002) See also (Doherty, Weigold and Schlenker 1990) whose social 
experiment confirmed the “self-serving bias position”— people prefer desirable interpretations 
of their own motives.  Not only do they ascribe their own helpful behavior predominantly to 
positive motives, they denigrate evaluators who contend that their motives are less pure.  
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experiments to show that most people believe that they themselves engage in good conduct 
because of their internal factors (e.g., moral goodness) and that if any their own conduct appears 
negative it is because of external forces (e.g., the pressures of a given situation).  However, most 
people are less charitable in their assessment of others, believing that the bad behavior of others 
is evidence of the poor internal character of other people.  
One explanation for this “holier than thou” assessment is social survival. The true motives of 
others are often unknown and full of risk.  We don’t know who will obey the law, who will act 
morally and who may harm us, so we construct archetypes for predicting the behavior of others.  
Even if our archetypes are unreasonable (perhaps nothing more than prejudice), they give us 
comfort to think that we can predict the behaviour of others.  We ascribe positive motives to 
ourselves to give us confidence to demand respect and support from our community.  We ascribe 
negative motives to others and seek their denunciation to reinforce the belief that, in the long run, 
everyone gets their just deserts.  As Bénabou and Tirole point out
256
, individuals strive to 
motivate themselves or their children towards effort, educational investment, perseverance in the 
face of adversity, and away from the slippery slope of idleness, welfare dependency, crime, 
drugs, etc. In such circumstances, maintaining somewhat rosy beliefs about the fact that 
everyone will ultimately get their just deserts can be very valuable.
257
 
                                                 
256
 (Bénabou and Jean 2006) 
257
 Trivedi and Umashanker argue the logical extension of this view—that moral reasoning 
influences regulatory compliance and that those who don’t comply usually have anti–
establishment views (Trivedi, Shehata and Mestelman 2004) 
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Procedural justice 
Procedural justice focuses on how decisions are made, rather than what those decisions are.  
Tyler
258
 argues that the way people are treated by the authorities is the main motivation for legal 
compliance. Where the authority treats the person with respect, gives the person an opportunity 
to be heard and listens to the person, and then renders a reasoned decision without bias, an 
unfavorable decision will often be accepted. “People have a tremendous desire to present their 
side of the story and value the opportunity to be heard.”259  Although their short-term interests 
may not be achieved, being listened to and being treated fairly in a meaningful procedure 
reinforces their sense that they are being valued within their community and that, in the long-
term, their interests will be respected. “The key point is that having one’s views considered is 
important because it is a message about one’s standing in a social group, not because it means 
that one’s views will necessarily prevail.”260 
 
Citizenship Motive 
 
The citizenship-oriented individual obeys the law because they believe that the authorities have 
the “legitimacy” to create laws and, within a range of reasonableness, they should be obeyed 
                                                 
258
 (Tyler 2006) 
259
 (Tyler 2006) at p.147 
260
 (Tyler 2006) at p.150 
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regardless of their content.
261
  It is different than the desire for justice, since it is compliance 
because “it is the law” rather than compliance because “it is the right thing to do”. 
Empirical studies show that individuals and corporations in democracies comply with tax laws 
more than would be expected by deterrence theory and the estimate of the amount and 
probability of punishment
262
. Frey and Jegen
263
 argue that this civic virtue shows a commitment 
to citizenship and respect for the law. Citizens who consider that the authorities are fair and 
respectful are more compliant than those with negative perceptions of government.
264
 Greater 
democratic participation enhances civic virtue, a motivation not explained by deterrence 
theory.
265
  
                                                 
261
 (Scholz &Pinney, 1995) 
262
 (Rummel and Feinberg 1988) used 45 experimental studies covering the period 1971–85. 
They also cite 20 studies from Wiersma (1992) covering 1971–90, 10 and cite 50 studies from 
Tang and Hall (1995) from 1972–92. These meta–analyses, according to Rummel and Feinberg, 
support their findings that intrinsic motivation is undermined if the externally applied rewards 
are perceived to be controlling by the recipients (pp.9–10) see also the heading “Income Tax 
Compliance” in this paper. 
263
 (Frey and Jegen 2001). They also refer to an analogy by Deci with Flaste 1995 regarding a 
perfectionist child in violin class. Once ‘gold–stars’ were introduced as a symbolic reward for a 
certain amount of time spent practicing the instrument, the girl lost all her interest in trying new, 
difficult pieces. Instead of improving her skills, the aim shifted towards spending time playing 
well–learned, easy pieces in order to receive the award. At p.596. 
264
 A further discussion in this paper regarding tax compliance is found at p. 146.  
265
 Equally, according to Frey and Jegen, “crowding–out theory” holds that when the regulator 
exercises excessive control over the regulated, self–determination is “crowded out” and the 
regulated just follow the commands of the regulator. (Frey and Jegen 2001) pp.9–10. 
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Tyler
266
 argues that regulations cannot be effectively enforced without the cooperation (i.e., the 
“normative accord”) of the population it hopes to control.267 In democratic societies with a strong 
rule of law tradition, business managers have “internalized” the social norms which “under–gird” 
many regulatory rules.
268
 Most corporations are “contingent good apples” which are educated by 
“signal” enforcement cases and are motivated by the corporation’s ongoing reputation within its 
community of suppliers and customers.
269
 Thornton, Gunningham and Kagan surveyed 233 firms 
in several industries in the United States and found that most corporate officials are less 
concerned about environmental penalties than they are about informal social and economic 
sanctions.
270
  
Tax compliance research shows that individuals will reciprocate and cooperate with others, even 
when their self–interest suggests that they should not. For example, people often contribute to 
public goods (including charities), even though they could maximize their personal finances by 
not contributing. Contribution happens even in anonymous situations.
271
 People generally want 
                                                 
266
 (Sutinen 1999) at p. 182 
267
 (Gunningham and Kagan 2005) at 215. Procedural justice is often more important than 
outcomes. Civil penalties and other sanctions should match the value of the harm done or gains 
realized; individuals subject to surveillance and monitoring should be treated with dignity and 
respect; and regulations should be reasonable and "make sense." (Sutinen 1999), p.183 
268
 (Thornton, Gunningham and Kagan 2005) at p.264 
269
 (Thornton, Gunningham and Kagan 2005) at p.267 
270
 (Thornton, Gunningham and Kagan 2005) at p.271 
271
 See: (Lederman 2003) p. 1453; and (Kahan 2001) 
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to be seen as good. Monetary incentives can taint the public image of a pure charitable action, so 
monetary incentives are more effective in private than in public situations.
272
 
 
Rules or principles for Conflicts of Interest?—Literature Review 
 
This section reviews the literature about whether conflicts of interest should be regulated by rules 
or principles. Those in a conflict of interest have a tendency to favour themselves and to 
minimize the importance of any conflict. Which language strategy best regulates conflicts of 
interest? Some authorities favour rules, since principles can be interpreted in a self–serving 
manner; others say principles, since rules have predictable borders which the clever can side–
step. 
 
Regulating conflicts of interest and self–dealing 
 
If left unregulated, those who control a corporation (whether as managers or controlling 
shareholders) can use their power to divert corporate wealth to themselves rather than sharing it 
with other investors.
273
 Various forms of such self–dealing include: executive perquisites, 
                                                 
272
 (Ariely, Bracha and Meier 2007) 
273
 (Djankov, et al. 2008)  
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excessive compensation, transfer pricing, appropriation of corporate opportunities, self–serving 
financial transactions such as directed equity issuance or personal loans to insiders, and outright 
theft of corporate assets.
274
 
The efficient market hypothesis asserts that the prices for publicly traded securities are efficient 
in two senses: (1) the current price of a security best predicts its future price and (2) the 
prevailing price immediately assimilates new information provided to the market.
275
 If the 
hypothesis were true for a particular market, then, arguably, the market will reflect how well 
management deals with conflicts of interest and other governance issues—that investors will pay 
a premium for well–managed companies, and will discount those which are not.276 But, as 
Djankov notes, virtually no society accepts this “do nothing” approach as “the temptation to 
‘take the money and run’ in an unregulated environment is just too great.”277  
                                                 
274
 (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) at p. 742 
275
 (Gordon and Kornhauser 1985) at pp.770-71 
276
 (Gordon and Kornhauser 1985) at p.824: “In an efficient market, the market prices of the 
firm’s securities will signal the relative quality of management because evidence of management 
shirking, misappropriation or incompetence will presumably be reflected in the firm’s securities 
prices.” 
277
 (Djankov, et al. 2008) at p.431. See also at p.463 where the conclusion is that “corporate 
governance, particularly in the area of self–dealing transactions. Perhaps the most basic 
conclusion from the data is that laissez–faire—the strategy of no public involvement at all—does 
not lead to more developed financial markets. The public sector clearly has a central role to play, 
but principally as the designer of the rules of the game, which are then enforced by private 
action. .. Countries with successful stock markets mandate that shareholders receive the 
information they need and the power to act—including both voting and litigation—on this 
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There are two regulatory approaches to self–dealing: One approach is to facilitate private 
enforcement. The private law approach imposes disclosure requirements, approval procedures 
for transactions, and private litigation when self–dealing is shown. In the private law approach, 
the government regulates the contracting framework, but leaves enforcement to private parties.  
A more invasive approach is to add public enforcement, including fines and prison terms for 
self–dealing.278 For example, section 426 of the Criminal Code prohibits “secret commissions”: 
426. (1) Every one commits an offence who 
(a) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or agrees to give or offer to an agent or to 
anyone for the benefit of the agent — or, being an agent, directly or indirectly, corruptly 
demands, accepts or offers or agrees to accept from any person, for themselves or another 
person — any reward, advantage or benefit of any kind as consideration for doing or not 
doing, or for having done or not done, any act relating to the affairs or business of the 
agent’s principal, or for showing or not showing favour or disfavour to any person with 
relation to the affairs or business of the agent’s principal; or 
(b) with intent to deceive a principal, gives to an agent of that principal, or, being an 
agent, uses with intent to deceive his principal, a receipt, an account or other writing 
(i) in which the principal has an interest, 
(ii) that contains any statement that is false or erroneous or defective in any material 
particular, and 
(iii) that is intended to mislead the principal. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
information. There is no evidence that these countries rely heavily on fines and criminal 
sanctions.” 
278
 (Djankov, et al. 2008) p. 431 
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Argandoña lists private enforcement solutions to conflicts of interest, including: (1) prevention 
by recusal of the person who has to make the decision, or the divestiture by the agent of his or 
her private interests, and/or (2) “process solutions”, such as full disclosure of the conflict of 
interest and a level of competition so that the principal can consider alternatives.
279
 Djankov
280
 
further divides process solutions between those which are ex ante (where the independent 
directors and/or shareholders must approve the transaction before its completion) and those 
which are ex post (where after–the–fact disclosure is made and shareholders can sue if there is 
undue self–interest).  
As explained by Djankov, modern regulation of self–dealing evolved from the original common 
law rule of equity under which directors, being subject to fiduciary duties, cannot enter into 
engagements with their company when they have a conflict of interest, unless they first obtain 
shareholder approval (ex ante). However, during the 19
th
 century, this rule of equity lost its bite 
as courts came to accept that shareholder approval could be granted in general, rather than for 
specific transactions, in the organizing documents. Thus, legislators stepped in with constraints 
on self–dealing.281  
Canadian corporate law requires directors of the corporation to obtain ex ante approval for self–
interested transactions. The Ontario and Canada business corporations acts require a director of a 
                                                 
279
 (Argandoña 2004)  
280
 (Djankov, et al. 2008) 
281
 (Djankov, et al. 2008) at p.439. According to Djankov, US corporate law places greater 
emphasis on ex post litigation rather than ex ante shareholder approval. (at p. 463) 
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corporation who is a party to a proposed material contract or transaction to disclose the interest 
in writing and not to vote on any resolution to approve the contract.
282
 The Ontario and Quebec 
securities commissions have gone further and require controlling shareholders to obtain ex ante 
approval for certain transactions by adopting Multilateral Instrument 61–101 to regulate insider 
bids, issuer bids, business combinations and related party transactions, i.e., transactions 
favouring a controlling shareholder. Related party transactions require a formal valuation and the 
approval of the majority of the remaining shareholders. Multilateral Instrument  61–101 is a 
rules–based approach to conflicts of interest. Together with its Companion Policy, it is 44 pages 
in length. As shown above (Table 1) it has more words per paragraph than comparative 
legislation and approaches the complexity of the Income Tax Act when considering the average 
number of words per sentence.  
Should conflicts of interest be regulated by rules or principles? 
One approach is to use rules, since vague principles can be narrowly interpreted by the self–
interested agent. As Argandoña notes, agents can be selective when assessing evidence; they are 
more likely to find evidence that supports their desired conclusion and value it uncritically. If 
evidence contradicts their desired conclusion, they tend to ignore it or examine it more 
                                                 
282
 See: Section 132 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, Chapter B.16, and 
sections 83 and 120 of the Canada Business Corporations Act R.S., 1985, c. C–44, s. 1; 1994, c. 
24, s. 1(F) 
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critically.
283
 Arguably, by itemizing in advance what must be disclosed, the agent’s opportunity 
to narrowly interpret principles will be controlled. 
Ford proposes rules where compliance is especially important, such as safeguarding participation 
and procedural rights.
284
  On the other hand, detailed rules may not fully account for all of the 
factors affecting an agent. Antony Page describes how agents are not only biased by material or 
financial benefits (“homo economicus”285), but are biased by other factors, including group 
loyalties, friendship, and nonpecuniary self–interest.286 Principles are more flexible and can refer 
to softer influences on the agent, influences which cannot easily be itemized in advance by a 
rule.  
                                                 
283
 (Argandoña 2004) p.7 
284
 (Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation, A Research Study 2009) p.43. See also page 
42 where Ford states: “A legislature that was concerned about regulatory overreaching or lack of 
transparency would ensure that the regulator had very little discretion (i.e., expectations were 
cast as rules rather than principles and were enshrined in the statute) when it came to such things 
as access to information, the handling of complaints, or accountability to parliament. A 
legislature that was concerned about individual rights would limit discretion (i.e., would craft 
rules not principles) regarding hearings, procedural fairness, and consultation/participation 
rights.” 
285
 Supra, note 234 
286
 (Page 2009) at 240. See also at p.265:“[N]umerous studies have shown that people will 
frequently either neglect or reject disconfirming information. This process, termed confirmation 
bias, creates a tendency for people to search for and interpret new information as supportive of 
current beliefs and to fail to search for, ignore, discredit, or underweight unsupportive 
information. Although some people are corrupt and do this consciously, many people will do this 
in good faith. In other words, they are unaware of the self–interested bias by which they process 
information.” 
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According to Nelson, regardless of the precision of standards, practitioners consciously or 
unconsciously make financial reports that are consistent with their own personal incentives. 
Precise standards can help an auditor discourage aggressive reporting by a client who was 
previously unaware of a precise standard. However, once the standard is known, the client can 
later contort evidence to superficially comply with the precise standard.
287
 
Applying principles for conflicts of interest is not necessarily too vague. Consider the broad 
description of the offence of “fraud” in section 380 of the Criminal Code288 which controls self–
interested economic behaviour analogous to the selfish transactions of a conflicted agent. 
Criminal courts have applied the broadly worded offence of fraud for years in a variety of fact 
situations. Although courts cannot articulate in advance all behaviour which is fraudulent, when 
presented with sufficient facts they can identify the wrong. Arguably, regulators could assess 
conflicts of interest with principles just as easily as courts can identify fraud. 
 
 
 
                                                 
287
 (M. Nelson 2003) p.17 
288
 Criminal Code (R.S., 1985, c. C–46), section 380: “Every one who, by deceit, falsehood or 
other fraudulent means, whether or not it is a false pretence within the meaning of this Act, 
defrauds the public or any person, whether ascertained or not, of any property, money or 
valuable security or any service…is guilty…”. “Fraud” itself is not defined but determined by 
Judge–made case law.  
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Accounting for Conflicts of Interest 
 
There are two accounting models to measure the value of assets and liabilities of a corporation: 
the “historical cost” model and the “mark–to–market” model. Both have advantages and 
disadvantages when assessing conflicts of interest.  
Under the “historical cost” model, assets and liabilities are recorded at their values when 
acquired (their “book values”) and only restated when there is a later transaction. One of the 
advantages of using book values is that financial statements are relatively straightforward to 
produce and less open to manipulation, as they are prepared from the verifiable records of a 
firm’s transactions. Detailed rules can regulate historical costs, since it is generally a matter of 
accurately recording the transactions and presenting them in a standardized format.  
Under the “mark–to–market” model, assets and liabilities are periodically restated to reflect their 
current fair market values, regardless of whether there has been a transaction. Where the fair 
market values of assets can be readily determined (such as liquid securities listed on a stock 
exchange), mark–to–market can provide objective financial statements. Where assets are illiquid, 
however, fair market values can be difficult to ascertain, and marking the value of assets to the 
market can be manipulated. Principles are best for assessing the mark–to–market value of assets, 
since the assessment of fair value (what an arm’s length purchaser would pay) depends on many 
factors which typically cannot be itemized in advance.  
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The historical cost model 
One advantage of disclosing historical costs, with detailed rules, is described by Mahoney. It can 
measure the conflict of interest when a promoter solicits public funds for a company which is 
buying property indirectly from the promoter. Mahoney describes how a promoter can arrange 
transactions at artificial prices among family or business associates to hide the promoter’s 
personal gain as an agent of the corporation. For example, a promoter could transfer mining 
claims to a private company owned by associates controlled by the promoter, which then sells 
them to the public company at what may appear to be a third–party transaction. The final transfer 
to the public company may indeed be at fair market value, but to fully assess the compensation 
of the promoter, shareholders should know the historical cost when the promoter originally 
acquired the mining claims and the history of the transactions. If the promoter acquired the 
claims at less than fair value at the start, it doesn’t necessarily mean that the public company is 
paying too much at the end, but it is important information to fully assess the promoter’s 
personal interest.
289
  
                                                 
289
 According to Mahoney (Mahoney 1995), the English Companies Act, 1867 provided that a 
prospectus must disclose the parties to and dates of "any contract entered into by the company, or 
the promoters, directors, or trustees thereof, before the issue of such prospectus. The statute gave 
a direct right of action to shareholders, notwithstanding their lack of privity with the promoter 
and directors. Failure to make the required disclosures was deemed fraudulent "as regards any 
person taking shares in the company on the faith of such prospectus”. Also corporations had a 
minimum par value for shares, so that promoters couldn’t issue themselves shares at a discount. 
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Mahoney describes how, beginning in the late 19
th
 century, this “promoter problem” led to the 
first mandatory disclosure rules for transactions before the initial public distribution. Common 
law agency laws (fiduciary duty, full disclosure, etc.) were adapted to securities markets in 
England by the English Companies Act, 1867, with an evolving list of mandated items that 
promoters were required to disclose in a prospectus. It was essentially a rules–based approach, 
with itemized lists of historical transactions, in order to fully assess the compensation of the 
promoter. 
Mahoney argues that, given the scarce resources of smaller issuers, regulators should focus on 
historical cost disclosure with a rules–based regime, to address the promoter problem. Mahoney 
is critical of the increasing requirement of forward–looking statements and estimates of current 
market values. Rather than having the regulator mandate expensive disclosure for small issuers, 
based on a mark–to–market accounting model, let investors negotiate the kind of valuation 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Faced with a promoter who discloses a substantial adverse interest, most investors would refuse 
to invest unless they were assured that someone–either a knowledgeable and independent board 
of directors or a sophisticated "lead" investor with a large sum at stake–was going to negotiate 
the terms on which the corporation would be willing to purchase the promoter's property and 
services. The disclosure rule is therefore, in Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel's phrase, 
"contract–inducing." It encourages the creation of the promoter/investor relationship, 
notwithstanding the promoter's potentially conflicting interests, by forcing the promoter to 
negotiate the terms of the self–interested transaction, pp. 1090–91 
 145 
 
necessary for a particular transaction. Mahoney is critical of what he sees as the US Securities 
Commission’s move towards a future–oriented “accuracy enhancement” model of disclosure 
(based on current and future estimates, rather than historical costs). 
 
The mark–to–market model 
 
Marking the value of assets to their current fair market value can add valuable information for 
the investor generally, and also for assessing the agent’s conflict of interest. For example, 
regardless of what the promoter paid for the mining claims, and whether they were vended 
through controlled corporations, the current investor should know whether the current price 
being paid to the promoter (directly or indirectly) is a fair price. For this reason, in situations of 
related party transactions, Multilateral Instrument 61–101 requires a professional, independent, 
business valuator to give an opinion as to the value, or a range of values, representing the fair 
market value of the assets being transacted. The opinion must also provide sufficient disclosure 
to understand the principal judgments and principal underlying reasoning of the valuator, so as to 
form a reasoned judgment of the merits of the valuation.
290
 
Valuing assets is a complex process, requiring an assessment of the asset, market conditions, 
future market changes, and complex tax considerations. Such a range of factors is best regulated 
                                                 
290
 61–101 Section 6.4 
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by principles as many industries and transactions face unique circumstances and it would be 
overwhelming for the regulator to itemize each consideration in advance. 
 
Rules or Principles—Comparison with other Regulated Activities 
 
This section briefly reviews the use of rules and principles in other regulated fields. It starts with 
a review of income tax compliance, accounting standards, and some other regulated fields. The 
purpose of this review is to look for similarities with issues faced and the effectiveness of 
language strategies in those other contexts. 
 
Income Tax Compliance 
 
The Canadian Income Tax Act (“ITA”), regulations, interpretation bulletins, and policy 
statements are an enormous compendium of rules–based regulation. The ITA was enacted in 
Canada in 1917 as a temporary means to finance the Great War.  Income taxes were introduced 
in the United Kingdom over a hundred years earlier, to finance another major war—the 
Napoleonic war.  The 1799 English statute was 150 pages in length, imposed on all residents of 
Britain, against their entire world income; it was a relatively low rate of tax (by modern 
standards)—ten percent on total income from all sources above £60, with reductions on income 
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up to £200
291
.  When the English income tax was imposed for the first time during peacetime, in 
1842, the tax was about three percent of income. Progressive rates of tax were introduced by 
Lloyd George in his “people's budget” of 1909, but this “supertax” still amounted to only eight 
percent of the incomes of the wealthy.  
As the rates of income tax increased after the First World War, so too did the incentive to avoid. 
Many scholars, including McBarnet
292
, describe the growth of “creative compliance”—the 
(mis)characterization of property transactions to comply with the letter but not the purpose of tax 
law. Braithwaite describes a “contrived complexity” of many commercial transactions, as part of 
a cat-and-mouse game with authorities to avoid tax.  But other scholars, including Picciotto
293
, 
give an alternative explanation for disputes about the application of tax rules.  So-called 
“mischaracterizations” can arise from honest disagreement about the purpose or fairness of rules.  
As Fuller notes, a rule sometimes requires an understanding of its purpose
294
; and as Braithwaite 
argues, certainty does not flow so much from the precision of the words used as it does from a 
tacit understanding within a community as to objectives.
295
  
The purpose of tax laws may seem straightforward until we scratch the surface.  For example, the 
ITA starts simply enough with the principle that tax shall be paid on the taxable income for each 
                                                 
291
 (Customs 2011) and see (E. R. Seligman 1911) 
292
 (McBarnet 2003) 
293
 (Picciotto 2007) 
294
 (L. Fuller 1958) at p.663  
295
 (Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty 2002) at p.71 
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taxation year of every person resident in Canada at any time in the year (section 2 of the ITA).  
But “income”, according to Prebble, is “an artificial construct”– an invented calculation of what 
is identified by the authorities as revenue less what the authorities permit as deductions during a 
defined period of time.  For example, tax rules prescribing the period over which an asset can be 
depreciated (i.e. expensed) may have little factual connection with the economic life of the 
particular asset.  Similarly, some economic income is not taxable at all (e.g., gifts, inheritances, 
gains on the principal residence) and some economic income is only half-taxable (such as the 
capital gain on most assets).   
Even if the purpose of tax rules is understood, their fairness can be challenged.  For example, 
Canadian and UK income tax is imposed on residents on all sources of income from across the 
globe. When incorporations became more common in the late 1800s, the determination of 
residency in UK law was applied to international corporations, including those registered 
overseas.  The decisive precedent involved the De Beers mining company, formed under South 
African law; with its head office, general meetings, and all mining operations in South Africa.  
The House of Lords held that De Beers resided in England because England was where its 
central management and control was exercised.
296
  Leaders of international corporations rejected 
the fairness of this decision and argued that only corporate income earned in England should be 
taxed in England. Mining income earned in South Africa should be taxed in South Africa, 
whether or not management uses offices in England. Following the De Beers decision, 
                                                 
296
 DeBeers Consolidated Mines Limited v. Howe, (1906) A.C. 455 
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corporations set up complicated decision structures so that central management and control was 
not located in Britain, and in some cases, set up non-resident trusts to hold the corporate shares 
of British residents (i.e., the majority of trustees would reside in a foreign jurisdiction, so that 
income could accumulate for years in the non-resident trust without being subject to British 
tax.)
297
  
Two of the factors discussed in chapter three for choosing principles-based or rules-based 
regulations are “is there a shared understanding of regulatory text” and “do the regulated see 
enforcement as fair and effective”? The dispute about taxing a corporation on its world income 
shows how these factors can be intertwined—if the regulated are not committed to the public 
purpose because they do not see the principles as fair and effective, then they may engage in 
“creative compliance” or “contrived complexity”.  This will be discussed further in chapter three. 
Another issue in tax law, which parallels that of securities law, is the concern about the cost of 
compliance.  In addition to the actual tax payable, compliance includes the administration costs, 
the costs to collect data, complete forms, deal with authorities, stay current with tax laws, and the 
costs of tax consultants. The Canadian Federation of Independent Business surveyed a total of 
8,271 business owners during the period December 10, 2007 to February 13, 2008 and found that 
the average tax compliance cost per SME was $18,321 per year. Because compliance costs are 
relatively fixed, there is an economy of scale—cost per employee range from $3,928 for very 
                                                 
297
 (Picciotto 2007) at p.22 
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small firms (those with fewer than five employees) to $481 for larger firms (with 50 to 499 
employees).
298
  
How can compliance be improved at a minimum cost? Feld and Frey note that deterrence theory 
does not explain behaviour. The probability of tax evasion being detected, and the size of fines in 
many countries, is so low that individuals who are motivated only by personal gain would be 
rational to evade taxes.
299
 Thus, tax compliance is a “quasi–voluntary act” and can best be 
explained as a psychological tax contract, rather than by deterrence theory. Tax morale is a 
complicated interaction between taxpayer and the government. The more taxpayers believe that 
the government is using their money to benefit their community, the greater is their 
                                                 
298
 (Charron, Chow and Halbesma 2008). See: p.16: “…there is currently more support within 
the tax administration system for larger businesses. For example, the Canada Revenue Agency 
(CRA) has special employees and software dedicated to help the economy’s larger businesses 
and sectors comply with the tax system. There are no SME “specialists” within the CRA and in 
trying to comply with the tax system small and mediumsized business owners often have to put 
up with extremely burdensome processes, (a) such as long wait times on the telephone, 
inconsistent information and rulings, unwillingness to provide written rulings or interpretations, 
and lengthy audits to name but a few.”  
 
As to securities regulation, see (Bradford 2004): “whether exemptions for small businesses and 
small transactions that appear in many regulations are economically efficient. As demonstrated 
by many empirical studies of regulatory compliance costs, the fixed costs of regulation, and 
some of the variable costs, are subject to economies of scale that benefit larger firms and larger 
transactions.”  
299
 (Feld and Frey 2007) 
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compliance.
300
 The more that procedural rules appear fair and taxpayers are treated with respect, 
the greater is their willingness to pay. 
“If the taxpayer in question indeed did not intend to cheat but simply made a mistake, he 
or she will most likely be offended by the disrespectful treatment of the tax authority. The 
feeling of being controlled in a negative way, and being suspected of tax cheating, tends 
to crowd out the intrinsic motivation to act as an honorable taxpayer and, as a 
consequence, tax morale will fall. In contrast, if the tax official makes an effort to locate 
the reason for the error by contacting the taxpayer in a friendly way, the taxpayer will 
appreciate this respectful treatment and tax morale will be upheld.”301 
 
Of course, not all taxpayers will pay if the authorities treat them with respect. Plumley
302
 
describes five categories of explanation for tax compliance. Following each category of 
explanation, I will analogize to the Ontario securities market in italics. 
 
(i) “Tax Policy”: For example, marginal rates of tax may affect compliance rates; those with 
higher income have a greater incentive to evade than those with lower income (the 
penalties for underreporting with low income represents a larger share of net income).
303
 
 
                                                 
300
 See also (Wahl, Kastlunger and Kirchler 2010) at 385: `Findings from prior research on 
national and international survey data show that trust in tax authorities is positively related to tax 
compliance.` 
301
 (Feld and Frey 2007) at pp.107–108 
302
 (Plumley 1996) 
303
 (Plumley 1996), p.16 
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A comparison to the Ontario securities industry is this: Smaller issuers, in general, have 
less ability to withstand penalties or administrative proceedings For example, a small 
issuer, doing a significant transaction once every few years, would find it hard to absorb 
the costs of a regulatory review or an administrative hearing. A larger issuer, with many 
transactions and regulatory filings, is in a better position to absorb the risk of regulatory 
review of any particular transaction. If so, then smaller issuers are more likely to 
cooperate with the regulator and not take an adversarial approach. 
 
(ii) “Burden/Opportunity”: The more complex the tax system becomes (and the more 
difficult it is to know how to comply), the more people become noncompliant — either 
unintentionally due to confusion, or willfully out of frustration;
304
 
 
The rules of the Ontario Securities Commission seem to be in a constant flux. For 
example, the prospectus and dealer exemptions in multilateral rule 45–106 seems to be 
amended every two or three years (see Table 2)  There are additional exemptions in 
Ontario’s local instrument 45–501, which has been amended a number of times.305 The 
level of non–compliance can only be conjectured, but it is likely that participants are 
frustrated with the need to frequently update their legal advice. 
 
                                                 
304
 (Plumley 1996), p.16 
305
 See the OSC website at < http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/15146.htm > 
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(iii) “Enforcement”: Audits have a strong, positive impact on reporting compliance, according 
to Plumley. As word of the audit spreads among friends and associates, there is a 
deterrent “ripple effect”. The ripple effect in the general population is about eleven times 
larger than the adjustments proposed by the audits themselves, according to Plumley. 
Even without formal audits, the perception that the authorities review taxpayer filings 
have a deterrent effect.
306
 Nonfiler notices, information document matching (for example, 
comparing the disclosure documents of opposite parties to a transaction) and return 
preparation assistance are more cost–effective than audits in boosting revenue. Tax 
evasion convictions also have a deterrent effect, for the reasons described above by 
Thornton, Gunningham and Kagan: that knowledge of the “signal enforcement cases” 
reassures that compliance is not foolish and is a reminder to check compliance 
routines.
307
 
 
Securities enforcement would benefit from a similar approach. As noted under the topic 
“Risk–based, proportionate and responsive enforcement”, responsive regulation employs 
a series of increasing enforcement techniques depending on the seriousness of the 
                                                 
306
 See also (Rechberger, et al. 2010) at p.215: tax amnesties must be structured so as not to 
signal to taxpayers that enforcement is weak. When taxpayers expect future amnesties, they may 
lower their tax compliance. To be effective, amnesties should bring back offenders into 
compliance for the future. 
307
 (Gray and Scholz 2008) at p. 198, who found that, regarding occupational health compliance, 
the likelihood of being penalized may be a greater deterrence than the amount of penalty. 
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violation. Notices for defective or late disclosure, information document matching and 
other low level reviews, would likely be more cost–effective than formal audits of an 
issuer’s compliance or enforcement proceedings. This low–level approach would 
especially be effective if (i) was true—that smaller issuers tend to be cooperative. 
 
(iv) “Authorities’ Responsiveness”: Generally, a pleasant experience with a tax collection 
agency such as the IRS (e.g., getting the correct answers in a reasonable amount of time) 
ought to contribute to higher voluntary compliance. For this reason, Leslie Book 
discourages the “audit first” approach “given agency resource issues and the backlash 
that would likely accompany a meaningful increase in IRS audits of preparers and small 
business taxpayers.” Instead, “[f]irst steps can be tied to educating, serving and informing 
preparers of best practices, so long as the IRS is willing to continue monitoring and to 
impose more intrusive sanctions on bad actors.”308 
 
As noted above,
309
 Staff of the OSC are “typically reluctant to sit down and discuss issues 
of concern, preferring to gather information through a prolonged exchange of 
correspondence.” This is because Staff take a rules–based approach and leave it to 
counsel for the issuer to provide compliance advice. Improved compliance could result if 
                                                 
308
 (Book 2009)  
309
 Supra, note 148 
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Staff tried educating, serving and informing issuers with a less formal, proactive 
approach. 
 
(v) “Demographics/Economics”: Trivedi and Umashanker found that an individual’s 
personal characteristics like moral reasoning, attitudinal variables and intentions are the 
most significant predictor of their tax compliance.
310
 However, Plumley suggests that 
one’s perception of ability to pay is more important. One is more likely to pay high taxes 
if one is optimistic about future income, and less likely to pay if facing unemployment.  
 
As with tax compliance, it is more likely that venture issuers will comply if they are 
optimistic and less likely to comply if they are on the verge of collapse and desperate to 
raise funds from any source possible. The logical response, of course, is for the regulator 
to keep close watch on under–financed issuers.  
 
Accounting Standards 
 
The purpose of accounting standards is similar to that of securities regulation—full and true 
disclosure of financial information. Company auditors assess information provided by 
management, who may be in a conflict of interest, so that the shareholders are fully informed. 
                                                 
310
 (Trivedi, Shehata and Mestelman 2004)  
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Although the focus of auditing is different than the focus of securities law (auditors report to 
current shareholders whereas securities disclosure reports to the market generally), similar issues 
can arise.  
As with income tax principles, accounting principles can sometimes be interpreted (or 
misinterpreted) depending on one’s underlying values or culture.  This is why the first two 
factors identified in chapter four are “Is there a shared understanding of regulatory principles?” 
and “Are the regulated committed to the public interest?” In 1988, Gray noted four cultural 
values which have influenced the evolution of different international accounting standards:
311
 
Professionalism versus Statutory Control—some cultures impose prescriptive accounting 
requirements; other cultures rely on individual professional judgment and self-regulation. 
 
[Gray argues that in the U.K., presentation of a company's financial position depends on 
the judgment of the accountant as an independent professional, with fairness comments 
not specifically required by law. In contrast, Gray notes that France and Germany have 
traditionally imposed prescriptive and detailed standards. Harrison and McKinnon 
describe how, after WWII, Japanese culture resisted American efforts to enhance 
independent audits, because Japanese business culture emphasized the protection of 
relationships and mutual interests—a third-party independent audit was considered 
“alien” to Japanese business practice.312  ] 
                                                 
311
 (S. Gray 1988) 
312
 (Harrison and McKinnon 1986) At p.245 
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Uniformity versus Flexibility—some cultures impose uniform accounting practices 
among companies; other cultures allow for flexibility based on the circumstances of each 
business. 
[Gray argued that in France, the tradition has been a uniform accounting plan to facilitate 
national planning and macroeconomic goals. In contrast, in the U.K. and in the U.S.A. 
there is more concern with inter-temporal consistency together with some degree of inter-
company comparability subject to a perceived need for flexibility.] 
Conservatism versus Optimism —some cultures favour cautious financial statements 
because of uncertainty; other cultures permit a more optimistic, laissez-faire, risk-taking 
approach. 
[Conservatism or prudence in asset and profit measurement is perceived as fundamental 
by accountants the world over. However, according to Gray, the degree of conservatism 
varies according to country, ranging from a strongly conservative approach in France and 
Germany, to a less conservative approach in the U.S.A. and U.K.] 
Secrecy versus Transparency — some cultures favour confidentiality and the restriction 
of information to management; other cultures favour a transparent, open and publicly 
accountable approach. 
[Secrecy is related to conservatism; a cautious approach to disclosure can avoid conflicts 
of interest and can avoid leaks of intellectual property to competitors. According to Gray, 
the extent of permitted secrecy varies across countries, with lower levels of disclosure in 
France and Germany, compared to the U.S.A. and U.K.] 
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Just as “mischaracterization” in income tax compliance can arise from honest disagreement 
about meaning and fairness, different cultural attitudes can result in different interpretations 
about financial disclosure. According to Gray, accounting culture in France evolved into 
standardized rules as an instrument of national economic planning, whereas the British tradition 
has been one of professional independence and flexibility.  Neither is “correct” in an absolutist 
sense.  Standardization and flexibility are different goals; with different risks and benefits.  
In January 2011, Canadian public issuers were required to shift from generally accepted 
accounting practices (“GAAP”) to International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”).  IFRS 
is a more principles-based approach.  IFRS principles must be applied based on judgment and 
assumptions given the specific facts at hand.  IFRS provides entities with more accounting policy 
choices and greater use of professional judgment than Canadian GAAP.  Critics have argued that 
IFRS provides management with too much flexibility.”313 
Although American accounting standards have been influenced by the British tradition of 
flexibility and professional independence, U.S. accounting regulations are very detailed and 
complex.  The primary U.S. accounting standard setter, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB), was criticized after Enron for relying too much on detailed rules. According to 
Gill, judging by the sheer volume of authoritative accounting literature, U.S. accounting 
standards are the most detailed in the world.
314
 The FASB considered principles–based 
                                                 
313
 (Romano and Grewal 2009) 
314
 (Gill 2003) at p.972 
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accounting in a 2003 proposal, and discussed its costs and controls. It said that a principles–
based approach could lead to good–faith, but different, professional interpretations for similar 
transactions, raising concerns about comparability. Guidance would be necessary, and if FASB 
did not provide it, others would become de facto standard setters without the due process 
provided by the FASB. The FASB concluded that principles–based regulation could lead to 
abuse if the standards were not applied in good faith. The FASB decided that it would be 
difficult for the SEC and other participants in the U.S. financial accounting and reporting process 
to adjust to a principles–based approach.315 
A bright–line rules approach, as advocated by the FASB, is not necessarily more effective. 
Similar to the discussion regarding “Rules and Precision” (page 76 above), Cuccia and Nelson 
investigated whether replacing a vague standard with a numerical threshold would reduce 
aggressive tax reporting. What they found was that practitioners were equally aggressive under 
the rules–based regime; practitioners compensated for the loss of latitude in standards by 
relaxing their interpretation of evidence supporting detailed rules.
316
 And the reverse appears 
true. Nelson and Kinney found that auditors respond to the ambiguity of a vague standard by 
reporting more conservatively.
317
  
 
                                                 
315
 (Financial Accounting Standards Board 2002) at p. 9 
316
 (Cuccia, Hackenbrack and Nelson 1995) at p.228  
317
 (Nelson and Kinney 1997)  
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Australian Competition and Consumer Act  
 
Parker, Ainsworth and Stepanenko
318
 reported on the different enforcement techniques and 
messages used by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) in the field of 
anti-competitive and collusive cartels (which includes price-fixing and market sharing 
agreements).  Four case studies were examined by interviewing ACCC staff, by interviewing the 
lawyers and business people involved, and by reviewing documentary reports. The four cases 
examined were the Freight, Concrete, Transformers and Queensland Fire Protection cases. Each 
was associated with boom times in the Australian economy from the 1940s to the 1960s, which 
was responsible for the formation of large, oligopolistic firms in the 1980s, with a culture of 
collusion and price fixing.  
Just as the fairness of income tax and accounting standards can be disputed, the fairness of rules 
prohibiting price-fixing was disputed by some Australian managers.  “Price-fixing” is a 
disparaging term for what some consider “orderly marketing”.  For example, unions, 
governments, and agricultural marketing boards have been regulating minimum prices and 
                                                 
318
 (Parker, Ainsworth and Stepanenko, The Impact of ACCC Enforcement Activity in Cartel 
Cases 2004) at p.13 
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market share for many years. Many Australian managers felt justified in negotiating prices and 
market share arrangements because of the smaller revenues in the Australian market.
319
  
The ACCC began tougher enforcement proceedings in the early 1990s, including proceedings 
against the TNT Australia, Ansett Transport, Mayne Nickless Limited and nearly twenty 
individuals, alleging collusive behavior (the “Freight case”).320 Although staff of the ACCC 
believed that enforcement penalties which were the greatest deterrent, industry interviews 
suggested that negative publicity was as at least as effective. In an age where much of business is 
about managing brand value and reputation, media coverage motivates defendants to agree to 
consent orders, rather than engage in prolonged and adversarial litigation. Media coverage deters 
future conduct (“specific deterrence”—see page 116). Thirdly, it sends a message out to the 
industry about the dangers of price fixing (“general deterrence”—see page 119). 
Even though the negative publicity and the threat of enforcement had a significant impact on 
industry attitudes (and cartels were no longer considered acceptable), Parker, Ainsworth and 
Stepanenko found that the new attitudes did not necessarily result in improved behaviour. 
Compliant behaviour is dependent on specific contextual factors (such as opportunity, 
surveillance, social networks and knowledge). Enforcement action must change the contexts for 
                                                 
319
 (Parker, Ainsworth and Stepanenko, The Impact of ACCC Enforcement Activity in Cartel 
Cases 2004) at p.12 
320
 (Parker, Ainsworth and Stepanenko, The Impact of ACCC Enforcement Activity in Cartel 
Cases 2004) p.23 
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behavior, with a web of controls straining against anti-competitive behavior.
321
 This corresponds 
to the discussion of “Responsive regulation” (above, page 105). 
 
Other Regulated Fields 
 
The importance education for principles-based regulation is illustrated by Fairman and Yapp in 
the food–service industry in the UK. In “making sense” of prescriptive requirements they didn’t 
understand, the most common response was to ignore them. However, compliance was better if 
rules were linked with harm in the mind of the business owner.
322
 Where the enforcement 
authorities took an educative approach, with warnings and graduating penalties, compliance was 
generally improved. Such an approach requires a greater regulatory investment.
323
 
Commodity futures regulation in the U.S. illustrates the importance of enforcement and 
monitoring in a principles-based regime.  In contrast to the rules-based regulation of traditional 
capital markets by the SEC, in 2000, commodities regulators adopted a more principles-based 
approach for the regulation of futures and derivatives.  The pace of change in these markets was 
considered too rapid to allow for a comprehensive system of rules to govern market participants.  
                                                 
321
 (Parker, Ainsworth and Stepanenko, The Impact of ACCC Enforcement Activity in Cartel 
Cases 2004) at pp.104-5 
322
 (Fairman and Yapp 2005) p.505 
323
 (Fairman and Yapp 2005) p. 504 
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The Commodity Futures Modernization Act has several principles-based components, with a set 
of “core principles”.  As Ford notes, the core principles share features with the FSA’s Principles 
for Business and the BCSC proposed code of conduct for dealers and advisors.
324
  Critics have 
argued that the Commodity Futures Modernization Act came with a philosophy of de-regulation 
in 2000.  Derivative transactions between “sophisticated parties”, such as banks and securities 
firms, were largely unregulated. These derivatives, especially credit default swaps, were at the 
heart of the credit crisis of 2008 and subsequent global recession.
325
   
  
                                                 
324
 (Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation, A Research Study 2009) at p. 18 and in the 
Appendix A to her research report. 
325
 (CBS News: 60 Minutes 2008) 
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Chapter 3: Eight Factors to Consider on Continuum of Rules to Principles 
 
This chapter gleans eight factors from the literature review in chapter two in order to assess 
where along the rules/principles continuum a particular area of regulation should lie, and then 
applies those factors to reach tentative conclusions about the regulation of Ontario venture 
issuers.  Chapters four and five will further assess those conclusions with a survey, and chapter 
six assesses those factors by consulting six industry experts. 
(i) Is there a shared understanding of regulatory principles?  
Description of factor 
 
Is there a shared understanding about regulatory principles, or must every facet of activity be 
either approved or proscribed? As noted in the Introduction, a cookbook for the novice might 
assume knowledge of “boil”, “poach” or “garnish”, but ignorance of “braise”, “blanch” or 
“flambé”. Similarly, a capital gains tax article for the layperson may require a detailed 
explanation of the meaning of “disposition” or “deemed capital gain”, but an article for the tax 
lawyer could simply refer to the relevant section numbers in the Income Tax Act.   
The question parallels the discussion of “interpretive communities”, a literary concept developed 
by Stanley Fish—that text has no meaning outside of the cultural assumptions, or “interpretive 
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templates”, which give meaning to words.326 The communication between writer and reader is a 
cultural exchange, based on shared meanings. It includes the author’s intent, but is not limited to 
it.
327
 Thus, Fish challenges the notion that text is self–sufficient and argues that “interpretive 
strategies” give texts their shape, making them rather than, as is usually assumed, arising from 
them.
328
 Fish argues that the “business of criticism” (of literary criticism) is not to uncover 
evidence of the author’s intent but to persuade the literary community of the context and 
assumptions from which the text should be interpreted.
329
 The critic shapes the community’s 
understanding of text, and the community’s appreciation of meaning evolves. 
The same applies to interpreting law—good legal argument is not so much an historical 
investigation into the legislature’s intent when proclaiming the law (by evidence of 
parliamentary debate, for example); rather, it persuades the legal community that a particular 
interpretation fits best within the community’s current understanding of legal purpose (and 
places the interpretation within a body of existing precedent).  This is especially true when 
                                                 
326
 This is similar to Braithwaite’s statement that certainty does not flow so much from the 
precision of the words used as it does from a tacit understanding within a community as to 
objectives. See footnote 116 
327
 (Fish 1980) pp. 147–174. See also (Spaak 2008). As Julia Black argues, (Black, Regulatory 
Conversations 2002) at p.167: “language is not an abstract system of normative forms, and 
meaning is never fixed. Reference is always various and open ended. Meaning and use of 
language will vary with the context in which it is used, with different genres (for example, 
formal parliamentary debate, or gossip between friends), and with different speech 
communities.” 
328
 (Fish 1980) at p.13 
329
 (Fish 1980) at p.16 
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interpreting the constitution.  The “living tree doctrine” of constitutional interpretation holds that 
the constitution is an organic document that should be read in a broad and progressive manner so 
as to adapt it to changing times.  As Chief Justice Lamer stated in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act 
(1985), “[i]f the newly planted 'living tree' which is the Charter is to have the possibility of 
growth and adjustment over time, care must be taken to ensure that historical materials, such as 
the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee, do not stunt its 
growth.”330 
The court’s understanding of purpose is not necessarily what is most efficient from an economic 
or regulatory perspective.  For example, the 2011 reference to the Supreme Court of Canada on 
the proposed national securities act
331
 illustrates the kinds of arguments required to interpret the 
constitutionality of legislation.  At issue was whether the regulation of the securities industry is a 
valid exercise of the federal “trade and commerce” power (like federal competition laws) or 
whether it was in pith and substance the regulation of property and civil rights, which is a 
provincial power (like insurance regulation).  The court did not decide on the basis of which 
level of government could better coordinate investment or regulate the industry.  “[A]rguments 
in the reports as to whether securities should be regulated federally or provincially as a matter of 
policy are irrelevant to the constitutional validity of the legislation.” (at paragraph 127).  Rather, 
the decision turned on the division of powers as previously interpreted by the courts: “The 
                                                 
330
 Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486 at par.53 
331
 See note 51 and discussion at page Error! Bookmark not defined. of this paper. 
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Secession Reference affirmed federalism as an underlying constitutional principle that demands 
respect for the constitutional division of powers and the maintenance of a constitutional balance 
between federal and provincial powers.” (at paragraph 61). The problem with the federal 
proposal was that it went beyond matters of national interest of orderly markets and reached 
down into the detailed regulation of all aspects of securities regulation. 
Meidinger argues that it is through communicative interactions that regulatory issues are defined 
and redefined and identities constructed.
332
 The regulatory conversation forms spaces in which 
concepts can be constructed, knowledge created, issues and problems defined, and cooperation 
facilitated. Braithwaite and Drahos, in their analysis of global business regulation, observe the 
ability of regulatory conversations to define problems and create new sets of knowledge, and to 
facilitate the modelling process through which that knowledge is disseminated and the patterns 
of regulation adopted.
333
 
Black describes the regulatory conversation through “discourse analysis”, which “governs the 
way that a topic can and cannot be meaningfully talked and reasoned about, and influences how 
ideas are put into practice and used to regulate the conduct of others”. 334 For example, “the 
vogue for ‘proceduralization’, in the form of structuring institutional processes so as to require 
                                                 
332
 (Meidinger 1987) 
333
 (Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation 2000) 
334
 (Black, Regulatory Conversations 2002)  
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and facilitate deliberation, is a conversational technique.”335 If there is a requirement or 
expectation of transparency, this may affect who participates in the conversation.   
Black argues that discourse is the basis of social action because it is constitutive, functional, and 
coordinative.
336
 It is “constitutive” because it builds objects, worlds, minds, identities, and social 
relations, not just reflects them. For example, regulation as discourse builds and defines 
problems (e.g. “market failure” and “risk”), suggests solutions (e.g. “criminalization”, “meta–
regulation”) and creates categories (e.g. “compliance”). Discourse is “functional” because it 
achieves certain ends, such as persuading others through rhetoric and argument (often by 
regulatory hearings). Discourse is “coordinative” because, through shared meaning and 
perception, it produces social coordination. For example, regulatory discourse can produce new 
norms and practices within a regulated community.
337
 
Black describes how regulatory communities can exist at a “surface” level or “deep” level. At a 
surface level, an interpretive or regulatory community might consist of only a shared 
“sociolinguistic register or understanding of practices”—for example, enforcement strategies. At 
                                                 
335
 (Black, Regulatory Conversations 2002) at 172. See also (Black, Proceduralizing Regulation: 
Part I 2000) at p.599 where she notes that the nature of participation may take a number of 
forms. “It could be the egotistical bargaining and voting of interest group pluralism or liberal 
democracy. This may be described as a “thin” conception of proceduralization, where procedures 
are aimed simply at bargains and compromises. Alternatively, participation could be orientated 
towards the mutuality, consensus, and inter–subjective understanding of deliberative democracy. 
This deliberative form of proceduralization may be described as a “thick” conception.” 
336
 (Black, Regulatory Conversations 2002) pp.164–65 
337
 (Black, Regulatory Conversations 2002) p.165 
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a deep level, it might consist of shared validity claims and normative commitments. Developing 
an interpretive community at this deep level requires a shared commitment to the values of the 
regulatory system. As Black says: “The development of shared understandings and tacit 
knowledge will help to address issues of certainty, rule entrepreneurship … of ‘honest 
perplexity’, and will also contribute to the development of ‘instinctive’ compliance: the 
inculcation of the habit of compliance on which successful regulation depends.”338 
For example, lawyers in Ontario share a common education—law school and the Bar Admission 
exams. “Thinking like a lawyer”, which is a deductive process based on the application of law 
and precedent, is not a natural process for some students. Law students take time to acquire the 
distinctions, categories, and notions of relevance and irrelevance that comprise “thinking like a 
lawyer”.339 On learning the templates, they join the interpretive community and can discuss such 
principles as “reasonable care”, “due diligence” and “administrative discretion”, which, to the 
non–lawyer, can seem to be nothing more than vague and meaningless phrases. As Black notes, 
“Formal systems of control are always supplemented by informal structures: practices, attitudes, 
experiences, personal codes of morality. The task for any system of regulation, be it of firms, 
bureaucrats, employees, and so on, is to ensure that those informal systems support the formal 
system by enhancing cohesion, initiative, and morale.”340 
                                                 
338
 (Black, Regulatory Conversations 2002) p.179 
339
 (Patterson 1996) p. 110 
340
 (Black, Regulatory Conversations 2002) at p.182 
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To apply this analysis to the principles versus rules question, the more that there is a “deep level” 
understanding of values, the more that principles will be understood. Otherwise, specific rules 
may be necessary to enforce all of the “do’s and don’ts”.  
Application to Ontario venture issuers 
 
Shared understanding of principles can come from education or experience, or both.  The OSC 
regulates who can be a dealer (either directly or through an SRO) and the TSX–V limits who can 
be a director or manager of a public issuer. To be registered as a dealer in Ontario requires 
compliance with National Instrument 31–103, a detailed document which prescribes educational 
and capital requirements for different categories of registration. The educational courses are 
provided by the Canadian Securities Institute (for dealers and advisors), the CFA Institute (for 
chartered financial advisors), the Institute of Canadian Bankers (for bank–related mutual funds) 
and the Investment Funds Institute of Canada (for mutual fund dealers). Most dealers have 
qualified analysts to assist them before recommending an investment.
341
 
                                                 
341
 Unfortunately, most analysts follow a “herd instinct”, according to The Task Force to 
Modernize Securities Regulation They tend to be too optimistic about the market generally and 
about popular stocks (including Enron). “The empirical evidence supports this hypothesis that 
career concerns motivate securities analysts to stick close to consensus earnings forecasts – and 
in particular to avoid downward deviations. According to this research, accuracy does not 
improve analysts’ career prospects as much as do predictions that err systematically on the side 
of optimism.” It may be (and the proposed survey will test this), that when the analyst leaves the 
herd and assesses a venture issuer “out on a limb”, the tendency is reversed, and the analyst 
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To be approved as a director or manager of a TSX–V issuer, management, directors and officers 
must have (a) adequate experience and technical expertise relevant to the issuer’s business and 
industry; and (b) adequate reporting issuer experience in Canada or a similar jurisdiction (see 
TSX–V Corporate Finance Manual Policy 3.1). The TSX–V considers previous involvement 
with public and private issuers, and whether the person has satisfactorily completed any 
corporate governance or reporting issuer management courses acceptable to the TSX–V.342  
Every Chief Financial Officer of a TSX–V issuer, and every member of the audit committee, 
must be “financially literate” as defined by National Instrument 52–110, meaning someone who 
“has the ability to read and understand a set of financial statements that present a breadth and 
level of complexity of accounting issues that are generally comparable to the breadth and 
complexity of the issues that can reasonably be expected to be raised by the issuer's financial 
statements.” Although a comprehensive knowledge of GAAP and GAAS is not required, the 
capacity to understand and evaluate the issuer’s financial statements is. It seems reasonable to 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
becomes overly pessimistic because a false buy recommendation for an obscure issuer is more 
embarassing than a false “don’t buy”. (The Task Force 2006) Final Report, at pp.137–138. 
342
 The CSNX is a smaller exchange, with smaller issuers and a lower threshold of entry. The 
main advertised benefit of listing on the CSNX, according to its website <www.csnx.ca>, is the 
reduced listing fees. CSNX Policy 4 states that its investors expect issuers to comply with good 
governance. I would expect similar education levels to those venture issuers listed on the TSX–
V. 
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expect that financial managers of venture issuers have at least an undergraduate degree in 
business or accounting. 
As to non–financial managers, each industry brings its own educational requirements. The 
venture issuers listed on the TSX–V are primarily mining and oil and gas ventures.343 OSC Staff, 
the TSX–V, and the more senior TSX exchange, have experts with mining and energy 
experience. National Instrument 43–101, which governs the scientific and technical disclosure of 
mining prospects, is considered a global standard in mining disclosure.
344
 There are also a 
number of trade organizations for the mining sector, including the Prospectors & Developers 
Association of Canada (“PDA”), which hosts an annual conference in Toronto each year.345 In 
addition, under National Instrument 43–101, only a “qualified person” can publicly disclose 
mineral information, and to be qualified, the person must (a) be an engineer or geoscientist with 
at least five years of experience in mineral exploration, mine development or operation or 
mineral project assessment, or any combination of these; (b) have experience relevant to the 
                                                 
343
 The “quoted market value” (The number of shares outstanding multiplied by the quoted price 
per share.) for junior mining issuers on the TSX–V in December 2007, which was a record year, 
was $34.5 billion. Although it plummeted after the market meltdown to $8.7 billion on 
December 31, 2008 and the quoted market value for oil and gas issuers was reduced to $3.2 
billion, they still far exceeded the remaining sectors on the TSX–V: technology at $1.4 billion, 
life sciences at $0.4 billion, and “cleantech” at $0.6 billion as of December 31, 2008. 
344
 http://www.tsx.com/en/pdf/Mining_Sector_Sheet.pdf 
345
 The PDA courses in 2009 on such topics as “Aboriginal awareness training seminar”, 
“Geometallurgy”, “Remote sensing and spectral geology”, “Framework for Responsible 
Exploration: Principles and Performance Guidelines” and “Special session on continuous 
disclosure and financial reporting”.  
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subject matter of the mineral project and the technical report; and (c) be a member in good 
standing with a designated professional association.  
In addition, advisers to venture issuers, including their accountants and solicitors, tend to be 
specialized. Since 2004, and as a result of various accounting scandals
346
, the Commissions 
enacted National Instrument 52–108 which requires an auditor of public issuers to participate in 
the oversight program of the Canadian Public Accountability Board. As for solicitors, securities 
law tends to be a specialized field practiced by the large or boutique firms in Toronto, Vancouver 
and Calgary.  
 
(ii) Are the regulated committed to the public interest? 
 
Description of factor 
 
Is there a deep level commitment to shared principles, as described by Black? Such a 
                                                 
346
 Enron, Tyco, Adelphia, Peregrine and WorldCom. Contributing factors included: (1) directors 
failed to supervise complex business issues, or did not have the expertise to do so; (2) audit 
committee were not independent of management; (3) auditing firms were not independent 
“financial watchdogs” for the shareholders – many were being paid lucrative non–audit or 
consulting fees by management; (4) securities analysts issued buy or sell recommendations while 
being paid for lucrative investment banking services by the companies being analyzed; and (5) 
executive stock option and bonus practices, combined with volatile stock prices, encouraged 
management to manipulate earnings. 
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commitment could be based on one or more of the compliance motives discussed above—i.e., 
the “reason driven motive” (page 111), the “social identity motive” (page 121), the “justice 
motive” (page 129), or the “citizenship motive” (page 132). As to the social identity motive and 
the desire to join “the right community” (page 122), as Carol Rose notes, those with a shared 
religion or family derive benefits from cooperation and trust: “Modern game–theorist 
mathematicians buttress this point, telling us that if we can arrange things in such a manner that 
we have repeated contact with our opposite numbers, then we can enforce cooperation through 
the game of ‘Tit for tat’.”347  The importance of trust arises, for example, among the community 
of lawyers in specialized fields or small towns, who must negotiate with one another later, on 
different cases. The value of one’s reputation becomes important—that the lawyer can be trusted, 
will “play by the rules”, will honour their undertakings, and will refrain from “sharp practice” for 
tactical advantage. As Gunningham describes, “Self–regulation works best where there exists a 
sense of professional or collegiate responsibility on the part of a business community, and a 
sense of shared values at the institutional or professional level. Professions such as doctors or 
lawyers have a collective ethos that ensures the maintenance of appropriate standards and 
justifies the trust placed in them to run their own affairs.”348 
Arguably, principles will work when the regulated wish to enhance their reputation within the 
community. Conversely, rules are required where reputation is not valued and deterrence and the 
                                                 
347
 (Rose 1988) at pp.601–602 
348
 (N. Gunningham 2006) p. 442 
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threat of punishment are needed. For example, Gunningham describes how the precariousness of 
the 1987 Hong Kong stock market, in the shadow of impending Communist control, created a 
culture of immediacy—brokers and traders invested short–term to accumulate funds and 
emigrate as soon as possible. Unlike the “gentleman’s club” in London, where high ethical 
standards prevailed and where a “chap’s word is his bond”, the Hong Kong market was open to 
abuse.
349
  
As noted under governance theory (above, page 113), Hopkins observes that most accidents are 
not caused by a failure to follow rules, but by a failure to notice warning signs and adopt a 
“safety culture”.  Strategies to improve risk judgment treat regulatory consequences as important 
and not just a cost of doing business. 
Application to Ontario venture issuers 
 
As Edwards and Sen Gupta describe, small firms are embedded in networks that supply 
information and help generate trust
350
 and, as Chau and Siu argue, successful small organizations 
build coalitions in order to benefit from these networks.
351
  As noted in Table 6 at page 212 of 
this paper, 85% of investment funds raised by TSX-V issuers are from private placements—close 
                                                 
349
 (N. Gunningham 2006) See also (Bucar and Hisrich 2003) at p. 271 who found that insider 
trading was considered unethical by Americans (with the US tradition of stock exchange 
operations) but highly acceptable for Russians. 
350
 Supra, note 239 
351
 Supra, p. 127 
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friends and family, existing business contacts and private investors introduced by an arm’s length 
broker.  Presumably, a reputation for success and honesty among friends, family, business 
contacts, and the broker community is essential to raise capital.  Also, in order to acquire good 
assets for their venture, such as promising mining claims or industrial patents, a reputation for 
financial success would seem important.  This is because most start-up ventures do not have the 
cash to purchase such assets from the prospector or inventor, and so will issue shares in the 
venture in exchange for the property.  A reputation for financing success is therefore important, 
since the prospector or inventor who has received shares in the venture is tied to the venture’s 
ability to finance development. 
Regardless of how important a reputation for success may be for the managers of venture issuers 
within networks, the question for the rules/principles factor is whether or not the managers of 
venture issuers are committed to the “public interest” as defined by Ontario securities regulation.  
Section 1.1 of the Ontario Securities Act defines the public interest as “to provide protection to 
investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices”; and “to foster fair and efficient capital 
markets and confidence in capital markets”.352 The primary means to achieve these purposes are 
threefold: (i) requirements for timely, accurate and efficient disclosure of information,
353
 (ii) 
                                                 
352
 See also Committee for the Equal Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v. Ontario 
(Securities Commission), 2001 SCC 37 (CanLII), [2001] 2 SCR 132, <http://canlii.ca/t/521n> 
retrieved on 2013-12-17, per Iacabucci J. at paragraph 41.   
353
 See also section 56(1) of the Ontario Securities Act requires “full, true and plain disclosure” 
for a prospectus; section 130.1 prohibits a “misrepresentation” in an offering memorandum and 
“misrepresentation” is defined as an untruth or an omission of a material fact. 
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restrictions on fraudulent and unfair market practices and procedures, and (iii) requirements for 
the maintenance of high standards of fitness and business conduct to ensure honest and 
responsible conduct by market participants.
354
   
What follows is a discussion of whether or not venture issuers are committed to the public 
interest of securities regulation, including: (i) full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts 
to investors, (ii) insiders should not take advantage of information which has not been publicly 
disclosed,
355
 and (iii) high standards of fitness and business conduct to ensure honest and 
responsible conduct.  
Commitment to “Full, True and Plain Disclosure” 
Are venture issuer promoters and their professional advisers committed to the “fundamental 
principle” of giving investors timely, accurate and efficient disclosure (section 2.1 of the Ontario 
Securities Act)? 
Financing venture issuers requires extensive use of “private placement” securities exemptions 
because of the prohibitive cost of filing a prospectus. The usual exemptions are the “private 
issuer exemption” which permits securities to be sold among family, friends and close business 
                                                 
354
 Ontario Securities Act, section 2.1(2).  An example of the public interest of Ontario securities 
regulation being more than protecting investors in a particular transaction is Multilateral 
Instrument 72-101, which regulates a distribution of securities outside of Ontario. 
355
 Section 76(1) of the Ontario Securities Act. 
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associates of the directors and control persons, and the “accredited investor” exemption, which 
permits securities to be sold to certain wealthy individuals and well–capitalized organizations. 
Most junior mining ventures, which comprise 64% of the number of issuers on the TSX-V
356
, are 
exploration companies with no revenues.  They trade on the possibility of a major discovery, but, 
as described from page 43, success is unlikely (less than 1%). No revenues are required for a 
mining venture to list on the TSX-V—only adequate working capital and financial resources to 
carry out stated work program for the next 12 months and $100,000 in allocated funds
357
. 
Exploration can easily cost millions of dollars. Thus, repeated rounds of private placements are 
usually required before a bankable “feasibility study” is available to assess the economics of 
mining the ore. The mining promoter must maintain the confidence of his or her core of investors 
as they will be approached again and again as exploration proceeds. If, along the way, results are 
negative, the promoter who is motivated by a long term reputation in the industry will disclose 
the results and not seek additional financing for what may be a failing property.  
Some junior venture promoters may look to excite their investors with a short-term bump in the 
stock price. The promoter’s approach may depend on what their investors are seeking. Some 
investors may have a six–month investment horizon, looking for a bump in share price from the 
announcement of a discovery, while others may have a long–term horizon, looking for solid 
management to develop the property.  If the investors do have a short-term horizon, then it 
                                                 
356
 Table 3 at p.209 
357
 TSX-V Policy 2-1 for Tier 2 Issuers. < http://www.tmx.com/en/pdf/Policy2-1.pdf> 
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makes sense for the promoter to reciprocate with short-term developments, to maintain ongoing 
and steady financing of the project during its development stage.  
Most promoters are required to hold a portion of their shares with an escrow agent until certain 
targets are met, thus reducing any incentive to dump the founder’s shares on unsuspecting 
investors before disclosing results.
358
 
As for the professional advisers of venture issuers, solicitors are regulated by the Law Society 
and have ethical and regulatory duties to their profession. Investment dealers have similar 
obligations. Probably, such gatekeepers are reluctant to spoil their professional reputation for the 
short–term success of a particular issuer; however, those who hold significant options or shares 
in the venture, or who are expecting the closing of a transaction in order to be paid substantial 
fees, may be pressured to compromise their professional standards in order to secure the success 
of a transaction—I am not aware of any statistics which measure this.  In contrast, auditors are 
prohibited from owning shares or benefiting from other financial interests in the company they 
are auditing, as part of their professional obligations.
359
   
If promoters are motivated by the short-term trading price of their issuer’s shares, rather than 
their long-term value or the promoter’s personal reputation, arguably, their commitment to the 
public interest is lessened.  However, as mentioned above, the promoter’s approach may depend 
                                                 
358
 National Policy 46–201 and TSX-V Policy 5-4 
359
 See Guide to Canadian Independence Standard, 2009 update, 
<http://www.icao.on.ca/CAfirms/PracticeMatters/Articles/1011page1628.pdf> 
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on what their investors are seeking. Some investors may have a six–month investment horizon, 
looking for a bump in share price from the announcement of a discovery, while others may have 
a long–term horizon, looking for solid management to develop the property. 
Insider trading and business ethics 
Trading with material nonpublic information is not, by itself, illegal in Ontario. It depends on 
how the information was acquired. A trader who innocently happens upon nonpublic information 
can trade to the detriment of others with impunity, unless he or she is an “insider” or a “person in 
a special relationship” with the issuer.360 (Someone who receives a tip from an insider—a 
“tippee”—is a person in a special relationship.361) It is an evolution of the common law self–
dealing rule, which prevents a fiduciary and his or her associates from using the principal’s 
                                                 
360
 Section 75 of the Ontario Securities Act requires “forthwith” publication of a news release of 
any material change, unless publication would be detrimental to the issuer and then disclosure 
can be filed confidentially with the Commission; section 76(1) prohibits trading before the news 
release is published, and section 76(2) prohibits “tipping” another of material undisclosed 
information.  
Security analysts are generally not “insiders”. They gather and compile information, talk to 
corporate officers and other insiders, and issue recommendations to traders. Their reports may 
contain a variety of information that is "pieced together" without violating insider trading laws, 
under the mosaic theory. This information may include non–material nonpublic information as 
well as material public information, which may, when amalgamated together, be as valuable as 
individual pieces of material piece of information. Those who trade on this amalgamated 
information can take advantage of others in the market. See (Investopedia, a Forbes Digital 
Company 2010). 
361
 The person is a “tippee” if they know, or ought reasonably to know, that the person who 
tipped them is an insider. Section 76(5)(e) of the Ontario Securities Act. 
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property (including informational property) for personal gain.
362
   Fiduciary law allows for the 
tracing and return of property in the hands of a third party, unless the third party is a bona fide 
purchaser for value without notice of the breach.
363
 U.S. insider trading laws have similar 
fiduciary law origins. As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. O'Hagan
364
, "[a] 
company's confidential information...qualifies as property to which the company has a right of 
exclusive use. The undisclosed misappropriation of such information in violation of a fiduciary 
duty… constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement."  
Some academics reject the application of fiduciary law to insider trading. Although corporate 
law makes directors and officers fiduciaries for the company’s current security holders, creditors, 
directors and officers
365
, no fiduciary duty should be imposed on insiders to protect third persons 
                                                 
362
 Trustees, for example, cannot deal with trust property unless the beneficiary (or testator) 
specifically permits it. Even if it is a fair price (or a better than fair price) and the beneficiary 
suffers no loss, the transaction can later be cancelled by the beneficiary. It is a prophylactic rule 
based on loyalty, to prevent the trustee from ever acting in a conflict of interest. See Re Estate of 
Ronald R. Mitchell [1970] N.S.J. No. 106 and Re Ballard Estate [1994] O.J. No. 1898 
363
 Bank of Montreal v. I Trade Finance Inc, 2009 ONCA 615 (CanLII) 
364
 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997) 
365
 The oppression remedy in section 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act and section 
248 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act protects the company’s security holders, creditors, 
directors and officers from any act by the corporation which is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial 
or unfairly disregards the interests of these persons. Where conflicts arise among these 
stakeholders, the directors should resolve them in accordance with their fiduciary duty to act in 
the best interests of the corporation, viewed as a good corporate citizen. See at par. 81 of BCE 
Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 SCR 560 The Supreme Court quoted 
approvingly from the Revlon case in Delaware, which held “in general, the directors owe 
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with whom they trade on the stock market. Manne
366
 argued in 1966 that trading by employees 
in advance of favourable news can be an appropriate means of compensation, without any cost to 
current shareholders. The alternative is to issue directors and employees options, which, if 
exercised, dilute the ownership of current shareholders. Insider trading does not distort the 
market price, according to Manne. If an insider buys shares knowing of favourable news, the 
increased bidding for shares will drive up the price to its true value sooner than if insiders were 
excluded from trading. Similarly, if an insider sells knowing of impending bad news, the 
increased selling will decrease the price to its true value sooner. Thus, insider trading is efficient 
in the sense that the market price will sooner reflect its true value, and current shareholders who 
do not buy or sell during the period of non–disclosure remain unaffected. 
Rather than justifying insider trading laws on the basis of how quickly prices adjust to new 
information, they should be justified on the basis of fairness— that insiders should publicly 
disclose material information forthwith, so that those with whom they trade have access to the 
same information.
367
 This duty to disclose information is reinforced by the civil liability 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
fiduciary duties to the corporation, not to the stockholders.” (at par. 87).  Note, however, that the 
neither the Supreme Court nor the corporate legislation imposes a corporate law obligation to 
third parties. 
366
 (Manne 1966)  
367
 One of the twin purposes of the Ontario Securities Act is “to foster fair and efficient capital 
markets and confidence in capital markets” (section 1.1). To achieve this, the Commission is to 
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consequences of section 138.3(4) of the Securities Act: any person who acquires or disposes of 
shares during a period of late disclosure will have a right of action against the issuer and any 
director or officer who authorized, permitted or acquiesced in the late disclosure, and a right of 
action against those who “knowingly influenced” the late disclosure.368  The principle which 
underlies the insider trading rule is fairness; not efficiency.
 
 
 
(iii) Are the regulated able to find analogous solutions? 
Description of factor 
 
As mentioned above,
369
 research in psychology and tax law shows that, in a complex field, 
decision makers will look through the surface features of a problem to identify key relationships. 
They reason by analogy, mapping relations between standards.  Arguably, the greater the 
diversity of related experience from which decision makers can draw, the greater is the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
impose “requirements for timely, accurate and efficient disclosure of information” (section 
2.1(2)(i)).  
368
 Manne accepted in 1970 that allowing insiders to trade would be incentive to delay disclosure 
until after they trade, but “there was little reason to believe they would normally take much 
time… insiders will usually be in a very great hurry to use their information before others get it 
or before it becomes worthless for unforeseen reasons.” (H. G. Manne 1970) at p.553 
369
 See footnote 168 at page 93 above 
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possibility of finding analogous solutions. A board composed of like-minded individuals with 
identical backgrounds is less likely to find analogous solutions in complex situations. 
Experience and analogies must be organized in a meaningful way, notes Black (see page 169). 
Without a “storyline”, past experience becomes too detailed and a distraction.  Shearing and 
Ericson describe how a community can apply rules consistently by evolving a shared storyline 
from a variety of experience to explain how to act in a particular situation. It is a process of 
“mythological thinking”, “myth–making” or “poetic logic”. “People simply do not walk around 
with rules in their heads that they apply to situations in the midst of action”.370 Rather, 
knowledge is communicated through a culture by “analogous reasoning” from layered meanings 
in stories developed through experience. For example, police officers exercise their discretion by 
assessing behaviour through a “story book rather than a rule book.”371 When asked how 
decisions are taken in the course of action, officers tell stories that cite experience. “Unlike law, 
which formulates precedents as rules, police culture articulates a vocabulary of precedents in the 
form of anecdotes that provide a practical capacity to act.
372
 Using figurative language, 
experience provides a capacity to improvise across a range of contexts.  
Black notes that within an organization there may be competing stories, with competing 
identities and patterns to make sense of what is occurring. To influence the regulatory “story 
                                                 
370
 (Shearing and Ericson 1991) at pp.481–82 
371
 (Shearing and Ericson 1991) at p.493 
372
 (Ericson 2007) pp. 377–78 
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lines”, Black advocates a “strategy of compliance rather than deterrence” through education.373 
There needs to be close engagement based on mutual trust; firms need to be concerned beyond 
the minimal compliance and seek clearly communicated outcomes.
374
  
 
Application to Ontario venture issuers 
 
Many of the compliance matters that arise in securities law parallel similar requirements in 
corporate, trust and tax law. For example, regarding disclosure, the Ontario Business 
Corporations Act requires that notice of an annual meeting in which special business is to be 
conducted must disclose “the nature of that business in sufficient detail to permit the shareholder 
to form a reasoned judgment thereon”. Regarding the fiduciary obligations of corporate directors, 
they mirror those of the trustee in private trust law. Yearly financial statements required for tax 
returns are similar to the financial reporting obligations under securities law.  
The more closely that securities regulation parallel other legal obligations, the greater the 
likelihood that issuers will analogize compliance solutions from the related experiences. For 
example, a venture issuer facing a financial disclosure issue may draw from tax accounting 
experience, or an issuer facing a conflict of interest question may draw from the restrictions on a 
                                                 
373
 (Black, Rules and Regulators 1997) at p.43 
374
 (Black, Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation 2008) at p.4 
 186 
 
trustee buying property from the trust. If venture issuers (and their professional advisers) can 
reasonably interpret securities law principles from parallel business law and compliance 
experiences, then principles–based regulation may be effective and detailed rules may not be as 
necessary. 
 
(iv) Are there institutions or actors which promote regulatory collaboration? 
 
Description of factor 
 
Principles–based regulation requires collaboration, in order to flesh out the meaning of broad 
principles (see the discussion at page 86). Industry should develop best practices to achieve 
stated principles, which the regulator then monitors and analyzes. For example, in the U.K., to 
facilitate communication in the securities market, the FSA appoints a “relationship manager” for 
medium sized firms and a “supervisory team” for larger firms (see note 156).  
Collaboration can be achieved in a number of ways. Puri and Condon, in their report for the Task 
Force,
375
 studied the strengths and limits of a compliance–based approach to securities 
regulation. They note that rules which are considered legitimate embed compliance, and they 
recommend incentives (such as reduced sanctions) for self–reporting. This is further to the 
                                                 
375
 (Condon and Puri 2006) 
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discussion about governance theory (at page 111) and management based regulation (at page 
112), which discuss a more collaborative relationship between the regulator and regulated, to 
incorporate the regulated’s “context-specific experience”.  As Ford and Condon note376, 
collaboration gives the regulated greater autonomy to design processes to meet principled 
objectives, with mechanisms for transparency and accountability, emphasizing problem solving 
and experimentation in the design of regulatory strategies. 
As Black describes, principles–based regulation reframes the regulatory relationship “from one 
of directing and controlling to one based on responsibility, mutuality and trust.”377 The 
relationship moves from “telling and doing”, to one of communicating goals and expectations. 
As Black says, “regulatees adopt a self–reflective approach to the development of processes and 
practices to ensure that these goals are substantively met, and, critically, both trust each other to 
fulfill their side of this new regulatory bargain.” 
As noted above, Hopkins promotes a “safety culture” with proactive investigations that embed 
compliance.
378
 Hutter observed that smaller companies may not have the capacity to retain 
experts and complex systems, but they can be motivated to comply to maintain a good 
                                                 
376
 (Ford and Condon, Introduction to “New Governance and the Business Organization", 
Introduction to Special Edition 2011) 
377
 (Black, Rules and Regulators 1997)  
378
 (Hopkins 2007) supra, note 206 
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reputation.
379
  And as Ford and Hess note,
380
 independent monitors should motivate management 
to participate in compliance. 
To encourage regulatory collaboration, the BC Securities Commission has criticized the Expert 
Panel’s proposal which would separate the enforcement and adjudicative functions of the 
national securities commission from its policy functions. According to the BC Commission
381
, 
those who adjudicate securities cases are involved closely with the development and 
implementation of securities law and policy, and so have an extensive background in securities 
regulation and its public interest implications. If the adjudicative arm were separate, a gap would 
develop between the policy objectives and the enforcement outcomes. If that happened, the 
regulator’s ability to regulate markets effectively in the public interest would be seriously 
impaired. 
Application to Ontario venture issuers 
 
Principles–based regulation requires collaboration, in order to flesh out the meaning of broad 
principles (see the discussion at page 86). In addition to the regulatory authority of the Ontario 
Securities Commission, there are a number of non–governmental organizations (“NGOs”) which 
monitor and regulate venture issuers. For example the TSX–V Exchange regulates venture 
                                                 
379
 (Hutter 2011) 
380
 (Ford and Hess, Corporate Monitorships and New Governance Regulation: In Theory, in 
Practice, and in Context 2011) 
381
 Supra, note 165 
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issuers with its “TSX Venture Exchange Corporate Finance Manual”. It has rules respecting 
initial listing requirements, sponsorship requirements, corporate governance requirements, 
continuous and timely disclosure requirements, limits on commissions and finder’s fees, private 
placement procedures, escrow requirements, and other rules to control venture issuers.  
Advisers to venture issuers, including their accountants and solicitors, tend to be highly 
qualified. Since 2004, National Instrument 52–108 requires an auditor of public issuers to 
participate in the oversight program of the Canadian Public Accountability Board. As for 
solicitors, securities law tends to be a specialized field practiced by specialists within larger or 
boutique firms in Toronto, Vancouver and Calgary. The role of “gatekeepers” (brokers, 
securities lawyers and auditors) and of third–party regulatory surrogates (SROs, trade 
organizations) is essential for venture issuers. They provide information, ongoing support, and 
practical guidance.
382
 Their reputational capital is at risk if they interpret regulations 
improperly.
383
 
Do rules or principles better assist gatekeepers when advising or regulating venture issuers? As 
Nelson notes, “auditors' negotiating positions are particularly strong when they can point to 
precise rules that preclude the client's preferred accounting treatment.” As Gibbins et al. (2001) 
                                                 
382
 (Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation 2008)  
383
 (The Task Force 2006) p. 50. See: (Bazerman, Morgan and Loewenstein 1997) p. 99 suggest 
that identification with their client's situation might encourage auditors to allow aggressive 
reporting, while (King 2002) provides evidence that identification with an auditor peer group 
might discourage aggressive reporting. 
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note in their survey of 93 audit partners, precise standards can increase the auditor’s power to 
compel clients to disclose matters as determined by the auditor.  Vague standards can lead to 
multiple rounds of negotiation between auditor and issuer as to what should be disclosed. 
On the other hand, precise standards can create targets which managers use to achieve particular 
objectives. Auditors may be reluctant to argue "substance over form" when a client clearly 
complies with precise accounting criteria, even when those criteria are accompanied by qualifiers 
indicating the criteria do not apply in all circumstances.
384
 Precise standards can be less effective 
in constraining aggressive reporting when managers have latitude in interpreting the evidence 
related to the standard.
385
  
 
(v) Do the regulated see enforcement as “fair” and “effective”?  
 
Description of factor 
 
Principles-based regulation requires a commitment to interpret principles reasonably and to 
                                                 
384
 (M. Nelson 2003) at pp. 96–7 
385
 See (Cuccia, Hackenbrack and Nelson 1995) who found that professional tax preparers 
respond to a more stringent tax practice standard by interpreting evidence more liberally, such 
that decisions made under a more stringent standard are as aggressive as decisions made under a 
less stringent (principles–based) standard. 
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refrain from an adversarial, “cat-and-mouse” approach (see “Principles and Regulatory 
Compliance” at page 86). As described above at page 129, some people comply because of their 
sense of justice, whether it is distributive justice or procedural justice.  Generally, the more that 
regulations and enforcement are considered to be fair, the greater is the “justice motive” and the 
more likely it is that participants will interpret principles reasonably.  
“Social identity” is a compliance motive—the desire to join the “right community” but to refrain 
from unnecessarily joining or following rules (above, page 121).  The more that the regulated 
believe that others are upholding the spirit of the law the more likely they will too.  Kahan argues 
that individuals who believe that others are paying their taxes will likely treat honest payment as 
a moral duty
386
. Conversely, if they believe that others are shirking and following only the letter 
of the law, compliance may be considered an unnecessary expense.  Many believe that they 
themselves are motivated by justice and will “do the right thing”, but that the bad behavior of 
others is evidence of other people’s poor character and that the best method to achieve the 
compliance of others is through deterrence (see page 130).  Thus, it is important that the 
regulated believe that others are following the spirit of the law for principles-based regulation to 
work. 
Another compliance motive is the “citizenship motive” (page 132). Some comply because they 
believe that the authorities have the “legitimacy” to create laws and, within a range of 
reasonableness, they should be obeyed.  This is consistent with the description of tax compliance 
                                                 
386
 Supra, note 247 
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by Feld and Frey—that it is a psychological contract; the more that taxpayers believe that the 
government is using their money to benefit their community, the greater is their compliance.
387
 
The same “psychological contract” may be true for securities law compliance.  
Thus, an important factor of principles-based compliance is that the regulated see enforcement as 
both “fair” and “effective”. If not, then a rules-based regime with deterrence as its prime 
motivation is more effective. 
Application to Ontario venture issuers 
 
Securities laws are enforced by different agencies: the police enforce white collar crimes, 
including market manipulation and fraud related offences; the Ontario Securities Commission 
enforces the Securities Act through enforcement procedures before the court and before a 
Commission Panel, and by various settlement procedures; the TSX Venture enforce compliance 
with their rules, and the Investment Dealers Association enforce their rules by fines and by the 
threat of revoking membership.  
The Wise Persons’ Committee observed that “[t]here is a widely held view that enforcement in 
Canada is lax in comparison with the United States and other countries”388 and “[t]here is a 
perception both in Canada and abroad that serious misconduct in Canada too often goes 
                                                 
387
 Supra, note 299 
388
 (Wise Persons' Committee to Review the Structure of Securities Regulation in Canada 2003) 
at p.7 
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unpunished”.389   As Justice Cory and Marilyn Pilkington noted in their report to the Expert 
Panel, “[i]n our consultations, the most commonly cited reason for the perception of weakness in 
Canadian securities enforcement is the apparent inability to enforce securities laws in high 
profile cases that have substantial links to Canada”390, and “We heard repeatedly that the 
penalties imposed for white collar crime have not reflected the seriousness of these crimes and 
their impact.”391 Bhattacharya reports that the number of U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) enforcement actions, after scaling for the number of issuers listed on US and 
Canadian exchanges, are about ten times greater than OSC enforcement and the number of SEC 
insider trading enforcement cases is about 20 times greater than OSC enforcement.
392
 
Some Ontario newspapers have been critical of OSC enforcement. See for example a December 
1, 2007 article in the Toronto Star entitled “Why the OSC so rarely gets its man”: 
“[A]cademics, lawyers and forensic accountants interviewed for this story say 
accountability is sorely lacking when it comes to securities enforcement, whether it’s 
regulatory matters overseen by the OSC or violations of criminal law overseen by 
police….“For me, the hardest part about the Conrad Black trial has been explaining why 
it happened in Chicago and not in Toronto,” former Ontario premier Bob Rae wrote 
recently in his blog….All this is no surprise to Utpal Bhattacharya, a finance professor at 
the Indiana University’s Kelley School of Business and author of a report comparing the 
                                                 
389
 Ibid, p. 26 
390
 (Expert Panel on Securites Regulation 2009), p. 192 
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 Ibid, p. 194 
392
 Bhattacharya, Utpal, “Enforcement and its Impact on Cost of Equity and Liquidity of the 
Market”, Research Study for the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, May 
24, 2006, at p. 155 
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enforcement records of the OSC and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). “We found the enforcement in Ontario was pathetic,” said Bhattacharya. “Canada 
is a first–world country with second–world capital markets and third–world 
enforcement.” 393 
 
(vi) Are regulatory issues predictable? 
 
Description of factor 
 
If a field of activity is complex, detailed rules can obscure risk (see “Rules and Risk” at page 
83). As Peter May describes
394
, some systems can be too complex for detailed rules to prescribe 
compliance in advance, or the effects of detailed rules can be unobservable—for example, the 
safety of a nuclear power plant cannot be directly observed, nor can the effect of earthquakes, 
fire, or other potential harms on a building. Regulating complex systems with detailed rules is 
risky—better to regulate with flexible principles, to allow decision–makers to effectively deal 
with unpredictable problems as they arise. See also the discussion of “juridification”395 in which 
detailed rules can overwhelm and strangle the manager’s judgment, undermining the likelihood 
of effective solutions in complex systems. 
                                                 
393
 (Hamilton 2007) 
394
 Supra, note 145 
395
 Supra, note 147 
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In simple systems, with known results, clearly stated rules allow participants to focus on matters 
other than compliance, since the rules have predictable meaning and scope, thus reducing the risk 
of administrative discretion
396
 This parallels Colin Divers discussion about prioritizing the 
transparency, accessibility and congruence of rules—regulations which require predictability and 
transparency should be rules-based, whereas regulations which require congruence should be 
principles-based (see page 80).  Cristie Ford argues that periodic and prospectus securities 
disclosure should be rules–based, with uniform document presentation, so that investors can 
efficiently compare similar circumstances
397
 Principles should be used where a flexible approach 
is needed to ensure good corporate conduct; for example, material fact and material change 
disclosure, which can arise in unanticipated ways, should be principles–based.  
 
Application to Ontario venture issuers 
 
Ford argues that material fact and material change disclosure, which can arise in unanticipated 
ways, should be principles–based so that issuers must use their own judgment about what is 
material.
398
 As stated by the Canadian Securities Administrators in National Instrument 51–201 
for Disclosure Standards: 
                                                 
396
 Supra, note 111 
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 Supra, note 3 
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 Supra, note 3 
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“In making materiality judgements, it is necessary to take into account a number of 
factors that cannot be captured in a simple bright–line standard or test. These include the 
nature of the information itself, the volatility of the company's securities and prevailing 
market conditions. The materiality of a particular event or piece of information may vary 
between companies according to their size, the nature of their operations and many other 
factors. An event that is "significant" or "major" for a smaller company may not be 
material to a larger company. Companies should avoid taking an overly technical 
approach to determining materiality. Under volatile market conditions, apparently 
insignificant variances between earnings projections and actual results can have a 
significant impact on share price once released. For example, information regarding a 
company's ability to meet consensus earnings published by securities analysts should not 
be selectively disclosed before general public release.” 
 
Mahoney and Ford argue that disclosure about the current and estimated future value of assets 
should lean towards the principles end of the continuum, because they are subject to many 
considerations and can change rapidly.  Similarly, licensing market participants, such as brokers 
and public accountants, should be principles-based, with discretion to consider the many factors 
comprising “good character” before granting a licence.399  In contrast, periodic and prospectus 
securities disclosure should be rules–based, with uniform document presentation, so that 
investors can efficiently compare similar circumstances (see Cristie Ford comments, footnote 
397). 
 
 
 
                                                 
399
 Supra, note 135 
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(vii) Should historical transactions be disclosed? 
 
Description of factor 
 
As described above, there are two accounting models to measure the value of assets and 
liabilities of a corporation: the “historical cost” model and the “mark–to–market” model (see 
“Accounting for Conflicts of Interest” at page 142).  
One advantage of disclosing historical costs, with detailed rules, is described by Mahoney. It can 
measure the conflict of interest when a promoter solicits public funds for a company which is 
buying property indirectly from the promoter. Disclosing these “historical costs” allows the 
investor to assess the promoter’s self–interest. On the other hand, the “mark–to–market” method 
values the assets at their current fair market value, which can add valuable information for the 
investor. For example, regardless of what the promoter paid for the mining claims, and whether 
they were vended through controlled corporations, the current investor should know whether the 
current price being paid to the promoter (directly or indirectly) is at its fair market value.  
 
Application to Ontario venture issuers 
 
As described above, disclosing historical costs, with detailed rules, can measure the conflict of 
interest when a promoter solicits public funds for a company which is buying property indirectly 
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from the promoter. Disclosing these “historical costs” allows the investor to assess the 
promoter’s self–interest. 
 
(viii) Should future projections be disclosed? 
 
Description of factor 
 
Mahoney argues that, given the scarce resources of smaller issuers, regulators should focus on 
historical cost disclosure with a rules–based regime, to address the promoter problem. Mahoney 
is critical of the increasing requirement of forward–looking statements and estimates of current 
market values. Rather than having the regulator mandate expensive disclosure for small issuers, 
based on a mark–to–market accounting model, let investors negotiate the kind of valuation 
necessary for a particular transaction. Mahoney is critical of what he sees as the US Securities 
Commission’s move towards a future–oriented “accuracy enhancement” model of disclosure 
(based on current and future estimates, rather than historical costs). 
How important are projections made by the industry? It depends, of course, on whether industry 
insiders can accumulate or assess market information better than outsiders. For example, large 
pharmaceutical companies, with highly advanced research departments, may be better able to 
predict the risks of medical side–effects or the chances of market success than outside investors. 
Thus, pharmaceutical industry predictions could be a “public good” as described above (page 
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57). Most venture issuers, on the other hand, may not enjoy the resources or informational 
advantage to predict market success. For example, a venture issuer which is developing a new 
computer switching device, may be able to describe how the device will work with existing 
systems, but may be in no better position than outside investors as to the overall market success 
of the business. Similarly, a mining exploration venture will issue a “qualified person” 43–101 
mining report assessing the property, but be in no position to assess the market price of the 
minerals, if and when they are mined. 
 
Application to Ontario venture issuers 
 
Mahoney argues that “accuracy enhancement” disclosure (i.e., material disclosure about 
prospects and current value) should lean towards the principles–based end of the continuum, 
because such information is subject to many considerations which can change rapidly. Ford 
seems to agree when she argues that material fact and material change disclosure, which can 
arise in unanticipated ways, should be principles–based so that issuers use their own judgment 
about what is material in the circumstances.  
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Chapter 4: Survey of Ontario Venture Issuers  
 
This chapter explores the tentative conclusions in chapter three with a survey of 175 managers of 
venture issuers listed on the TSX Venture Exchange.  The research proposals, as they relate to 
securities regulation of Ontario venture issuers, are these: (i) is there a shared understanding of 
the regulatory principles? (ii) are the regulated committed to the public interest? (iii) are the 
regulated able to find analogous solutions? (iv) are there institutions or actors which promote 
regulatory collaboration? (v) do the regulated see enforcement as “fair” and “balanced”? (vi) are 
regulatory issues predictable? (vii) should historical transactions be disclosed? and (viii) should 
future projections be disclosed? 
Design and methodology of the survey 
Sampling method 
It was a voluntary survey.  One email invitation was sent to each venture issuer listed on the TSX 
Venture exchange, with a unique link to a web-based survey, during the first week of February 
2011.  A reminder email was sent during the last week of February 2011; and then, in February 
2012, another round of invitations was sent to those who did not respond in 2011, with an 
additional reminder in mid-March 2012. Since there was a year’s delay between the first round 
and the second round of invitations, the second was essentially a new survey, addressed to those 
who did not respond to the first survey. 
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The contact information for each venture issuer was obtained from a list on the TSX Venture 
Exchange’s website entitled “Listed Company Directory”.400  Of the 2,035 issuers that were 
listed on January 31, 2011 (a decrease from September 2010), many did not include an email or 
website contact address.  This left 1,687 issuers which could be contacted by email.  Of this, 106 
email solicitations were returned as undeliverable, probably because their contact email 
addresses had changed.  This left a database of 1,581 emails.  
An invitation was addressed to the President of each venture issuer.
 401
  If no President was 
shown on the TSX-V website, then the email was addressed to the CEO, whom failing, the 
Corporate Secretary, whom failing, to one of the directors of the issuer.  The introductory email 
included the suggestion that someone else on the team could answer the survey: “This is to invite 
you, or a member of your team, to complete a short survey about how to improve securities 
regulations for TSX venture issuers.”  It wasn’t considered important who in the organization 
actually answered the survey, since the first question asked the respondent what his or her role in 
the venture was, and a variety of managers would be useful. 
The survey website fluidsurveys.com was used to generate the invitations, monitor answers to 
the survey questions, and prepare a summary of results.  This was on the recommendation of 
                                                 
400
 <http://www.tmx.com/HttpController?GetPage=ListedCompaniesViewPage&Language= 
en&Market=T> 
401
 Access to the names of the directors and officers of each venture issuer was obtained from the 
TSX Venture info database. <http://infoventure.tsx.com/TSX-Venture/TSX-
VentureHttpController?SaveView=true&GetPage=LcdbSearch> 
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Michael Ornstein, a professor at York University and of the Institute of Social Research, who 
suggested a Canadian survey company could better control privacy since it would not be subject 
to the US Patriot Act. 
 
Ethics approval 
 
Ethics approval for the survey was obtained from York University Office of Research Ethics in 
2011 and in 2012.  The application for approval indicated that the draw for an Apple iPad was 
given in the first round, that there were no known risks for participating in the survey, that an 
explanation of the research would be available to respondents, that no deception was involved, 
that respondents would remain anonymous, and that the data will be destroyed within two years 
of the survey or when I complete my PhD, whichever is sooner. 
 
Was it a representative sample? 
Number of Respondents 
A total of 83 respondents answered all of the questions in 2011 and 50 answered all of the 
questions in 2012, for a total of 133 respondents who answered all of the questions. An 
additional 42 respondents answered some of the questions for a total of 175 respondents. This 
was a response rate of 8.5% for all of the questions and up to 11% for some of the questions.   
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Although this is a low response rate, the following limitations should be considered: (i) most of 
the email addresses on the Listed Company Directory were general information boxes, which 
would have to be forwarded to the person (the President, etc.) to whom the email was personally 
addressed; and (ii) the vast majority of those who received the email would not know me and 
would likely conclude that my research would have little effect on them—much different, 
probably, than had the survey been conducted by the TSX Venture exchange, the PDAC, or the 
Ontario Securities Commission. 
Attempts for assistance 
The TSX Venture Exchange and the Prospectors and Developers Association (PDAC) were 
approached for assistance in distributing the survey, but they ignored the request.
402
 
An invitation to the Toronto Geological Discussion Group listserve was submitted.  This is a free 
service provided by Phil Burt that includes email notices about geoscience presentations in 
Toronto.
403
 Eight geologists from the discussion group, each of whom indicated that they were 
managers of venture issuers, completed the survey. 
 
                                                 
402
 The PDAC was mailed a letter on April 12, 2010 explaining the purpose of the survey and a 
request that a link to the survey be circulated among PDAC members.  The request was ignored.  
Similarly, an email was sent to the TSX Venture for a list of respondent emails and the request 
was ignored. 
403
 <http://www.tgdg.net/contact-us/> Phil Burt is a co-director in a private mining venture with 
me. 
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Sampling error 
The data is subject to sampling error, which can be defined as the likely range of difference 
between the reported results and the results that would have been obtained had everyone in the 
relevant population completed the survey.
404
  Sampling error calculations and theories were 
developed under the assumptions of a random selection of a population.  This was not a random 
selection, but a voluntary sample. Many reasons can contribute to non-participation among 
respondents. However, not all contribute to significant bias.  Questions that address a sensitive 
subject (e.g. illicit drug use and sexual activities) may increase the potential for response bias.
405
   
Anonymous surveys (as in our venture issuer survey) minimize this concern. Some may be too 
busy to participate, some may not trust the researcher, and some may not believe that any ‘good’ 
will come from providing accurate responses.
406
   
The motivations of those who participated 
One generalization is that people who are interested in a topic are more likely to participate in a 
survey related to that topic.
407
  The email invitation said that “your opinion will contribute to a 
new, evidence-based, approach to the regulation of venture issuers, and whether securities 
regulations should be rules-based or principles-based.”  The invitation said that, if requested, 
                                                 
404
 (Bartlett, Bartlett and Reio 2008), p.48 
405
 (Berg 2005) p.7 
406
 (Armstrong and Overton 1977), p.397 
407
 (Fowler 2009) at p.52 
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respondents could receive a summary of the results.  Presumably, respondents interested in the 
topic of the survey would request a summary of the results.   
Of the 112 who participated in 2011, only fourteen respondents requested a summary of the 
results (12.5%), and of the 82 who participated in 2012, only two respondents requested a 
summary (1.2%).  Although most respondents were apparently not interested in the results, many 
gave detailed explanations for their answers in the survey though no explanations were required.  
In the 2011 round, 75% of respondents gave explanations for their answers, and in the 2012 
round, 70% of respondents gave explanations.  It would seem that, on the one hand, many 
respondents wanted to express their opinions, but on the other hand, they weren’t particularly 
interested in the opinions of others.  One explanation for this is that respondents didn’t think that 
the survey questions were useful.  However, that does not explain why so many gave detailed 
and vigorous answers.  I suggest that most respondents felt that the questions were worth 
answering, but thought that the results were not important as they were only to be used for my 
PhD and not for any regulatory body.  So, in a sense they were just giving me (an academic) 
their “two cents worth” about an important topic. 
There was a financial incentive to participate in the 2011 round which was not present in the 
2012 round.  In the 2011 round, respondents were told that the names of the first 100 respondents 
would be entered into a draw for an Apple iPad, worth over $500.  In the 2012, the only 
incentive was that respondents could request a summary of the results.  There was little 
difference in response patterns—those who responded in 2011 gave as many detailed answers as 
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those who responded in 2012, and those who responded in 2011 (who might have been expected 
to be more interested in the draw) were actually more likely to request a copy of the results.   
Employment and experience of respondents 
In response to the question: “In what capacity do you currently work for a venture issuer?” 
(Table 7) respondents included directors, officers, employees and professional consultants. The 
results showed a range of respondents—not just lower level employees, for example.  
175 respondents answered the question: “How many years have you worked for a venture 
issuer?” (Table 8). 2% had worked for a venture issuer for less than one year; 23% had worked 
from one to five years, 34% had worked from five to ten years; 24% had worked from ten to 
twenty years, and 17% had worked for more than twenty years.  This shows that the majority of 
respondents were experienced.  Even if the population of managers as a whole is not as 
experienced as those who responded to the survey, it is likely that new managers would be in a 
more junior capacity and would follow the direction of their superiors, and so the answers of 
senior managers may be more indicative of the actions of the venture issuer. 
Other sampling methods 
Another sampling method would have been to invite all managers, allowing for multiple 
respondents per organization. This might have weighted the responses toward the institutional 
values and influences of the larger organizations.  For example, if a larger organization includes 
twenty managers, and a smaller organization includes five, only one interview per organization 
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puts these two on equal footing, or weighting, within the findings.  Allowing all managers to be 
selected may have allowed the natural weighting of organizations to be represented.  However, 
when comparing the reported market capitalization of the respondents with the TSX Venture 
market as a whole (Table 5 Market Capitalization, page 211), it appears that, if anything, larger 
organizations were slightly over-represented.  Also, only one email address per organization was 
listed on the Listed Company Directory and each issuer was sent a unique survey link.  Although 
some recipients may have forwarded the email to its various directors and officers, it would be 
difficult to know how many individuals in the first round responded multiple times (with 
different names) to increase their chance of winning the iPad.  Given that the names of the first 
100 respondents were to be entered in the draw, it would have been easy to increase one’s odds 
by responding multiple times, giving the false appearance of multiple respondents. 
 
Industry participants not surveyed 
Some Ontario venture issuers are not listed on the TSX Venture Exchange.  126 issuers of which 
some are based in Ontario are listed on the Canadian National Stock Exchange (CNSX), which is 
a junior exchange, with a total market capitalization of $647 million
408
 (only 1.3% of the TSX 
Venture’s capitalization). Some Ontario venture issuers are listed solely on a foreign stock 
exchange.  However, given that the market capitalization of the TSX Venture greatly exceeds 
                                                 
408
 (CNSX Markets Inc. William Woods 2010) 
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that of the CNSX, and given that the number of Ontario venture issuers listed solely on a foreign 
exchange is probably small in comparison with the number listed on the TSX-V, restricting the 
survey to TSX Venture issuers was considered an adequate representation of the Ontario venture 
issuer community. 
The brokers, lawyers and auditors who advise the managers of venture issuers were not 
surveyed.  It is likely that some of the answers to the business ethics questions would be 
tempered by professional advice received.  The purpose of the survey was to assess whether or 
not there is an interpretative community among the managers of venture issuers.  It should be 
noted that the findings represent expressions of intent, attitudes, and memories which may differ 
from actions actually taken. 
Most significantly, the investors who are at the heart of securities regulation were not surveyed.  
Surveying investors is beyond the scope of this paper, since many are “accredited” (those 
deemed wealthy or sophisticated enough to negotiate terms of investment for their own 
protection).  To find a representative sample of accredited investors would be difficult, since the 
confidentiality of investors is maintained by the introducing broker and by the issuer.   
 
Comparing respondents to known population parameters 
 
In order to assess how representative the respondents’ and their venture issuers were with the 
 209 
 
population of venture issuers as a whole, a comparison with known qualities of the population 
TSX-V issuers are considered next.
409
 
Industry type 
Each respondent who answered all of the questions was cross-referenced to their industry as 
shown on the 2012 list of TSX-V issuers
410
. Some respondents could not be cross-referenced and 
TSX-V issuers which are “Capital Pool Companies” which have not yet entered into a qualifying 
transaction (and thus have not yet entered into a particular industry) were not included. 
Table 3 Industry Type on TSX-V 
  Survey Survey % TSX-V TSX-V % 
Mining 64 56% 1294 64% 
Diversified industries 15 13% 162 8% 
Oil and gas 12 10% 282 14% 
Technology 9 8% 82 4% 
Clean technology 6 5% 82 4% 
Life sciences 5 4% 67 3% 
Financial 3 3% 47 2% 
Forestry 1 1% 5 0% 
Other     11   
Total 115   2021   
 
These figures show that the survey slightly under-represents mining issuers and slightly over-
represents diversified issuers and technology issuers.   
                                                 
409
 See (Groves 2006), p.19 
410
 (TSX Market Intelligence Group 2012) 
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Industry headquarters 
Each respondent who answered all of the questions was cross-referenced to the jurisdiction of 
their headquarters as shown on the 2012 list of TSX-V issuers
411
.  Some respondents could not 
be cross-referenced. 
Table 4 Industry headquarters 
  Survey Survey % TSX-V TSX-V % 
British Columbia 46 39% 1143 50% 
Ontario 24 21% 422 19% 
Alberta 21 18% 327 14% 
Quebec 8 7% 152 7% 
USA 9 8% 86 4% 
China 4 3% 29 1% 
Manitoba 2 2% 17 1% 
Nova Scotia 1 1% 17 1% 
Saskatchewan 1 1% 16 1% 
Other 1 1% 62 3% 
 
117 100% 2271 100% 
 
These figures show that the survey slightly under-represents British Columbia issuers, which 
corresponds to the previous statistic which slightly under-represents mining issuers (most junior 
mining ventures have their headquarters in British Columbia).    
 
 
                                                 
411
 (TSX Market Intelligence Group 2012) 
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Market capitalization 
The survey identified a range of market capitalization.  The QMV (quoted market valuation) of 
TSX-V companies is summarized by the TSX-V in various spreadsheets.
412
  As of January 31, 
2011, of the 2,035 issuers on the TSX-V, the following table compares their QMV with those of 
the respondents. 
Table 5 Market Capitalization 
  Respondents   TSX Venture   
  Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Less than $5 million 33 25% 678 33% 
From $5 m to $15 m 32 24% 592 29% 
From $15 m to $25 m 13 10% 220 11% 
From $25 m to $50 m 22 17% 218 11% 
From $50 m to $100 m 13 10% 148 7% 
Over $100 m 20 15% 179 9% 
  133 100% 2035 100% 
 
These figures show that the survey slightly under-represents venture issuers with QMV less than 
$5 million. However, the question asked “what is the current market capitalization for the largest 
                                                 
412
 Mining Companies Listed on Toronto Stock Exchange and TSX Venture Exchange (two 
worksheets in the attached) at < http://www.tmx.com/en/listings/sector_profiles/mining.html> 
<http://www.tmx.com/en/listings/sector_profiles/energy.html> 
< http://www.tmx.com/en/listings/sector_profiles/clean_technology.html>   
<http://www.tmx.com/en/listings/sector_profiles/life_sciences.html> 
<http://www.tmx.com/en/listings/sector_profiles/diversified_industries.html> 
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venture issuer the respondent worked for?”—given that almost half of respondents said they 
worked for more than one venture issuers (Table 9), it seems likely that many respondents also 
work for smaller issuers. 
Exempt market financings 
The proportion of equity raised by private placement for all TSX-V issuers is shown in the 
following table (in billions of dollars).
413
 
Table 6 Proportion of raised funds 
Year Private ($) Public($) Total Private Public 
2007 9,754.00 1,388.00 11,142.00 88% 12% 
2008 4,666.90 833.60 5,500.50 85% 15% 
2009 3,816.70 1,033.30 4,850.00 79% 21% 
2010 6,392.40 3,439.30 9,831.70 65% 35% 
2011 6,819.70 3,276.50 10,096.20 68% 32% 
Average 6,289.94 1,994.14 8,284.08 76% 24% 
  
The figures for 2007 and 2008 are consistent with the sources of equity raised by respondents 
(Table 16)—15% of financings by respondents (during the previous three years) were from a 
prospectus, capital pool, take-over, or other. The remaining 85% were from private placements—
19% from close friends and family, 25% from existing business contacts and 41% from private 
investors introduced by an arm’s length broker.  Although the 2010 figures of TSX-V public 
                                                 
413
 See the TSX-V Market Intelligence Group listings at <http://www.tmx.com 
/en/mig/archives.html> 
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financings were significantly higher than what respondents reported, it should be noted that 
public financings are concentrated among a relatively small number of venture issuers.  In 2010, 
the number of public financings recorded was 337 out of a total of 2,603 financings—i.e. only 
13% of financings were public.  In other words, most financings are private placements, but the 
occasional public financing involves large dollar amounts.  Most venture issuers rely on private 
placements, but occasionally, a relatively large public financing is undertaken. Arguably, this is 
consistent with the answers given by respondents to the survey—that a large majority of 
financings are private placements. 
Research proposals 
(i) Is there a shared understanding of regulatory principles?  
 
This research proposal was addressed in two ways: (i) do the regulated have the capacity to 
apply securities law principles as they may evolve over time? and (ii) do the regulated in fact 
understand securities law principles as currently applied?  
The community may be capable of understanding securities law principles, but in fact not 
understand them because its members are not sufficiently motivated to learn them. As described 
in the literature review in chapter two, there are four general compliance motives: the incentive 
motive, the reason-driven motive, the social identity motive, the justice motive and the 
citizenship motive.  If, for example, the regulated do not perceive any reason to learn regulatory 
principles or do not have a sufficient social identity or justice motive to follow regulatory 
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matters, no matter how capable the regulated may be, over time, there will not be a shared 
understanding of regulatory principles.  
To test whether or not venture issuer managers have the capacity to understand securities law 
principles, respondents were asked what formal education they had completed (Table 12) and 
what formal education their Chief Executive Officer had completed (Table 13).  Of course, 
education on its own does not insure intellectual capacity.  However, I argue that achieving 
higher levels of education shows effort and personal commitment—qualities necessary for a 
long-term commitment to understanding the regulations of one’s own industry.  I suggest that an 
industry composed of highly educated people is more likely to be capable of reading and 
understanding regulatory principles and administrative decisions in a complex field such as 
securities regulation than an uneducated community.  
As to whether or not managers in fact have a shared understanding of securities law principles as 
currently applied, a series of business ethics
414
 questions were asked to test respondents’ 
recognition of insider trading and fairness principles.  These questions were developed after a 
series of trial questions were asked of one securities lawyer, one professor of law, one 
professional geologist and one senior manager of a large corporation.  The questions were 
refined after each draft was circulated, in order to reduce the possibility of confusion in the 
actual survey. 
                                                 
414
 By “business ethics”, I refer to lawful business practice and fiduciary duty as determined by 
Canadian and other common law courts.   
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Business Ethics Question #1 (Table 32):  Suppose that the buyer of a mining claim 
discovers from independent research (and without involving any trespass on the claim) 
that the claim follows the line of an adjacent mineral vein, and so the claim is far more 
valuable than the seller realizes. Should the buyer be legally required to advise the seller 
about this information before purchasing the claim? 
The answer “No” is consistent with the common law legal principle that those who work to 
acquire informational property should enjoy the fruits of their labour.  Acquiring information has 
a cost.  If the buyer is legally required to share the information, there is little incentive to acquire 
it.  If the source is from independent research or analysis, legally, the buyer is entitled to benefit 
from the intellectual work expended and trade with that advantage.  As one of the respondents in 
the survey noted said: “It’s not a commune.” 
Those who answered “Yes” were bounced to the third ethics question.  Those who answered 
“No” were asked this follow up question.  
Business Ethics Question #2 (Table 34):  You answered "no" to the last question. What if 
some of the valuable information came from an employee of the seller? – an employee 
who volunteers information to the buyer without realizing its importance and without 
telling his or her superiors.  Should the buyer be legally required to advise the seller 
about this information before purchasing the claim? 
In this case, the buyer is in “knowing receipt” of the seller’s informational property and should 
return it (i.e. disclose it) to the seller.  This conclusion is based on the common law of agency 
and the equitable law of constructive trust.  
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As to the common law of agency, the issue is whether or not the employee had “actual” or 
“apparent” authority, as agent for the seller, to transfer the valuable information to the buyer.  If 
not, then the informational property still belongs to the seller.  As to the employee’s “actual 
authority”, it is doubtful that the employee was in fact authorized to release the information since 
the employee did not tell his or her superiors.  As to the employee’s “apparent authority”, the 
buyer can only rely on this if a reasonable person in the shoes of the buyer would conclude that 
the employee was authorized.  If the buyer knows that the employee has not told his or her 
superiors about disclosing this valuable information, no apparent authority for the transfer of 
valuable information to the buyer would exist. 
This relates to the equitable concept of constructive trust.  The employee has a fiduciary 
responsibility to his or her employer.  The scope of fiduciary duty will vary, depending on the 
employee’s degree of responsibility and discretion.  Clearly, the employee has a fiduciary 
obligation not to release valuable information about the seller’s mining claims to a purchaser 
without telling his or her superiors.  The employee has, at a minimum, negligently breached this 
duty and the equitable issue is whether or not the buyer can appropriate this information with 
knowledge of the breach.  Even though the buyer offered no inducement, the buyer is in 
“knowing receipt” of proprietary information disclosed in breach of a fiduciary duty.  Cases have 
held that someone in receipt of property, knowing that it comes to them through a breach of 
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fiduciary duty, must return the property to the original owner (which in this context, means 
advising the selling company of the information).
415
 
Although the business law concept is not directly regulated by the Ontario Securities Act, it is 
indirect concern since one of the fundamental principles to be considered by the OSC in 
regulating the market is maintaining high standards of fitness and business conduct to ensure 
                                                 
415
 Per La Forest J. in Citadel General Assurance Co. v. Lloyds Bank of Canada [1997] 3 S.C.R. 
805 at para. 24: “The knowing receipt imposes obligations on strangers to the trust who receive 
trust property for their own benefit and with knowledge that the property was transferred to them 
in breach of trust.  In all cases, it is immaterial whether the breach of trust was fraudulent.”  As 
stated by Iaccobucci J. in Gold v. Rosenberg [1997] 3 S.C.R. 767 at para, 49: “…the cause of 
action in knowing receipt arises simply because the defendant has improperly received property 
which belongs to the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s claim amounts to nothing more than, ‘You unjustly 
have my property. Give it back.’  Unlike knowing assistance, there is no finding of fault, no legal 
wrong done by the defendant and no claim for damages. It is, at base, simply a question of who 
has a better claim to the disputed property.” 
See (Parker and Mellows 1979) at p. 156: “The rule is that if a stranger knowingly receives trust 
property and also knows that it is transferred to him in breach of trust he holds it upon a 
constructive trust for the beneficiaries.”  See (Pettit 1984) at p. 448: “The general principle laid 
down in Re Diplock’s Estate is that whenever there is an initial fiduciary relationship, the 
beneficial owner of an  equitable proprietary interest in property can trace it into the hands of 
anyone holding the property, except a bona fide purchaser for value without notice…” And at p. 
147, “knowing receipt” is an objective test of knowledge. As stated my Hoffman LJ in the 
English case of El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc, (as quoted by (Thomas 2001) at pp. 242-3), 
to compel the return of propriety by virtue of “knowing receipt” of trust property, the plaintiff 
need prove: “First a disposal of his assets in breach of fiduciary duty; secondly, the beneficial 
receipt by the defendant of assets which are traceable as representing the assets of the plaintiff; 
and thirdly, knowledge on the part of the defendant that the assets received are traceable to a 
breach of fiduciary duty” 
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honest and responsible conduct by market participants.
416
  Arguably, venture issuers which 
improperly acquire information and then trade to the detriment of another is a matter of honest 
and responsible business conduct. 
The next two business ethics questions were similar to the first two, except that they were in the 
context of trading shares on the stock market. 
Business Ethics Question #3 (Table 36):  Suppose an investor is buying shares of a 
company trading on a stock exchange.  The investor discovers from independent research 
that the company is far more valuable than the public realizes. Should the investor be 
legally required to disclose this research to the public before purchasing the shares on the 
exchange? 
This question is similar to the first ethical question.  Is there a duty to share information publicly 
if the investor discovers it from independent research?  The answer in a capitalist economy is 
“No”— the investor who expends the effort of independent research and discovers important 
information can use it for their personal benefit.  Otherwise, there would be little incentive to 
acquire such information.  Those who answered “No” were asked this follow up question.  
Business Ethics Question #4 (Table 38): You answered "no" to the last question.  Would 
your answer change if the source of the information is from an employee of the company 
who volunteers information to the investor without realizing its importance?  Should the 
investor be legally required to wait for the information to be disclosed to the public 
before purchasing the shares on the exchange? 
                                                 
416
 Ontario Securities Act, section 2.1(2)(iii) 
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The final ethics question is similar to the second—if an employee volunteers inside information 
to an investor, must the investor wait for it to be publicly disclosed?  The legal answer is “Yes”.  
It is a classic insider trading situation, prohibited by section 76 of the Ontario Securities Act.  
Trading on the undisclosed information is illegal, but the ethical basis of the rule has been 
challenged  (see page 219). 
 
(ii) Are the regulated committed to the public interest? 
 
Preliminary questions addressed whether or not respondents had a long-term commitment to the 
industry.  Respondents were asked how many years they had worked for a venture issuer (Table 
8), how many venture issuers they were currently working for (Table 9), and on average, how 
many days per week they currently work for venture issuer(s) (Table 10).  To test their long-term 
view, they were asked if they expected to leave the venture issuer industry in the next three years 
(Table 11).  (The three year time horizon was an arbitrary number.) 
Then, to test their commitment to securities disclosure issues, respondents were asked a series of 
questions about their issuer’s primary source of investment (close family, existing business 
contacts, private investors introduced by a broker, or the public) (Table 16), and what importance 
the respondent thought that each category of investor would place on management’s reputation 
for honesty, management’s past success, and evidence about the issuer’s assets and prospects 
(Table 17, Table 18, Table 19).  These questions assess the argument (above, at page 177) that 
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the promoter must maintain the confidence of his or her core of investors as they will be 
approached again and again, and that the promoter’s commitment to full disclosure may depend 
on who the investors are and what information those investors are relying on.  
To test the respondents’ perception of what motivates promoters, respondents were asked to rank 
the order of importance they thought that promoters placed on the following: share price over the 
next 12 months, long-term value of the business, and reputation for ethical business practice 
(Table 20).  Arguably, asking respondents to assess the motivation of promoters is speculative, 
since many respondents may not be (or may not consider themselves to be) a promoter, and so, 
for those, it is asking them to assess what are in the minds of others.  However, TSX-V issuers 
are usually small organizations.  In order to raise funds for development or exploration, the 
promoter must be intimately involved in all aspects of the business.  I suggest that most 
respondents would have long associations with promoters and would likely have a good idea of 
their behaviour and be in a position to infer the motives of promoters. 
 
(iii) Are the regulated able to find analogous solutions? 
 
Analogous reasoning is where current problems are compared with similar problems encountered 
in other situations. I suggest that a board with a range of experience will more likely find 
solutions to business issues, including compliance issues, than a board composed of like-minded 
individuals with identical backgrounds. A board composed entirely of engineers, for example, or 
a board composed entirely of accountants or lawyers, may see problems from the same angle and 
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will more likely suffer from “tunnel vision”.  Diversity by itself may not assist, but diversity 
across a broad range of relevant experience promotes analogous reasoning.  For example, the 
board of a technology issuer may need to assess whether or not a new social networking device 
will be a material change in its business, and the assessment could benefit from a mix of 
backgrounds with analogous issues, including technical, marketing, accounting and legal.  
Similarly, the effect of an environmental spill in a foreign country on the long-term finances of a 
mining company may depend on both scientific and political factors, and a broad range of 
experience could reach better conclusions.  
To assess the potential for analogous solutions, respondents were asked what skills their board of 
directors included—an engineer, a scientist (e.g., a geologist, computer scientist, biologist or 
medical scientist), a director with personal experience managing the kind of property the 
company owns, a finance expert (e.g, broker, financial adviser, financial analyst), a chartered or 
certified management accountant, or a lawyer? (Table 14).   
 
(iv) Are there institutions or actors which promote regulatory collaboration?  
 
Respondents were asked how frequently their directors had consulted with the following experts 
on continuous disclosure or press-release questions—a geologist or other scientist, a lawyer, an 
auditor or accountant, or a securities analyst (Table 22).  Respondents were asked how often, 
during the previous 12 months, their issuer had communicated with staff of the TSX-V and staff 
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of the Ontario Securities Commission and how helpful staff had been in terms of explaining or 
assisting with compliance issues (Table 23). 
Respondents were asked to rank how important it was that “issuers and staff of the OSC and 
TSX-V should collaborate and have regular communication” in order to make principles-based 
regulation effective (Table 30).  Respondents were asked whether “issuers and staff of the OSC 
and TSX-V should have a shared understanding about what makes the market fair and efficient” 
and whether “issuers and staff of the OSC and TSX-V should agree about which principles are 
the most important” (Table 30).  The assessment of staff of the OSC may have been 
unrepresentative, however, since only 21% of respondents had their headquarters in Ontario 
(Table 4 at page 210 above) and so most respondents would be primarily dealing with other 
provincial securities commissions. 
 
(v) Do the regulated see enforcement as fair and effective? 
 
Respondents were asked to assess how important they thought that “enforcement should be fair 
and balanced” in comparison with other factors, in order to make principles-based regulation 
understandable and effective for venture issuers (Table 30). 
The issue of fair enforcement of securities regulation was not further explored in the survey, 
because a number of questions would have been required.  For example, questions could assess 
fairness as between large and small issuers, as between different industries, as between different 
 223 
 
professional qualifications and cultures of respondents, and as between different kinds of cases 
and allegations involved.  Also, the different regulators would need to be assessed: staff of the 
Ontario Securities Commission, staff of other provincial securities commissions (since only 21% 
of the respondent issuers have their headquarters in Ontario—Table 4), staff of the TSX Venture 
Exchange, and in some cases, the police regarding criminal charges.  The fairness of tribunals as 
well as courts could be addressed.  Finally, “fairness” and “effectiveness” of securities 
enforcement could be compared with other fields, such as competition law and taxation—some 
respondents might consider all regulation as unfair and ineffective.  An evaluation of securities 
enforcement was beyond the scope of the survey.  As it turned out, only 76% of those who 
started the survey answered all of the survey questions.  It was decided to focus on the other 
questions in order to obtain answers and detailed written comments. 
 
(vi) Are regulatory issues predictable? 
 
To test the attitude of respondents to this research proposal, they were asked:  
To improve public disclosure for venture issuers, how do you think securities regulations 
should be drafted? (i) Detailed disclosure rules, describing exactly what should be 
disclosed and when; (ii) Broad principles, with examples of good disclosure in particular 
cases as guidance; (iii) It depends on what kind of information is to be disclosed; and (iv) 
No opinion. (Table 25) 
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Those who chose detailed rules or broad principles were asked a follow up question asking 
respondents to explain their answer.  Those who answered “It depends on what kind of 
information is to be disclosed” were asked a follow up question asking which of the various 
areas of regulation should be principles-based and which should be rules-based, with another 
follow-up question asking respondents to explain their answer. (Table 26, Table 27) 
 
(vii) Should historical transactions be disclosed? 
 
To test this research proposal, the explanations for those who chose “It depends” in the above 
questions about using rules or principles will be reviewed in the context of other factors. (Table 
26, Table 27) 
 
(viii) Should future projections be disclosed? 
 
To test this research proposal, the explanations for those who chose “It depends” in the above 
questions about using rules or principles will be reviewed in the context of other factors. (Table 
26, Table 27) 
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Chapter 5: Results of survey and background facts 
 
 (i) Is there a shared understanding of regulatory principles? 
 
As to the capacity to understand securities law principles, most respondents were highly 
educated and experienced in the industry.  51% had a university degree, 38% had a professional 
degree and 30% had a Masters degree (Table 12 and Table 13). For those who answered that 
they were not the CEO, a large percentage had a professional or Masters degree (39%). 
Regarding experience, 17% of respondents had worked for venture issuers for more than 20 
years, 24% had worked more than 10 but less than 20 years, 34% had worked more than 5 but 
less than 10 years—only a quarter of respondents had worked in the industry for less than five 
years.  74% of respondents worked full time for venture issuers—i.e. five days or more. 65% of 
respondents do not expect to leave the industry in the next five years.  In addition, the TSX–V 
limits who can be a director or manager of a public issuer.  With this high level of education and 
experience, it seems reasonable to expect, at a minimum, a capacity to understand securities law 
principles as they may evolve over time. 
As to whether or not respondents do understand securities law principles as currently applied, a 
series of business ethics questions were asked to test their recognition of fairness principles and 
insider trading.  As to fairness principles, one of the stated principles of the Ontario Securities 
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Act is that market participants should have high standards of fitness and business conduct.
417
  
This is a broadly worded principle which includes honest and legal behavior during a business 
transaction.  
Regarding the first ethical question,
418
 a high percentage (76%) answered that a buyer who 
discovers from independent research that a mining claim is far more valuable than the seller 
realizes should not be legally required to disclose this information to the seller.  This is 
consistent with the common law legal principle that those who work to acquire informational 
property should enjoy the fruits of their labour.  Most argued that the information was available 
to either party, and the buyer should be awarded for its efforts.  As some said, “it’s not a 
commune”, or “we do not function in a socialist environment (yet)”, and “[i]nformation 
advantages gained through honest research, diligence, and hard work should be for the benefit 
the party that has acquired that advantage... that's tantamount to requiring poker players to show 
each other their hands prior to making bets – it just doesn’t make sense.” Of the twelve who said 
that the information should be disclosed, eight gave rather vague explanations (Table 33), such 
as “it is the right thing to do!”, or “because it’s fair”, or “to maintain honesty and integrity of 
management.” 
                                                 
417
 Ontario Securities Act, section 2.1(2)(iii) 
418
 Business ethics question one: “Suppose that the buyer of a mining claim discovers from 
independent research (and without involving any trespass on the claim) that the claim follows the 
line of an adjacent mineral vein, and so the claim is far more valuable than the seller realizes. 
Should the buyer be legally required to advise the seller about this information before purchasing 
the claim? (Table 32) 
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In contrast, regarding business ethics question two,
419
 where the source of the information is 
from an employee of the seller who volunteers information to the buyer without telling his or her 
superiors, there is no congruence of opinion: 34% said that the buyer should be required to 
advise the seller about this information, 47% said that the buyer should not be required, and 19% 
were “not sure”.420 The employee has, at a minimum, negligently breached a fiduciary duty to his 
or her superiors.
421
  Even though the buyer offered no inducement for the leak, the buyer is in 
“knowing receipt” and, according to law, should return the informational property to the owner 
(i.e. disclose the leak to the selling company).  Prima facie, this incongruence suggests that there 
is not a “deep level” agreement about the use of inside information in business transactions. 
Further review of the explanations provided, however, show that some respondents who 
answered “no” or “not sure” recognized which principles applied, but saw more nuance in the 
question.
422
  It seems that most of the respondents agreed that, if the buyer assisted in taking (i.e. 
stealing) information, then the buyer must disclose the information to the seller.   
                                                 
419
 Business ethics question two: “You answered "no" to the last question. What if some of the 
valuable information came from an employee of the seller? – an employee who volunteers 
information to the buyer without realizing its importance and without telling his or her superiors.  
Should the buyer be legally required to advise the seller about this information before purchasing 
the claim ?” (Table 34) 
420
 Table 34 Ethics question 2, p.323 
421
 See footnote 415 at p.217 
422
 Table 35 Explanations for ethics question 2, p.324 
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Those who saw no duty to disclose in the second ethics question may question other principles 
which underlie business law.  The “knowing receipt” principle is akin to the principle that one 
should return lost property, such as a lost wallet or umbrella.  Those who stumble upon lost 
property, or who innocently receive confidential information, have a duty to preserve and return 
the property.  Capitalism rewards those who seize opportunities overlooked by others, but it 
doesn’t reward those who snatch up lost property when the legitimate owner can still be found.   
Question three
423
 paralleled question one, except that the investor is buying shares on the stock 
market rather than claims from a mining company.  Again, the information is from an 
independent source and there is no legal obligation to disclose.  91% of respondents agreed.  As 
one explained: “independent research implies publicly available information” and as another said 
“people do independent research all the time to try and find undervalued situations. It is part of 
what makes a market.” 
The fourth ethics question
424
 asked respondents if an investor should be legally required to wait 
for inside information (volunteered by an employee of the issuer) to be publicly disclosed before 
                                                 
423
 Business ethics question three: “Suppose an investor is buying shares of a company trading 
on a stock exchange. The investor discovers from independent research that the company is far 
more valuable than the public realizes. Should the investor be legally required to disclose this 
research to the public before purchasing the shares on the exchange?” (Table 36) 
424
 Business ethics question four: “You answered "no" to the last question.  Would your answer 
change if the source of the information is from an employee of the company who volunteers 
information to the investor without realizing its importance?  Should the investor be legally 
required to wait for the information to be disclosed to the public before purchasing the shares on 
the exchange?”(Table 38) 
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trading the issuer’s shares on the exchange.  20% said that the investor need not wait for the 
information to be publicly disclosed and 13% said they were “not sure”.  In other words, a third 
of the respondents apparently failed to recognize that it is illegal for a “tippee” of inside 
information to trade with knowledge of the tip on the stock market.
425
  Prima facie, this 
demonstrates a significant gap in knowledge—a “deep level” misunderstanding of securities law 
principles among a third of respondents.  However, further review of the explanations given by 
those who answered “no” or “not sure” shows that some recognized that it was an insider trading 
scenario but felt there was nuance to the question.
426
 Some respondents said that it would depend 
on whether or not the information was “material”, suggesting that they might make further 
inquiry before trading.  However, the question was a follow-up to the third ethical question, 
which stated that the information reveals that the “company is far more valuable that the public 
realizes”.  It is difficult to see how this would not be material information, since “material fact” 
is defined in the Ontario Securities Act as a fact that “would reasonably be expected to have a 
significant effect on the market price or value of the securities.”   
Some respondents who said that they would use the leaked information were quite bold about 
their disregard of ethics.  One said: “Tough luck for seller…seller may assert [that] an employee 
                                                 
425
 The person is a “tippee” if they know, or ought reasonably to know, that the person who 
tipped them is, among other persons, an employee of the reporting issuer. See section 76(5)(e) of 
the Ontario Securities Act. 
426
 See “Table 39 Explanations for ethics question 4” at p.335. 
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disclosed information before the sale, but how can it be proven?”  Another said, “[e]thics should 
not be set in the law.”   
Another question asked of respondents was: “How frequently do the directors of your venture 
issuer debate among themselves about when or which information should be press-released?”427 
12% replied that there was “always” a debate among the directors and 32% of respondents 
replied that there was “often” a debate (44% in total).  There are at least two explanations for 
why directors may disagree about disclosure.  A pessimistic explanation is that some directors 
wish to trade with inside information by delaying public disclosure.  As discussed in chapter one, 
the regulatory risks of venture issuers include: Spreading false information (page 47), 
Withholding material information (page 48), and  Market manipulation (page 49).  It seems 
unlikely, however, that a director who is considering illegal behaviour would risk detection by 
debating disclosure with other directors—silence would be a better strategy.  A more optimistic 
explanation is likely—that the assessment of what is material information is not always obvious.  
For example, the sampling of a mineral deposit can provide important information about its 
characteristics, but whether or not the results should be expected to affect the issuer’s share price 
can be a complex question, open for debate.  Conclusions from this question are limited, 
however, since over half of respondents said that such disclosure debates were “never”, “rarely” 
or “sometimes” argued among directors.  All that can really be said is that disclosure debates do 
occur and many seem to be based on honest disagreements about the application of principles. 
                                                 
427
 See Table 21, p.298 
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(ii) Are the Regulated Committed to the Public Interest?  
 
Respondents were asked how many years they have worked for a venture issuer (most have 
worked for more than five years
428
); if they currently work full-time or part-time for venture 
issuers (most work full-time
429
) and if they plan or expect to leave the industry in the next five 
years (65% said “no”430).  The answers to these questions suggest that most respondents do have 
a personal, long term commitment to the industry.  Whether or not they are committed to 
regulatory principles, however, is considered next. 
As to the respondents’ commitment to the principle of “full, true and plain” disclosure of all 
material facts to investors, respondents were asked to rank the importance of full disclosure to 
three different classes of venture investors. According to respondents, close friends and family 
rely more on management’s reputation for honesty and past business success (70% said this was 
of first importance) than they do on evidence about the issuer's assets and prospects (only 8% 
said this was of first importance).
431
 Similarly, existing business contacts rely on management’s 
reputation for honesty (44% said this was of first importance) and on management’s past success 
                                                 
428
 Table 8, p.292 
429
 Table 10, p.293 
430
 Table 11, p.293  
431
 Table 17, p.296 
 232 
 
in business (43% said this was of first importance).
432
  In contrast, investors who are introduced 
by a broker, and presumably public investors who subscribe based on a prospectus, rely on 
documentary evidence about the issuer’s assets and prospects—48% said this was of first 
importance and 36% said management’s past success was of first importance for these investors. 
According to respondents, only 18% of investors introduced by an arm's length broker, agent or 
finder rely primarily on management's reputation for honesty.
433
  I suggest these results make 
intuitive sense. Those who know the promoter and managers of an issuer are more likely to rely 
on their character before investing.  Those who are introduced by a broker are more independent 
and would more likely rely on documented statements about the issuer. 
The principle of full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts can be simplified for close 
friends and family and business associates, since these investors rely more on management's 
reputation for honesty than on documentary disclosure.  On the other hand, there is a danger that 
promoters may forgo important disclosure in raising funds from close friends and family and 
business associates. According to respondents, what is most important for promoters of venture 
issuers is the short-term share price of the issuer over the next 12 months (73%) rather than the 
long-term value of the business (24%) or a reputation for business ethics (only 5%).
434
  
Conclusions are tentative, however.  As discussed above (page 130), Sanderson and Darley 
suggest that most people believe that they themselves engage in good conduct but are less 
                                                 
432
 Table 18, p.296 
433
 Table 19, p.297 
434
 Table 20, p.298 
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charitable in their assessment of others. Respondents may believe that they themselves care 
about their reputation and the long-term value of their business, but that promoters in general do 
not.   
Despite the limitations of the survey, probably most promoters do focus on the short-term.  As 
discussed above under the topic “Success is unlikely” (page 43), 95% of junior ventures fail. 
Mining promoters must raise funds for working capital and for developing a property before any 
results can be proven and before any revenue.
435
 Repeated rounds of private placements are 
required before a bankable “feasibility study” is available. From personal experience as a 
solicitor in practice for twenty years and as a director of a venture issuer listed on the TSX 
Venture,
436
 I estimate a minimum “burn rate” of at least $10,000 per month to maintain a public 
listing and an office.  These short-term expenses cannot be overlooked.  Often, promoters must 
raise funds by selling shares to speculative investors who are looking for a quick profit.  
Considering these financial pressures, it should come as no surprise that many respondents 
believe that promoters are primarily motivated by short-term share price.  If so, and if many of 
the investors are friends, family or business associates (who do not rely on documented 
                                                 
435
 See “Commitment to “Full, True and Plain Disclosure”, from page 177) 
436
 I am a director of Peat Resources Limited, which is a struggling junior venture listed on the 
TSX Venture Exchange in the business of wet harvesting peat bogs for low CO2 fuels. 
 234 
 
disclosure)
437
 then the commitment of promoters to the securities law principles of full disclosure 
before an investment is made could be compromised. 
 
(iii) Are the regulated able to find analogous solutions? 
 
To test the potential for analogous reasoning, Table 14 asked about the range of experience of 
the board of directors.  165 respondents answered the question.  52% of the boards included an 
engineer; 64% included a scientist; 72% included a director with personal experience managing 
the kind of property which the company owns; 65% included a finance expert; 59% included a 
chartered or certified management accountant; and 52% included a lawyer.  Thus, the majority of 
venture issuers surveyed have a diverse range of experience from which to draw analogous 
solutions.  Whether or not boards do in fact draw from this range of experience is not answered 
in the survey. However, I argue that it is more likely that the board can apply principles-based 
regulation if they can draw from a broad range of experience.  If the board were composed of 
like-minded experts in one field, then the opportunity to apply principles-based on experience is 
                                                 
437
 Of the ninety-nine respondents who answered where funds were raised during the last three 
years, the mean amount raised from close friends and family of management was 19%, from 
existing business contacts of management was 25%, from private investors introduced by arm’s 
length broker was 41%, and from a public financing (such as a prospectus, capital pool or take-
over) was 15%.   
 235 
 
reduced.  A similar point is made under the topic “Risk-based regulation” (from page 101 
above), where I argue that diversity brings strength.  
 
(iv) Are there institutions or actors which promote regulatory collaboration? 
 
Two questions in the survey addressed the level of regulatory collaboration between issuers and 
regulators.  Respondents were asked how frequently they communicated with staff of the TSX-V 
and with staff of the OSC (Table 23), and how helpful contact has been in terms of explaining or 
assisting with compliance issues (Table 24).  It appears that TSX-V staff are more frequently 
contacted and considered helpful (58% contacted TSX-V staff 1-4 times, 23% contacted them 5-
10 times, and 12% them contacted more than 11 times; only 7% “never” contacted TSX-V staff 
during the previous 12 months).  TSX-V staff is considered “somewhat helpful” or “very 
helpful” by 81% of the respondents.   
Staff of the OSC is infrequently contacted (65% indicated “never” and 29% said less than five 
times during the previous 12 months) and most respondents (66%) had no opinion of their 
usefulness.  However, only 21% of respondents worked for issuers with their headquarters in 
Ontario (Table 4), and only 15% (Table 6) of respondents had raised funds through a prospectus, 
capital pool or take-over in the last three years (which would involve detailed OSC staff review), 
so it is no surprise that most respondents had little contact with, and expressed no opinion of, 
OSC staff.   
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Some respondents had negative comments about securities regulators and in particular TSX-V 
staff and some respondents view TSX-V staff as adversaries rather than collaborators.  Of 
course, staff has a duty to investors and to intermediaries as well as to listed issuers.  They must 
balance the desire of issuers to reduce disclosure costs against the investors’ need for full, true 
and plain disclosure.  Documents should be clear and consistent among different businesses.  It is 
not surprising that a minority of respondents believe that TSX-V staff is not helpful.   
Table 30 lists which factors respondents thought would make principles-based regulation 
understandable and effective.  56% of respondents said that it was very important that issuers and 
staff of the OSC and TSX-V should have a shared understanding about what makes the market 
fair and efficient; 43% said that it was very important that issuers and staff of the OSC and TSX-
V should agree about which principles are the most important; and 51% said that it was very 
important that issuers and staff of the OSC and TSX-V should collaborate and have regular 
communication.  
As to collaboration with experts (regarding continuous disclosure or press release questions—
Table 22), respondents consult with geologists and other scientists “very often” 29% of the time, 
lawyers “very often” 24% of the time, auditors or accountants “very often” 12% of the time, and 
securities analysts rarely. 
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(v) Do the regulated see enforcement as “fair” and “effective”?  
 
As mentioned above (page 190), attitudes to enforcement were not addressed.  This is because 
there are a number of different enforcement strategies employed by a number of different 
agencies. However, 65% of the respondents said that, for principles-based regulation to be 
understandable and effective (Table 30), it was very important that enforcement should be 
balanced and fair.   
 
(vi) Are regulatory issues predictable? 
 
144 respondents answered the question about whether to use detailed rules or broad principles 
for venture issuers (Table 25).  52% recommended broad principles, with examples of good 
disclosure in particular cases.  19% recommended detailed rules, describing exactly what should 
be disclosed and when.  Thus, 71% of respondents were either entirely for rules or entirely for 
principles, which reflects the dichotomy in much of the academic literature.  Only 27% said that 
“it depends on what kind of information is to be disclosed.” 
Those who chose principles-based regulation argued that detailed rules can become too 
cumbersome and constricting, and don’t allow for the flexibility required for different sized 
companies and for different controlling positions.  One respondent said: “We have a head office 
staff of six.  None of us are lawyers, and legal costs run around $30,000 per year.  Much of that 
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cost is to ensure that very specific information is declared.”  Another noted that “There are many 
different types of venture issuers, from Capital Pool Companies to mining operating companies, 
etc. Having specific rules for all Venture issuers does not allow for the flexibility that some 
venture issuers may require.”  One said “It is impossible to detail all possible examples so the 
only way to effectively indicate what should be disclosed is through examples covering the broad 
principles.”  Another observed that “under a rules-based scenario more time is spent trying to 
stay between the posts (or bending the posts) than observing the intent, and that can be 
counterproductive to the disclosure process; indeed, it is quite prone to misinformation.”  Some 
suggested principles-based regulation with guidelines and examples. 
Those who chose detailed rules explained their answers by saying that rules standardize 
regulations and “level the playing field.” As one respondent explained, “Small venture issuers do 
not have the luxury of resources (time and money) to have professional staff in the company or 
have advisors and consult with them as cost effectively and efficiently as an actual "rulebook" 
might provide.”  Another said, if regulations are too broad or too loose, the demand for 
expensive securities lawyers to interpret regulations will increase, which small firms cannot 
afford.  The most common comment was that clear and consistent rules are easier to follow. 
27% of respondents answered the question that “it depends on what kind of information should 
be disclosed”.  This reflects the more nuanced observations of Cristie Ford, that different areas of 
securities regulation require a different mix of rules and principles.  37 respondents answered the 
follow-up question about which areas should be regulated by rules and which should be 
regulated by principles.  Only 11% of these respondents said that mineral and oil and gas 
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reserves should be regulated entirely by principles—most said either rules, or a mixture of rules 
and principles. Similarly, only 16% of these respondents said that related party transactions 
should be regulated entirely by principles and only 27% said “other conflicts of interest” should 
be regulated by principles. In contrast, 59% of respondents said that business forecasting and 
49% of respondents said that ongoing disclosure about materials facts should be principles-
based.  It would seem, therefore, that 27% of respondents accept that some areas should be 
regulated by rules and some should be regulated by principles, and that property evaluation 
opinions and related party transactions, which are essentially historical or scientific assessments, 
should be regulated by rules.  Future predictions and ongoing disclosure, however, should be 
regulated by principles.  One respondent argued that mineral and oil and gas reserves are matters 
of measurement and can be rules-based.  But forecasts and materiality are subject to 
interpretation and should be principles-based. 
 
(vii) Should historical transactions be disclosed? 
 
Of the respondents who said that some areas should be regulated by rules and some should be 
regulated by principles, 49% said that detailed rules should be used for mineral and oil gas 
reserves and only 11% said principles should be used (30% said that a mixture should be used).  
Arguably, mineral and oil gas estimates are based on objective data and are quantifiable, making 
them less open to subjective interpretation, which is why many respondents believe that rules 
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would be preferable.
 438
  Historical transactions are also more objective than forecasts about the 
future; by the same token, they could more easily be regulated by rules. 
 
(viii) Should future projections be disclosed? 
 
Only 5% of respondents (who said that some areas should be regulated by rules and some should 
be regulated by principles) said that detailed rules should be used for business forecasting.  
Arguably, forecasting is a more subjective assessment of a variety of factors, making it difficult 
to prescribe in advance rules which will fit every situation.
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Chapter 6: Consultations with Industry Experts 
 
Six industry experts were consulted by personal interview during the summer of 2013.  Each 
interview was in the nature of a conversation of approximately one hour each, initiated with 
open-ended questions, as opposed to a formal interview or survey.  With consent, the 
conversations were recorded and afterwards each expert was emailed a copy of my interview 
notes in Appendix B.  Approval from York University Office of Research Ethics was obtained 
for the interviews.  In alphabetical order, the experts consulted were: 
Experts consulted:  
Ian Bandeen  
Ian Bandeen (“Bandeen”) B.A. LL.B. B.C.L.  is a co-founder and past CEO of the Canadian 
National Stock Exchange (CNSX), which, as mentioned above, is a junior exchange located in 
Toronto with a total market capitalization of $647 million in 2009.
440
 Mr. Bandeen is also a 
Founding Director of the National Angel Organization and is the Vice-Chairman of its Finance 
Committee. He is a member of the OSC Small and Medium Enterprises Advisory Committee.   
Elaine Ellingham 
Elaine Ellingham (“Ellingham”) MBA, MSc., BSc., P.Geo. worked with the TSX from 1997 to 
2005 in a number of capacities including National Leader, Mining and Manager, Company 
                                                 
440
 (CNSX Markets Inc. William Woods 2010) 
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Listings, with a range of responsibilities, including developing and implementing an 
international business strategy, and advising and participating in TSX policy revisions. She has 
over 25 years of experience in the mining industry and was responsible for the strategic direction 
and leadership of the TSX Investor Relations and Communications departments. 
Brian Prill 
Brian Prill (“Prill”), BA, LLB, MBA, LLM is a lawyer at BLP Law Professional Corporation. 
Prior to that, he was a partner at Blaney McMurtry LLP in Toronto. His practice focuses on all 
areas of corporate finance and securities transactions and includes mergers and acquisitions, 
general corporate matters, cross-border transactions and dealer registration. He is Past-President 
of the Exempt Market Dealers’ Association441 and now serves its Board of Directors. 
Edward Thompson 
Edward Thompson (“Thompson”), MA Sc., P.Eng. has more than 50 years of industry 
experience as a geologist, a professional engineer, and in a variety of senior management 
positions.  He was instrumental in drafting the former OSC policy regarding junior resource 
issuers and has served as the President of the PDAC and Treasurer and Director of the Canadian 
Mining Hall of Fame. 
                                                 
441
 The Exempt Market Dealers Association of Canada (EMDA) is a not-for-profit association 
founded in 2002 by a group of Canadian business people whose firms were active in the exempt 
securities market. Prior to September 2009 and the implementation of the exempt market dealer 
category across Canada through National Instrument 31-103, the EMDA operated under its 
previous name the Limited Market Dealers Association of Canada. 
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Michael White 
Michael White (“White”), BA MBA, has been with the exempt market dealer firm IBK Capital 
since 1992 and is currently its President and Chief Executive Officer. He has been involved in 
private placement financings totalling over $500 million. He has also been active in financial 
advisory assignments and mining industry developments including: advisory services to the 
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador with respect to its arrangements with Inco Ltd. over 
the development of the nickel deposit at Voisey’s Bay. 
Al Workman 
Al Workman (“Workman”) B.Sc., P.Geo., is Vice-President and Owner of Watts, Griffis and 
McOuat Limited ("WGM"), Canada's longest running independent firm of geological and mining 
consultants, with expertise in project management, property valuations, mineral resource and 
reserve estimates, technical reports, and due diligence reviews. Mr. Workman has more than 40 
years of experience in the industry. 
Why these experts were chosen: 
Thompson and Workman were chosen because of their extensive experience in the junior 
resource industry, which comprise the majority of venture issuers listed in Ontario.  Ellingham 
was chosen because of her knowledge of the TSX and TSX-V exchange.  Bandeen and Prill were 
chosen to gather insight from market intermediaries including the Exempt Market Dealers 
Association, and White was chosen to reflect the practical interests of one EMD which has 
consistently raised capital for venture issuers over many years.  
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Discussion of the experts’ opinions 
Are Ontario securities regulations currently principles-based or rules-based? 
Bandeen believes that, in comparison to the US, securities regulation in Canada is very much 
principles-based.  Directors of public companies have a fiduciary obligation to operate in the 
public interest; rules are not exhaustive but are applications in specific cases. This is different 
than in the US, said Bandeen, where rules are typically seen as limits and market participants 
will hire lawyers and accountants to skirt them, often with seemingly no care to underlying 
principles.  
Bandeen is correct in that the Ontario Securities Act sets out two fundamental purposes in section 
1.1 (to provide protection to investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices, and to foster 
fair and efficient capital markets and confidence in capital markets) and then organizes six 
principles to consider (in section 2.1) when pursuing these purposes. These are high-level 
directives.  Section 127 of the Act gives the OSC power to make various orders if in its opinion it 
is the public interest to do so, and, as stated by the Supreme Court of Canada, in exercising its 
discretion, the OSC should consider the protection of investors and the efficiency of, and public 
confidence in, capital markets generally.
442
  Again, these are high-level directives. 
However, as illustrated in Table 1, at page 27 above, the rules of the OSC have a large number of 
words per sentence, approaching the complexity of the notoriously complex Income Tax Act. 
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 Committee for the Equal Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v. Ontario (Securities 
Commission) [2001] 2 S.C.R. 132 
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The Securities Act, and the Rules and Policies of the OSC, comprise a book of over 3,000 pages 
of small print, of which 156 pages are for the Act and 25 pages are for the General Regulation; 
thus, there are over 2,500 pages of OSC rules in small print.
443
 It would seem, therefore, that 
Ontario regulations are a combination of principles-based legislation and detailed OSC rules.   
Bandeen’s description of US participants hiring experts to skirt US rules is similar to Moran’s 
description of the contrasting styles of London and New York, at page 54 above: London 
regulators have emphasized trust, flexibility and voluntary compliance, according to Moran, but 
U.S. regulation is detailed and adversarial. These different approaches may reflect different 
British and American social identity and citizenship motives in their business communities. 
Different cultures can have different commitments to the public interest (the second factor: “Are 
the regulated committed to the public interest”).   
Bandeen said that Americans tend to be the pioneers in financial matters—for example, 
securitization, multiple market trading, and high frequency trading.  In the U.S., financial 
pioneers create new kinds of markets, and then the old guard starts demanding reviews about 
“unfair trading practices”, forcing regulators to embark on time-consuming, consensus-building, 
exercises.  This is partly why US rules are a nightmare, said Bandeen.  They don’t start from first 
principles, but react to new products after-the-fact, and so the evolution of US regulations are 
difficult to navigate and often seemingly circular. Generally speaking, said Bandeen, Canadian 
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regulators have the luxury of coming to the game later, can see what happens in other 
jurisdictions, and can structure our markets to adopt the best and avoid the worst practices.   
Although Bandeen may be correct that Americans are pioneers in most industries, Canadians are 
pioneers in those markets which they dominate—mining, oil and gas.  As described from page 
52 above, the Toronto stock exchanges list more mining companies than any other exchange in 
the world, and half of those listed in Toronto are for mineral projects outside of Canada.  
Canadian securities commissions have pioneered mining and oil and gas regulations with new 
disclosure requirements, such as the requirement for an issuer to file a 43-101 mining report or a 
51–101 oil and gas report, as discussed from page 15 above. 
 
Should the regulation of Ontario venture issuers be more principles-based or rules-based? 
 
Workman said that principles are needed in that they provide general guidelines for individuals 
and companies to understand the rules.  Often, professionals will read the rules and are left 
wondering what they mean.  Rules can be abstract.  Principles should be used as a preamble to 
establish the context that surrounds a rule.  Principles on their own, however, are often soft and 
fuzzy said Workman, and regulators can change them without the need for a legislative process 
and debate.  So, principles help to interpret, but industry needs hard and fast rules.  Otherwise, 
the law is defined by decisions through litigation.  Industry needs both principles and rules, 
written in plain language, said Workman. 
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Workman’s observation that principles should be used as a preamble is similar to Braithwaite’s 
argument—that binding principles should be published, followed by detailed rules to illustrate 
how those principles should be applied to perhaps a dozen common situations (page 92 above). 
Similarly, Wood suggests (at page 73 above) that adding an implementation guideline that 
sequences the decisions necessary to implement a standard, or adding an index that better relates 
existing rules and precedents, can lower total task complexity by reducing coordinative 
complexity to more than offset any increase in component and dynamic complexity. The OSC 
rules most frequently referenced by venture issuers (as I suggest from page 13 above) are: 45-
106 (exemptions from the prospectus requirement, of 140 pages), 31-103 (Exempt Market 
Dealer, of 151 pages), 51-102 (ongoing disclosure requirements, of 239 pages) and 61-101 
(insider bids, issuer bids, business combinations and relate party transactions, of 44 pages).  Each 
of these rules is detailed.  They each begin with a table of contents, definitions, rules organized 
by topic, and then a Companion Policy statement and forms.  Because they are so long and 
detailed, and because they are posted on the OSC website along with all of their frequent 
amendments and proposals (see, for example, Table 2 at page 74), I would agree with Workman 
that the regulations could be simplified by using guidelines to understand the rules and with 
Braithwaite that the document should apply the principles to perhaps a dozen common situations. 
Workman illustrated his concerns with industry regulation by describing his participation in a 
round table last April 2013 regarding the new Ontario Mining Act, which he says has become an 
unreadable assemblage of old articles and paragraphs, modified where needed by new articles 
and paragraphs, the entirety of which is heavily cross-referenced to other documents and 
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appendices.  The regulations appear in multiple documents and many of the guiding principles 
are set forth in policy documents which can be changed without sufficient public comment, said 
Workman.  A professional in the mineral industry may be in breach of the policy without even 
knowing it.  That leaves the company at the mercy of the courts to decide their particular case, 
said Workman.  Also, the mining regulations go into new territory regarding aboriginal issues 
that has so many qualifications.  It should have been an entirely new document.  We need a 
framework that encourages investment, but the law has become unreadable.  The mining 
industry’s leading advocate, the PDAC, was simply ignored when the mining code was finalized, 
said Workman.  
Workman’s and the PDAC’s concerns with the Ontario Mining Act are partly as a result of the 
amendments made in 2009, which require that companies consult with Aboriginal communities 
before an exploration permit is granted by the Ministry. Section 2 of the 2009 Act states that its 
purpose is to encourage prospecting, staking and exploration for the development of mineral 
resources, in a manner consistent with the recognition and affirmation of existing Aboriginal and 
treaty rights in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, including the duty to consult, and to 
minimize the impact of these activities on public health and safety and the environment. The 
company must file an exploration plan with the Director of Exploration, who shall, before 
issuing a permit, consider a number of matters, including whether suitable arrangements have 
been made with the Aboriginal communities which may be affected.
444
  Aboriginal communities 
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 See Ontario Regulation 308/12 
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are given an opportunity to dispute the exploration plan under section 170.1 of the Act.  The 
Ministry policy
445
 states that the exploration company should consider ways to avoid, eliminate 
or minimize potential impacts through, for example, geographic or timing adjustments to a 
project. The problem, according to the PDAC,
446
 is that the duty to consult with Aboriginal 
communities should be the obligation of the Crown, rather than the junior venture which is 
raising funds for an exploration program.
447
  If the Crown and the Aboriginal community agree 
about what kind of exploration is appropriate, those agreements could then become regulation, so 
that the venture issuer has clarity before raising funds for exploration.  
In my view, the PDAC’s position is unrealistic, in that it demands legal certainty in situations 
where rights may still be undetermined.  In Haida Nation
448
, the Supreme Court of Canada held 
that the Crown must act honourably, and consult and accommodate Aboriginal claims, as part of 
a process of fair dealing and reconciliation that continues beyond formal claims resolution.  The 
purpose of requiring a company to disclose to the Aboriginal community a detailed exploration 
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 See: < http://www.mndm.gov.on.ca/sites/default/files/aboriginal_exploration_ 
consultation_policy.pdf> 
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 See: <http://www.pdac.ca/public-affairs/lands-regulations/public-affairs/2002/01/06/ontario-
government-s-review-of-the-mining-act> 
447
 In Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511, 
the Supreme Court of Canada held that third parties cannot be held liable for failing to discharge 
the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate.  The honour of the Crown cannot be delegated, 
and the legal responsibility for consultation and accommodation rests with the Crown.  This does 
not mean, however, that third parties can never be liable to Aboriginal peoples. 
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 Supra, note 447 
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plan is so that an informed discussion can begin before exploration starts.  As discussed above 
under the topic Rules and Risk, from page 83, precise rules may appear predictable, but they can 
obscure risk.  The risk, for a junior mining venture exploring its claims in an area where an 
Aboriginal community may later assert treaty or property interests, is that the issues may not be 
certain and rules can lead to a false sense of security.  In my view, the new Mining Act, and its 
regulations and policy, is a principles-based approach to improving dialogue among mining 
ventures and the Aboriginal communities affected.  Although Workman may be correct that the 
mining regulations should have been an entirely new document, or better organized, the law is 
not unreadable but deliberately high-level so that specific consultations and negotiations can be 
fostered early in resource development.   
Prill said that the problem with principles on their own is that the regulator may have in mind 
what they should mean, but the business community may operate on a different understanding 
for years.  Honest business people can believe that they are in compliance with the principles, 
and then face major adjustments and possibly enforcement proceedings after-the-fact.  This 
echoes the discussion of “interpretive communities” by Stanley Fish from page 165 above—that 
text has no meaning outside of the cultural assumptions, or “interpretive templates”, which give 
meaning to words.  
For example, Prill was providing the initial comment letters on Instrument 31-103 regarding 
Exempt Market Dealers.  The conflict of interest disclosure required for an underwriter in 33-105 
is quite clear and rules based—there is a 10% test for related issuer disclosure.  But similar 
requirements for a “connected issuer” in 31-103 are principles-based and hard to assess, said 
 251 
 
Prill.  If the connection is less than 2% of the outstanding securities, is it de minimus?  The 
principles do not give guidance, said Prill.  By comparison, audit committee rules do have a de 
minimus test of 5%. As a solicitor, there is a tendency to be very conservative so that your client 
isn’t the poster child for a 20:20 OSC interpretation, said Prill.  Another example referred to by 
Prill is referral arrangements. Rule 31-103 requires disclosure, but it is unclear whether or not a 
trailer fee would be allowed among EMDs—it is permitted in the mutual fund industry.  Prill has 
called staff of the OSC for guidance and was told: “We think that all the guidance is out there, 
and if you need more guidance, contact a solicitor.  Well, I am a solicitor and some things need 
more guidance.”  
Prill’s view that solicitors will be very conservative, so that their client won’t become a poster 
child for a 20:20 OSC interpretation, echoes Gill’s comment that if you tell people there is an 
invisible line somewhere in the middle of the room and if they cross it something bad will 
happen to them, people will tend to stand back from the middle of the room for fear of stepping 
on a line they don’t see. See above, page 98. 
Ellingham said that, when dealing with the smaller issuers on the TSX-Venture exchange, where 
the management teams are often not as sophisticated as those listed on the TSX, rules may be 
preferable.  Of their 1800 listed TSX-V companies, Ellingham described how many are quite 
strange.  The rules can help control them and avoid reputational risk to the TSX-V and TSX.  
This is why there are two tiers on the TSX-V, so issuers can graduate and move to the more 
principles-based TSX, said Ellingham. However, it may not be that junior issuers lack business 
sophistication generally, but just inexperience with securities rules—a third of respondents to the 
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survey failed to recognize the insider trading example. See above page 229. The solution, as will 
be argued later, is better education rather than more rules. 
 
What is the effect of using principles or rules when regulating venture issuers? 
 
Ellingham described how, prior to demutualization in 2002, the TSX accepted listings in a 
discretionary, principles-based manner. For example, the foreign company listing policy used to 
be unwritten, so the TSX imposed requirements without any specific rules—eg. at least two 
Canadian directors, broker sponsorship, a sufficient distribution of shareholders in Canada, or an 
office or an investment relations person located in Canada.  A larger issuer with noteworthy 
management, with more ties in Canada, could be listed more easily.  If some of the managers had 
been involved in companies that had imploded, an independent director would be required.  
Similarly, when the technology boom happened in the late 1990s, technology companies that 
didn’t have any revenues were listed, on an exceptional basis, by the application of underlying 
principles.  It was in some ways an old boys’ network, according to Ellingham—a lot depended 
on reputation and who you knew, but underlying this was a principles-based application of 
precedent—if we granted an exemption for this one, we should do it for that one, depending on 
the underlying principle of investor protection. 50% of TSX management were lawyers who 
understood this precedent-based application of principles.  
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When the TSX was demutualized in 2002 and became a for-profit business, there was a major 
paradigm change, said Ellingham.  The TSX looked at where its revenues were coming from and 
no longer saw itself as a regulator, but as a business.  TSX clients were the listed issuers, who 
paid our fees, and the more listings that the TSX could acquire and the greater their growth, the 
more profits there would be.  The TSX had targets on the number of new listings, and so the 
focus changed from protecting investors to growing the TSX business. 
The OSC had to decide how it was going to audit us, since the TSX was no longer seen as a 
partner protecting investors, said Ellingham. To meet this concern, the TSX adopted rules and 
standards, which could more easily be verified on audit, rather than to allow discretion.  Though 
the TSX corporate manuals may not have changed much, the application of those standards 
changed profoundly, said Ellingham.  The TSX also cut costs by hiring people with business, 
marketing and relationship management experience—MBA graduates who could apply standards 
to be verified on audit, rather than (more expensive) lawyers who could apply legal precedent. 
The effect of moving to standards rather than discretion is that you don’t always get a sense of 
what the company is trying to do, said Ellingham.  For example, Ellingham was involved in the 
listing of Amica retirement homes, which started with the name Ishtar.  The prospectus was very 
confusing: retirement homes, with gourmet food, etc.  “It was, as it turned out, middle-eastern 
people who were immigrating and bringing their parents, and they saw that there were no high-
end retirement homes, so they thought it would be a good business. It did become a good 
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business and meeting the people and getting outside the strict application of rules was 
important.”449 
Ellingham’s example illustrates the advantage of principles, when assessing applications—it 
allows for greater flexibility and deeper assessments of merit.  Later, I argue that licensing 
market participants, such as brokers and public accountants, and listing companies on an 
exchange such as the TSX-V or the CSNQ, should be principles-based, with discretion so that 
the regulator can consider many factors before deciding to approve an applicant.  Ellingham’s 
example also illustrates why principles-based regulation requires regulatory collaboration, as 
discussed from page 186 above.  In order to fully assess an applicant, the regulator needs to 
collaborate and communicate directly with the applicant. 
 
Is there a shared understanding of regulatory principles in the industry? 
 
I asked White if he thought there was a shared understanding of regulatory principles among the 
brokers and issuers in the venture issuer community.  White has been in the business since 1992 
and his father and partner has been in the business for 45 years.  White believes that when his 
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 Amica Mature Lifestyles Inc. is now a leader in the management, marketing, design, 
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capitalization of about $260 million as of July 2013. 
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father was younger and the street was smaller, principles worked well since everyone knew and 
trusted each other and reputation was everything.  You couldn’t become an investment banker 
unless you had been in the industry for at least 15 years, he said.  You had to become part of the 
club, get to know everyone and build trust, and then you could move up in the business.  Now 
people move around more, said White. If you don’t know someone, it’s difficult to trust them.  I 
can see why rules are more required now, he said.   
Similarly, Workman has been in the resource industry for almost 40 years, in Yemen for four 
years, Indonesia for two years, and his firm has worked in over 140 countries, and so he draws 
from a broad range of experience.  I asked him whether or not there is a community of shared 
values in the junior resource industry.  He said there are a lot of players, and some come and go.  
Twenty or thirty years ago, the business was dominated by well-established Canadian, U.S. and 
European companies with a similar business culture.  In the last few decades, the industry has 
become more cosmopolitan and culturally diverse because foreign companies are accessing 
Canadian markets. Canadian exchanges are the largest in the world for funding mineral 
projects—more than half of the money raised globally goes through the Canadian markets.  He 
said: “There is a wide variety of business ethics on this planet, and there are some groups of 
individuals whom we have never had a good experience with, and there are some individuals out 
there, some cultures, that are always trying to deceive you and get a one-up on you.  These 
companies or individuals have no scruples when it comes to circumventing rules or principles, 
including any sense of fair dealing.” Workman said that when his firm does a 43-101 mining 
report, it requires complete disclosure and it is often the most expensive part of the project for a 
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client.  But, said Workman, for some companies and individuals, it’s just not part of their culture 
to provide full disclosure.   
White’s and Workman’s observations about how industry is changing are, quite frankly, 
something that I hadn’t fully considered when reviewing the literature and conducting the 
survey.  The first factor “is there a shared understanding of regulatory principles” and the second 
factor “are the regulated committed to the public interest” are not static social relationships that 
can be measured in a single survey, but evolving conversations between regulators and regulated.  
The proper balance of rules and principles should address the long term development of the 
industry.  A shared understanding of regulatory principles may be less likely as Ontario’s junior 
resource market becomes more international. 
 
Are the regulated committed to the public interest? 
 
Thompson said that: “I have dealt with people in the industry for 50+ years, most are involved 
for the long-term, and I usually assume that they are upright and will do a fair deal.  Yes, a lot of 
promoters are opportunists who look for the short term, promoting mining when mining is hot 
and high-tech when high-tech is hot. In the last upturn, just about anybody could raise money, 
and so it attracted the fringe players.  Canada has become the global place to finance resource 
exploration, and people from different cultures can think differently about business ethics.”   
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Thompson reiterates that, although the industry is becoming international, most players are 
involved for the long term.  This is reflected in the survey—most respondents are involved for 
the long term (Table 8, Table 9, Table 10, Table 11).  As one respondent said (Table 27, page 
303, line 41), “principles-based regulations gives the fair mindedness that most all issuers have 
good ethics and morals and that they will do their best for shareholders given limited resources.  
I believe this is the case and most people in junior mining are trying their best and have good 
ethics…Education of Boards and their duties and responsibilities is a better means to better 
disclosure and transparency.  Education is the means to get directors to make better decisions in 
a principles-based reporting system.” 
 
Are the regulated able to find analogous solutions?  
I asked Workman if greater diversity on the boards of junior companies would allow them to 
better apply principles, and he said that most companies do try to get a board with a diverse 
background.  A few companies, he said, have got into trouble because they didn’t have the 
specific technical ability for their project.  Issues of aboriginal rights, corporate social 
responsibility and environmental issues are becoming more important, said Workman.  Twenty 
years ago, companies had open access under the mining law, as an essential right on Crown land 
and on private land subject to dealing with the (surface rights) land-owner.  Sometimes, the 
negotiations relating to access would test the relationship, but the law was always on the 
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company’s side.  Now, much more is required. A company’s board should be much broader in 
terms of its abilities, since local communities can be very demanding and difficult to deal with.   
This relates to Workman’s earlier comment that the Mining Act has become too complex, and 
my suggestion that the complexity may partly be because the extent of Aboriginal treaty and 
property rights in many cases is still uncertain. The solution is not necessarily more rules but 
greater sensitivity by management.  Negotiations with First Nations are a frequent challenge for 
mining ventures, and so, as Workman said, the board should have the capacity to appreciate 
these issues.  Greater diversity across political and environmental skills can provide better 
management and better disclosure to investors as to the benefits and risks of investment. 
 
Are there institutions which promote regulatory collaboration? 
 
As to collaboration with the regulator, Thompson said that when he was running companies in 
the 1970s, he would often meet with OSC staff and discuss what was acceptable without 
involving lawyers.  “You would explain what you were doing and if they had a problem, they 
would ask you. Now, the OSC doesn’t want to talk with the CEO, just the lawyers.  This drags 
the review on for months and months.”  It seems, according to Thompson, that the OSC staff has 
a lot of turnover, with employees who work there for just a few years, with a CYA attitude, and 
they want hard and fast rules so they don’t have to exercise judgment.  The industry needs 
experienced staff who we can work with.   
 259 
 
I asked White about collaboration with the regulator, and he said that there used to be more trust 
with the OSC when members of staff were in positions for a long time and people got to know 
each other.  It used to be that an investment banker would work through a prospectus with a 
point man at the OSC and one could talk through situations directly, said White.  Now, it is rare 
to have a working relationship with OSC staff and most dealings are conducted through lawyers.  
There is still, however, direct contact with the exchanges.   
I asked Workman if he thinks there is cooperation and collaboration with regulators, and he said 
there is, if you have a specific question.  The regulators in Toronto and Vancouver have been 
quite responsive, according to Workman, and have been able to clarify what was required in a 
43-101 report.  But, in some instances, the feedback has often been very myopic, said Workman, 
in part because the reviewer for the regulator was not truly qualified in the subject matter.  We 
have had to insert qualifying statements to the extreme, and in some cases the redundancy verges 
on overwhelming, leaving important non-technical aspects overlooked, such as how market 
forces may affect the viability of a project.   
The problem, if indeed the OSC is becoming less cooperative with junior issuers, is that the 
kinds of opportunities that Ellingham describes under the topic “What is the effect of using 
principles or rules when regulating venture issuers?”, from page 252 above, may be missed.  As 
Ellingham said, the effect of moving to standards rather than discretion is that you don’t always 
get a sense of what the company is trying to do. 
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Bandeen said that, yes, the OSC is accessible and there is dialogue and collaboration, but what is 
missed is that it is disproportionately the larger participants and their agents who are privy to 
these dialogues. The banks have had a disproportionate effect on the markets in Ontario, 
according to Bandeen.  They will be at the table, 85-90% of the time.  Bandeen said that he has 
seen instances where OSC staff say that they’ve received 28 comments that said one thing and 2 
comments that said the other, so they’ve assumed the majority of comments reflect the industry; 
but often, it’s just because smaller issuers don’t have the resources to follow the regulations and 
make comments.   
It is of course important for the regulator to dialogue with junior issuers as well as financial 
institutions.  As discussed under the topic “Industry concentration of Canadian venture issuers”, 
from page 38 above, Ontario is heavily concentrated in the financial services sector, with large 
institutions inter–listed in the United States.  As reflected in many of the comments in the survey, 
in Table 26, many junior issuers do not have the financial resources to participate in public 
forums.  Thus, it is important for the OSC to cooperate with junior resource trade associations, 
such as the PDAC. 
 
Do the regulated see enforcement as “fair” and “effective”? 
 
Whether you have principles or rules, those setting out to misinform investors will find a way, 
said Workman.  Fairness opinions and valuations are an example, he said.  The Ontario Business 
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Corporations Act only mentions valuation once, in the context of transactions between 
corporations, where a company is going private, and a valuation is required.  When talking of 
mergers and takeovers, the law is moot on valuations, so companies trot out fairness opinions, 
disclosing that they are not valuations in footnotes, but the public treats them as though they 
were valuations.  In many cases, the company giving the fairness opinion is in a conflict of 
interest because the financial institution will receive a success fee if the transaction goes through.  
This is a problem, said Workman. 
Ontario takes a very paternalistic view of securities regulation, according to Prill.  The BC 
securities commission mission statement is “[t]o protect and promote the public interest by (i) 
fostering a securities market that is fair and warrants public confidence and (ii) a dynamic and 
competitive securities industry that provides investment opportunities and access to capital.”450  
The OSC statutory mandate is “[t]o provide protection to investors from unfair, improper or 
fraudulent practices and to foster fair and efficient capital markets and confidence in capital 
markets.”451  The key difference, according to Prill, is that the BC mission expressly includes 
investment opportunities and access to capital. The OSC seems to focus more on investor 
protection, according to Prill.   BC offers an olive branch to get you to comply.  Ontario sees any 
non-compliance as a problem with integrity. We need to help those who are honestly trying to 
learn, and we should encourage education, said Prill.  
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 Section 1.1 of the Ontario Securities Act 
 262 
 
Thompson noted that the Vancouver Stock Exchange started with guidelines and they were 
successful in raising money, but there were a few bad examples.  Today, the regulators try for 
perfection and make 98% suffer to regulate the 2% who are bandits, said Thompson.  If someone 
wants to commit fraud, they will do so no matter what your rules or regulations say.  The 
regulators should be prepared for the odd bad case, said Thompson.  
These opinions mirror what many of the respondents said in the survey, in Table 26, Table 27, 
Table 29.  However, the notion that the OSC is strict should be contrasted with Bhattacharya’s 
report (above, page 193), that the number of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
enforcement actions, after scaling for the number of issuers listed on US and Canadian 
exchanges, are about ten times greater than OSC enforcement and the number of SEC insider 
trading enforcement cases is about 20 times greater than OSC enforcement.  As the Wise 
Persons’ Committee observed that “[t]here is a widely held view that enforcement in Canada is 
lax in comparison with the United States and other countries.”452   
 
What mandatory paper disclosure should an investor receive? 
 
I asked Thompson what disclosure documents should be drafted for private placements 
introduced through a broker, and he said that he subscribes to a number of private placements 
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each year, with virtually no paper disclosure, but based on the people involved: “Sometimes, 
they’ll have some documents or a file and I will look at what exploration project they have.”  
Thompson said that many of the juniors have insufficient finances and should consolidate, but 
the cost to generate the disclosure documents is about $300,000 and that is far too much.  It 
should just be financial statements and the directors’ recommendation—future projections, for 
example, are a waste of time and effort. 
I asked White what prospectus exemptions should be available for juniors to raise funds and 
what disclosure documents should be required. He said that the current private placements 
exemptions work well and that most of his investor clients look at the people involved, who are 
running the company, and chat about the opportunities. The people involved in the company are 
90% of the decision making process and detailed disclosure documents are not worth the cost, 
said White. The investor needs to know that, with this type of high risk, management has the 
ability to make a return of such-and-such a magnitude but the investment could go to zero.  
The opinions of Thompson and White reflect the results of the survey.  As noted above, 
according to respondents, close friends and family rely more on management’s reputation for 
honesty and past business success (70% said this was of first importance) than they do on 
evidence about the issuer's assets and prospects (only 8% said this was of first importance).
453
  
Similarly, existing business contacts rely on management’s reputation for honesty (44% said this 
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was of first importance) and on management’s past success in business (43% said this was of 
first importance).
454
    
The regulators have said in public that they wish to re-visit the whole subject of disclosure, said 
Bandeen.  There is a school of thought that the prospectus model is broken and that the 
disclosure process has become lawyered up with reams of unread material.  We have to 
modernize the rules to reflect how the world works, which is a wired, connected, global place, 
said Bandeen.  People have access to a large amount of information.  Hardly anyone reads the 
disclosure documents.  Most people who want to learn will Google the business, read about 
management, and search with a few provocative words to check out the negatives.  What they 
really want is timely financials, material risks, a summary of the product, and a summary of the 
managers and principals involved. It should be in an accessible language. CSNX is a model with 
meaningful transparency. We did away with the hundreds of pages of often conflicting 
prescribed rules such as you would see with the TSXV and went instead for simple to read forms 
and rules.  
The accredited investor concept is outdated and very elitist and paternalistic, according to 
Bandeen.  Just because someone has money, doesn’t mean they are sophisticated.  Bandeen 
would rather focus on meaningful disclosure and transparency, and have qualified advisors 
review for suitability.  Younger kids, of 20s and 30s, are more sophisticated about technology 
businesses.  If they want to invest $5,000 in a company that they think will catch on, why do we 
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think that the regulator knows better?  At the end of the day, who are you protecting? People 
should understand that it is a risky venture and that they could lose all their money.  The advisor 
should sign off that the client understands.  Suitability rules should be principles-based.   
The question of who is sophisticated enough to invest in a public company without a prospectus, 
especially a junior venture company, is a difficult subject.  On the one hand, the OSC’s statutory 
mandate is to protect investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices and to foster fair 
and efficient capital markets and confidence in capital markets.  The Ontario Securities Act 
contemplates that most financings should be done by prospectus, with full disclosure and OSC 
review, to protect the public.  The description of junior mining risks from page 43 above 
illustrates the kinds of risks that junior resource investors face.  On the other hand, junior 
companies usually do not have the funds to file a prospectus, as described above under the topic 
“The Cost of Securities Regulation” page 50.  Many of the respondents to the survey said that 
access to the exempt market should not be constrained.  It is a difficult balance and the OSC is 
certainly not ignoring the issue.  On December 14, 2012 the OSC published a consultation paper 
which describes four concept ideas for possible new prospectus exemptions in Ontario.
455
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Exempt Market Dealers (“EMDs”) and investment banks 
 
Bandeen worked at McLeod Young Weir and Burns Fry before they were absorbed by the banks 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and he described the cultural shifts that happened. I-banks 
were very independent, said Bandeen. “It was your own capital; decisions were made swiftly on 
the right basis, with the level of risk management that a prudent owner of capital would employ. 
The IDA was your own club, and the presidents of various investment clubs were rotating chairs, 
so it was a different world, more clubby, but also perhaps more conscious of the real risks 
involved in the business.”  In contrast, the banks are very bureaucratic, with a mandarin level 
that acts as a buffer between lines of production and decisions, said Bandeen. The banks are 
supposed to be well regulated deposit institutions, and so they have shut the junior issuers out of 
their retail systems to avoid reputational risk.  As a result, Bandeen said he was beginning to 
think that it might have been a fundamental regulatory error to allow the takeover of these I-
banks.   
The banks are used to oversight from OFSI, and so they have the resources and experience to 
handle the increasing levels of regulation, said Bandeen.  For the little company, compliance is 
much more onerous. Bandeen said that he has been in heated arguments with those, usually now 
part of the big banks, who say that juniors are currently in a cyclical down market, that the weak 
will be weeded out, and that new stars will emerge when markets recover.  Bandeen thinks this 
might not be true.  The increased regulatory compliance is material.  I hear of people spending 
30% of their operating expenses on compliance, often resulting in little or no profits, said 
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Bandeen.  This does not bode well for the junior or early stage companies, he said.  White said 
he doesn't believe that the current financing downtrend is because there are not enough 
accredited investors; rather, it's because fewer want to invest at this time because the junior 
resource market is cyclical. The offering memorandum exemption should be looked at, but 
White doesn't think it will suddenly open the gates for more investment. 
There are new OSC capital and reporting requirements which many EMDs find unnecessary, 
said Prill.  For example, often the investors are introduced to the EMD by the issuer in order to 
close a specific private placement.  The EMD may have no previous contact with the investors 
and, once the transaction is closed, no continuing relationship.  However, the EMD is required to 
maintain an ongoing reporting relationship with each investor.  There is a sense that the OSC is 
imposing the attributes of a retail broker (who has a continuing relationship with the investor) on 
an EMD (who, in many cases, does not).  If the OSC wishes to change this fundamental business 
relationship, then yes, Prill says we need better education.  But the education should be more in 
the nature of a dialogue, where both regulator and regulated listen to each other. 
I asked White to comment on the regulatory changes imposed on EMDs, and he described how 
his firm IBK Capital has been conducting business along these lines for many years, such as a 
healthy buffer of capital, insurance, and self-imposed proficiency requirements.  The real change 
for the industry, according to White, is that the OSC now requires each EMD to emphasize its 
duty to protect the investor rather than to raise funds for the issuer, even though the investor does 
not pay the EMD for these services nor does the EMD usually hold any securities for the 
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investor.  According to an OSC survey
456
, many EMDs do not protect investors and focus only 
on closing the trade to get their commission, said White.  In IBK's case, it is ultimately the client 
who decides whether or not to invest but IBK must decide if the trade is suitable. Sometimes, we 
go back to the investor and say that the investment is not suitable based on our knowledge of the 
investor, the investment size and the risks of the investment, said White.  We have to keep 
detailed logs, to be able to prove to the OSC that we know the investor and that the product and 
the trade are suitable.  
But, said White, there is a mood among certain advocacy groups that investors are not being 
protected enough. If the focus were only to protect investors, then the best practice would be to 
avoid any high-risk stock.  The big banks and large brokerage houses won’t sell their retail 
clients anything other than blue chips, said White.  Many people think that bigger companies are 
less risky, but that’s not necessarily true—many large companies have imploded, and the 
potential for fraud exists in all quarters.  For many investors, a well-rounded portfolio can 
include a mix of junior issuers. The greatest potential for growth is in the junior market.  To 
name a few successes: Goldcorp, Barrick, First Quantum, Wheaton River, New Gold, Detour and 
Osisko were all once high-risk penny stocks that depended on the junior markets to execute their 
business plans, and are now some of the most profitable mining companies in Canada.  There 
will be successes and failures in the junior market and investors need to know they can lose their 
entire investment.  So, it is good policy to require EMDs to know their investors and the 
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suitability of the investment and IBK Capital has done this for years.  But ultimately, the investor 
has to be responsible for deciding what level of risk to assume and the EMD can only advise.   If 
the regulators expect more than this from EMDs, they will leave the private placement junior 
market, which could make it very difficult to raise funds for emerging industries.  The OSC 
should understand this. 
The OSC is again in a difficult position, being statutorily mandated to protect investors, but also 
being asked by many in the industry to loosen the rules to allow for easier financings. Section 
13.3(2) of OSC Rule 31-103 does allow, as noted by White, that ultimately the investor is 
responsible for deciding the level of risk.  The rule states that: “If a client instructs a registrant to 
buy, sell or hold a security and in the registrant’s reasonable opinion following the instruction 
would not be suitable for the client, the registrant must inform the client of the registrant’s 
opinion and must not buy or sell the security unless the client instructs the registrant to proceed 
nonetheless.”[emphasis added].  In a recent “compliance sweep” of over 85 Ontario EMDs, the 
OSC found that in 22% of cases, EMDs had poor documentation practices to demonstrate the 
suitability advice given and 15% sold unsuitable investments to some clients. Furthermore, 18% 
improperly relied on the accredited investor exemption when distributing prospectus-exempt 
securities to investors.
457
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Should there be mandatory continuing education? 
 
I asked Workman whether or not mandatory continuing education for the managers of venture 
issuers would be a good idea, and he said that managers ought to be continuing their education 
for their own self-interest.  However, there will always be those who flout the regulations, so 
enforcement is important.  Some have had the attitude that “I’ll do it my way and I’ll pay the fine 
if I get caught”, said Workman. 
I asked Bandeen about a CPD education requirement for directors of venture issuers, and he said 
that one kind of education would be to beef up enforcement so that people clearly understand 
what is considered bad behaviour and that there are tangible, significant, costs to conduct one’s 
business inappropriately. One problem with CPD, he said, is that it would just feed the business 
schools, which are very expensive.  But maybe it’s not a bad idea, he said, as long as it doesn’t 
become perfunctory.  For example, most people wrongly think that that their only obligation is to 
the shareholders, rather than the broader stakeholder groups, said Bandeen.   
I asked Prill whether or not a continuing education requirement would help the industry, and Prill 
said that he didn’t think it would make much difference for the managers of venture issuers, but 
it could help EMD firms which are the gatekeepers.  Traditionally, EMDs (formerly “broker 
dealers”) saw their client only as the issuer, since the issuer pays their commission. They would 
sell the security, describing its prospects in the best light, subject to all disclosure rules, and 
leave it to the investor to assess its suitability for their own financial plan. It is comparable to 
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how one would expect a real estate agent for the vendor of a house to act—disclose what is 
required by law, but emphasize all of the positive aspects of the house, leaving it to the purchaser 
or the purchaser’s agent to decide what is suitable.  Canadian regulators have imposed a primary 
fiduciary obligation to the investor, even though EMDs continue to collect their fees from the 
issuer.  
I asked Thompson if there should there be a CPD requirement for the directors and managers of 
venture issuers, and he said that it might help for some of the new areas, such as corporate 
responsibility.  He noted that governments and regulators have placed more social responsibility 
obligations on companies than they used to.  One of the problems with imposing education, said 
Thompson, is that the directors of junior companies usually don’t get paid, and they will want to 
be paid if they have to pursue further education.  Any requirement will add to the issuer’s cost 
and reduce the amount of money spent on exploration. 
In the following chapter, I argue that a continuing education requirement should be imposed. 
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Chapter 7: Summary, Recommendations and Areas for Further Inquiry 
Summary 
 
This paper addresses whether or not the securities regulation of Ontario venture issuers should be 
based primarily on rules or principles.  Those who advocate rules-based regulation argue that it 
makes law predictable, less discretionary, and easier to enforce.  Principles–based regulation is 
grounded on the philosophy that when an activity is complex, such as securities regulation, 
detailed rules can evolve into a confusing web, obscuring core values and discouraging creative 
solutions. As described in chapter one, the OSC shifted towards rules in 1995 in response to the 
Ainsley case, and again in 2004 in response to US Sarbanes Oxley regulations.  The BC 
Commission proposed a principles–based Securities Act in 2004, with a simplified, plain 
language rulebook with an overarching “Code of Conduct” of twenty–eight general principles.  
Chapter one reviewed the regulations affecting junior issuers, the cost of securities regulation 
and competition with foreign jurisdictions for listing issuers. Reference was made to the 
restrictions introduced on junior mining financings in Ontario in the 1970s and how many juniors 
left the Toronto exchange to list on the Vancouver stock exchange. A number of securities law 
reports were reviewed in chapter one.  The 2006 Crawford Panel recommended principles-based 
regulation with plain language, and the 2009 Expert Panel argued that principles–based 
regulation would better achieve regulatory outcomes since it would give businesses greater 
flexibility to adapt compliance practices to the latest innovations in the capital markets.  
However, any shift to principles-based regulation must be balanced against the regulatory risks 
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of the Ontario venture market. Chapter one discussed these risks, including industry 
concentration, controlling shareholders, and how junior mining ventures are susceptible to 
market manipulation in three ways: (i) spreading false information in an offering document, 
circular or news release; (ii) withholding material information from investors, and (iii) creating a 
false impression of the value of a security by spreading false rumours and manipulating the 
market.   
Chapter two reviewed the rules approach and the principles approach, and discussed regulatory 
compliance theories—why do people comply with the law? Is it because they are self–interested 
and will comply if the amount and probability of the penalty is greater than the illegal gain 
(deterrence theory)? Are other motives in play? Many of the respondents to the survey said that 
venture issuer managers are usually honest and will comply with the principles if given the 
opportunity, as did the expert Thompson, who said that most are involved for the long-term and 
he usually assumes that they are upright and will do a fair deal. This corresponds with the 
reason-drive motive, the social identity motive, the justice motive and the citizenship motive.  
However, 73% of respondents said that the most important motive of promoters is share price 
over the next 12 months, rather than the long term value of the business or a reputation for 
ethical business practice (Table 20).  Thompson agreed that a lot of promoters are opportunists 
who look for the short term, promoting mining when mining is hot and high-tech when high-tech 
is hot.  It would seem, therefore, that promoters need to be regulated by the incentive motive, 
including specific and general deterrence. Deterrence is best enforced by rules-based regulations 
since infractions and punishments are clearly prescribed ex ante to deter future behaviour.   
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New governance theory was discussed in chapter two.  It is a more collaborative relationship 
between regulator and regulated. It gives the regulated greater autonomy to design processes to 
meet principled objectives, with mechanisms for transparency and accountability. It emphasizes 
problem solving and experimentation in the design of regulatory strategies.   Also discussed in 
chapter two were comparisons with other regulated activities, including income tax compliance, 
accounting standards, and the Australian Competition and Consumer Act.  The purpose of these 
comparisons was to glean factors to assess whether rules-based or principles-based regulation 
would be more effective for a particular field of regulation. 
Chapter three described eight factors to assess whether rules or principles would be more 
effective, chapters four and five applied these factors to venture issuers with a survey, and 
chapter six discussed these factors with open-ended consultations with six experts in the 
industry.  The answer to the research question is not a simple choice of all principles or all rules.   
Analysis 
(a) Where on the rules/principles continuum do Ontario securities regulations currently lie? 
 
Table 1 compares Ontario securities regulations with other regulations, including US Sarbanes 
Oxley.  Although the Ontario Securities Act is of average complexity, the rules of the OSC have 
a large number of words per sentence, exceeding that of Sarbanes Oxley and approaching the 
complexity of the notoriously complex Income Tax Act.  The Ontario Securities Act, and the 
Rules and Policies of the OSC, comprise a book of over 3,000 pages of small print, of which 156 
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pages are for the Securities Act passed by the legislature and 25 pages are for the General 
Regulation; thus, there are over 2,500 pages of OSC rules in small print.
458
  The Securities Act 
sets out its fundamental principles in section 2.1, with the primary means for achieving these 
purposes to include “requirements for timely, accurate and efficient disclosure of information, 
restrictions on fraudulent and unfair market practices and procedures, and requirements for the 
maintenance of high standards of fitness and business conduct to ensure honest and responsible 
conduct by market participants.”  These are high-level directives.  Section 127 of the Securities 
Act gives the OSC power to make various orders if in its opinion it is the public interest to do so, 
and, as stated by the Supreme Court of Canada, in exercising its discretion, the OSC should 
consider the protection of investors and the efficiency of, and public confidence in, capital 
markets generally.
459
  Again, these are high-level directives. 
It would seem, therefore, that Ontario regulations are a combination of principles-based 
legislation and detailed OSC rules.   
(b) Should OSC regulations be more principles-based? 
 
The industry expert Workman said that principles are needed in that they provide general 
guidelines for individuals and companies to understand the rules, but they should be used as a 
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preamble to establish the context that surrounds a rule, since principles on their own are often 
soft and fuzzy.  The industry expert Prill agreed: the problem with principles on their own is that 
the regulator may have in mind what they should mean, but the business community may operate 
on a different understanding for years, and then face major adjustments and possibly 
enforcement proceedings after-the-fact.  These comments are similar to those of David Brown, 
former Chair of the OSC, as quoted above (page 70): “To force investors to interpret a set of 
principles and to make a judgement as to whether their application by an issuer or registrant is 
adequate is neither efficient nor would it inspire confidence.”  Braithwaite also argues that vague 
principles are “a common affliction of regulatory standards, especially those that rely on such 
open–ended terms as ‘in the public interest’, ‘feasible’, or ‘reasonable’ (see above, page 70)    
Some aspects of securities regulation should be principles-based and other aspects should be 
rules-based.  Applying Diver’s analysis to securities regulation (above, page 78), licensing 
market participants, such as brokers and public accountants, should be principles-based, with 
discretion to consider the many factors comprising “good character” before granting a licence.  
Similarly, the expert Ellingham noted that when the TSX used principles to determine which 
companies could be listed on the exchange, it was more able to adapt to foreign listings, 
technology listings and unusual listings such as Amica Homes (see page 252).  Enforcement 
regulations, however, should be rules–based, precise and transparent, to enhance predictability, 
says Divers. This is echoed by the expert Prill, who said that precision is essential, since no 
solicitor wants their client to be a poster child for a 20:20 OSC interpretation.  Without clear 
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rules, market participants may become too cautious and experimentation and diversity may be 
overly constrained. 
 
(c) Better organization of principles and rules in OSC regulations 
 
As Braithwaite said, laws can be written by setting down binding principles, with detailed rules 
to illustrate how the principles should be applied to perhaps a dozen common concrete 
commercial arrangements (above, page 92).  As Wood notes, rules may increase or decrease task 
complexity, depending on the circumstances, but an implementation guideline that sequences the 
decisions necessary to implement a standard, or adding an index that better relates existing rules 
and precedents, can lower complexity (above, page 73). 
The Law Society of Upper Canada regulates 40,000 lawyers in Ontario.
460
  It would seem that 
the training, fiduciary obligations (including holding trust funds for clients), mortgage 
transactions, client confidentiality issues, and conflicts of interests that lawyers face are as 
complex as they are for market intermediaries regulated by the OSC.  Many of the securities 
disclosure documents for issuers are drafted by lawyers, who face the risk of a negligence claim 
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if their due diligence fails to disclose a material fact.  According to Table 1, the bylaws of the 
Law Society (or at least bylaws 1 to 3) and the Rules of Professional Conduct have fewer words 
per sentence than OSC Rules.  The Rules of Professional Conduct are written in the style 
advocated by Braithwaite—binding principles are set out, with explanatory plain language 
comments describing how they should be applied in typical situations.  With comments, they are 
a total of 95 pages (136 pages, including Bibliography, Table of Concordance and Index).  The 
bylaws of the Law Society, which regulate all other matters dealing with Ontario lawyers, 
including practice management, and the election of benchers, are a total of 321 pages of rather 
large print.  This is considerably less text than the regulations in the securities industry. 
 
(d) Better education to promote principles 
 
One of the factors in assessing rules or principles is—is there a shared understanding of 
regulatory principles?  The survey suggests a misunderstanding among many respondents of the 
purposes of securities regulation, though further review of the explanations given shows that 
some recognized which principles applied but disagreed about their application to the facts.   
The experts Thompson, Workman and White all noted that the junior resource industry in 
Ontario has evolved in the past thirty years from a location for financing exploration among 
North Americans and West Europeans to the pre-eminent location to raise funds for mineral 
exploration around the world.  Funds are raised in Canadian markets, and in the TSX and TSX-V 
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in particular, from investors from many different cultures, for projects in many different 
locations, including Central America, South America, Africa, the Middle East, etc. The more 
culturally diverse market players become, the less we can assume that there is a shared 
understanding of business ethics and regulatory principles. As discussed above under the topic 
Rules or Principles—Comparison with other Regulated Activities, from page 146, different 
cultures may have different notions of fair play in business and regulation, so the evolving nature 
of the venture market must be considered. 
Better education of the managers of venture issuers about securities principles may assist.  For 
example, commencing January 1, 2011, lawyers and paralegals in Ontario must complete in each 
calendar year at least 12 hours of continuing professional development in eligible educational 
activities. No less than 3 of the 12 hours must be on topics related to professional responsibility, 
ethics and practice management ("professionalism"). The required 3 hours related to 
professionalism must be accredited by the Law Society.
461
  Similarly, since January 1, 2004, the 
Chartered Accountants of Ontario requires that members in public accounting complete a 
minimum 20 hours per calendar year, with at least half this of verifiable learning, and a 
minimum 120 hours in each 3-year period.
462
  Ontario professional engineers must maintain a 
rolling total of at least 240 continuing professional development hours for any continuous three 
year period. Members must have a minimum number of 5 hours in at least three of the six 
                                                 
461
 (Law Society of Upper Canada 2011) 
462
 (Chartered Accountants of Ontario 2011) 
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categories in any three-year period; professional practices, formal training, other educational 
activity, participation, presentations and contributions to knowledge.
463
   
In contrast, the TSX-V and the Ontario Securities Commission have no continuing education 
requirements for directors of venture issuers.  TSX-V Policy 3-1 section 5.10 states that 
“Management, Directors and Officers must have: (a) adequate experience and technical expertise 
relevant to the issuer’s business and industry; and (b) adequate reporting issuer experience in 
Canada or a similar jurisdiction.” These twin considerations are further itemized in sections 5.11 
and 5.12 of Policy 3-1, but these are initial requirements in order to be approved by the TSX-V 
to become a director.  The TMX Learning Academy (for both TSX Venture issuers and the more 
senior TSX issuers) is an educational platform that provides educational materials and tools for 
TSX-V issuers, and the TSX-V does host a number of workshops with helpful information on the 
various aspects of being a public company.
464
  However, these are voluntary courses.  Given that 
there appears to be a deep level misunderstanding of the principles of securities regulation 
among many respondents, and that, in many cases the directors and officers disagree about the 
application of disclosure principles to their particular facts, consideration should be given to a 
mandatory continuing education program.  Courses could be offered by the TSX-V Learning 
Academy, universities, colleges, or private educational resources (including web-based 
seminars).  Continuing education could enhance the reputation of Ontario venture issuers 
                                                 
463
 (Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of BC 2011) 
464
 (TSX Venture Exchange 2011) 
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worldwide.  Such requirements may discourage part-time or semi-retired directors from 
remaining in their position, many of whom have years of experience to contribute, and so, 
consideration should be given to grandfathering provisions.  The experts Bandeen, Workman and 
Thompson were tentatively in favour of mandatory continuing education, subject to cost.  
However, the best approach may be a gradual introduction of education, with incentives rather 
than punishments, such as reduced regulatory fees for issuers which have managers who 
complete approved education programs. 
 
(e) Enforcement strategies based on compliance motives 
 
Some of the respondents to the survey argued that venture issuer managers are usually honest 
and will comply with regulatory principles if given the opportunity.
465
  This was echoed by 
Thompson, who has been in the industry for 50+ years, and who finds that most people in the 
industry are in it for the long-term, upright and will do a fair deal.  Some respondents said that 
principles are too vague and that managers will twist principles to suit their own purposes.
466
 All 
of the experts including Thompson agreed that, no matter what regulations you may have, there 
will always be some who will mislead or commit fraud.  Many respondents agreed that 
                                                 
465
 Table 27 lines 26, 41 and 62; Table 40 line 40. 
466
 Table 26 lines 22, 23; Table 40 lines 6, 47, 52 
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enforcement was important to level the playing field and insure consistency.
467
  As the expert 
Prill said, honest business people can believe that they are in compliance with the principles, and 
then face major adjustments and possibly enforcement proceedings after-the-fact. 
Chapter two discussed various theories of why the regulated do (or do not) comply—(i) the 
“incentive” motive, i.e. the cost-benefit calculation of rewards and punishment; (ii) the “reason-
driven” motive, where the regulated look to the law for convincing policy reasons for doing (or 
not doing) certain things; (iii) the need for “social identity” and to join the right community and 
to adopt its norms; (iv) the desire for justice and morality; and (v) the “citizenship-oriented” 
motive, i.e., those who choose to comply simply because it is the law.   
Addressing the “reason motive” would seem to be an effective strategy for respondents.  As 
Parker suggests, regulators must convince people that the law represents shared values. 
Regulators must avoid the “compliance trap”— i.e. where compliance becomes difficult to 
improve because the values underlying compliance are contested.
468
 A significant number of 
respondents failed to apply the law against insider trading and a significant number failed to 
apply the law of fiduciary duty when receiving confidential information. The desire for justice 
and morality should be considered as motivating factors for respondents, however, since many 
gave detailed explanations for their answers, evidencing interest in the ethical correctness of their 
                                                 
467
 Table 26, lines 1, 2, 9; Table 29, lines 4, 5; Table 27 line 1, 24, 27; Table 40 lines 2, 3 
468
 (C. Parker, The Compliance Trap - The Moral Message in Responsive Regulatory 
Enforcement 2006) at 34. 
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views.  If the population of venture managers in general care as much about ethics as many 
respondents did, enforcement proceedings should be based on justice and the OSC should 
publish plain language reasons and welcome industry comment for their enforcement and 
settlement proceedings. 
A “regulatory pyramid” should be developed, with an educational, dialogue approach, with 
informal rewards such as praise, rather than sanctions (“soft words before hard”) at the base of 
the pyramid. Ascending strategies (such as penalties) could be invoked for serious or repeat non–
compliance. As enforcement moves up the enforcement pyramid, the “incentive” motive, i.e. the 
cost-benefit calculation of rewards and punishment, could be the basis for compliance.  An 
ascending pyramid with punishment as an option seems necessary, since the survey found that 
most respondents believe that promoters are motivated by short-term interests rather than by the 
long term value of their business or their reputation for ethical business practice.   
 
(f) Accept analogous solutions and foster collaboration with regulators 
 
The third factor is to improve problem solving by accepting analogous solutions. The expert Prill 
referred to the 5% de minimus test for audit committees, and suggested that the same should 
apply to the “connected issuer” principle in 31-103.  If principles are to work, regulators should 
accept analogous interpretations unless they clearly do not apply.  For example, when 
interpreting a financial disclosure principle, issuers should be allowed to draw from analogous 
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tax accounting issues.  When faced with a conflict of interest question, issuers should be allowed 
to draw from the analogous situation of a trustee buying property from a trust—in trust law, a 
trustee can seek court approval on notice to interested persons for a transaction in the face of a 
conflict of interest.  In some cases, a director who wishes to enter into a transaction while in a 
conflict of interest should be able to obtain approval from OSC staff, on public notice to the 
shareholders and the market, without necessarily triggering all of the valuation and minority 
approval requirements in Multilateral Instrument 61-101.
469
  Staff of the OSC and TSX-V should 
accept analogous solutions unless they are clearly inapplicable.   
The survey found a diverse range of expertise on the boards of most respondents. A board with a 
range of experience will more likely find solutions to business issues, including compliance 
issues, than a board composed of like-minded individuals with identical backgrounds.  The 
experts Thompson and Workman both referred to the benefits of a board with experience in the 
new areas of corporate responsibility, including environmental compliance and local community 
participation.  Such diversity of relevant experience should be encouraged, given the importance 
of cooperation with Aboriginal communities under the new Mining Act and given the 
internationalization of the junior resource market in Ontario.  
The fourth factor to improve is regulatory collaboration. The experts Thompson, White and 
Workman all described a shift of relations with OSC staff, from one of direct communication and 
meetings, to one of indirect email communication through lawyers. All three saw this as a 
                                                 
469
 See the topic “Regulation of Ontario venture issuers” from p.13 above. 
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negative trend, increasing the cost of disclosure.  The expert Ellingham described how 
principles-based regulation and direct contact is more effective for the regulator when dealing 
with new situations and different parties.   
One suggestion to increase communication is to adopt a policy similar to the Practice 
Management Helpline available for Ontario lawyers.  This lawyer helpline provides confidential 
telephone assistance to interpret their obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct or the 
Paralegal Rules of Conduct.
470
  For the managers of venture issuers, a TSX-V disclosure helpline 
could be provided.  Managers who are in disagreement about disclosure issuers (which 
apparently is quite often—see the results of Table 22), could receive independent assistance from 
a group of experts.  Of course, the directors of the issuer cannot simply unload their 
responsibilities on an outside body and say “this is what the experts told us to disclose”, because 
the directors have primary responsibility for insuring compliance.  However, discussing 
disclosure with independent experts could enhance the quality of the debate among the directors 
of the corporation, leading to faster and better disclosure.  It should be a voluntary decision, as it 
is with the lawyer’s helpline. 
 
 
                                                 
470
 (Law Society of Upper Canada 2011) As a lawyer in private practice, I have personally 
accessed this resource when facing difficult ethical issues and I found the service excellent. 
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(g) Rules for historical transactions and principles for ongoing and future disclosure 
 
In simple systems, with known results, clearly stated rules allow participants to focus on matters 
other than compliance.  This parallels Divers discussion about prioritizing the transparency, 
accessibility and congruence of rules—regulations which require predictability and transparency 
should be rules-based.
471
 Ford argues that periodic and prospectus securities disclosure should be 
rules–based, with uniform document presentation, so that investors can efficiently compare 
similar circumstances.
472
  The majority of respondents to the survey who answered that choosing 
rules or principles depend on the kind of information that should be disclosed (Table 25) said 
that property evaluation opinions and related party transactions, which are essentially historical 
or scientific assessments, should be regulated by rules.  This parallels Mahoney’s comments 
regarding historical costs and how bright-line rules allow investors to better measure a 
promoter’s compensation and self-interest (above, page 142). 
Future predictions and ongoing disclosure should be regulated by principles. (This is what most 
respondents thought—see Table 28).  This is because the considerations which can affect 
forecasting are numerous and have to be weighed; in a sense, like predicting the weather.  
However, the Canadian Securities Regulators in Staff Notice 51-330 require that cautionary 
statements be included in any forward looking statement, including any forward statement in an 
                                                 
471
 Above, p.194 
472
 See above, note 3 
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Annual Information Form, Management Discussion and Analysis, news release or investor 
presentations archived on company websites.  Issuers must identify and incorporate by reference 
material risk factors, material factors or assumptions in any forecast, avoid “boilerplate” 
disclosure, and use tables and other methods of presentation that clearly link specific material 
risk factors and material factors and assumptions.  These requirements appropriately caution 
investors of the risks of forecasts. However, because of the numerous factors which can affect 
future events, forecasts should be principles-based. 
 
(h) Simplify private placement disclosure 
 
Over the last three years, 19% of the funds raised by respondents were private placements from 
close friends or family of management, 25% were private placements from existing business 
contacts of management, and 41% were private placements (usually accredited investors) 
introduced by an arm’s length broker, agent or finder.  Only 15% of the funds raised were from a 
prospectus, capital pool or take-over (Table 16).   
Respondents said that close friends and family and existing business contacts rely more on 
management’s reputation for honesty and past business success than they do on evidence about 
the issuer's assets and prospects (Table 17).  The expert Thompson, who has been in the business 
for 50+ years, said that he subscribes to a number of private placements each year, with virtually 
no paper disclosure, but based on the people involved.  The expert White observed that most 
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private investors look at the people involved, who’s running the company and chat about the 
opportunities.  The people involved are 90% of the decision making process and detailed 
disclosure documents are not worth the cost.  As the expert Bandeen said, hardly anyone reads 
the disclosure documents.  Most people who want to learn will Google the business, read about 
management, and search with a few provocative words to check out the negatives.  What they 
really want is timely financials, material risks, a summary of the product, and a summary of the 
managers and principals involved. 
Given the expensive costs of a prospectus for most venture issuers, consideration should be 
given to a principles-based, investor document for funds raised from accredited investors.  In 
British Columbia, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland/Labrador, the prospectus 
requirement does not apply to a distribution by an issuer of a security of its own issue to a 
purchaser if the purchaser purchases the security as principal, the issuer delivers an offering 
memorandum to the purchaser in compliance with the rules, and the investor signs a risk 
acknowledgement in compliance with the rules.  In Ontario, there is no corresponding 
exemption.  As Sarra notes, proportionate disclosure should be based on what is relevant to 
investors.
473
  See also the comments by Deaves
474
, who wrote a report for the Task Force—he 
suggests that investors can suffer from “information overload” and that greater attention should 
be given to the form, rather than the content, of disclosure. 
                                                 
473
 Supra, note 99 
474
 (Deaves 2006) 
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To make the private placement rules accessible, the OSC should refrain from amending them so 
frequently.  See Table 2 at page 74—it seems as though every six months the private placement 
rules are being tinkered with, making it difficult for managers to comply without consulting 
expensive securities lawyers.  It is hard to understand why the rule should be amended at all, 
since the regulatory concerns remain the same over time.   
 
(i) Questions raised by the experts but beyond the scope of research 
 
Some of the issues raised by experts were important but beyond the scope of research in this 
paper.  For example, the question as to whether Exempt Market Dealers should have a primary 
fiduciary obligation to the investor, rather than to the issuer which pays their fee, is important 
and will affect the market profoundly over the years.  Similarly, the question about who is 
sophisticated enough to be an “accredited” investor (someone who can invest without a 
prospectus), and the observation that the banks have become too dominant in the industry and 
that their conservative blue chip investment strategies have crowded out risk-financing for the 
juniors, are important but beyond the scope of this research. 
 
 
 
 290 
 
Conclusions 
 
Ontario securities regulations are a combination of principles-based legislation and detailed OSC 
rules.  The Securities Act, with its broadly worded public interest powers, lies on the principles 
end of the rules/principles continuum; in contrast, the OSC instruments most frequently accessed 
by venture issuers lie on the rules end of the continuum. Some aspects of securities regulation 
should be principles-based.  For example, licensing market participants, such as brokers and 
public accountants, and listing companies on an exchange such as the TSX-V or the CSNQ, 
should be principles-based, with discretion so the regulator can consider many factors before 
deciding to approve an applicant.  Other aspects should be rules-based.  For example, 
enforcement rules should be precise and transparent, to enhance predictability.   
For those areas which should be principles-based, instruments should be written in the style of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct for Ontario lawyers.  Binding principles should be stated, 
followed with examples to illustrate how those principles should be applied to perhaps a dozen 
common situations.  Plain language commentary should be included.  For those areas which 
should be rules-based, task complexity should be reduced by indexing rules according to subject, 
plain language should be used, and amendments should be infrequent. 
The OSC should encourage greater diversity of related experience on the boards of venture 
issuers, to increase the possibility of finding analogous solutions. Workman and Thompson 
described the benefits of boards with experience in the new areas of corporate responsibility, 
including environmental compliance and local community participation.   
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Better collaboration with the regulator would assist, with direct contact between staff of the OSC 
and the issuer, rather than email correspondence through lawyers.  To make this effective, 
managers of venture issuers should have continuing education requirements, so that they 
understand the principles and can cooperate directly with OSC staff.  The junior resource market 
in Ontario is becoming internationalized.  Different cultures will have different attitudes and may 
not understand the purposes of Ontario securities regulation, and so, greater education 
requirements could benefit both venture issuers and their investors.  
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Appendix A: Venture Issuer Survey 
Table 7 In what capacity do you currently work for a venture issuer? 
In what capacity do you currently work for a venture 
issuer?  (Check all that apply)       
    2011   2012   Total 
Response Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count 
Director 61% 66 57% 40 61% 106 
Officer 71% 77 67% 42 68% 119 
Employee 23% 25 18% 14 22% 39 
Professional consultant (e.g. lawyer, accountant, geologist, 
scientist) 18% 19 22% 13 18% 32 
  
 
108 
 
66 
 
174 
 
Table 8 How many years have you worked for a venture issuer? 
How many years have you worked for a venture issuer? 
(for any venture issuer and in any capacity; not 
necessarily your current one)             
    2011   2012   Total 
Response Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count 
Less than 1 year 2% 2 2% 1 2% 3 
1 or more but less than 5 years 25% 27 16% 14 23% 41 
5 or more but less than 10 years 33% 36 37% 24 34% 60 
10 or more but less than 20 years 24% 26 24% 16 24% 42 
20 years or more 16% 17 20% 12 17% 29 
  
 
108 
 
67 
 
175 
 
 
Table 9 How many venture issuers do you currently work for? 
How many venture issuers do you currently work for?             
    2011   2012   Total 
Response Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count 
1 56% 60 50% 31 53% 91 
2 15% 16 19% 14 17% 30 
3 11% 12 21% 14 15% 26 
4 or more 18% 19 10% 7 15% 26 
  
 
107 
 
66 
 
173 
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Table 10 How many days per week do you currently work for all venture issuer(s)? 
On average, how many days per week do you currently 
work for all venture issuer(s)?             
    2011   2012   Total 
Response Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count 
Less than 1 day 2% 2 2% 3 3% 5 
1 day 6% 6 0% 0 3% 6 
2 days 4% 4 4% 4 5% 8 
3-4 days 14% 15 20% 11 15% 26 
5 or more days 75% 81 74% 46 74% 127 
  
 
108 
 
64 
 
172 
 
Table 11 Do you expect to leave the venture issuer industry in the next three years? 
Do you expect to leave the venture issuer industry in the 
next three years?             
    2011   2012   Total 
Response Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count 
Yes 12% 13 17% 9 13% 22 
No 66% 71 64% 41 65% 112 
Not sure 21% 23 19% 15 22% 38 
  
 
107 
 
65 
 
172 
 
Table 12 What formal education have you completed? 
What formal education have you completed? (check all 
that apply)             
    2011   2012   Total 
Response Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count 
Community College 14% 14 22% 11 16% 25 
Undergraduate university degree 54% 55 46% 26 51% 81 
Professional degree (Engineering, Law, Medicine, etc.) 36% 37 44% 23 38% 60 
Masters degree 27% 28 41% 20 30% 48 
Doctoral degree 2% 2 2% 4 4% 6 
  
 
102 
 
56 
 
158 
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Table 13 What formal education has your Chief Executive Officer completed? 
What formal education has your Chief Executive Officer 
completed? (check all that apply, and answer for your 
largest venture issuer)             
    2011   2012   Total 
Response Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count 
I am the CEO and I answered the last question 40% 39 37% 24 40% 63 
Community College 2% 2 12% 5 4% 7 
Undergraduate university degree 26% 25 30% 16 26% 41 
Professional degree (Engineering, Law, Medicine, etc.) 24% 24 19% 9 21% 33 
Masters degree 19% 19 19% 9 18% 28 
Doctoral degree 2% 2 5% 7 6% 9 
  
 
98 
 
59 
 
157 
 
Table 14 Which of the following skills does your board of directors include? 
Which of the following skills does your board of directors 
include? (check all that apply, and answer for the board 
of your largest venture issuer)             
    2011   2012   Total 
Response Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count 
Engineer 53% 56 49% 30 52% 86 
Scientist—e.g., a geologist, computer scientist, biologist or 
medical scientist 62% 66 70% 40 64% 106 
Director with personal experience managing the kind of 
property the company owns 73% 77 70% 42 72% 119 
Finance expert—e.g, broker, financial adviser, financial 
analyst 63% 67 67% 40 65% 107 
Chartered or certified management accountant 62% 66 53% 31 59% 97 
Lawyer 57% 60 47% 25 52% 85 
  
 
106 
 
59 
 
165 
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Table 15 Market capitalization of the largest venture issuer you work for? 
What is the current market capitalization of the largest 
venture issuer you work for?  (“Market capitalization” 
equals the number of shares outstanding multiplied by 
the current market price of the shares.  Do not include 
outstanding warrants or options.)              
    2011   2012   Total 
Response Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count 
Less than $5 million 29% 28 14% 10 24% 38 
$5 million or more but less than $15 million  20% 20 35% 17 23% 37 
$15 million or more but less than $25 million 10% 10 7% 4 9% 14 
$25 million or more but less than $50 million 17% 17 23% 14 20% 31 
$50 million or more but less than $100 million 9% 9 9% 5 9% 14 
$100 million or more 14% 14 12% 9 15% 23 
Not sure 0% 0 0% 1 1% 1 
  
 
98 
 
60 
 
158 
 
 
Table 16 Percentage of equity funding raised from the following? 
Over the last three years, what percentage of your venture 
issuer's equity funding was raised from the following? (include 
debt that is convertible to equity, and answer for your largest 
venture issuer.)      
 
2011 Mean 2012 Mean Total Mean 
Close friends or family of management 2042 21% 745 15% 2787 19% 
Existing business contacts of management 2500 26% 1287 25% 3787 25% 
Private investors introduced by arm’s length broker, 
agent or finder 3668 37% 2468 48% 6136 41% 
Other (eg. prospectus, capital pool, take-over) 1590 16% 600 12% 2190 15% 
Total 9800* 100% 5100* 100% 14900 100% 
*represents the sum of percentages and the next column divided the sum by the number of respondents. 
  
 296 
 
Table 17 Close friends and family of management 
For venture issuers, please rank the order of 
importance you think that investors who are close 
friends and family of management place on the 
following. 
                
  
1st 
importance   
2nd 
importance   
3rd 
importance   Total   
2011         
Management's reputation for 
honesty 66 73% 19 21% 6 7% 91 100% 
Management's past success in 
business 20 21% 59 63% 15 16% 94 100% 
Evidence about the issuer's assets 
and prospects 7 8% 15 16% 71 76% 93 100% 
  
        2012 
        Management's reputation for 
honesty 36 67% 13 24% 5 9% 54 100% 
Management's past success in 
business 14 26% 30 57% 9 17% 53 100% 
Evidence about the issuer's assets 
and prospects 5 9% 11 21% 37 70% 53 100% 
  
        Total 
        Management's reputation for 
honesty 102 70% 32 22% 11 8% 145 100% 
Management's past success in 
business 34 23% 89 61% 24 16% 147 100% 
Evidence about the issuer's assets 
and prospects 12 8% 26 18% 108 74% 146 100% 
 
Table 18 Existing business contacts of management 
For venture issuers, please rank the order of 
importance you think that investors who are existing 
business contacts of management place on the 
following. 
                
                  
  
1st 
importance   
2nd 
importance   
3rd 
importance   Total   
2011         
Management's reputation for 
honesty 40 43% 33 35% 20 22% 93 100% 
Management's past success in 
business 40 43% 31 34% 21 23% 92 100% 
Evidence about the issuer's assets 
and prospects 13 14% 29 31% 51 55% 93 100% 
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2012 
        Management's reputation for 
honesty 24 47% 17 33% 10 20% 51 100% 
Management's past success in 
business 22 42% 16 30% 15 28% 53 100% 
Evidence about the issuer's assets 
and prospects 8 15% 20 38% 25 47% 53 100% 
  
        Total 
        Management's reputation for 
honesty 64 44% 50 35% 30 21% 144 100% 
Management's past success in 
business 62 43% 47 32% 36 25% 145 100% 
Evidence about the issuer's assets 
and prospects 21 14% 49 34% 76 52% 146 100% 
 
Table 19 Introduced by an arm's length broker 
For venture issuers, please rank the order of 
importance you think that investors who are 
introduced by an arm's length broker, agent or finder 
place on the following. 
                
                  
  
1st 
importance   
2nd 
importance   
3rd 
importance   Total   
2011         
Management's reputation for 
honesty 15 17% 32 36% 43 48% 90 100% 
Management's past success in 
business 33 36% 30 33% 29 32% 92 100% 
Evidence about the issuer's assets 
and prospects 45 48% 30 32% 18 19% 93 100% 
  
        2012         
Management's reputation for 
honesty 11 21% 21 40% 20 38% 52 100% 
Management's past success in 
business 19 36% 19 36% 15 28% 53 100% 
Evidence about the issuer's assets 
and prospects 25 46% 13 24% 16 30% 54 100% 
  
        Total 
        Management's reputation for 
honesty 26 18% 53 37% 63 44% 142 100% 
Management's past success in 
business 52 36% 49 34% 44 30% 145 100% 
Evidence about the issuer's assets 
and prospects 70 48% 43 29% 34 23% 147 100% 
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Table 20 Promoters 
For venture issuers, please rank the order of 
importance you think that promoters place on the 
following. 
              
                
  
1st 
importance   
2nd 
importance   
3rd 
importance   Total 
2011        
Share price over the next  12 months 62 68% 17 19% 12 13% 91 
Long term value of the business 26 28% 57 61% 10 11% 93 
Reputation for ethical business 
practice 5 5% 18 20% 69 75% 92 
  
       2012        
Share price over the next  12 months 43 81% 4 8% 6 11% 53 
Long term value of the business 9 17% 31 60% 12 23% 52 
Reputation for ethical business 
practice 3 5% 17 31% 35 64% 55 
  
       Total 
       Share price over the next  12 months 105 73% 21 15% 18 13% 144 
Long term value of the business 35 24% 88 61% 22 15% 145 
Reputation for ethical business 
practice 8 5% 35 24% 104 71% 147 
 
Table 21 Disclosure debates 
How frequently do the directors of your venture issuer 
debate among themselves about when or which 
information should be press-released?  (answer for your 
largest venture issuer) 
            
    2011   2012   Total 
Response Percentage Count Percentage Count Percentage Count 
Never 6% 6 5% 2 5% 8 
Rarely 20% 19 29% 15 23% 34 
Sometimes 29% 27 27% 15 29% 42 
Often 32% 30 27% 17 32% 47 
Always 12% 11 12% 6 12% 17 
  
 
93 
 
54 
 
147 
 
  
 299 
 
Table 22 How frequently do your directors consult on continuous disclosure issues? 
How frequently do your directors consult with the 
following on continuous disclosure or press-release 
questions? (answer for your largest venture issuer) 
  
                
                        
  Never        Rarely       Sometimes    Often        
Very 
Often   Total 
2011            
Geologist or other 
scientist 25 27% 8 9% 15 16% 15 16% 29 32% 92 
Lawyer 4 4% 5 5% 31 34% 31 34% 21 23% 92 
Auditor or 
accountant 7 8% 24 26% 38 42% 10 11% 12 13% 91 
Securities analyst 35 38% 32 35% 18 20% 5 5% 1 1% 91 
  
           2012            
Geologist or other 
scientist 11 20% 7 13% 6 11% 17 31% 14 25% 55 
Lawyer 2 4% 7 13% 12 22% 19 35% 15 27% 55 
Auditor or 
accountant 5 9% 15 28% 17 31% 11 20% 6 11% 54 
Securities analyst 25 48% 13 25% 9 17% 3 6% 2 4% 52 
  
           Total 
           Geologist or other 
scientist 36 24% 15 10% 21 14% 32 22% 43 29% 147 
Lawyer 6 4% 12 8% 43 29% 50 34% 36 24% 147 
Auditor or 
accountant 12 8% 39 27% 55 38% 21 14% 18 12% 145 
Securities analyst 60 42% 45 31% 27 19% 8 6% 3 2% 143 
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Table 23 How often has your issuer communicated with staff of the TSX-V and OSC? 
In the past 12 months, how often has your issuer 
communicated with staff of the TSX-V and staff 
of the Ontario Securities Commission?  (do not 
include just filing forms,and answer for your 
largest venture issuer)  
  
                
                        
  Never        
1 -4 
times   
5 - 10 
times   
11 - 20  
times   
more than 20 
times   Total 
2011            
Staff of TSX-V 4 4% 53 59% 21 23% 7 8% 5 6% 90 
Staff of OSC 52 62% 27 32% 3 4% 1 1% 1 1% 84 
  
           2012            
Staff of TSX-V 6 11% 31 55% 13 23% 5 9% 1 2% 56 
Staff of OSC 37 70% 13 25% 2 4% 1 2% 0 0% 53 
  
           Total 
           Staff of TSX-V 10 7% 84 58% 34 23% 12 8% 6 4% 146 
Staff of OSC 89 65% 40 29% 5 4% 2 1% 1 1% 137 
 
Table 24 How helpful has staff been? 
How helpful has staff of the TSX-V and OSC been in 
terms of explaining or assisting your issuer with 
compliance issues? 
              
                    
  
No 
opinion   
Not 
helpful   
Somewhat 
helpful   
Very 
helpful   Total 
2011          
Staff of TSX-V 9 10% 5 5% 36 39% 42 46% 92 
Staff of the OSC 50 62% 3 4% 14 17% 14 17% 81 
  
         2012          
Staff of TSX-V 12 21% 2 4% 23 41% 19 34% 56 
Staff of the OSC 38 73% 4 8% 6 12% 4 8% 52 
  
         Total 
         Staff of TSX-V 21 14% 7 5% 59 40% 61 41% 148 
Staff of the OSC 88 66% 7 5% 20 15% 18 14% 133 
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Table 25 How should regulations be drafted? 
To improve public disclosure for venture issuers, how do you think securities 
regulations should be drafted? 
      
Response 
  Percentage Count 
2011   
Detailed disclosure rules, describing exactly what should be disclosed and when.  27% 24 
Broad principles, with examples of good disclosure in particular cases as guidance 43% 38 
It depends on what kind of information is to be disclosed. 29% 26 
No opinion 
  1% 1 
  
  
 2012 
  
  Detailed disclosure rules, describing exactly what should be disclosed and when.  7% 4 
Broad principles, with examples of good disclosure in particular cases as guidance 67% 37 
It depends on what kind of information is to be disclosed. 24% 13 
No opinion 
  2% 1 
  
  
 
55 
Total 
  
  Detailed disclosure rules, describing exactly what should be disclosed and when.  19% 28 
Broad principles, with examples of good disclosure in particular cases as guidance 52% 75 
It depends on what kind of information is to be disclosed. 27% 39 
No opinion 
  1% 2 
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In the last question, you chose detailed disclosure rules.  Please explain why. (Minor grammatical 
mistakes corrected.) 
Table 26 Explanations - detailed rules 
# Explanations – detailed rules 
 2011 
1 The rules don't seem to be followed by all issuers on what has to be disclosed or how truthful that disclosure must be 
and it presents a competitive disadvantage to the group that provides accurate timely disclosure today. 
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2 1 - Staff of venture issuers come from many backgrounds. Rules help to standardize required and put all participants 
on a level playing field.  2 - Allows exchanges and commissions to give follow up which is to the point.  3 - Reduces the 
amount of boiler plate, which is reproduced over and over. 
3 They should know what they want disclosed and what they are looking for specifically. There are too many gray areas 
now. 
4 Standard forms as used by the SEC are a great idea.  Makes compliance simple because there is essentially a check list 
that drives the disclosure. Makes the regulators job easier too. 
5 The OSC considers that every event and every news release requires an MCR (Material Change Report). It is a $50 per 
tax grab. All news release are now available to all regulators on SEDAR. 
6 No- I noted that it depends on the issues. In some cases "principle" based regulation is preferable, but for certain 
regulations that is not going to get the result the regulators are trying to achieve. 
7 Leaves no doubt as to the rules of conduct. 
8 Small venture issuers do not have the luxury of resources (time and money) to have professional staff in the company 
or have advisors and consult with them as cost effectively and efficiently as an actual "rulebook" might provide. 
9 Too many promoters tend to play hard and fast with the rules. 
10 We need to know and we need examples. 
11 The less judgement involved the better. 
12 Smaller firms need specific guidance.  If there are broad and/or loose rules, there may be increased demand for the 
services of a securities lawyer to interpret the rules or provide guidance.  Smaller firms have a propensity to use legal 
services only when they need them, due to budget constraints. 
13 SO that there is no ambiguity. 
14 To provide black & white guidelines whenever possible. 
15 For the purpose of clarity, precise rules are preferred. 
16 To assure timely and complete disclosure. 
17 To make it easier for each issuer to comply. 
18 For clarity. 
19 Every company should have a detailed list for disclosure - just makes it easier to be consistent. 
20 The rules and policies are vague when it comes to disclosure rules and what qualifies as needing to be disclosed.  The 
TSX-V now offers 1/2 day seminars. One of the seminars is on Disclosure.  This is a great idea! 
21 Full disclosure, good and bad, is good for the industry overall. The 43-101 rules, for example, while clunky and 
inconvenient, have straightened out the industry, especially the stock broker side of the industry. 
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 2012 
22 The current broad coverage is in many cases too vague and is open to interpretation which the TSX interprets to their 
best interest and the Company interprets to its easiest interest and then can get in trouble with the TSX as to whether 
something should have been filed or not. (particularly in regard to assets sales and acquisitions). 
23 I believe that when rules are ambiguous it allows for interpretations that may not be entirely ethical. If the rules are 
specific there can be no excuse. 
 
In the last question, you chose broad principles.  Please explain why. (Minor grammatical mistakes 
corrected.) 
Table 27 Explanations - broad principles 
# Explanations – broad principles 
 2011 
1 One size often does not fit all.  In mining the prescriptive part of technical disclosure is NI 43-101 which also regulates 
quality and competence of preparers as well.  Other areas of disclosure can be deficient if hard and fast rules are set 
because much of the financial and MD&A disclosure at the SME level is landed on the accounting staff who like to 
follow precedents and templates and quote peers.  This would be easier with highly specific rules, but not as much 
thought would go into it (in an ideal world). 
2 Strict rules are too constricting and don't allow flexibility for companies of various sizes and controlling positions, to 
pursue growth plans. 
3 We have a head office staff of six.  None of us are lawyers, and legal costs run around $30000 per year.  Much of that 
cost is to ensure that very specific information is declared. 
4 There are many different types of venture issuers, from Capital Pool Companies to mining operating companies, etc. 
Having specific rules for all Venture issuers does not allow for the flexibility that some Venture issuers may require. 
5 The directors clearly understand their public responsibility and clearly understand the meaning of a material issue. 
6 Management of most firms understand responsibilities in this regard. However regulators do subtly move 
requirements, so that ongoing indication of expectations could be helpful, particularly for less experienced 
participants. 
7 Because each Company or for that matter each individual will have their own style of news release. 
8 We should have something along the lines of GAAP. 
9 Materiality is often subjective, to a large degree, and management can best determine which news is material. Also, 
oftentimes news which is not necessarily material would best serve the shareholders if released. 
10 The Board must have a detailed policy of disclosure that shall state what and when to be disclose. The policy shall be 
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published with the annual report and proxies and revised by the OSC or other provincial jurisdiction 
11 Governance, in Canada, is mostly principles-based systems allowing the application of the business judgement rule 
and while exercising the duties owed to the corporation. For smaller issuers, who need access to capital this is a must. 
The more American style "rules-based" system creates much higher costs and harms a smaller issuers ability to be 
and remain a public company. In fact, the SEC, this summer will likely alleviate the SOX requirements for NYSE issuers 
who are smaller cap- moving towards a Canadian principles-based system. 
12 Very important to review each public disclosure on a case-by-case basis. 
13 Better than having too many rules to cover the many scenarios that can arise. 
14 It is impossible to detail all possible examples so the only way to effectively indicate what should be disclosed is 
through examples covering the broad principles. 
15 Legislator and bus. Community 
16 I don't like detailed, ruled based systems. The get ever longer and more complex as they try and deal with every 
eventuality, which increases compliance costs and you never can deal with every eventuality. You have to trust 
people to work sensibly. Yes you will get people who cheat and find ways around the rules, but they will do that 
anyway. More complex rules do not stop that sort of behaviour. So draft the rules for use by reasonable people. 
17 Markets work more efficiently when participants understand the rules and can focus on running their businesses. 
Detailed rules often force participants to look for ways around the rules when they are too proscribed. 
18 As a mineral exploration company we are dealing with nature and complex geological issues and defining what is 
material is complex. We cannot have rules for every eventuality this just creates non productive bureaucracy, we 
NEED COMMON SENSE. After all we should be intelligent to understand/interpret what is needed from broad 
principles. In today’s litigious society there is no escape as no one is responsible for anything anymore as exemplified 
by politicians, judges, police, bureaucrats. 
19 Only broad principles can cover all the different types of industries listed in Venture and I feel there are already too 
much disclosure requirements. As most venture issuers are starting new business, the time and money spent on 
meeting the continuous disclosure requirements would be better spent on developing the business, after all investors 
for Venture stock is looking for potential of the company, not the present value of the company. 
20 The nature of our business does not always lend itself to specificity.  Also, once one gets into a rules-based scenario 
more time is spent trying to stay between the posts (or bending the posts) than observing the intent, and that can be 
counterproductive to the disclosure process; indeed, it is quite prone to misinformation. 
21 There is a lot of "exceptions" when growing a small business and lack of sophistication.  Broad rules permit more 
leeway to tailor disclosure to the investor audience. 
22 Disclosure should be made for all items that are material to a company, but materiality differs greatly from company 
to company, industry to industry.  Too much detail can cause disclosure to become strictly rules-based at the expense 
of the intent to provide material information to the shareholder. 
23 So there are no "grey areas". 
24 Helps to see what like companies are doing. 
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25 Reducing the number of pages required to disclose regulatory requirements is useful. A guideline takes up much less 
room, and requires less sorting through each time there is a question or conflict about the regulations.  Subsections 
and too many references make it very difficult to comply, and to know we are in compliance for sure. 
26 I am assuming that the regulatory functions will operate reasonably effectively as gatekeepers in allowing junior 
company management access to the public's funding. That being the case, I also assume that management will 
generally be honest, and sufficiently competent and experienced in carrying out their functions as to be able to rely 
on their knowledge, experience and, yes, even wisdom in conducting the affairs of the issuer. Statements of broad 
principle, combined with some examples, should provide adequate guidance. 
27 There are too many "exceptions" because there is a broad range of business types (foreign, domestic, small, large, 
early exploration, production). 
28 To provide guidelines based upon past experiences. 
29 Specific situations are hard to define and anticipate.  General principles provide better guidance. 
30 Too detailed an explanation would leave more questions than it would answer. 
31 Different industries require different disclosures.  Also shell companies and CPC's [Capital Pool Companies] have not 
much to disclose - so exacting rules would be overkill. 
32 ""Intention" not "rule following" is key to the "Canadian advantage" - without that Canada is just a different version 
of America and it loses that advantage for venture based companies. 
33 In most cases it is a judgment call, so it is much better to have general rules because it is simply impossible to cover 
all cases. 
34 The industry has a core of well respected individuals with years of success that are held in high regard. The principals 
that established their track record should be used as the "cookie cutter" for other companies.     As it is, I feel we get 
bogged down in very costly regulatory rules that are established and implemented by people with very little practical 
experience in the industry. It never fails to surprise me that in order to do one simple act for the benefit of all 
shareholders it may cost many thousands of dollars to do it. The costs of doing something that would be a benefit for 
all, based on principle, becomes impossible because of the regulatory cost involved. Sometimes it makes me wonder 
who they are trying to protect. 
35 Specific situations that cannot be covered exist.  It is better to have a "principle" based policy that can accommodate 
the many situations that arise. 
36 It is too difficult for the regulatory bodies to try and define and put parameters around every situation.  Instead, 
broad guidelines are required for material disclosures then each issuer needs to assess what is material and execute 
timely disclosure. 
 2012 
37 you will never select each and every possible case that can happen if you go to detailed. 
38 We should be principled based regulation.  Securities industry is complicated and may need explanation.  Rules-based 
is dogmatic and does not always allow for the detail needed for full disclosure 
39 We should avoid being over regulated, that creates an environment where regulators turn into traffic cops trying to 
penalize issuers.  Using broad principles creates flexibility (which some issuers abuse).  There are often grey areas 
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around disclosure and companies should have the latitude to manage this.  The exchange and IIROC are good 
resources for companies to use in dealing with these grey areas. 
40 Very difficult to have definitive rules to cover all public companies - would need different sets of rules for each 
industry, which is not practical. 
41 TSX-V listings are junior companies that have limited access to people who are willing to be on the Board of a junior 
mining company.  This can hamper skill level on a Board and the BoD have to rely on expertise from their network to 
fill in the gaps.  Having a strict set of rules means that when a square peg doesn't fit in the round hole, the regulators 
would need to get involved in solving disclosure issues.  That is not the best thing for Venture issuers and there would 
be big delays getting replies to issues.  Principle- based regulations gives the fair mindedness that most all issuers 
have good ethics and morals and that they will do their best for shareholders given limited resources.  I believe this is 
the case and most people in junior mining are trying their best and have good ethics.    Regulator driven rules means 
that we will move toward the US style of securities where companies look to their lawyers to find loopholes in the 
rules rather than reporting based on principles.  This means the regulators distrust people who manage junior 
companies and that distrust becomes two sided and also delays decision making processes when junior companies 
need to be nimble.  Education of Boards and their duties and responsibilities is a better means to better disclosure 
and transparency.  Education is the means to get directors to make better decisions in a principle based reporting 
system 
42 There should be an assumption that management knows its business and what aspects are material for purposes of 
disclosure to the market. Not a hard and fast list of items mandated for disclosure which often will have no relevance 
to the market based on the size and activity level of the issuer. 
43 There is no way that anybody could write enough rules to cover disclosure.  The more rules there are, there are more 
ways to get around them. Disclosure has already gone overboard and a great deal of time is wasted trying to decide 
what will and will not require disclosure. A litmus test will do.   
44 There are far too many complexities in different forms of transactions to be addressed by rules 
45 The wide variety of issuers with different business focuses requires broad limits with respect to principles. 
46 The rules and regulations have become so complicated that regular investors have no idea what is going on.  Out of 
100 investors if one reads a prospectus i would be shocked. You have high costs for Venture issues and the regular 
investor does not understand the information that is being issued by Issuer. 
47 So many variables to try and write a one fits all guideline it is impractical and in my opinion probably will not be 
particularly helpful. Admittedly there are some areas that a specific definition such as what market value should be 
used to determine the exercise or strike price of an awarding a stock option - day awarded or closing day before, if 
day awarded is it the high, low or close that should be used??? 
48 Rules obtain exact compliance, Principles and objectives of fair full disclosure encourage disclosing material 
information within the context of a situation. Recent accounting and now IFRS is an example of massive disclosure to 
the point that no one reads any of it.  Placer operations can no longer meet disclosure rules so virtually all of the 
successful ones if not in a large company stay private because the rules of 43-101 cannot be met.  Integrity and 
judgement result in better disclosure than rule compliance.  If there is misleading or dishonest behavior prosecute 
that to the point of severe pain for the guilty. SOX reporting is the perfect example of over regulation that was 
unnecessary, the guilty were prosecuted successfully under existing laws but saddled managements and investors 
with huge costs for useless activities 
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49 Rules-based approach cannot foresee every circumstance, so at some point you need to rely on principals.   Rules are 
too rigid when a principal can take into account all of the facts of the situation. 
50 Provides more flexibility to deal with individual circumstances. 
51 Not every company is the same and if you use broad principles they can count for all types of companies instead of 
just some. 
52 No set of rules can be comprehensive enough to include all possibilities in the junior mining business. Inevitably the 
set of rules keeps expanding in a futile attempt to cover more and more of those possibilities. The system becomes 
driven by policy and procedures rather than by business merit. This results in greater and greater expenditures on 
lawyers and accountants to generate ever increasing amounts of paper with useless detail and the original purpose of 
the business becomes less and less relevant. I believe that a principles-based approach is much more efficient and 
much more effective. 
53 Many times the detailed principles have no relevance 
54 Less regulation is better.  More detailed rules makes increases costs. 
55 Left to their own devices, they will soon create/have created, a regimen of rules that require a full time staff to 
interpret/comply with. This is a TSX "Venture" company...not Bell Canada. 
56 I believe the conduct of business should be left to those with the experience remembering they have already 
qualified with the TSX-V as fit directors or qualified persons. Fixed rules can never be comprehensive enough to 
master human ingenuity. 
57 For small venture issuers, generally there are not many significant material changes to the business.  Using a 
principles-based approach would allow less meaningless disclosure. 
58 Every circumstance cannot be anticipated by regulators. 
59 Each issuer has its own unique circumstances to navigate - detailed disclosure requirements may actually work 
against investor interests.  Take two issuers that sign a large, material contract.  In one case, it may make sense to 
disclose all of the pertinent details, perhaps even the contract itself.  In the other case, such disclosure may seriously 
compromise the issuer's competitive position, which hurts shareholder value.  Detailed rules cannot be relied upon to 
always work to the shareholders' advantage - management must have some discretion to protect the company's 
value in specific circumstances. 
60 Detailed rules inherently result in something being missed, and the various security commission then try to apply a 
principles-based approach based on the rules they wrote. It seems much more practical to just start with a principles-
based approach. 
61 Detailed disclosure rules can never cover all the bases or special circumstances. 
62 Can never deal with all the details to provide strict rules for each situation and (I can see it now - strict rules can be 
found at www.big-site-where-you-never-find-anything-and-designed-by-gov.com) do we really need another one of 
these? besides I don't have any confidence that the regulator could provide these accurately or efficiently neither 
through motive nor intellect.  Keep it broad, most people are honest and you'll always have to weed out the few 
undesirables no matter what you implement.  Most important..... Educate the investor how to ask the right 
questions.  Most investors I know have been around the block to know to ask the hard questions and that's either 
because they are savvy and/or they have learned the hard way.    
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63 Broad - Understandable and covering key concepts. Too much detail defeats understanding of spirit of directive. 
Example - helps issuer craft a good document 
64 Because there are far too many variables/scenarios to be specific. Compliance would be a regulatory and 
counterproductive nightmare. 
65 because reference is to be made to case histories. 
66 Because most of the disclosure in our business will relate to drill hole results and in some cases they are material and 
in others they are not.  Having broad disclosure principles will allow the Board to release results that actually are 
material to the share price and the shareholders while not releasing results that can be misleading or misconstrued. 
67 Because it would be impractical, or, nearly impossible to provide rule-based guidelines that would cover every 
possible situation. 
68 The current broad coverage is in many cases too vague and is open to interpretation which the TSX interprets to their 
best interest and the Company interprets to its easiest interest and then can get in trouble with the TSX as to whether 
something should have been filed or not. (particularily in regard to assets sales and acquisitions). 
69 I believe that when rules are ambiguous it allows for interpretations that may not be entirely ethical. If the rules are 
specific there can be no excuse. 
70 It depends on what kind of information is to be disclosed. 
 
 
This question was only answered by those who answered “It depends on what kind of 
information is to be disclosed” in Table 25 
Table 28 Detailed rules or broad principles? 
Which of the following do you think should be regulated with 
detailed rules and which should be regulated with broad 
principles ?  
              
                    
  Detailed rules 
Broad 
principles   
Mixture of 
both   
No 
opinion   Total 
2011          
Mineral and oil and gas reserves 10 42% 2 8% 9 38% 3 13% 24 
Related party transactions 11 46% 4 17% 9 38% 0 0% 24 
Other conflicts of interest 12 50% 5 21% 6 25% 1 4% 24 
Executive compensation 8 33% 10 42% 6 25% 0 0% 24 
Business forecasting 1 4% 11 46% 11 46% 1 4% 24 
Ongoing disclosure about 
material facts 4 17% 10 42% 9 38% 1 4% 24 
  
         2012          
Mineral and oil and gas reserves 8 62% 2 15% 2 15% 1 8% 13 
Related party transactions 10 77% 2 15% 1 8% 0 0% 13 
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Other conflicts of interest 7 54% 5 38% 1 8% 0 0% 13 
Executive compensation 7 54% 6 46% 0 0% 0 0% 13 
Business forecasting 1 8% 11 85% 1 8% 0 0% 13 
Ongoing disclosure about 
material facts 5 38% 8 62% 0 0% 0 0% 13 
  
         Total 
         Mineral and oil and gas reserves 18 49% 4 11% 11 30% 4 11% 37 
Related party transactions 21 57% 6 16% 10 27% 0 0% 37 
Other conflicts of interest 19 51% 10 27% 7 19% 1 3% 37 
Executive compensation 15 41% 16 43% 6 16% 0 0% 37 
Business forecasting 2 5% 22 59% 12 32% 1 3% 37 
Ongoing disclosure about 
material facts 9 24% 18 49% 9 24% 1 3% 37 
 
Please give reasons for your answer. (Minor grammatical mistakes corrected.) 
Table 29 Explanations to rules or principles 
 Explanations 
 2011 
1 I believe in full, open dialogue.  However, there are instances whereby it is in the interests of the company and / or the 
shareholder to use broad principles over detailed rules, to allow the company room to facilitate business.  All of this, of 
course, should be at the discretion of the governing bodies and as such, should they should have final right to 
approve/disapprove dissemination of information.    It’s a tough nut to crack, how much information is too much and 
how much is not enough.   IIROC does a tremendous job as it is today, overseeing the market - any more work and they 
may become ineffective. 
2 I feel the market is over regulated in some respects with many rules and regulations that are not enforced in practical 
terms but at the same time blatant pump and dump schemes abound. The dealing with a security commissions and 
TSX is very similar to security at the airport. Many rules and regulations administered by under-achievers who catch 
nobody but burden the process of doing business with useless costs. Accounting costs are staggering for the small 
issuer. 
3 People who are conflicted or who stand to gain personally from a transaction should have to explain their actions. 
Rules provide loopholes while principles capture intent.    Forecasting and compensation are decision-based - 
principles apply as well as metrics.  A mixture of regulation is needed to ensure both are reported.    Material facts are 
facts, they can be codified.  Do so. 
4 Even playing field for all. 
5 This seems self-evident to me. Mineral and Oil and gas reserves are matters of measurement. The standards by which 
these measurements are to be performed should be well defined to ensure consistency between projects. Leaving 
these open to interpretation encourages exaggeration.  Related party transactions are the means by which public 
money is used for personal interests. It's something that has to happen, but oversight must be strict to ensure that the 
shareholders' interests are being taken care of, and not just the interests of the related party.  Companies who unfairly 
compensate executives for poor performance should be punished by the shareholders, rather than regulators. 
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Conversely, letter-of-law limits on executive compensation limits the potential for executives to be properly 
compensated.  Forecasts are someone's best guess. I'd rather not engage in it if I can help it. It seems irresponsible.  
Materiality is always going to be subject to interpretation, especially in mining. Certain things, however, are material or 
are not. 
6 It is not possible to predict all fact situations. Common law is better than civil. 
7 Broad principles are useful for smaller companies that struggle with excessive red tape that is generated for large 
companies who can afford it.  Unfortunately, the people who take advantage of loopholes in broad principles will use 
them to the detriment of unwary and unsophisticated investors. Reputation does matter although it is unrecognized in 
various rules.  As for TSX-V, they seem more interested in creating a large bureaucracy that is completely out of whack 
with junior mineral exploration.  Some detailed rules are obviously needed but how many is a very specific question to 
answer. 
8 The way stock prices move in the junior market there is need to have detailed disclosure of the people involved I have 
seen stock go up significantly before news. Our group is appalled by markets moving up or down before news- we are 
very tight lipped and disclose fully on our releases, i.e. drill results, when others are very vague 
9 Disclosure laws need a proper balance; they should not be overly cumbersome on the corporation but also should 
obviously disclose relevant material information to protect investors. 
 2012 
10 Too much detail already that no one understands but experts 
11 They are my opinion 
12 The first two are capable of having detailed rules made and enforced when necessary...for the latter it is hard to make 
detailed rules covering all possible situations...that is where general 'best practice' principles are best applied, but of 
course the interpretation and application of those principles is quite subjective, and subjective rules are much more 
difficult to enforce. 
13 Generally, the more guidance the better, except where it becomes too difficult to cover every eventuality.    
14 1) Reserves fall under 43-101 (which needs clarification here, and an overhaul is required- I think it has become too 
limiting and a cash cow for consultants) 2) RPT- require detailed rules; without which, there are too many sharp 
business people who find ways around that... 3) same as above 4)same as above 5/6)Forward looking statements are 
easily understood by public market- principles can apply 
 
 
  
 311 
 
Table 30 Factors to make principles work 
How important do you think the following factors are, in 
order to make principles-based regulation 
understandable and effective for venture issuers?  
  
                  
                        
  
Very 
Important 
  
Important  
  
Neutral    
  
Somewhat 
Important 
  
Not at all 
Important 
  Total 
2011            
Issuers and staff of the OSC 
and TSX-V should have a 
shared understanding about 
what makes the market fair 
and efficient 49 57% 31 36% 4 5% 2 2% 0 0% 86 
Issuers and staff of the OSC 
and TSX-V should agree about 
which principles are the most 
important 34 40% 43 50% 7 8% 0 0% 2 2% 86 
Issuers and staff of the OSC 
and TSX-V should collaborate 
and have regular 
communication 31 36% 32 37% 15 17% 5 6% 3 3% 86 
Enforcement should be 
balanced and fair 51 60% 29 34% 5 6% 0 0% 0 0% 85 
                        
2012            
Issuers and staff of the OSC 
and TSX-V should have a 
shared understanding about 
what makes the market fair 
and efficient 28 54% 18 35% 5 10% 1 2% 0 0% 52 
Issuers and staff of the OSC 
and TSX-V should agree about 
which principles are the most 
important 26 50% 22 42% 4 8% 0 0% 0 0% 52 
Issuers and staff of the OSC 
and TSX-V should collaborate 
and have regular 
communication 23 44% 19 37% 8 15% 2 4% 0 0% 52 
Enforcement should be 
balanced and fair 38 75% 11 22% 1 2% 1 2% 0 0% 51 
                        
Total                       
Issuers and staff of the OSC 
and TSX-V should have a 
shared understanding about 
what makes the market fair 
and efficient 77 56% 49 36% 9 7% 3 2% 0 0% 138 
Issuers and staff of the OSC 
and TSX-V should agree about 60 43% 65 47% 11 8% 0 0% 2 1% 138 
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which principles are the most 
important 
Issuers and staff of the OSC 
and TSX-V should collaborate 
and have regular 
communication 54 39% 51 37% 23 17% 7 5% 3 2% 138 
Enforcement should be 
balanced and fair 89 65% 40 29% 6 4% 1 1% 0 0% 136 
 
 
What other factors do you think are important, to make principles-based regulation work for venture 
issuers? (Minor grammatical errors corrected.) 
Table 31 Other factors for principles-based regulation 
 Other factors for principles-based regulation 
2011 
1 OSC has to harmonize for TSX-V issuers with at least ASC and BCSC too.    Issuers have to know that regulators in fact 
have the resources to monitor and provide guidance that is useful have top level enforcement responsibility and not 
just leave it to the courts and class action lawyers to enforce their principles.    You will never get agreement amongst 
all issuers so in some ways a rigid rules system would make better goal posts if this does not work. 
2 1 - Principles are open to interpretation and so require someone to decide if they have been interpreted as they were 
intended to be interpreted.  2 - Principles require an appeal process, if issuers don't agree with the exchanges 
interpretation.  3 - The move to IFRS is a move away from principles and professional judgement, which I think is right 
because it reduces the subjectivity that comes from national or cultural bias. 
3 I live in Quebec, which seems not to be your focus. The AMF here in Quebec is much more intrusive in Venture 
matters than other securities commissions. For example, the AMF is the only securities commission that has NOT 
delegated complete responsibility to the TSX-V for implementation of the TSX-V Policy 2.4 (Capital Pool Companies). 
4 Markets should be regulated by OSC and not TSX. TSX is a public company operating for profit and should also be 
regulated by the OSC. 
5 The regulators should do enough background work on the issuer and the issuers people so that they are in a position 
to accept the disclosure or answers the issuer puts forward.(ie. you should not be treated as bad or guilty until 
proven to be so). The existing regulatory environment for the TSX-V is adversarial. The issuer is treated like a liar and 
a thief by the TSX-V staff in particular. They also do not read the continuous disclosure information provided by the 
issuer in their own files. Every new submission to them is like starting from square one. Issuers are automatically 
deemed to be guilty of something. Further "Tier One" TSX-V issuers are supposed to be regulated under the TSX rules. 
It doesn't happen. The regulatory environment is equivalent to a nasty parent. Totally patriarchal. 
6 The less regulation the better. 
7 Not sure I can think of any. 
8 Who said they work? 
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9 Venture issues are risky, and venture investors understand this.  The regulator needs to assist the process, not stand 
in the way.  The regulator shouldn't pass judgment, but instead ensure that the process is transparent.  Investors and 
companies are not morons and don't need nannying - they need clear communication. 
10 Fair and open communication; OSC and TSX-V staff that have relevant public company experience. 
11 Allow pre-marketing of an IPO, to avoid the costs of $1 million and a failed IPO. IPO's are private companies and so 
there is no risk of information leakage. The current system is a barrier for firms to go public and the CPC process is a 
good start but that is showing cracks in the type and size of companies going public. The larger SPACS, for Canada, 
have never happened, not one, to date. So CPC and Spac's are not a good answer.  Pre-marketing under green sheets, 
with dealers should be allowed for IPO, and then the IPO documents can be drafted if there is an order book. The 
street never buys from an IPO document anyway. Strict compliance with existing rules can be maintained and the 
issuers can have confidence in trying an IPO, if the initial costs can be deferred until there is an order book... 
12 Some of these regulations need to be economically sound .... OSC is disconnected from real economic impact of some 
of their regulations or requirements. 
13 Professional judgement on the part of the OSC in applying the spirit of the rules as opposed to the letter of the rules, 
and, actually following their own rules as set out in NI. 
14 Principles? This is the stock market!  The quality of the directors is paramount. 
15 Because it can be so complex, case stories (i.e. examples) of enforcement should be publicized or communicated to 
issuers (on an anonymous basis of course) 
16 Regulators lack real world experience. TSX-V must hire more outsiders to compensate for this weakness. 
17 Penalties for failing the follow the broad rules should be severe and publicized. 
18 A practical experience working in TSX-Venture companies should be a pre-requisite for any regulator not a 26 year old 
lawyer wet behind the ears. 
19 For the most part, I am not impressed with the staff of the TSX-V.  They show minimal understanding or empathy for 
the pressures and exigencies experienced by the business side of things.  Their regard for the time constraints of the 
issuers are deplorable.  Their reviews of Technical Reports are, for the most part, petty (e.g. move the sentence on p. 
3 to p. 17, etc., etc.) and seldom go the substance, and that just requires a lot more time to address their idiotic BS.  
Typical bureaucrats! 
20 Some common sense and tailoring regulations/fees etc. to the current economy and conditions. The fundamental 
problem is applying regs/structures suited to international co's to small issuers, who struggle just to do their work, 
with ever-expanding requirements/fees/rules that have virtually no benefit to shareholders of ethical companies.    
Many regulatory bodies have a strong desire to 'empire build', because they have no reason to streamline or reduce 
fees, as it's contrary to their existence.    The regulators' staff should have mandatory job placements in TSX-V issuers 
to get a better understanding of how their regs etc. impact people working in the industry, and how useful they are. 
21 The factor that is most important is the how similar TSX-V policies are to OSC rules. 
22 Regulations need to be determined and agreed upon by the various Securities Commissions, and NOT by the 
exchanges, as the latter are for profit businesses.  What benefits the shareholders of the exchange is often at odds 
with what benefits the shareholders of the companies that list upon them. 
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23 Regulatory staff should be sufficiently experienced and balanced in their views to allow them to assess the apparent 
integrity and demonstrated track records of management. If these factors support the initiatives proposed by 
management, the attitude of regulators should be "Is there any reason not to say 'Yes'?" rather than "What hoops 
should we make these guys jump through?". 
24 Consistent application of the rules.  Some companies bend over backwards to comply and the "bad guys" go on 
reporting information (I am thinking mostly technical) in misleading formats 
25 Prompt feedback from regulators on submissions and a willingness to be flexible. 
26 Thorough investigation of possible infractions and strict, punitive, well publicized enforcement and punishment. 
27 Fair and transparent and equitable exercise of the rules 
28 Very difficult to align regulators and issuers. Generally viewpoints are very divergent simply based on what side of the 
industry you choose to work on. Regulators tend to want strict rules under which to prosecute the perpetrators of the 
illegal. Issuers operating in the arena of the TSX-V tend to be entrepreneurs trying to build a successful company with 
as little staff as necessary - often precluding expertise in the regulatory sector. 
29 I think there is a lot of grey area with principle-based regulation since a regulator could interpret situations differently 
and the absence of clear cut rules could be a major problem. 
30 A well-educated regulatory staff. 
31 I deal with the BC Securities Commission and they are interested only in regulations which bring income to the 
Province - regulation is done for the regulation's sake - not fairness - their propensity to issue fines seems to be their 
incentive. Money rules with the BC Securities Commission 
32 Clear guidelines in laymen terms  Workshops, seminars and webinars to define and education issuers  Regular 
updates and newsletters  Chat or online access to OSC or TSX-V staff to query on issues 
2012 
33 Who would not agree with the apple pie above??  Start by asking for each regulation...Does this REALLY help level the 
playing field for investors and maintain market integrity ?? I think there is a lot of stuff that we have to do that does 
not really help the investor.  Put more effort in managing what brokers are allowed to do ...those rules would help 
the market. 
34 Unfortunately the regulators seem divorced from what is important to investors,  Too much "law" and too little 
common sense.   
35 They have a nasty habit of changing their own rules if they don't like the answers they're getting, or, something out of 
the SEC is suddenly "Flavour of the month". Principles-based reduces that ability. 
36 The TSX rules are arbitrary inforced. They tend to investigate the small player while ignoring the larger co0mpanies. 
They are just counting scalps not uniform investigating fraud at all levels. 
37 The staff at OSC and TSVX must make decisions job number one when asked about disclosure. 
38 The securities commissions should try to be more collaborative with issuers 
39 Staff at the OSC and TSX-V need to have some flexibility to consider unique circumstances - policy doesn't always 
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protect shareholders.  It is my opinion that policy presently rules over common sense - even when staff at securities 
regulators or the TSX-V may agree with the issuer's position they are powerless deviate from policy directives. 
40 OSC and TSX-V officials need a basic understanding of capitalism - filling a market need. They need to come from the 
prospective that risk capital is investing based upon a gamble that the directors and executives can fill the projected 
market need profitably. 
41 OSC and TSX-V consultation with BCSC, ASC, etc. 
42 No comment 
43 Maybe you should generalize to say principal regulator rather than OSC 
44 It is important that issuers and regulators agree on the goals of regulation.  (ie - the goal is not the regulation of the 
rules, the goal is fair and open disclosure).  The system often causes inappropriate disclose for the sake of following a 
rule - a company may be caused to file a material change report because of a change in trading volume or price that 
itself will cause further swings, in the absence of no real material change in the business...silliness ensues for the sake 
of following a "rule".   
45 integrity to follow - by the issuer 
46 If principles are to be the prime objective of market oversight, then it will cost more to issuers for OSC TSX-V to keep 
a lid on it. Principles will, on the other hand, allow more freedom for creative business practices (which may be a 
good thing to stimulate productivity), but could allow more abuse....?? 
47 I think you have mandatory courses for Directors' Officers in regards to principal based regulation - and frequent 
seminars - think tank meeting between issuers and TSX - Securities Commission 
48 accessibility of regulators.  regular communication - electronic and I would suggest seminars/workshops on issues 
either regulators (as a group) or company managements (as a group as determined by requests to regulators) might 
think are topical. 
49 ENFORCEMENT SEEMS TO BE MAINLY FOR THE LITTLE GUY WHO MISSSED A FILING BY A DAY WHEREAS BIG RIP OFFS 
RARELY GO ANYWHEERE EXCEPT for a LONG DRAWN OUT COURT CASE!!!!   REGULATORS usually  OVERREACT by 
MIXING FRAUD WITH GENUINE MISTAKES 
50 - Keep it simple - Regulators should consult business as to what may work rather than implementing their idea which 
is often based in less than the real world. - Market self regulates to some degree.  Educate the consumer more to 
help self-regulation.  Do you constantly over promise and under deliver? Educate investors, have them conduct due 
diligence. - No matter what you have issuers disclose, investors will still lose money and make money, please do not 
make this another idiot proof design reducing us all that much further towards being idiots ourselves. 
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Table 32 Ethics question 1 
Suppose that the buyer of a mining claim discovers from independent 
research (and without involving any trespass on the claim) that the 
claim follows the line of an adjacent mineral vein, and so the claim is 
far more valuable than the seller realizes. Should the buyer be legally 
required to advise the seller about this information before purchasing 
the claim? 
          
    2011     2012    Total   
Response   Percentage Count Percentage Count Percentage Count 
Yes   12% 10 5% 2 9% 12 
No   74% 62 84% 41 76% 103 
Not sure   14% 12 11% 9 15% 21 
    
 
84 
 
52 
 
136 
 
 
Table 33 Explanations for ethics question 1 
 Explanations for ethics question 1 
 
Those who answered “Yes”—the buyer should be legally required to advise the seller about this information 
before purchasing the claim. 
 
2011  
1 There is legal precedent in Canada regarding this issue. 
2 It is the "right" thing to do!! 
3 Ethics - however, I'm biased as a claim holder.  We've been over-staked contrary to AOI [added by John Allen 
– the “area of mutual interest” in a joint venture agreement”] provisions and had many other co's/geo's visit 
our claims without permission, to get 'an edge'.  I think it could partly depend on how ethically the 
information was attained, and who was acquiring.  It doesn't seem right that the seller doesn't benefit from 
non-disclosure of a material fact. 
4 Yes, because it's fair. 
5 This applies if the buyer owns the adjacent claim (i.e. area of interest issue). I don't think it applies if good 
"intelligence" or other intellectual capacity (i.e. interpretation of airborne geophysics) leads to the conclusion 
that a claim is more valuable than the seller thinks. 
6 To maintain the honesty and integrity of management. 
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7 I think that should the buyer not disclose the discovery, it is unethical and just opening up a potential future 
litigation. 
2012 
 8                 Common practice 
 
Those who answered “No”—the buyer should not be legally required to advise the seller about this information before 
purchasing the claim. 
 
2011  
9 I am assuming that you mean it lies in the path of the known vein elsewhere and not that the buyer has 
trespassed on the property to observe it (or used information from someone who has).  If he has then it 
should be disclosed. If he has not it may be a simple geometric extrapolation or result of complex geological 
analysis. 
10 If the seller did their own research, they could find the same information. 
11 Many products can be put to non-intended uses, which make them more valuable. There is no obligation to 
inform the seller. In sugar growing areas molasses is a by-product of refining and is often poured back onto 
fields as a fertilizer. The pharmaceutical industry can prepare very expensive drugs from molasses. Should 
they, a purchaser of raw molasses from a refinery, be obliged to say that he has a customer who is in the 
pharmaceutical industry? 
12 As long as the buyer is not using illegally obtained information, and the seller has the right to obtain the same 
information.  As well, veins are not straight, and do not last forever. 
13 If the buyer has done - and presumably paid for - his own independent research, he should benefit from that. 
Also, it has not been proven that the claims are more valuable. It will likely require more drilling, anyway. 
14 Buyer beware applies to seller too. 
15 The buyer and the seller both have a duty to do what is in the best interest of their respective shareholders 
and have a duty to understand the assets that each is trading (due diligence).  Each party has its own 
interpretation of the value of the asset and accordingly, the price at which the exchange/trade is to take 
place. If one party sees value that the other does not, that is part of the process.    
16 When we are the buyer or Optionee of the property our internal due diligence checks all information 
provided by seller or Optionor as we assume it is all data regarding property. If we discover a material 
deficiency we can choose to discuss or discontinue acquisition plan. We do not feel an obligation to inform 
the Optionor the reason why we discontinued. Your example above is common, as most mineral occurrences 
are structurally controlled and the structural setting is most important in our due diligence. If the Optionor is 
not aware of this common geological fact we feel no responsibility in its education.  
17 Everyone has the right, opportunity, and duty to conduct research. We do not function in a socialist 
environment (as yet). 
18 That information is not public information and is therefore meant to be a competitive advantage to the 
buyer. Sharing it with the seller would enable the seller to seek a higher bidder who had no prior knowledge 
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of the adjacent mineral vein. 
19 It is not the obligation of a buyer to correct the perception a seller has about a given asset. Caveat emptor is 
the key concept in the purchase of any asset.   
20 The outcome of due diligence is the property of the person that did it, not the market.  The "market" is made 
up of individuals, each of whom is responsible for and benefits from the outcome of their own efforts.  It's 
not a commune. 
21 "If the seller has not done their due diligence on their OWN property, but the buyer has, that reflects the 
seller's incompetence.  
If someone is selling an old piece of furniture but does not realize the true value of it, but I, as a buyer, do, I 
am under no obligation to tell them the true value.  
The seller should have their asset appraised by a third party." 
22 If the buyer, found this knowledge through no breach of a confidentiality agreement with the seller and not 
through the seller but through independent third party due diligence done or paid for by the buyer- then this 
information belongs to the buyer, it is the buyer's property. 
23 It is the seller's responsibility to determine the value of the asset they sell and not the buyer's.  The seller 
should look to ensure in its legal agreements that compensation for the claim would encompass additional 
payments if the claim value proves more financially rewarding than originally thought just as the buyer looks 
to protect itself that it does not overpay for the claim. 
24 The seller should not get the benefit of the adjacent owner's geologic investigations, because he did not pay 
for the data. 
25 Both parties are able to do their own independent research. The vendor is either selling his property with 
representation or "as is". If the vendor makes representation, then he is liable for those representations. In 
either case, it is up to the purchaser to evaluate the property and to assess its potential. As such, the 
purchaser is the one who should benefit from his assessment. 
26 The value of a property is always a judgment call where the seller and buyer make their decision without any 
guaranty of success and they are on equal basis in that respect.   
27 It is up to the seller to value his property, it is not the duty of a buyer to tell him what it is worth. 
28 The question assumes the seller could have discovered the same facts with a bit of work or if the seller had 
better management. There is no reason to force the buyer to share the fruits of its labours. 
29 There is no basis in law to require the buyer to voluntarily disclose information acquired in those 
circumstances. 
30 It is not his property, so not entitled to provide info outside of that. 
31 It is not a fact that the vein exists under the claim until drilled or explored, the TSX-Venture is littered with 
properties like this that never amounted to a hill of beans. We humans are so arrogant that we 
underestimate Mother Nature. The seller is selling land and should have conducted his own due diligence or 
hired an independent geologist before offering for sale. 
32 It is the seller's responsibility to do the due diligence if somebody shows interest in buying his claim. 
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33 Caveat emptor applies to buyers and sellers alike.  As long as the information was acquired legally I see no 
reason to disclose. 
34 This is a business issue, not a securities issue. 
35 This fact is a private commercial matter and in the normal course of business.  It should not be governed by 
securities rules or TSX-V policy.  If it was, public companies would be at a distinct disadvantage relative to 
private companies. 
36 If the information that made the claim more valuable is publicly available, then the person who discovers it is 
entitled to reap the rewards, not the seller who didn't find the information.  
37 Ignorance should not be rewarded. 
38 First, so long as the buyer broke no laws obtaining his information, or in no way impaired the seller from 
obtaining this information, this is the essence of free enterprise - searching for a competitive advantage.  
Second, there is no way to guarantee that the buyer’s information is more accurate until the mine is 
exploited it is simply the buyer’s informed opinion. 
39 The information that the buyer obtained was done so by using its own resources and should be considered 
proprietary.       
40 A buyer isn't required to tell the seller of a company, or a car, that the item is more valuable than they expect 
because of information they don't know yet. It is caveat emptor - the buyer has done more research, and 
information is lopsided, which is how value is ultimately determined in any market. 
41 An ancient business principle is 'caveat emptor'. It seems totally fitting that 'caveat vendor' should equally 
apply. If this question were reversed, such that the vendor knew of information which diminished the 
marketability of the claim, our entire business system is surely based on the vendor NOT being required to 
disclose that information. 
42 The seller has equal opportunity to undertake due diligence on their claim. Neglecting to undertake such due 
diligence should not place that burden on the buyer. 
43 The seller has access to attaining the same information. 
44 Nothing/nobody misleading in the transaction. 
45 "Veins do not go in straight lines and are not necessarily following separate direction, Can veer, dip, stop. Just 
because it looks like it might be on your ground no reason to be true until it is tested". 
46 Caveat emptor and vice versa. 
47 Buyer (and Seller) beware. Each has responsibility for their own due diligence.  
48 You are assuming that the vein extends onto the claim in question - which is indeterminable until it is 
developed. You also assume (possibly very incorrectly) that the seller does not know about the possibility of 
potential value and in his research, has very little chance of actually extending onto the claim. If both sides 
are happy in their decision to buy/sell - stay out of the deal! 
49 Pretty simple: the increase value comes essentially from the buyer's due diligence. Why would he share it 
with the seller?  
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50 Buyers and sellers are responsible for their own due diligence. If they were not then what would prevent any 
seller to make claims on the buyer in the future. The seller would sell to the buyer but always have the right 
to make claim at anytime in the future?  
51 The seller had access to the same information as the buyer. 
52 Perhaps the seller is aware of the information and has discounted it. 
53 The directors of a company are mandated to get the best result for its shareholders, and it is up to a seller 
and a buyer to do their own analysis in choosing to price an asset. Your assertion that perhaps ethics should 
drive a company to disclose that a seller is selling cheaply is ludicrous. 
2012  
54 You are not in business to protect the interest of a seller who has not done their own due diligence on their 
own asset.  This is the seller's problem. 
55 You are kidding right? 
56 Why should the buyer offer an advantage to the seller if the buyer was the one who did research on the 
properties surrounding the claim. Who is to say that the claim is more valuable - you could have two 
geologists give three different opinions. It is still going to cost millions to prove out the theory - nothing is 
guaranteed in geology. 
57 There is no duty owned by the buyer to the seller. Our whole legal system is premised on 'buyer beware'... 
which means that the vendor is not obliged to inform the buyer but may not misrepresent to the buyer...the 
converse is also true.  If you sell a painting that you hate and I buy it for an agreed price, the fact that I knew 
in advance that it was by a little known but valuable artist does not change the deal.  Same goes for 
jewelery...if you sell me a ring thinking it is paste but it is in fact a diamond and I recognize it as such does not 
alter the binding buy-sell contract...think if a flea market or swap meet scenario.  Mineral claims are not 
different. Large mining concerns do sell properties that they, for one reason or another, fail to recognize the 
potential and someone else comes along seeing the project differently and good things results...that is how it 
is. 
58 There are never any guarantees of how far a vein will run 
59 The whole premise of 'markets' is different parties with different knowledge. If each participant had perfect 
knowledge, trades would nearly never occur.  Assuming it was legally obtained, contract law does not have 
any broad requirement to for parties to disclose privately obtained research to their counterparts in 
negotiation. Extending such a requirement solely to TSX-V issuers would put them at a competitive 
disadvantage and discourage listing. 
60 The seller should have done the same technical work as the buyer to realize the value of his asset.  If the 
seller did not bother to do this they are negligent. 
61 the seller should have done his research. after all he is the owner... 
62 The seller is obligated to do his own research and if his neglect on that front allows him to sell his claims for 
less than they are worth, then so be it. 
63 thats just crazy talk. of course not. business is competitive- keep it that way. 
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64 It is the seller's responsibility to understand and inform themselves of the value of their property.  The buyer 
has no duty of care to the seller. 
65 Same rules need to apply to both sellers and buyers.   
66 Places undue burden on potential buyer.  Seller may claim later that the buyer knew about something that 
was really unknown to buyer, but later discovered. 
67 It is the responsibility of the purchaser to make a fair and reasonable deal in the first place. In this day and 
age it is hard to imagine that a vendor would not be aware of the the 'area code' value of his claim before he 
offers it for sale in the first place. 
68 It is the responsibility of the seller to set their price. If I offer to buy a car at a certain price based on my 
knowledge of the market for that type of car, I am under no obligation to inform the seller that he should be 
charging me a higher price or, for instance, that he/she has not noticed that all that is required for a 
substantial increase in the value is a simple and inexpensive repair. 
69 It is speculation until proven. Seller needs to investigate motive of buyer and arrange in a sales agreement 
sufficient protection against something that turns out to be prior knowledge on the part of the buyer which 
was unreasonably or illegally obtained. 
70 Information advantages gained through honest research, diligence, and hard work should be for the benefit 
the party that has acquired that advantage.  In this scenario, to legally require the buyer to disclose the 
information they hold is the same as requiring the buyer to relinquishing a competitive advantage gained 
within the confines of the law - that's tantamount to requiring poker players to show each other their hands 
prior to making bets - it just doesn't make sense.  Buyers and sellers all have to take responsibility for 
themselves, otherwise there's no motivation to exercise your own diligence - you can be lazy and negligent 
and simply exploit the other party's hard work to your advantage.  That is blatantly unfair. 
71 If the seller is to lazy to do his/her own homework, than that's to bad. There's a big difference between this 
scenario + selling something that you know is encumbered/faulty. 
72 If the buyer uses independent means, not in any way from the Company or its management, then that is the 
seller’s problem that they didn't discover this on their own. 
73 If one does independent research, the fruits of that research should be his. (the same information found by 
one one person may not lead to the same conclusion if found by another. So the decision to disclose goes 
beyond the information. The reason for the decision would depend on how the information is interpreted 
and that should be proprietary.   
74 He found out from independent research, doing his due diligence before proceeding to buy.  The seller has 
every opportunity to do his own research and if he is negligent in doing so, the buyer should not be the one 
to have to pay for that. 
75 Did the buyer spend resources to get this research...did the seller have the opportunity to get the same 
research? I think you see where I am going... 
76 Definitely not, are we to now conduct due diligence for others?  This is the same as staking ground - if we 
have a discovery adjacent to a property using a theory we have developed about mineral occurrences in an 
area, do we sit on our discovery and wait to test them on our neighbor when the property becomes available 
and staked by us or do we disclose this information to our neighbor so they may make a discovery?  If 
required to do this you are taking the B out of Business.  Hmmm, perhaps I should then be required to 
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disclose where the good fishing is??? On the other hand, if the sellor were to require this disclosure in a 
contract of sale, then the buyer is obliged. 
77 caveat emptor in reverse 
78 Caveat emptor - from a seller viewpoint 
79 capitalism. This is an arm's length transaction - buyer owes no duty of care to seller. 
80 Buyers and sellers all have different views and due diligence.  The buyer did his homework, the seller did not. 
81 Assuming that the information is freely available to all, the Buyer did his due diligence and the Seller did not. 
82 as long as the critical information was equally available to either party using legal means of acquiring same. 
83 As is. If you r that dumb you shouldn't be in the business game 
84 A good and fair rule should benefit the hard working and smart people. The seller in this case should figure 
out the value of his claim himself. 
Those who answered “Not Sure” 
2011  
85 It depends where the information came from. 
86 Would need more depth on the question; on the surface - not really how often in real estate is property 
bought KNOWING that the value will increase with the implementation of a new road/rail/bridge access??!!   
So, not sure is the only answer I can give. 
87 I am not in mining area - ethically it should be disclosed but the seller has set a price based on their 
knowledge and the buyer is willing to pay - the ultimate value is irrelevant. 
88 This sounds like a question for counsel. It's also a half-baked question. 
Has the adjacent ground been staked? Are we talking about a claim that has already been purchased? (We're 
talking about a "buyer" rather than a "potential buyer") Is the seller looking for an area of interest as part of 
an option agreement? 
 
This largely depends, I think, on whether or not a deal has been consummated, and what the terms were.  
 
Feel free to get back to me with this one once it's cooked.  
89 I suppose it depends on the facts.  Ethically the buyer should advise the seller if the property is far more 
valuable.  That said, if the same information is available to the seller and the seller has not taken the time to 
complete its own independent research, then the obligation should not all rest upon the buyer.  Also, it is 
difficult to really get an idea of how valuable a mineral claim is until you are on the property, drilling and 
reviewing the results. 
90 Depends on whether the information obtained was in the public domain or not.  The seller should be aware 
of the value of the property and hence the knowledge that the adjacent mineral vein was potentially present.  
The buyer should know what is on his property or is potentially on it. 
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2012  
91 We presume the seller of the claim had originally acquired the claim because of its location, that being 
proximal to a mineral vein. A property acquisition process in the exploration trade known as "tying on 
ground" in anticipation of creating value based on "closeology".  Owners of tie-on ground are traditionally 
looking to make a quick profit, knowing that the chances of finding a mine along strike from a mineralized 
vein are about one in one hundred.  If, in the highly unlikely event that the independent research had 
identified a mineral deposit that had economic viability, the purchaser should not legally, but morally offer 
the seller an underlying royalty that would, if the property came to production, be of significant value. 
92 Unlike most venture issuers I have no idea what you are talking about.  I am not a mining guy.  But, in general, 
if a buyer sees more value in an asset than the seller, this would be indeed rare, and not likely the obligation 
of the buyer to disclose to the seller. 
93 Depends on who dealing with and deal.  Answer is yes if dealing with prospector and no if dealing with major 
company. 
94 Depends on the circumstances of the purchase.  If it is "tendered" out to several potential buyers, then it is a 
competitive system and would not need to be pointed out.  To the benefit of the buyer.  If it is a transaction 
where the seller is still involved financially or based on a royalty involvement through the purchase (e.g NSR 
or NPI or similar) then they need to be informed but obviously the buyer should be able to benefit somewhat 
on pointing out the oversight. 
 
 
Table 34 Ethics question 2 
You answered "no" to the last question. What if some of the valuable 
information came from an employee of the seller? – an employee who 
volunteers information to the buyer without realizing its importance 
and without telling his or her superiors.  Should the buyer be legally 
required to advise the seller about this information before purchasing 
the claim ?  
          
    2011    2012    Total    
Response   Percentage Count Percentage Count Percentage Count 
Yes   35% 22 28% 13 34% 35 
No   47% 29 50% 19 47% 48 
Not sure   18% 11 22% 9 19% 20 
    
 
62 
 
41 
 
103 
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Table 35 Explanations for ethics question 2 
 Explanations for ethics question 2 
 
Those who responded with “Yes”, they would change their answer and say that that the buyer must disclose  
 
2011 
1 If he does not disclose and the vendor discovers the special knowledge and advantage after-the-fact then likely he 
would try to sue anyway. 
2 The buyer has gained an unfair edge from the seller through the tipped information. 
3 This information was obtained by the seller.   
4 The employee has an obligation to his employer, and this information came to the buyer technically from the seller. 
This should be discussed with the seller. 
5 Obvious conflict of interest 
6 In this situation the information actually belongs to the seller. 
7 It's selective disclosure and can be influenced by money.  That's a breach of trust, not due diligence. 
8 This information is now not from an independent source and there should be at least disclosure to the seller of 
where the information originated. 
9 Because the buyer is acting on information from an employee of the seller (who is appears to be in a conflict of 
interest - even though they do not know they are)...and the buyer did not generate the information on its own. 
10 The employee has inside info and therefore should be disclosed 
11 The employee has given privileged information and it cannot be used  without permission  
12 The information came from the seller (directly or indirectly). 
2012 
13         Yes because the employee works for the seller... 
14         This is now a clear conflict interest 
15         The information came from the seller's camp and materially affects the value of the transaction 
16         That is a very clear conflict of interest on the part of the sellers employee. 
17         It's inside information, regardless of its importance. 
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18         In this case, the valuable information belongs to the seller. It is not legal to steal it from his employee. 
19         If this proprietary information was leaked by an employee of the seller, you would if effect be in possession of 
material undisclosed information, provided you could confirm the information (not just misinformation floated to 
influence buyers). 
20        Breach of potentially confidential information. 
Those who responded with “No”, they would not change their answer and continue to say that the buyer need not 
disclose to the seller. 
2011 
21 The flaw in this question is your use of the word "valuable" as meaning positive. Valuable information to us is 
knowledge and information that is negative as well. The employee is an agent of the seller and we assume his job is 
to assist in the sale of the property and that the Company knowledge = employee knowledge. We are able and 
accept the responsibility that we can tell what is positive and what is negative from any agent of the company 
regardless of the fact that he may something that the Company doesn't (which is unlikely) and then decide if the 
property has value. Overall negative = no purchase and no reason is given. 
22 Again, the buyer has no obligation nor should he/she have, to do anything for the seller other than pay for the asset 
on the agreed upon terms.  
23 How would an employee know the true value and not the owner? Again, the owner is being painted as being 
incompetent. The owner should know the true value of their asset; that is the owner's (or seller's) responsibility. 
24 The Seller should fully understand the merits of the property which he's selling. Smart employees should be sharing 
this valuable information with their respective management team.    
25 There should be an onus on the seller to do their homework both internally and externally. If the employee 
knowingly withholds information from its employer this would be illegal.  
26 "Ethics should not be set in law. The purchaser would be wise to investigate the information volunteered from the 
employee. Once again, if the property is being sold with representation, then only the representations of the vendor 
should be relied upon. In such a case, if an employee of the vendor disclosed information, he would be an agent for 
the vendor and as such, the purchaser should inquire to the vendor as to the truth of such claim.  
In either case, if the purchaser believes the employee has withheld information from the vendor, the purchaser 
should inform the vendor. That would be ethical. " 
27 Same as before. The buyer and seller are making business decisions both assuming that they will benefit from the 
transaction. 
28 Again, no. It appears management of the buyer is smarter / better educated than that of the seller. Why penalize the 
buyer? 
29 The information was not acquired through any act or omission that contravenes a law. The buyer is still not obligated 
to disclose. 
30 The seller would have its remedy against the discloser.  Furthermore, the information could be wrong; the buyer has 
to make a decision regarding source and accuracy (or if it was deliberate misinformation).  On the other hand, if the 
discloser stole the info from his employer, that would be another story. 
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31 It is the employee's responsibility to act according to corporate principles or ethics.  The buyer may or may not use 
the information provided. 
32 If the information was gained during a sanctioned site visit with insufficient supervision to oversee employees with 
valuable information; then too bad for the seller. If the employee brought the information forward in an unethical 
communication then yes, it should be brought to the attention of the seller. 
33 Ignorance and stupidity should not be rewarded 
34 The employee may be liable to his employer for breaching confidentiality, or securities legislation about material 
matters, but that is not the responsibility of the buyer of the property. 
35 This question refers closely to the factum of the 'Navidad' claims in Argentina. Cdn litigation on this matter has made 
its determination, with which I disagree, based on my >30 years’ experience in mineral exploration. Given the legal 
precedent, I realize that following my own advice may pose some risks to me - which I am prepared to assume. 
36 If the employee had valuable information, it is incumbent on the employee to divulge that to the seller.  
37 The seller is still responsible for the choice they make  
38 Nothing misleading; employee is an agent of the seller 
39 "Definitely not . .. there is no way the buyer should be required to tell the seller something they should already know 
exception - If the employee tells the buyer that they are intentionally hiding the information from the seller that 
would be clearly intention to defraud" 
40 As before, each bears their own responsibility for due diligence.  
41 "How do you determine the accuracy of the ""inside"" information? also how would the employee get this 
information without the company knowing? Perhaps this is just a false information plant to make the buyer want to 
buy without proper due diligence.  
For every theoretical possibility, there are two sides. It will be difficult to regulate knowledge and requirements on 
both sides of the buy/sell equation." 
42 The employee who provided the buyer with such information should be telling his employer - the seller. 
43 Same as prior. 
2012 
44        Tough luck for seller.  Again, seller may assert an employee disclosed information before the sale, but how can it be 
proven?  Leaves the door open for frivolous lawsuits. 
45         this issue is one between the seller and its employees. Management of the seller needs to be clear to whom buyers 
can speak with, and sellers' should always have c/a's with its employees (usually do- I do). 
46        This is one point - there may be several negatives that the seller has not exposed or maybe the employee is wrong. 
47        The unsolicited actions and/or statements of the seller's employees are the responsibility of the seller, not the buyer. 
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48        The seller and buyer need to have access to the same information. If the seller ignores their access, the buyer should 
not be punished 
49        the same rules as "buyer beware" apply to the seller 
50        The responsibility for proper disclosure lies with the issuer. Directors are elected by the shareholders - one of their 
primary roles is to ensure appropriate and effective governance and oversight is dispensed. If the shareholders elect 
sloppy or under-qualified directors, they should ultimately suffer the consequences! Regulation should not be a 
substitute for good governance. 
51        The buyer owes no duty of care to the seller.  The seller has issues with their employee.  Why would the employee 
not make this information known to their employer in the first place, this does not make sense.  If the seller believes 
they have sustained a loss, they may have a case against their employee for breach of contract or breach of 
confidentiality. 
52        The buyer is not responsible for controlling the employees of the seller. (I am assuming nothing nefarious between 
the employee and the buyer, just an inadvertent employee making a casual comment) 
53       same answer 
54       providing there is no coercion (financial or otherwise) the same principle as above applies. 
55         Often employees may think providing information would help in the sale so it may be innocent comment.  More to 
the point why not disclose the information if it will help the sale and further withholding information could lead to 
litigation.  The buyer is only doing his due diligence in collecting information, as he should. 
56       Legally...no, as long as the contact with the employee was above board. Ethically, not sure. 
57        It goes back to my previous answer - it would still cost millions to prove out the idea - and the employee would be a 
geologist and I would assume he would inform the board of his theories and it is their option to accept it. A secretary 
is not going to have information that the president doesn't already know.  A geologist would have told his superiors 
what his opinion of the property is.  I thought it was the job of a company did get the best deal it can for its 
shareholders (that includes buying claims) 
58         I believe the company is responsible for its internal relations and if they handle information without caution or pick 
poor employees, that are their issue.  If that employee asks for consideration for this information then they may be 
breaking a law to which the purchaser is obliged to inform or be an accomplice. 
 
Those who responded with “Not Sure” and gave reasons 
 
 2011 
59 This sounds like insider trading which is not accepted, but which authorities have much difficulty stopping and 
proving when suspected. 
60 "This is NOT the old ""theft"" of information. Much Supreme Court of Canada precedents on this, make this very 
clear, this is not theft or misappropriation. 
The only issue would be what is the exact wording of the confidentiality agreement. It would come down to what 
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that agreement actually states." 
61 It is another form of buyer beware again because we are dealing with information from the loose tongue employee 
of the seller who has NO INTENT to harm his employer. Again it is not the responsibility of the buyer to legally 
protect the seller. 
62 This is a criminal act of betrayal by the seller's employees and the acceptance of the illegal information by the buyer, 
the transaction would be void by the court, anyway. 
63 It depends on whether the employee was coerced into providing the information, and whether the information was 
obtained legally.  If the employee volunteered the information or let slip uncoerced then any issue the seller may 
have should be with the employee.  If the information was not obtained legally, or the employee was coerced, then 
the buyer should disclose.  
64 I find this to be quite grey - the seller should be aware of all information with regards to the property that they own 
and if they had information that showed that it was completely worthless - would they be required to provide that 
information?  I think that is something that the courts would settle after the fact- buyer & seller beware.   
65 it should be treated as inside information and as such i would not get involved. 
 2012 
66 This is where you get advice from a lawyer. 
67 Not sure if he's legally required to mention it, but ethically I would say yes. 
68 Not enough information given to answer.  The answer could be influenced by the nature of the information, the 
jurisdiction of the seller, any confidentiality agreements in place, etc.  In any event, this is the type of situation that is 
best disposed of according to law.  Introducing regulatory requirements in situations like this could actually 
complicate the matter by creating multiple regimes to comply with (legal and regulatory in multiple jurisdictions) - 
regimes which may conflict in certain circumstances thus putting the issuer in a position where it cannot avoid non-
compliance. 
69 need more facts - employee's are bound by rules of confidentiality and generally if an employee knows 
"information" so should the employer.  from the question sounds like a junior employee who would not normally be 
expected to have more information than management. 
70 Depends on the circumstances; is it an opinion or is it a set of facts. If it is facts then I believe the employee is 
basically committing fraud for some reason and as a buyer I would disclose the information to the seller.  If it is a 
subjective opinion that is something the employer was not interested in or the buyer placed more emphasis on than 
the seller in which case as long as the seller had given permission to talk to the employee I think that is simply a 
difference of opinion leading up to a deal being possible 
71 Assuming that the information was freely disclosed (no payments or other coercion by the Company towards the 
employee), same answer. 
72 As per prior answer, seller needs to protect itself and take legal action if necessary 
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Table 36 Ethics question 3 
Suppose an investor is buying shares of a company trading on a stock 
exchange.  The investor discovers from independent research that the 
company is far more valuable than the public realizes. Should the 
investor be legally required to disclose this research to the public 
before purchasing the shares on the exchange?  
  
          
     2011    2012    Total   
Response   Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count 
Yes   5% 4 3% 1 4% 5 
No   93% 78 89% 46 91% 124 
Not sure   2% 2 8% 5 5% 7 
    
 
84 
 
52 
 
136 
 
 
Table 37 Explanations for ethics question 3 
 Explanations for ethics question 3 
 
Those who answered “No”, the investor should not be legally required to disclose this research before trading. 
 
 2011 
1 Investors, unless in possession of undisclosed material information that belongs to an issuer, should be able to 
analyze and conclude how to handle their risk capital as long as they use their own (or public) information and brains.  
They can use any "black box" system they like and take their chances. 
2 There is no obligation unless they are insiders  
3 Buyer has no disclosure obligation. 
4 Private research is an expensive product. If the exchange is interested in having private research disclosed, it should 
pay for it and then transfer it to the public domain. 
5 Every share is bought by someone who thinks the company is worth more than it is traded at.  Attempting to have 
everyone disclose this information would become a nightmare.  Half the time they are wrong. 
6 Independent research will likely tell you that 80% of the TSX Venture stocks are worth more than the public is valuing 
them. It would be ludicrous and impractical for such an investor to disclose such information. Besides, this research 
would likely express an opinion regarding value, not an absolute "truth" regarding value. 
7 This does not sound probable. Are you talking about insider trading? 
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8 If you mean a positive evaluation from independent research as "his own" research it  is difficult to understand how 
the information could have material value unless there's an inside connection to the information, which would rule 
out "independence." If the independent research is purchased as proprietary by the investor and the research 
generator is independent of the Company, and a material value change in the shares of the company is predicted, no 
problem.     
9 Independent research implies publicly available info. 
10 There is no black box formula to arrive at the correct share price of a company. It is an open free market where the 
price is what someone is willing to pay, no more and no less. 
11 Not his place to do anything if the research he has done is indeed independent.  
12 People do independent research all the time to try and find undervalued situations. It is part of what makes a Market. 
13 "Why?  An investor is looking to maximize the value of his/her investment which in the case of an institution may be 
finances from a number of individuals.   By disclosing their perceived inherent value it may increase the value of the 
stock, lowering their ability to generate the returns to their investors.  Equally, scam artists have been pulling this 
trick for years... claim value on stock that doesn't exist." 
14 Private initiative should be rewarded. 
15 I answered this already.  The due diligence results are the proprietary intellectual property of the person that 
performed them. They should not be compelled to give up their rights.  Furthermore, they might be wrong. After all, 
values are in the eye of the beholder - they're just an opinion. 
16 "If the investor does independent research that any member of the public can do themselves, they are doing their 
due diligence. Why would they disclose what they have found?  
Does Warren Buffett disclose that he has found undervalued companies? No, he invests, then discloses. And even 
then, he does not have to. 
Are suggesting some level of socialism here? Do you understand what a free market is?" 
17 Prices traded on exchange are market value.  The ultimate value is only what is paid and so the investor is still taking 
risk until the investor can unlock any other value. 
18 No inside information, all available in public domain. 
19 That's the real value of completing your research and conducting meaningful due diligence.   
20 It is a public market.  Investors are entitled/obliged to do their own homework from whatever sources they deem 
advisable. 
21 My concern would be whether or not this information was material and available to management. 
22 It's not an investor's role to educate the public on his investment decisions. 
23 He has discovered the information on his own and has no fiduciary obligation to the public. 
24 As long as the company is complying with its continuous disclosure obligations, then all investors should have access 
to the same accurate information.  It seems all too common these days that the share price of companies does not 
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accurately reflect the true value of such companies.   
25 If he is right, and if he acquired the information legally, he should benefit from his research work! 
26 It is up to the market (i.e. individuals in that marketplace) to value the company.  The purchaser is not obliged to tell 
the market what a company is worth. 
27 If this is so, then you just put the entire money management industry out of work. 
28 The investor has no duty to anyone else to disclose the fruits of his own labour in acquiring the information. to do so 
would place an unreasonable expectation on every participant in public markets. 
29 Onus is on company to divulge that. 
30 The investor should be rewarded for appropriate due diligence. 
31 "If the information is freely available then the investor is legally entitled to benefit from the fruits of his labour. 
Should a lawyer be obliged to disclose to a policeman when a policeman makes an error in processing that will 
benefit the lawyers client???? 
What is good for the goose is good for the gander" 
32 It is personal opinion. What happen if the independent research company makes a mistake? 
33 It's a difference of opinion that makes a horse race interesting.  Unless selling for reasons unrelated to perceived 
value, buyers and sellers of stock always have a difference of opinion about value.  Anyone who determines that a 
stock is undervalued (or overvalued), for whatever reason, provided that that determination is arrived at 
independently, should be entitled to act accordingly. 
34 As long as the information is derived from a fully independent source, there is no requirement to inform the public. 
35 The investor is doing due diligence for his/her own purposes. 
36 The value of a company is subjective.  All material information is to be in the public domain, and as such, no investor 
may have an unfair and distinct advantage over another.  It is legal for an investor to derive a conclusion through 
mosaic theory. 
37 The person / company that uncovers any publicly available information that the company or general public is 
unaware of should be the one who benefits. 
38 Individual initiative within the law should always be rewarded. The investing public would have access to the same 
information as the investor with initiative. Investing for profit is not a communal activity. Lazy "investors" deserve 
nothing. 
39 This is the point of independent research.  As long as the investor did not have insider information that was not 
available to the general public he should not be punished for doing a superior job of analysis than other investors.  
40 I consider this proprietary information because the investor used his own resources to come to his conclusion and 
was not paid by the public for the research. 
41 The investor did his homework aka due diligence.  He isn't paid to help others realize this. 
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42 Definitely not.  Arbitrage is powered by lopsided information. Profit can be realized any time someone knows more 
than someone else. 
43 Reaching insights such as this is one of the purposes of conducting independent research. It is at the heart of 
capitalism - and of free markets. 
44 Huh?  Are you saying that the investor has inside information that other investors don't have?  Otherwise this doesn't 
make sense to me. 
45 Provided that the independent research carried out did not involve inside information and was readily available to all 
investors that cared to research it is information that is available to everyone. 
46 Investor is not an insider of the company. 
47 The company is responsible for the public disclosure of any pertinent information. 
48 The market supposedly represents values; they are established by buyers and sellers. 
49 Independent research should be done by all before investing if he found something he can act not inside information 
only 
 
50 "Absolutely not . . .why do independent research if it's of no monetary value?  
Lack of independent research will lead to more insider advantage and hurt the long term knowledge in the 
marketplace. 
PS - just asking this type question demonstrates the ignorance of the questioner or those pressuring him or her to ask 
the question" 
51 "What if the research (completely contrary to general knowledge) is significantly flawed? You could have just caused 
a run on the market where significant numbers of people could get hurt.  
This is a silly argument." 
52 It comes exclusively from its own due diligence. Why would he share it with others? 
53 Independent research is the cornerstone of good investing. If the info used is in the public domain then good 
investors will use it, and should, to their advantage. This is what separates good managers from the others. 
54 There are many companies that trade below their value.  It is not an individual investor’s role to ensure the public is 
aware of the value. 
55 The public is never fully informed nor can they be.  It is possible even in the simplest transaction to overwhelm the 
public.  e.g., ask yourself how the Black Scholes pricing model on options works and how it affects a junior's share 
price.  Not one in 10,000 can answer this, yet virtually all juniors issue options. 
56 Stupid question. 
 2012 
57 With the very large assumption that the individual has no connection to the Company, and the data obtained is not 
from an insider, no. Differing amounts of knowledge is part of the market. 
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58 Why? Let the public do their own research. 
59 Value is a matter of opinion, not a matter of fact.  Investors should be able to act however they want when acting on 
their own research - no one else should be entitled to benefit from the investor's hard work and analysis. 
60 U don't know if it's true 
61 Too subjective.  Investor may be using different criteria than other investors. 
62 This would prejudice the the right of an investor to keep proprietary information to himself. If this right is not 
protected every acquisition would attract litigation or no research would be done if the reward is taken away. 
63 This is capitalism - remove this and it takes away from what our economy and system is all based on. 
64 The same research information is available to everybody 
65 The same as with the mining claim.  Anyone buying shares on the open market has the ability to do the research for 
him or herself. 
66 The investor owes no duty of care to the public in relation to this matter.  The company may be doing a poor job of 
disclosure. 
67 The buyer has done their own research to formulate their opinion of the value of the asset and should be allowed to 
act on that analysis. 
68 So long as the research was legal and did not include any insider information! The company should have been able to 
do the same and therefore disclosed it - see previous answer.   
69 So long as no inside information is gained, buyers should not be required to educate anyone with information they 
spend time, money or energy obtaining. So long as the information is legally obtained. 
70 Should the Company, for internal strategic reasons such as negotiating terms of additional asset acquisitions, may not 
believe it to be in the best interest of its shareholders to disclose corporate strategy yet to be consummated. Forcing 
the investor to be legally required to disclose results of his research could impair the company's market capitalization 
and shareholder value. Further to which subsequent litigation could have far-reaching effects. 
71 same answer 
72 No.  Independent research could (1) be wrong, (2) not bear fruit, (3) be internal to the buyer, (4) depend on faactors 
out of control of either the seller or the buyer. 
73 It is public information, no obligation to force feed people;  one would have to wonder about the competence of 
management and the board though. 
74 Isn't that the whole purpose of research, trying to identify an opportunity before others. 
75 Investors that do their own or hire others to do research is fair ball. theoretically, any investor could do similar 
research. 
76 Investor needs to be rewarded for his effort 
77 If the information is in the public domain, the investor has no responsibility to disclose this information to the public 
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78 If investor prepared to do own research he should benefit from it and have no obligation to the general public 
79 If he is basing his opinion on publicly available information, there is no need to publish his work product. 
80 I wish we had more shareholders like this! 
81 I am sure if he published what he knows he would be crushed by the securities commission - he would be asked to 
provide independent studies from what he found out - he would be forced to prove to the Company, TSX, and 
securities commission his public statements (making him libel).  My guess is his safest bet it to keep his mouth shout - 
you never know - his research could be wrong and he loses all his money 
82 He should not be legally required to do so if he is not an insider and get it from his independent research. He might 
not be sure whether his opinion is right or wrong. His purchase might be highly risky. 
83 He should be rewarsed for his research. 
84 From the investor's own analysis of publicly available knowledge, the investor has determined that the shares are 
undervalued. He/she are under no obligation to give away this analysis and no-one has a right to demand it. 
85 due diligence 
86 crazy talk. arm’s length investor can do what it wishes. 
87 Cmon, that's a ridiculous question. 
88 as long as the investor is only utilizing public info and is not himself an insider or control person. 
89 As long as no laws have been broken in acquiring the information there is no obligation to tell anyone else about your 
personally researched information. 
90 Again requires investor to disclose what may or may not be material.  How is he or she to decide?  Again places undue 
burden on investor and opens him or her to frivolous lawsuits. 
91 again capitalism - this is how market efficiency works. investors analysts etc. compete to outwit and find temporary 
inefficiencies.   
 
Those who responded “Not Sure” 
 
91 "Yes to disclose if the information came not from some public source. 
No if the information was available for all who cared to do some basic research." 
92 In this situation I think I would need to know specific circumstances such as why the company is so undervalued in the 
first place. 
 2012 
93 The research is not the Company's copyright. 
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Those who respondent “Yes” 
 2012 
94 If he is gaining the information from insider information, then yes.  If he has done analysis and valuation and has 
found out there is more value to the Company that is his benefit. If he is going to finance the issuer, then he should 
disclose this to the management. 
 
 
 
Table 38 Ethics question 4 
You answered "no" to the last question.  Would your answer change if 
the source of the information is from an employee of the company 
who volunteers information to the investor without realizing its 
importance?  Should the investor be legally required to wait for the 
information to be disclosed to the public before purchasing the shares 
on the exchange?  
          
    2011   2012   Total   
Response   Percent Count  Percent Count Percent Count 
Yes   64% 49 72% 31 67% 80 
No   18% 14 22% 10 20% 24 
Not sure   17% 13 6% 3 13% 16 
    
 
76 
 
44 
 
120 
 
 
Table 39 Explanations for ethics question 4 
 Explanations to ethics question 4 
 
Those who responded that “Yes”, their answers would change and the investor should wait for the information to be 
disclosed. 
 
 2011 
1 I think this is in fact the law regarding material undisclosed information.  An employee is responsible to his company 
and therefore not allowed to give out proprietary information on his or her own. 
2 The buyer now has material undisclosed info, so cannot trade. 
3 Obvious. 
4 That is by definition insider trading (trading on information known to insiders of the company and not the public). 
 336 
 
5 He has come into possession of "insider" information and knows that it is insider info. 
6 That would be classed as insider information. 
7 This is insider trading, is it not? Is this information material non-public information? 
8 Tipping is illegal – period. 
9 Insider information, makes the buyer a tippee.. against securities laws. 
10 That situation refers to insider information ... and should never be tolerated.   
11 "Yes---because otherwise he would be trading on insider information." 
12 Trading on insider information is not only unfair, but illegal. 
13 It is insider trading pure and simple. It is illegal again common sense. 
14 It is inside trading. 
15 Yes - this is now in the realm of tipping, or insider information. 
16 That is a company disclosure issue. 
17 It's insider information. 
18 If the investor does not wait then they are acting on insider information. 
19 That would make it insider trading which is illegal. 
20 If the information is material, it should be publicly disclosed before an employee is allowed to talk about it to the 
general public. Otherwise, this is a securities violation. 
21 My answer changes because the information now becomes material information not generally disclosed to the 
markets - the recipient is either a "tippee" or dangerously close to being one - as defined by insider trading laws. 
22 Relates to previous comment.  I can see where you are going now...  
23 That would be insider trading therefore it should not be acted upon. 
24 This becomes insider information. 
25 In this case the investor should inform the company or the regulator. 
26 Tougher decision, but limited disclosure is a "no--no".  The employee represents the company, no matter how stupid 
he or she may be.   
27 He should not buy the shares; he’s got insider info. 
28 Insider information was disclosed. 
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29 I think they are already required to do that....it is called tipping and would put the buyer off side with insider trading 
rules. 
30 It would become insider trading. 
31 Inside information is inside information. 
32 Absolutely!  All employees need to be aware of insider information and be reminded by the company that sharing 
information that is not publicly available to anyone outside the company. 
33 The source is non-public and material.  It must be disclosed. 
 
 2012 
34 Yes - then he has received insider information from inside the Company - have now idea how you in force that - and 
inform the public about it - don't think there is a lot of that insider trading going on - more important insider trading 
going on with press release being leaked before being disseminated - would be a waste of time and resources to go 
after the accidental leak (don't see it as rampant as other insider trading issues) 
35 this sounds like deliberate tipping 
36 this really is an issue between issuer and its employees. the employee is liable in my opinion, not the issuer. 
37 This is now inside information and must be treated as such. 
38 Then it is not entirely independent. 
39 The investor would be in possession of material undisclosed information. 
40 The information is now likely an insider tip, and the individual should not trade until it is public. This is a reasonable 
limit on the market given the range of investors. 
41 That's inside information whether intentional or not. 
42 That is a clear conflict of interest on the employee’s part, and insider trading on the investors part. 
43 sounds like "tipping" and there are rules covering this already which should be known. 
44 It's an investment decision made on the basis of inside information. 
45 It is insider information and it does not matter how it was obtained or by whom. 
46 Investor becomes party to insider information. 
47 information should be of full disclosure to all to have everyone on the same playing field 
48 if material inside information, that is essentially current practice and law. 
49 If it is "insider" information then the buyer must ensure it is public prior to buying shares. 
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50 If he is trading on material undisclosed information, he is guilty of insider trading. 
51 I do not think the person should buy shares as he is now privy to inside information even if the employee does not 
recognize its significance.  I would phone a director and stress the need to disclose asap 
52 Employee information is inside information in my opinion 
53 Arguably falls into "special relationship" 
54 Any person trading on the basis of undisclosed material information might be guilty of insider trading. 
 
Those who responded that “No”, their answers would not change. 
 
 2011 
55 It is the issuer’s duty to make sure that employees do not disclose confidential information and is the officers of the 
listed to make sure that data that could influence purchases is not readily available to employees who do not know of 
those restrictions. 
56 Does the employee know the difference between "important" information and "material" information? Does the 
investor know? If the investor acts on the information and it turns out it was "material" this could be a problem, but 
we do not think there is an obligation on the part of the investor for public disclosure. His decision is to buy or short 
the shares or not based on his analysis of the information and his awareness of what is material and what can 
significantly change the value of a company (up or down).   
57 "The onus isn't on the investor here; it's on the employee (and possibly his supervisors) to know what's public and 
what isn't, and to keep his mouth shut. 
Did the investor even know if it was public information? He could have figured, by virtue of the fact that he was being 
told, that it was public." 
58 If anyone had access to the same employee but failed to ask the right questions, then no, this investor ought to be 
able to benefit from his own superior due diligence efforts. 
59 The information was not acquired under false pretenses. It is the responsibility of the issuer to advise its employees 
on confidentiality policy. 
60 Yes if the information is material.  No if it is immaterial. 
61 Anti-insider knowledge rules hurt in the long term .. . this is not even an insider knowledge situation being described . 
. . sorry but trying to make legal activity illegal just does not make sense . . if there is collusion or fraud .. . that's 
different . .but the above describes neither. 
62 "If you are judging whether to buy shares based on employee's information, I suspect you will be disappointed in the 
long run.  
However, if your information is coming from an officer or director of the company, you are de facto an ""insider"" 
and are already precluded from buying, just as the other insiders are." 
 339 
 
 2012 
63 The investor would not necessarily be in a position to determine whether such information is material and non-
public.  Sophisticated investors are well versed on what they can and cannot do with misappropriated information 
and already have standards they have to adhere to (i.e. CFA charter holders have a code of ethics covering this).  It 
would be blatantly unfair to hold the general investing public to the same standards when they do not have the 
information and education to adhere to those standards. 
64 Same answer as before. 
65 same 
66 Owner should have a disclosure policy for employees. The employee needs to sign off and be aware of the chance of 
prosecution for breach 
67 It is the responsibility of the issuer to ensure inside information remains inside. Again - investors should not be made 
responsible for someone else's poor oversight or governance practices. More emphasis should be on penalizing the 
directors/officers that allowed this to happen. 
68 If any employee discloses confidential information, that is already addressed.  If it is not confidential information but 
does provide strategic benefit, the acquirer should not be obligated to wait for the information to go public. Very 
often the information one gets does not meet the materially test and does not meet disclosure requirements.  If it 
does, it should be held as confidential and not disclosed by employees.    
69 Ethically yes, he should wait.  The employer should educate the employees about the importance to keep certain 
things quiet until it is publicly disclosed.  If they have been educated the person should lose their job. 
70 All of which is too difficult to define, regulate and enforce. A marketplace would not exist if there was a common 
sharing of opinion based on disclosure to the public.    
71 Again, the actions/statements of an employee regarding the business are the responsibility of his/her employer. If 
you do not want your employees giving away potentially valuable proprietary information, then give them 
instructions not to volunteer information. If they do not appear to have the necessary judgement, then do not hire 
them in the first place. 
 
Those who responded that “Not Sure” if their answers would change 
 
 2011 
72 "Do you mean buying insider information? 
Disclosure before purchase would be an admission of intent to do inside trading." 
73 Depends on the status of the information and the nature of the information.   
74 It depends what kind of information this is. If the information is material, non-public information that could have a 
material impact on value or share price, then yes. If the investor is in possession of such material, non-public 
information, then he should make this information public before buying. 
75 I think it should be disclosed -  but then it depends on the nature - I don't know. 
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76 Would depend upon the context of the employee divulging such information. 
77 I answered "no" to the last question assuming that the company was compliant in its continuous disclosure 
obligations.  While it seems unethical for the investor to purchase securities in this fact pattern, I think the onus 
should be on the company to have staff that are knowledgeable and skilled in the company's business and also to 
disclose any material information once received.  Management should consider implementing black-out periods and 
reviewing confidentiality concerns with employees if material information is pending.  The arm's length investor 
should not be put in this position in the first place. 
78 If he is not an insider himself he should be allowed to benefit from his "research" efforts. However, the company that 
let insider information be released could be in trouble... 
79 "It's complicated! 
We have a Question of disclosure from management ... " 
80 Again complex and depends on a variety of factors. 
81 The question is too broad - it would depend on some of the circumstances.  Generally, any information, however 
obtained, provided that it is not illegal to listen to it, should be OK to act upon.  It is the management of the company 
itself which is in error in that it does not appreciate its asset value.  Fire the management. 
82 Question for securities lawyers. 
 
83 The test should be whether the information is inside information.  A classic example, highlighted years ago by Peter 
Lynch, is Chrysler corporation in the '80s.  If an employee noticed that the 1 millionth magic wagon rolled off the 
assembly line in record time, and concluded that this should lead to record profits and a corporate turnaround, the 
employee or investor to whom he relayed this information is just making an astute investment to buy.  However, if 
the employee disclosed the actual financial results, this is insider information and the investor/employee should not 
be legally able to buy.  In the first scenario it is not certain to the buyer that Chrysler will have superior results, it is an 
assumption, in the latter scenario it is certain. 
 2012 
84 The correct answer is actually 'not clear' rather than 'not sure'.  I think that legally there has been no illegal tipping by 
the employee, but there is still a question of insider trading on the part of the investor...and it might turn on whether 
or not the investor knew that the information was insider knowledge. 
85 Nothing is pure black and white. Your question is coming into a gray area. I would keep saying "no" if the investor 
make his own analysis and draw his own conclusions after discussing with the employee of the company about its 
pulic information. I will change my answer to "yes" if some material and factual information such as new assay grade, 
interval, thickness, tonnage is provided by an employee to the investor before they are disclosed to the public. In 
brief, the key issue is how to define the source of the information, personal understanding/opinion or factual data. 
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“What other factors do you think influence whether or not principles-based regulation would be 
effective for venture issuers?”   
Table 40 Other factors 
 Responses 
1 There will be people who try to take advantage of it either by pushing the envelope or even as a framework for fraud.  
Principles are in some ways harder that detailed rules, although if properly adhered to would be more useful.  
Arguments against would be lack of comparability even if more accurate and higher costs of both compliance and 
enforcement in all likelihood. 
2 There is inconsistent application by TSX-V and OSC of regulations. 
3 They must promote transparency and a level playing field for all issuers. 
4 I don't think principles are the road to take. Take a look at the rules-based systems that were required to get 
civilization to where it is today - Hammurabi Code, Justinian Institutes, Civil Codes. Then in the common law world - 
Criminal Codes, Family Codes and the Uniform Commercial Code. 
5 Compliance enforcement and a strong regulatory body 
6 1)  Can issuers be held accountable to principles?  2)  Do issuers have principles? 
7 You will need to sensitize officers and directors to such principles. This will be a culture change for many. 
8 We already view the relationship in this way in that the board of venture issuers has to determine what is material 
and when to disclose it.     The investor has to know what to base its decision of owning venture issuers shares or not 
and be responsible for that. 
9 Pragmatically, look at the mess in the US under its penalty-based system, rather than principles-based. 
10 Principles vary by cultures and rules that vary by culture would be absurd. 
11 Well, in Japan it is expected that people trade on insider information. I like our system better. 
12 I am not sure; I would have to look at the concept with more clarity than I have. 
13 Venture issuers are inherently risky. Investors should be protected from fraud and misrepresentation, not from risk. 
It's an uncertain world in the venture market - regulation shouldn't attempt to reduce that risk, only present it for 
what it is.  Rules-based regulation inherently creates filters that the unscrupulous presenters can use to hide 
important information from the market.  Principle-based regulation is more robust, although it's more difficult to 
enforce. 
14 Principles-based regulation will achieve benefits for consumers by fostering a more innovative and competitive 
financial services industry. Principles-based regulation also offers effective protection as senior managers drive the 
changes necessary for their firms to meet the Principles. 
15 The rules should be more adaptable to the specific situation of a company. 
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16 Those are bad examples of principle based governance; they are all governed by securities laws and rules. You need 
better examples of governance systems, for example:  a) M&A  b) Material facts  c) Press release and "Spins"  d) 
Future events  e) Accounting Policies and IFRS vs. GAAP  f) Mining reports 43-101  etc, etc... 
17 Principles-based regulation works fine so long as everyone involved has principles. That's a tough thing to govern. 
18 Don't know. 
19 Degree of compliance, clarity of regulations, manner of corrective measures, means of disciplinary action available. 
20 The actual honesty and business practices of the management of the company in question 
21 Small issuers have not the same budget to staff its disclosure team!  Principles-based should be enough ... 
shareholder should decide to buy or not if they are not satisfy with the disclosed info - compared with the standard in 
the industry 
22 None. 
23 Exact location of claim boundaries, especially when there is a discovery, then they should be surveyed. 
 
24 The principles have to reflect the real world. The regulators have to get out of the board room and let the directors do 
their job. The Founder's Policy from Dec 2007 is one example of a horrible regulation that cripples boards and 
undermines transactions. 
25 Public confidence in such an approach would be improved if the regulatory authorities impose severe penalties 
including substantial fines and lifetime bans from the public markets of those caught in breach. 
26 Would it be a Material change or not is the factor 
27 Basic rules published in simple English not legal BS that can be understood by all. 
28 Investors/shareholders are entitled to material or relevant information on a timely basis:  that principle I agree with 
unequivocally.  Principles, in my opinion, do not readily lend themselves to specific rules.  The rule drafters are always 
going to miss something.  No one is smart enough to contemplate every possible contingency or permutation. 
29 Not sure. 
30 Enforceability   Interpretation Impact on public - depends on what the issue is, some are less sensitive than others.  
Cost - should have a 'streamlining' effect that would be welcomed by many issuers.  There comes a point where the 
camel's back breaks. 
31 Size of the firm, in terms of market capitalization, total net tangible assets or other measures. 
32 No comment. 
33 N/A 
34 It is my belief that persons investing in the capital markets must take responsibility for their decisions - and that this is 
especially so in the "high risk / potentially high reward" world of junior resource markets. Enforcement of principles-
based regulation, to prosecute and obtain disgorgement of ill-gotten gains from transgressors, is the way to go to 
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discourage the predatory players in this industry. But we do NOT need "super-Nannies". 
35 There are over 1700 mining companies alone on the TSX-V and policing them is a task that is currently underfunded.  
Working with anything other than a principal based system would be more expensive than companies or investors 
would be willing to accept.  Not sure how a merger with the LSE is going to help the individual investor and it is 
certainly going to cost companies more money. 
36 Each and every situation is different in some way or other which is why I believe guidelines of past experiences lend 
themselves to the guidance for the future. 
37 I don't see how principles-based regulation can be sufficiently described/defined/documented/enforced to assure an  
effective and fair market place. 
38 The speed of the regulation being enforced and transparency of the transactions. 
39 Cost/benefit analysis    costs of compliance and costs of policing would kill the goose. 
40 I believe that most issuers are honest and work for the benefit of the shareholders and the interested public. 
However, the few percent that are not get all the press. This distorts the actual reality and causes the regulators to 
react - possibly with more posturing than required.   I still think it is better to quietly maintain a position of auditing a 
limited number of issuers and prosecuting those that don't comply with the rules. 
41 I think the practical application of principles-based regulation would definitely cause some confusion for venture 
issuers since the standards would be so broad and it does not seem to be clear to me as to how such principles would 
be measured or enforced. 
42 Streamlined listing process that will be far less costly for the investing public. Although, this may come at a cost of 
regulatory jobs, I believe entrepreneurialism should be encouraged, on broad levels, as opposed to punish by 
unnecessary costs. 
43 Probably many I can't consider now. 
44 We already have 'principled based disclosure'. It's called a 43-101. To implement regulation along the lines suggested 
by this questionnaire would be preposterous. 
45 Not sure. 
 2012 
46 what are the costs to the issuer to do this? ie) legal costs, exchange costs (passed back to the issuer), etc. would it be 
more or less costly overall? 
47 Unfortunately, you will not be able to remove all of the rouge people who would cut corners and not give proper 
disclosure. 
48 Too much legalese will become indecipherable to non-legal experts and hence principles should be outlined. A smart 
issuer, knowing the principles, will seek proper legal advice for the detail but will be aware of the general principles. 
49 The volume of information that any issuer must sift through with respect to compliance is very expensive.  In theory, 
principles-based regulations should be more cost effective than extensive, restrictive policies.  With small venture 
issuers with limited cash positions and management resources, it could actually be detrimental to shareholders if 
venture issuers have to devote too much management time and money to compliance rather than working on the 
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venture issuer's business objectives. 
50 The regulator also has to understand that decisions made in real time must be reviewed in light of the circumstances 
at the time the decision was made and based on what a reasonable person would be likely to conclude in those 
circumstances. 
51 The knowledge and integrity of management. 
52 The fact that being ethical and honest does not seem to matter anymore when money is involved.  You can't do 
business on a handshake anymore.  When the bottom line is in danger, principles get thrown by the wayside.  May be 
cynical but alas we've had to change the way we do things because the old way of doing things just doesn't work 
anymore. 
53 The ability of the various SCs to apply them fairly. 
54 Strict enforcement for those issuers that violate exchange regulations. 
55 Speed and flexibility for juniors Project by project basis for discipline or investigation by regulators Ability for limited 
skilled boards inherent in junior companies to do the best they can to meet disclosure rules Principles-based is easier 
to educate people on.  Rules-based is easier for lawyers to work on and directors and management never gain 
experience and education because the lawyers are doing all the work and companies only learn from mistakes (which 
would be very costly) compared to the cost of education for Boards. 
56 see previous answers 
57 Regulators like rules to follow and enforce, judgement is hard to regulate and is shades of grey, but that usually 
resulted in more meaningful disclosure 
58 Regular reviews of issuer disclosure under principles-based regulation would help compliant issues improve disclosure 
and give the regulating authority a better idea of who to review more often. 
59 Quality of regulatory and TSX-V staff. training, etc. it is a big change from current practice. 
60 Principles-based regulation cannot be applied to a market place functioning on risk capital investment. The existing 
regulatory environment for TSX-V is more than adequate and has been so since its conception. Another layer of 
"regulation" imposed by authorities who do not understand the necessity of risk capital investment would hasten the 
demise of a financial institution that has created real wealth not only for Canada, but many other parts of the world. 
61 principles-based regulation sounds like the best policy but a mixture of both would provide a fairer market since 
principles can be broadly interpreted. 
62 Principles are a personal thing and rules are meant to level the playing field.  This means that the exchange should be 
very cognizant of the principles of individuals allowed to act as Directors etc. if it is principle based. I feel that this was 
lacking in the 08 meltdown all the way up the highest levels. Rules didn't help.   
63 No comment 
64 It is more in keeping with the nature and capabilities of a Venture Issuer 
65 In order to be effective needs lots of communication between regulators and issuers.  Need to have a joint discussion 
with the regulators and Issuers.  Also need mandatory courses. 
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66 Impartially 
67 If everyone acted within their stated parameters such as:  This survey is estimated to take 4 minutes of your time 
when in fact it takes much longer than that for me, am I average, best case or worst case?  - Has the issuer of the 
survey actually tested this time determination? if so with whom? Where is this disclosed? - Perhaps the issuer is 
acting from the best case scenario which is just that, the best case, what about the average case, or worst case, what 
about a range, for instance, this survey will take between 4 minutes and 30 minutes. - Maybe it's just a matter of 
interest in contributing to this and if I were to do my due diligence to find that it actually takes on average 30 minutes 
then I can draw my own conclusions to contribute or not. - Perhaps the issuer of the survey should be required to 
construct a website divulging the survey in its entirety prior to the survey beginning it and provide an opportunity for 
the predecessors to comment. - Perhaps next time I see a survey like this I'll say to myself, nope, it is way too much 
time.  I hope that you may be able to see a parallel here.  Thanks      
68 Focusing on the big rip offs and show some leniency for the juniors, especially first time offenders. 
69 Everything is dependent upon the issuers good intentions, i.e. that they WANT to be good corporate citizen 
70 Ethics, skill and experience of management.  Demonstrated performance of the Company. 
71 continuous disclosure and corporate governance in place for pubco 
72 Any thing that makes sense. 
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Appendix B – Expert interviews 
Ian Bandeen  
Bandeen believes that, in comparison to the US, securities regulation in Canada is very much 
principles-based.  Directors of public companies have a fiduciary obligation to operate in the 
public interest; rules are not exhaustive but are applications in specific cases. This is different 
than in the US, where rules are typically seen as limits and market participants will hire lawyers 
and accountants to skirt them, often with seemingly no care to underlying principles.  
The Americans tend to be pioneers in financial matters, according to Bandeen—for example, 
securitization, multiple market trading, and high frequency trading.  Financial pioneers create 
new kinds of markets, and then the old guard starts demanding reviews about “unfair trading 
practices”, forcing regulators to embark on time-consuming, consensus-building, exercises.  This 
is partly why US rules are a nightmare.  They don’t start from first principles, but react to new 
products after-the-fact, and so the evolution of US regulations are difficult to navigate and often 
seemingly circular. Generally speaking, Canadian regulators have the luxury of coming to the 
game later, can see what happens in other jurisdictions, and can structure our markets to adopt 
the best and avoid the worst practices.   
The banks have had a disproportionate effect on the markets in Ontario, according to Bandeen.  
They and their agents have the resources to dedicate time to write comments, gather a consensus, 
and storm the Bastille.  Physically, their head offices are near the OSC.  They will be at the table, 
85-90% of the time.  I have seen instances where OSC staff say that they’ve received 28 
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comments that said one thing and 2 comments that said the other, so they’ve assumed the 
majority of comments reflect the industry; but often, it’s just because smaller issuers don’t have 
the resources to follow the regulations and make comments.   
Bandeen worked at McLeod Young Weir and Burns Fry before they were absorbed by the banks 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and he described the cultural shifts that happened. I-banks 
were very independent, said Bandeen. “It was your own capital; decisions were made swiftly on 
the right basis, with the level of risk management that a prudent owner of capital would employ. 
The IDA was your own club, and the presidents of various investment clubs were rotating chairs, 
so it was a different world, more clubby, but also perhaps more conscious of the real risks 
involved in the business.”  In contrast, the banks are very bureaucratic, with a mandarin level 
that acts as a buffer between lines of production and decisions, said Bandeen. The banks are 
supposed to be well regulated deposit institutions, and so they have shut the junior issuers out of 
their retail systems to avoid reputational risk.  As a result, Bandeen said he was beginning to 
think that it might have been a fundamental regulatory error to allow the takeover of these I-
banks.   
The banks are used to oversight from OFSI, and so they have the resources and experience to 
handle the increasing levels of regulation, said Bandeen.  For the little company, compliance is 
much more onerous. Bandeen said that he has been in heated arguments with those, usually now 
part of the big banks, who say that juniors are currently in a cyclical down market, that the weak 
will be weeded out, and that new stars will emerge when markets recover.  Bandeen thinks this 
might not be true.  The increased regulatory compliance is material.  I hear of people spending 
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30% of their operating expenses on compliance, often resulting in little or no profits, said 
Bandeen.  This does not bode well for the junior or early stage companies, he said.   
The regulators have said in public that they wish to re-visit the whole subject of disclosure, said 
Bandeen.  There is a school of thought that the prospectus model is broken and that the 
disclosure process has become lawyered up with reams of unread material.  We have to 
modernize the rules to reflect how the world works, which is a wired, connected, global place, 
said Bandeen.  People have access to a large amount of information.  Hardly anyone reads the 
disclosure documents.  Most people who want to learn will Google the business, read about 
management, and search with a few provocative words to check out the negatives.  What they 
really want is timely financials, material risks, a summary of the product, and a summary of the 
managers and principals involved. It should be in an accessible language. CSNX is a model with 
meaningful transparency. We did away with the hundreds of pages of often conflicting 
prescribed rules such as you would see with the TSXV and went instead for simple to read forms 
and rules.  
The accredited investor concept is outdated and very elitist and paternalistic, according to 
Bandeen.  Just because someone has money, doesn’t mean they are sophisticated.  Bandeen 
would rather focus on meaningful disclosure and transparency, and have qualified advisors 
review for suitability.  Younger kids, of 20s and 30s, are more sophisticated about technology 
businesses.  If they want to invest $5,000 in a company that they think will catch on, why do we 
think that the regulator knows better?  At the end of the day, who are you protecting? People 
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should understand that it is a risky venture and that they could lose all their money.  The advisor 
should sign off that the client understands.  Suitability rules should be principles-based.   
I asked Bandeen about a CPD education requirement for directors of venture issuers, and he said 
that one kind of education would be to beef up enforcement so that people clearly understand 
what is considered bad behaviour and that there are tangible, significant, costs to conduct one’s 
business inappropriately. One problem with CPD, he said, is that it would just feed the business 
schools, which are very expensive.  But maybe it’s not a bad idea, he said, as long as it doesn’t 
become perfunctory.  For example, most people wrongly think that that their only obligation is to 
the shareholders, rather than the broader stakeholder groups, said Bandeen.   
Elaine Ellingham 
Prior to demutualization in 2002, the TSX accepted listings in a discretionary, principles-based 
manner, said Ellingham. For example, the foreign company listing policy used to be unwritten, 
so the TSX imposed requirements without any specific rules—eg. at least two Canadian 
directors, broker sponsorship, a sufficient distribution of shareholders in Canada, or an office or 
an investment relations person located in Canada.  A larger issuer with noteworthy management, 
with more ties in Canada, could be listed more easily.  If some of the managers had been 
involved in companies that had imploded, an independent director would be required.  Similarly, 
when the technology boom happened in the late 1990s, technology companies that didn’t have 
any revenues were listed, on an exceptional basis, by the application of underlying principles.  It 
was in some ways an old boys’ network, according to Ellingham—a lot depended on reputation 
and who you knew, but underlying this was a principles-based application of precedent—if we 
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granted an exemption for this one, we should do it for that one, depending on the underlying 
principle of investor protection. 50% of TSX management were lawyers who understood this 
precedent-based application of principles. 
When the TSX was demutualized in 2000 and became a for-profit business, there was a major 
paradigm change, said Ellingham.  The TSX looked at where its revenues were coming from and 
no longer saw itself as a regulator, but as a business.  TSX clients were the listed issuers, who 
paid our fees, and the more listings that the TSX could acquire and the greater their growth, the 
more profits there would be.  The TSX had targets on the number of new listings, and so the 
focus changed from protecting investors to growing the TSX business. 
The OSC had to decide how it was going to audit us, since the TSX was no longer seen as a 
partner protecting investors, said Ellingham. To meet this concern, the TSX adopted rules and 
standards, which could more easily be verified on audit, rather than to allow discretion.  Though 
the TSX corporate manuals may not have changed much, the application of those standards 
changed profoundly, said Ellingham.  The TSX also cut costs by hiring people with business, 
marketing and relationship management experience—MBA graduates who could apply standards 
to be verified on audit, rather than (more expensive) lawyers who could apply legal precedent. 
The effect of moving to standards rather than discretion is that you don’t always get a sense of 
what the company is trying to do, said Ellingham.  For example, Ellingham was involved in the 
listing of Amica retirement homes, which started with the name Ishtar.  The prospectus was very 
confusing: retirement homes, with gourmet food, etc.  “It was, as it turned out, middle-eastern 
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people who were immigrating and bringing their parents, and they saw that there were no high-
end retirement homes, so they thought it would be a good business. It did become a good 
business and meeting the people and getting outside the strict application of rules was 
important.”475  
When dealing with the smaller issuers on the TSX-Venture exchange, where the management 
teams are often not as sophisticated as those listed on the TSX, rules may be preferable, said 
Ellingham.  Of their 1800 listed TSX-V companies, Ellingham described how many are quite 
strange.  The rules can help control them and avoid reputational risk to the TSX-V and TSX.  
This is why we have two tiers on the TSX-V, so issuers can graduate and move to the more 
principles-based TSX, said Ellingham. 
Brian Prill  
The problem with principles is that the regulator may have in mind what they should mean, but 
the business community may operate on a different understanding for years, said Prill.  Honest 
business people can believe that they are in compliance with the principles, and then face major 
adjustments and possibly enforcement proceedings after-the-fact.  
For example, Prill was providing the initial comment letters on Instrument 31-103 regarding 
Exempt Market Dealers.  The conflict of interest disclosure required for an underwriter in 33-105 
                                                 
475
 Amica Mature Lifestyles Inc. is now a leader in the management, marketing, design, 
development and ownership of luxury seniors residences. There are 23 Amica Wellness & 
Vitality™ Residences in operation in Ontario and British Columbia, Canada, with a market 
capitalization of about $260 million as of July 2013. 
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is quite clear and rules-based—there is a 10% test for related issuer disclosure.  But similar 
requirements for a “connected issuer” in 31-103 are principles-based and hard to assess, said 
Prill.  If the connection is less than 2% of the outstanding securities, is it de minimus?  The 
principles do not give guidance.  By comparison, audit committee rules do have a de minimus 
test of 5%. As a solicitor, there is a tendency to be very conservative so that your client isn’t the 
poster child for a 20:20 OSC interpretation, said Prill.  Another example referred to by Prill is 
referral arrangements. Rule 31-103 requires disclosure, but it is unclear whether or not a trailer 
fee would be allowed among EMDs—it is permitted in the mutual fund industry.  Prill has called 
staff of the OSC for guidance and was told: “We think that all the guidance is out there, and if 
you need more guidance, contact a solicitor.  Well, I am a solicitor and some things need more 
guidance.”  
I asked Prill whether or not a continuing education requirement would help the industry, and Prill 
said that he didn’t think it would make much difference for the managers of venture issuers, but 
it could help EMD firms which are the gatekeepers.  Traditionally, EMDs (formerly “broker 
dealers”) saw their client only as the issuer, since the issuer pays their commission. They would 
sell the security, describing its prospects in the best light, subject to all disclosure rules, and 
leave it to the investor to assess its suitability for their own financial plan. It is comparable to 
how one would expect a real estate agent for the vendor of a house to act—disclose what is 
required by law, but emphasize all of the positive aspects of the house, leaving it to the purchaser 
or the purchaser’s agent to decide what is suitable.  Canadian regulators have imposed a primary 
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fiduciary obligation to the investor, even though EMDs continue to collect their fees from the 
issuer.  
There are new OSC capital and reporting requirements which many EMDs find unnecessary, 
said Prill.  For example, often the investors are introduced to the EMD by the issuer in order to 
close a specific private placement.  The EMD may have no previous contact with the investors 
and, once the transaction is closed, no continuing relationship.  However, the EMD is required to 
maintain an ongoing reporting relationship with each investor.  There is a sense that the OSC is 
imposing the attributes of a retail broker (who has a continuing relationship with the investor) on 
an EMD (who, in many cases, does not).  If the OSC wishes to change this fundamental business 
relationship, then yes, Prill says we need better education.  But the education should be more in 
the nature of a dialogue, where both regulator and regulated listen to each other. 
Ontario takes a very paternalistic view of securities regulation, according to Prill.  The BC 
securities commission mission statement is “[t]o protect and promote the public interest by (i) 
fostering a securities market that is fair and warrants public confidence and (ii) a dynamic and 
competitive securities industry that provides investment opportunities and access to capital.”476  
The OSC statutory mandate is “[t]o provide protection to investors from unfair, improper or 
fraudulent practices and to foster fair and efficient capital markets and confidence in capital 
markets.”477  The key difference, according to Prill, is that the BC mission expressly includes 
                                                 
476
 See: <http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/about.asp> accessed October 2013. 
477
 Section 1.1 of the Ontario Securities Act 
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investment opportunities and access to capital. The OSC seems to focus more on investor 
protection, according to Prill.   BC offers an olive branch to get you to comply.  Ontario sees any 
non-compliance as a problem with integrity. We need to help those who are honestly trying to 
learn, and we should encourage education, said Prill.  
Edward Thompson 
Thompson notes that the Vancouver Stock Exchange started with guidelines and they were 
successful in raising money, but there were a few bad examples.  Today, the regulators try for 
perfection and make 98% suffer to regulate the 2% who are bandits, said Thompson.  If someone 
wants to commit fraud, they will do so no matter what your rules or regulations say.  The 
regulators should be prepared for the odd bad case, said Thompson. 
As to collaboration with the regulator, Thompson said that when he was running companies in 
the 1970s, he would often meet with OSC staff and discuss what was acceptable without 
involving lawyers.  “You would explain what you were doing and if they had a problem, they 
would ask you. Now, the OSC doesn’t want to talk with the CEO, just the lawyers.  This drags 
the review on for months and months.”  It seems, according to Thompson, that the OSC staff has 
a lot of turnover, with employees who work there for just a few years, with a CYA attitude, and 
they want hard and fast rules so they don’t have to exercise judgment.  The industry needs 
experienced staff who we can work with.   
Thompson does think there is a shared community: “I have dealt with people in the industry for 
50+ years, most are involved for the long-term, and I usually assume that they are upright and 
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will do a fair deal.  Yes, a lot of promoters are opportunists who look for the short term, 
promoting mining when mining is hot and high-tech when high-tech is hot. In the last upturn, 
just about anybody could raise money, and so it attracted the fringe players.  Canada has become 
the global place to finance resource exploration, and people from different cultures can think 
differently about business ethics.”   
I asked Thompson if there should there be a CPD requirement for the directors and managers of 
venture issuers, and he said that it might help for some of the new areas, such as corporate 
responsibility.  He noted that governments and regulators have placed more social responsibility 
obligations on companies than they used to.  One of the problems with imposing education, said 
Thompson, is that the directors of junior companies usually don’t get paid, and they will want to 
be paid if they have to pursue further education.  Any requirement will add to the issuer’s cost 
and reduce the amount of money spent on exploration. 
I asked Thompson what disclosure documents should be drafted for private placements 
introduced through a broker, and he said that he subscribes to a number of private placements 
each year, with virtually no paper disclosure, but based on the people involved: “Sometimes, 
they’ll have some documents or a file and I will look at what exploration project they have.”  
Thompson said that many of the juniors have insufficient finances and should consolidate, but 
the cost to generate the disclosure documents is about $300,000 and that is far too much.  It 
should just be financial statements and the directors’ recommendation—future projections, for 
example, are a waste of time and effort. 
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Michael White 
I asked White if he thought there was a shared understanding of regulatory principles among the 
brokers and issuers in the venture issuer community.  White has been in the business since 1992 
and his father and partner has been in the business for 45 years.  White believes that when his 
father was younger and the street was smaller, principles worked well since everyone knew and 
trusted each other and reputation was everything.  You couldn’t become an investment banker 
unless you had been in the industry for at least 15 years, he said.  You had to become part of the 
club, get to know everyone and build trust, and then you could move up in the business.  Now 
people move around more, said White. If you don’t know someone, it’s difficult to trust them.  I 
can see why rules are more required now, he said.   
I asked White about collaboration with the regulator, and he said that there used to be more trust 
with the OSC when members of staff were in positions for a long time and people got to know 
each other.  It used to be that an investment banker would work through a prospectus with a 
point man at the OSC and one could talk through situations directly, said White.  Now, it is rare 
to have a working relationship with OSC staff and most dealings are conducted through lawyers.  
There is still, however, direct contact with the exchanges.   
I asked White to comment on the regulatory changes imposed on EMDs, and he described how 
his firm IBK Capital has been conducting business along these lines for many years, such as a 
healthy buffer of capital, insurance, and self-imposed proficiency requirements.  The real change 
for the industry, according to White, is that the OSC now requires each EMD to emphasize its 
duty to protect the investor rather than to raise funds for the issuer, even though the investor does 
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not pay the EMD for these services nor does the EMD usually hold any securities for the 
investor.  According to an OSC survey
478
, many EMDs do not protect investors and focus only 
on closing the trade to get their commission, said White.  In IBK's case, it is ultimately the client 
who decides whether or not to invest but IBK must decide if the trade is suitable. Sometimes, we 
go back to the investor and say that the investment is not suitable based on our knowledge of the 
investor, the investment size and the risks of the investment, said White.  We have to keep 
detailed logs, to be able to prove to the OSC that we know the investor and that the product and 
the trade are suitable.  
But, said White, there is a mood among certain advocacy groups that investors are not being 
protected enough. If the focus were only to protect investors, then the best practice would be to 
avoid any high-risk stock.  The big banks and large brokerage houses won’t sell their retail 
clients anything other than blue chips, said White.  Many people think that bigger companies are 
less risky, but that’s not necessarily true—many large companies have imploded, and the 
potential for fraud exists in all quarters.  For many investors, a well-rounded portfolio can 
include a mix of junior issuers. The greatest potential for growth is in the junior market.  To 
name a few successes: Goldcorp, Barrick, First Quantum, Wheaton River, New Gold, Detour and 
Osisko were all once high-risk penny stocks that depended on the junior markets to execute their 
business plans, and are now some of the most profitable mining companies in Canada.  There 
will be successes and failures in the junior market and investors need to know they can lose their 
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entire investment.  So, it is good policy to require EMDs to know their investors and the 
suitability of the investment and IBK Capital has done this for years.  But ultimately, the investor 
has to be responsible for deciding what level of risk to assume and the EMD can only advise.   If 
the regulators expect more than this from EMDs, they will leave the private placement junior 
market, which could make it very difficult to raise funds for emerging industries.  The OSC 
should understand this. 
I also asked White what prospectus exemptions should be available for juniors to raise funds and 
what disclosure documents should be required. He said that the current private placements 
exemptions work well and that most of his investor clients look at the people involved, who are 
running the company, and chat about the opportunities. The people involved in the company are 
90% of the decision making process and detailed disclosure documents are not worth the cost, 
said White. The investor needs to know that, with this type of high risk, management has the 
ability to make a return of such-and-such a magnitude but the investment could go to zero. White 
said he doesn't believe that the current financing downtrend is because there are not enough 
accredited investors; rather, it's because fewer want to invest at this time because the junior 
resource market is cyclical. The offering memorandum exemption should be looked at, but 
White doesn't think it will suddenly open the gates for more investment. 
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Al Workman 
Principles are needed in that provide general guidelines for individuals and companies to 
understand the rules, said Workman.  Often, professionals will read the rules and are left 
wondering what they mean.  Rules can be abstract.  Principles should be used as a preamble to 
establish the context that surrounds a rule.  Principles on their own, however, are often soft and 
fuzzy said Workman, and regulators can change them without the need for a legislative process 
and debate.  So, principles help to interpret, but industry needs hard and fast rules.  Otherwise, 
the law is defined by decisions through litigation.  Industry needs both principles and rules, 
written in plain language.  
For example, Workman was involved in a round table last April 2013 regarding the new Mining 
Act, which he says has become an unreadable assemblage of old articles and paragraphs, 
modified where needed by new articles and paragraphs, the entirety of which is heavily cross-
referenced to other documents and appendices, said Workman.  The regulations appear in 
multiple documents and many of the guiding principles are set forth in policy documents which 
can be changed without sufficient public comment.  A professional in the mineral industry may 
be in breach of the policy without even knowing it.  That leaves the company at the mercy of the 
courts to decide their particular case.  Also, the mining regulations go into new territory 
regarding aboriginal issues that has so many qualifications.  It should have been an entirely new 
document.  We need a framework that encourages investment, but the law has become 
unreadable.  The mining industry’s leading advocate, the PDAC, was simply ignored when the 
mining code was finalized, said Workman.  
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Whether you have principles or rules, those setting out to misinform investors will find a way, 
said Workman.  Fairness opinions and valuations are an example, he said.  The Ontario Business 
Corporations Act only mentions valuation once, in the context of transactions between 
corporations, where a company is going private, and a valuation is required.  When talking of 
mergers and takeovers, the law is moot on valuations, so companies trot out fairness opinions, 
disclosing that they are not valuations in footnotes, but the public treats them as though they 
were valuations.  In many cases, the company giving the fairness opinion is in a conflict of 
interest because the financial institution will receive a success fee if the transaction goes through.  
This is a problem, said Workman. 
Workman has been in the resource industry for almost 40 years, in Yemen for four years, 
Indonesia for two years, and his firm has worked in over 140 countries, and so he has a broad 
range of experience.  I asked him whether or not there is a community of shared values in the 
junior resource industry.  He said there are a lot of players, and some come and go.  Twenty or 
thirty years ago, the business was dominated by well-established Canadian, U.S. and European 
companies with a similar business culture.  In the last few decades, the industry has become 
more cosmopolitan and culturally diverse because foreign companies are accessing Canadian 
markets. Canadian exchanges are the largest in the world for funding mineral projects—more 
than half of the money raised globally goes through the Canadian markets.  He said: “There is a 
wide variety of business ethics on this planet, and there are some groups of individuals whom we 
have never had a good experience with, and there are some individuals out there, some cultures, 
that are always trying to deceive you and get a one-up on you.  These companies or individuals 
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have no scruples when it comes to circumventing rules or principles, including any sense of fair 
dealing.” Workman said that when his firm does a 43-101 mining report, it requires complete 
disclosure and it is often the most expensive part of the project for a client.  But, said Workman, 
for some companies and individuals, it’s just not part of their culture to provide full disclosure.   
I asked Workman if greater diversity on the boards of junior companies would allow them to 
better apply principles, and he said that most companies do try to get a board with a diverse 
background.  A few companies, he said, have got into trouble because they didn’t have the 
specific technical ability for their project.  Issues of aboriginal rights, corporate social 
responsibility and environmental issues are becoming more important, said Workman.  Twenty 
years ago, companies had open access under the mining law, as an essential right on Crown land 
and on private land subject to dealing with the (surface rights) land-owner.  Sometimes, the 
negotiations relating to access would test the relationship, but the law was always on the 
company’s side.  Now, much more is required. A company’s board should be much broader in 
terms of its abilities, since local communities can be very demanding and difficult to deal with. 
I asked Workman if he thinks there is cooperation and collaboration with regulators, and he said 
there is, if you have a specific question.  The regulators in Toronto and Vancouver have been 
quite responsive, according to Workman, and have been able to clarify what was required in a 
43-101 report.  But, in some instances, the feedback has often been very myopic, said Workman, 
in part because the reviewer for the regulator was not truly qualified in the subject matter.  We 
have had to insert qualifying statements to the extreme, and in some cases the redundancy verges 
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on overwhelming, leaving important non-technical aspects overlooked, such as how market 
forces may affect the viability of a project.   
I asked Workman whether or not mandatory continuing education for the managers of venture 
issuers would be a good idea, and he said that managers ought to be continuing their education 
for their own self-interest.  However, there will always be those who flout the regulations, so 
enforcement is important.  Some have had the attitude that “I’ll do it my way and I’ll pay the fine 
if I get caught”, said Workman. 
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